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Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Comment

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Agricultural Economics and Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 305 Mumford Hall, 1301 West Gregory Drive, 61801, Urbana, IL

    Steven C. Deller

  2. Department of Agricultural Economics and Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 305 Mumford Hall, 1301 West Gregory Drive, 61801, Urbana, IL

    David L. Chicoine

Authors
  1. Steven C. Deller
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  2. David L. Chicoine
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Deller, S.C., Chicoine, D.L. Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Comment. Public Choice 56, 69–72 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00052071

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