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On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games

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Abstract

Standard solution concepts, like subgame perfection, implicitly require that players will continue to assume everybody is rational even if this has been revealed to be false by virtue of having reached a node that could not have been reached had all players behaved rationally. Several attempts have been made in the literature to solve this problem. The present paper shows that the problem is insoluble.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Delhi School of Economics, 110007, Delhi, India

    K. Basu

  2. Department of Economics, Princeton University, USA

    K. Basu

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  1. K. Basu
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Basu, K. On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games. Int J Game Theory 19, 33–44 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753706

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753706

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