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Professional associations and the free rider problem: The case of optometry

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Abstract

Political influence by a professional association, like the influence of any special interest group, is a collective good for the members of the profession. This paper investigates the variables affecting the ability of state optometric associations to overcome the free rider problem and induce optometrists to join the association. Although the empirical results show little evidence that organization costs are reduced by concentration in urban areas, the results do strongly support the hypothesis that there will be less free riding in smaller groups. The results also support the hypothesis that selective incentives enable latent groups to overcome the free rider problem. By providing continuing education at reduced fees to members of the association, optometric associations have increased the percentage of optometrists who are association members in those states with statutory continuing education requirements.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, USA

    Sally Conway Kilbane

  2. School of Business Administration, Gonzaga University, 99258-0001, Spokane, WA

    John H. Beck

Authors
  1. Sally Conway Kilbane
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  2. John H. Beck
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Kilbane, S.C., Beck, J.H. Professional associations and the free rider problem: The case of optometry. Public Choice 65, 181–187 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123798

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123798

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