Abstract
This paper contains a theoretical model of medicalpartnerships with individual quantity and qualitychoice. The firm selects price, the number ofpartners and profit sharing. The firm encouragesinter-firm quality competition and discouragesintra-firm quality competition through differentialprofit sharing. An empirical model using data from anationwide survey of medical practices supports thetheoretical results. Further, empirical resultssupport the view that time per visit can be used as aproxy index for quality in the primary carephysician market.
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Bradford, W.D., Martin, R.E. Partnerships, Profit Sharing, and Quality Competition in the Medical Profession. Review of Industrial Organization 17, 193–208 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007894428368
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007894428368