Summary
Keynesian demand management offsets some of the distortions caused by monopolistic competition and thus induces multiplier effects on national income and environmental damages. The cost of public funds rises with the virtual environmental tax and the degree of competition in the product market. The virtual environmental tax rises with abatement and falls with the cost of public funds. Consequently, greener preferences induce a rise in the virtual environmental tax, the cost of public funds and public abatement, and a fall in the provision of traditional public goods. A greater preference for traditional public goods harms environmental quality, since both abatement and output fall. Protecting cartels lowers the cost of public funds and may raise the provision of both traditional public goods and abatement. Environmental quality may thus rise, but other components of social welfare will fall. The paper also analyses the effects of private abatement, pollution taxes, fiscal consolidation and the progressivity of the tax system on government policy, employment, environmental quality and welfare.
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This paper was prepared for the OCFEB workshop ‘Quantitative Economics for Environmental Policy’ held at the Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, March 22 1994. We thank Casper van Ewijk and Jenny E. Ligthart for useful comments.
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Heijdra, B.J., Van Der Ploeg, F. Fiscal and environmental policy under monopolistic competition. De Economist 143, 217–248 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01384536
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01384536