Abstract
It has often been claimed that the current allocation of votes among EU states is not fair. In this paper we verify this assertion by carrying out an evaluation of the distribution of power among the member states. The results show that the current distribution of votes for the qualified majority does not lead to a fair distribution of power whatever definition of the EU is considered. It can not be claimed however that the current voting process has a systematic bias in favor of certain states. We also present a simple method to derive voting weights which lead to a fair allocation of power.
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Laruelle, A., Widgrén, M. Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?. Public Choice 94, 317–339 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004965310450
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004965310450