

Damian Guzek

Mediatizing Secular State

Media, Religion and Politics
in Contemporary Poland



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The book provides an empirically based analysis of changes on how various political and denominational actors seek to influence the Church and state relationship, as well as how we understand the idea of the secular state. A set of case studies shows how and why changes in the coverage of the secular state and Church-state relations have followed the dynamics of media logic. By establishing a grounded theory based on media content, legal regulations and political party programs in the years 1989–2015 as well as a current survey, the author throws new light on the theory of mediatization. The book demonstrates that the disseminated idea of the secular state is largely a result of the adaptation of both political and religious representatives to a dynamically changing media logic.

“The book is the first study of this kind showing the Polish perspective. It is an interesting and important source of information for those who want to trace the media picture of relations between the Polish state and the institution of the Roman Catholic Church, representing the largest religious community in Poland.” *Professor Dorota Piontek, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań*

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To Marek Jachimowski

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Abbreviations

AWS	<i>Akcja Wyborcza “Solidarność”</i> [Solidarity Electoral Action]
BBWR	<i>Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform</i> [Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms]
CEE	Central European Countries
KPN	<i>Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej</i> [Confederation of Independent Poland]
LiD	<i>Lewica i Demokraci</i> [Left and Democrats]
LPR	<i>Liga Polskich Rodzin</i> [League of Polish Families]
PChD	<i>Partia Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczna</i> [Christian Democratic Party]
PD	<i>Partia Demokratyczna</i> [Democratic Party]
PO	<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i> [Citizen’s Platform]
PJN	<i>Polska Jest Najważniejsza</i> [Poland is most important]
PK	<i>Partia Konserwatywna</i> [Conservative Party]
PPS	<i>Polska Parta Socjalistyczna</i> [Poland’s Socialist Party]
PSL	<i>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe</i> [Poland’s Peasants Party]
PRL	<i>Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa</i> [Polish People’s Republic]
PC	<i>Porozumienie Centrum</i> [Citizen’s Central Agreement]
PiS	<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i> [Law and Justice]
PR	<i>Polska Razem</i> [Poland Together]
SDPL	<i>Socjaldemokracja Polska</i> [Social Democracy of Poland]
SDRP	<i>Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej</i> [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland]
SLD	<i>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</i> [Democratic Left Alliance]
SP	<i>Solidary Polska</i> [Solidarity Poland]
UD	<i>Unia Demokratyczna</i> [Democratic Union]
UPR	<i>Unia Polityki Realnej</i> [Real Politics Union]
UP	<i>Unia Pracy</i> [Labour Union]
UW	<i>Unia Wolności</i> [Freedom Union]
ZChN	<i>Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe</i> [Christian National Union]

Introduction

Regarding the mediatization of the secular state

In Poland, a secular state remains the “pious wish” of opponents of religion in the public sphere. November 13, 2015, was the day after the swearing-in ceremony which opened the new term of the Polish parliament. On the largest Polish news portal, Onet.pl, a text with a significant title appeared: *Sejm of the 8th term. How many deputies swore “without God”* (2015). The author of the article named 27 deputies who took an oath without ending “so help me God.” Here, the author allowed the readers to interpret who was “righteous” or “wicked.” This figure shows that the Church-state relationship in Poland really does matter.

June 1, 2018, was the day after the Corpus Christi processions on the streets. The YouTube channel called *Wolność24 – Wolność i już!* [Freedom 24 – Freedom Now!] showed a new film with the Butterfly-man, a disguised performer who used to disrupt one of the big Corpus Christi processions every year. This time, the Butterfly-man chose the main procession in Warsaw. A report about his performance dressed as Jesus, in a dozen or so hours, was viewed by over 60,000 YouTube users. Here we can see that the controversy of the meeting point of the Church in public space has a significant reception and this is happening even faster than ever before.

Comparing these images, we perceive a certain scheme. Religion in Poland’s public space is doing very well. Those who do not enter into its framework are subject to controversy. It does not matter if their agency takes on a civilized form or breaks religious feelings and blasphemy. Today, this is happening at a faster pace thanks to digital media, while in the past, this was happening at a slower pace through traditional media. What essentially is this process? What are its dynamics?

Context: Secularization, desecularization

In this book, we deal with this issue by associating the fields of media, religion, and politics. This attempt leads to articulate the thesis on the mediatization of the secular state. In particular, this matter gets to the roots of the general problem of religion in society. Two essentially permitted empirical approaches can be pointed out in this case: secularization and desecularization.

When we think of a secular state, it becomes clear that the context of secularization reveals the most natural ambience for its implementation in systemic

practice. However, secularization does not quite suit the Polish case. To begin with, let's recall José Casanova's (2006) statement made over a decade ago:

“Let Poland itself prove the secularization thesis wrong. Let *Polonia Semper Fidelis* keep faith with its Catholic identity and tradition while succeeding in its integration into Europe, thus becoming a ‘normal’ European country. Such an outcome, if feasible, could suggest that the decline of religion in Europe might not be a teleological process necessarily linked with modernization, but rather a historical choice Europeans have made. A modern religious Poland could perhaps force secular Europeans to rethink their secularist assumptions and realize that it is not so much Poland that is out of sync with modern trends, but rather a secular Europe that is out of sync with the rest of the world.”

In his short text, Casanova establishes two mechanisms. The first indicates that modernization does not have to involve a decline in religiosity. The second assumes a missionary perspective according to which Poland has the potential to convince Europe to abandon the path of secularization. This rhetorical matter indicates that when thinking about secularization, we have in mind the decline in religiosity associated with modernization. Second, secularization cannot be reduced in this way in Poland. In a country with such a strictly homogeneous religious structure (Borowik, Dyczewska, & Litak, 2012), this would be an abuse. Let's, therefore, ask two basic questions. What is secularization? To what extent can we create an analytical context for contemporary Poland?

Secularization derives from the Latin *saeculum* [world] (Vorgrimler, 2005: 333), which suggests *secularizing*, or the late Latin *saecularis* [secular] (Grabowska, 2002: 21). It appeared in relation to the Church authorities' progress since the Reformation when lay rulers robbed Church property. In European languages, the term became popular at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 where it expressed the transfer of Church-controlled areas to the state (Wilson, 2005: 8214). In Poland, it appeared in this sense only in 1773 in connection with the dissolution of the Jesuit Order (Grabowska, 2002). Sometime later, the term *secularization* meant a priest being dispensed from his vows and his transfer to the secular state (Wilson, 2005).

The classics of social thought began to perceive secularization as a process of particular areas of social life (culture, politics, economy, etc.) becoming independent from the influence of religion in Western Europe. Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Émile Durkheim postulated a decline in religiosity along with social modernization. Present in Max Weber's (1946) slight reflection on rationalization, *Entzauberung der Welt* [disenchantment of the world] has become the basic term for describing these processes.

In modern approaches to secularism, attention has been drawn to the fact that in the sacred space of meaning, religion is losing control over other spheres of

life that are gaining autonomy. On the other hand, individuals are constructing their own privatized version of the world. As a result, their religion (1) loses the transcendent element and enters into the worldly and (2) penetrates the world in such a way that it begins to be *invisible religion* (Luckmann, 1967). According to Peter L. Berger's (1967) view, secularization proceeds along with the rationalization of the world and industry. Society is then freed from the control of religion. Religions themselves begin to compete with each other for followers. Bryan R. Wilson (2016) claims that, during the course of social differentiation, rationalization brings secularization, whose basic feature refers to autonomy. The independence of social institutions causes institutional religions, practices, and ways of thinking related to religion to lose their importance. Many theoreticians popularize the view of Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (1979) that the process of secularization is not a linear departure from religion. There is also a consensus that, depending on the variant, secularization occurs at the social, institutional, and individual levels (Dobbelaere, 2002; Giddens, 2009; Kaufmann, 1979; Wilson, 2016).

In recent decades, there have basically been two approaches that comprehensively relate to the progress of secularization. Casanova's (1994) sociological concept understands secularization in three dimensions. The first is the progressive loss of beliefs and the decline of religious practices in modern societies. The second refers to the privatization of religion. The third assumes the emancipation of secular social spheres, meaning their differentiation from religious institutions. Charles Taylor in his *Secular Age* (2007) presented another approach to secularization a decade ago. The author based this on a largely philosophical analysis of the progress of secularization in the North Atlantic world on several typologies, which, according to Robert N. Bellah (2007) and later researchers (Künkler, Madeley, & Shankar, 2018), three dimensions come to the fore: Secularity I, II, and III. Bellah interprets Taylor's Secularity I by differentiating domains such as the state, economics, bureaucracy, law, and politics from religious norms and the authority of institutional religions. Using Taylor's Secularity II, Bellah appealed to the decline of religious practices at the individual level. However, at the Secularity III level, he was concerned about the phenomenon that religious practices and faith became an individual option in society. Consequently, an individual must justify his faith more than disbelief. Both the secular and sacred find a place in society "by virtue of the conditions of the experience of and search for the spiritual" (Taylor, 2007: 4).

Taylor's Secularity I and II concepts seem to be based on Casanova's project. However, Taylor's full concept is shaped by omitting emancipation and privatization, which are very important for Casanova's model (Gorski, 2018). Thus,

Taylor's approach has a broader character than Casanova's and, as recently shown by editors Mirjam Künkler, John Madeley, and Shylashri Shankar (2018) in their work, after its adaptation to the empirical project, it quite well describes the non-Western context. It is necessary to mention that in this adaptation, the authors narrowed down the analysis time in comparison to Taylor's concept. They focused equally on every kind of secularization, trying to identify and explain the patterns and dynamics of change. They did this clearly differently than Taylor, who especially emphasized Secularity III based on understanding the changes in the conditions of practicing the faith. Eleven non-Western cases served as the basis for their empirical analysis: China, Japan, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, and Morocco.

The results of the analysis showed two general regularities regarding secularization in non-Western countries. First of all, the Western version of the scheme cannot be easily translated into a general model. The globalization and modernization that are progressing worldwide do not apply just one characteristic model of secularization. The second conclusion proposed by Künkler et al. states that religions differ in their dependence on state regulations. In the case of Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, the dependence of religion on government authorities is greater than in Christianity, Buddhism, or Chinese religions.

When we translate secularization presented as such in the case of Poland, we can see the implementation of Secularity I and partial implementation of Secularity II (Zielińska, 2009). Despite a few Church-state links in the system, a clear differentiation among the spheres of state, law, politics, bureaucracy, and economics from the nation's religious space occurs. It cannot be forgotten, however, that this process was unique in post-communist countries. In the period of the Polish People's Republic, the state functioned according to the model of hostile separation. In accord with Soviet standards, the authorities promoted atheism. After the systemic changes in 1989, a period of shaping public secular institutions and marked tensions between the secular authority began, which was exercised mostly by Catholics and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church just recently admitted into the public sphere.

Regarding Secularity II, there is a drop in institutionalized religious practices at the individual level. Religiosity in the country is slowly being privatized and the incomplete consensus regarding faith is increasing (Borowik, 2010). Such a case, however, goes beyond Taylor's (2007) conceptualization. The relationship between Poland and Secularity III is even weaker. The dominating narrative proves that Catholic identity is still intertwined with Polish identity. Schemes from the periods of partitions and the communist regime, such as "a Pole = a Catholic," are not as clear-cut when we consider the division of religiosity in the

countryside and in the city. However, in many regions of Poland, it is impossible to talk about religious practices and faith only as an option (CBOS, 1994b). At the same time, the percentage of religious practices in large cities has decreased (CBOS, 2014; Urzykowski, 2014).

The theory of secularization assumed the disappearance of religion. Berger (1999, 2011), its chief propagator, surprised many by pointing out in the last decade of his life that modernity is marked by an increase in religious pluralism, brought about by counter-secularization. He called this the *desecularization* process. In order to precisely outline the context of our reflection on the media's idea of a secular state, we cannot overlook the specifics of this phenomenon.

Desecularization should be placed on the continuum of the reflection on religion at the turn of the millennium. According to sociologists, it is impossible to only speak about the erosion of whatever is religious, meaning secularization. Instead, one sees the complexity and diversity of religion, the development of new forms of spirituality and the breakup of secularization tendencies (Mariański, 2013). This kind of religious revival is taking place all over the world (Berger, Davie, & Fokas, 2008; Joas, 2014). This is accompanied by the conviction that non-religious projects for Europe have not worked. Modernity, therefore, does not give a clear-cut choice concerning the secular side. Actually, modernity allows people to choose a lifestyle of both a secular and religious character (Berger & Zijdeveld, 2009). Modernization does not, therefore, lead to the disappearance of religion but its change. This should be understood in the following way. Religion is not returning to the public sphere because religion has never disappeared from it (Beckford, 2012). Religion, however, has gained new visibility. This property shows how religion changes along with society's changes (Woodhead, 2012).

It turns out that when we try to capture the essence of secularization, we can treat it in two ways: (1) as religion returning to various spheres of social life, and (2) as a revival of traditional faith and practices and the emergence of new forms of spirituality that are not affiliated with institutional religions (Mariański, 2013). In the first approach, we see desecularization as standing in opposition to secularization. Desecularization provides a space for connecting the religious with public issues. In this sense, we get closer to the deprivatization of religion (Casanova, 1994). On the other hand, secularization, recognized as social differentiation, emancipates individual spheres of social life from the power of institutional religions. The second meaning of desecularization presupposes a return to traditional piety and the development of spirituality, which can be defined as non-denominational (Mercadante, 2014) and the widening of popular religion (Knoblauch, 2008). In this sense, secularization means precisely the process of pluralizing the religious space.

In the context of Central European Countries (CEE), including Poland, Christopher Marsh's (2011) proposed way of understanding desecularization seems significant. Its essence boils down to the domination of religious institutions and symbols over specific spheres of culture and society. In the case of post-communist countries, grassroots and spontaneous desecularization were to replace the earlier secularization imposed by communist authorities. In Poland, this type of approach can be combined after 1989 with the aspirations of the authorities stemming from the Solidarity opposition camp in order to secure the free functioning of the Catholic Church in the country. Thus, when we talk about bottom-up activities, the main point is that voters have chosen the majority on behalf of liberties for the Church and thus compensate for the losses suffered during the communist period.

Desecularization, however, has strong opponents. The articulation of objections towards the approach points to its problematic side. At the same time, it confirms several significant intuitions that result from combining this perspective with the secularization that was previously expounded. The fundamental problem that Titus Hjelm (2015) points to relates to the descriptiveness of desecularization. The phenomenon bravely summarizes the current religious status of the world rather than providing a theory of social and religious change. The author here refers to Casanova's (1994) argument that the persistent return of religiousness into public life, which is noticeable in individual regions of the world, does not immediately mean the falsification of the theory of secularization.

The second argument against desecularization applies to the term itself. The prefix "de-" indicates that secularization has already fully occurred. Desecularization would, therefore, mean the return of religious faith. In the light of what was written earlier, this claim is empirically unverifiable. A unique approach is proposed by Hjelm (2014), who treats *desecularization* as a useful term for clarifying the visibility of religion. His proposal, however, turns out to be insufficiently competitive for republicization (Herbert, 2015). The latter term does not suggest that religion has previously been secularized, but simply that it has expanded its public visibility.

When we look at desecularization as an element that specifies the context of our considerations, we are able to take advantage of its inevitable relationship with secularization. Modernity tells us that previously adopted secularization requires correction in the form of religious changes, which also takes into account desecularization. In practice, in the context of the secularizing world, there is a place for the phenomena and processes of desecularization, which confirm the increased visibility of religion.

Media and religion

In the context of Poland, this relationship ought to be more clearly studied. During the last few decades, religion has not disappeared from the public space, including its media coverage. On the contrary, numerous religious events, including the funeral of Pope John Paul II and his beatification and canonization, or Pope Benedict XVI's resignation from office, showed a significant participation of religion in media agendas (Brzoza, 2015; Dyczewski, Lewek, & Olędzki, 2008; Guzek, Szostok, & Głuszek-Szafraniec, 2015; Olędzki & Sasińska-Klas, 2016; Sarna, 2014) as well as group and community practices (e.g., schools were closed for the funeral of Pope Wojtyła). At the same time, the whole is accompanied by the ongoing and unabated privatization of religiosity (Borowik, 2010; Mariański, 2013).

In recent studies, little space has been devoted to media relations and the idea of a secular state. In the report on the media's image of the Church in the public sphere, Sławomir Sowiński et al. (2013) point to four models of the description of the Church-state relationship in Poland: separation, presence and natural tension, equal status and testimony, and the religious public sphere. Their proposal, however, is based only on the analysis of the media contents in the area of several social debates. The question remains to what extent representations of this type correspond with the legal status, political practice, and knowledge of recipients about the secular state.

In general, studies on religious content in the media indicate the functioning of the so-called *secular sacred* (Knott, Poole, & Taira, 2013b: 176). The secular sphere is, however, a derivative of the analysis of religious categories in the media rather than the object of Church-state relations. Also, in the literature about media, religion, and politics, there is a lack of empirical studies that would indicate the role of the media in understanding state secularism by the citizens. Native studies focus on establishing media representations of selected religious issues, such as the activities of Pope John Paul II (Dyczewski et al., 2008; Hodalska, 2011) or the presence of specific contents in the media (Krzemiński, 2017). The question concerning the intersection between media, secular state, and Church-state relationship remains open to be answered.

Mediatization instead of mediation

In his analysis, Stig Hjarvard (2008a) views the relationship between media and religion in a way that does not touch upon the problem of what the media do with religion, but how social and cultural changes give the media an opportunity to play a more important role in it. Similarly, Hubert Knoblauch (2013) does not

ask about mediation and media coverage, but how certain sociocultural forms transform in relation to the media. This clearly indicates a different phenomenon than mediation, which refers to communication.

The term *mediatization* turns out to be the keyword, but at the same time, it causes double trouble. First of all, mediatization, which appeared in studies from Western Europe, in the so-called high modernity societies, functioned in the literature on the subject as a competitive term for mediation. Second, the term *mediatization* in English does not sound good (Livingstone, 2009). Indeed, it was accepted among the representatives of social sciences, but it clearly has German and Scandinavian roots. The matter is complicated by the fact that these languages do not lack similar-sounding terms. For example, the German term *Medialisierung* [*medialization*] expresses the status of society as a media society, while *Mediatisierung* [*mediatization*] concerns social changes caused by media changes (Imhof, 2006).

Individual works treat mediatization and mediation interchangeably, ascribing both terms the key character of changes taking place under the influence of the media (Chouliaraki, 2013; Couldry, 2008; Silverstone, 2007). However, the prevailing view is that mediatization and mediation are names of separate processes that, although linked, focus on different goals (Hjarvard, 2008b; Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009; Thumim, 2008). In this book, it is assumed the distinction, according to which “ ‘mediation’ refers to the process of communication in general – that is, how communication has to be understood as involving the ongoing mediation of its meaning construction, thus ‘mediatization’ is a category designed to describe these changes” (Couldry & Hepp, 2013: 196). When it comes to determining which term remains broader, we follow Sonia Livingstone’s (2009) alternative among other approaches, according to which mediatization represents a broader concept. We emphasize the present division in the current literature that mediation assumes a neutral act of transmitting messages (Mazzoleni, 2008b), while mediatization represents a process-oriented concept affecting all aspects of society (Strömbäck & Esser, 2009).

The word *mediatization* appeared in the English language in the context of Napoleon’s activity to describe “the subsumption of one monarchy into another in such a way that the ruler of the annexed state keeps his title and maybe some power” (Lundby, 2009a: 11). In the social sciences, the term *mediatization* was used for the first time by Kent Asp (1990) in a study on the importance of the media in political processes. In the initial phase of development, the concept functioned rather metaphorically. However, in the mid-nineties, the theorization of the concept began, along with its clear distinction from the metaphorical approach to mediation (Krotz, 2001; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Schulz, 2004).

The metaphor and the strict research concept were then easily identified among representatives of various fields of the humanities and social sciences.

In *L'échange symbolique et la mort* [*Symbolic Exchange and Death*], Jean Baudrillard (1993: 63) used the term *l'information médiatisée* [*mediatized information*] to present the way photography, film, and television make presentations. John B. Thomas in his *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (1995: 46) used the term *mediatization of culture* to point to a clear process of social change under the influence of Johannes Gutenberg's invention of movable type.

Theoretical and empirical studies in the second decade of the twenty-first century indicate that the concept of mediatization has clearly matured (Hepp, Hjarvard, & Lundby, 2015). However, scientific literature on mediatization in Poland calls for an update. In a recent diagnosis, Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech (2013) remarked that the term did not meet with in-depth analysis in Poland and was accepted intuitively or journalistically. The publications that referred to mediatization in the title rather concerned media coverage (Bsoul, 2009). On the other hand, in the case of conceptualization attempts, the mediatization process was considered mainly in relation to the political field (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2006; Fras, 2009; Kolczyński, Mazur, & Michalczyk, 2009; Oniszczyk, 2011; Piontek, 2011). Newer publications include definitions by Winfried Schulz (Głuszek-Szafraniec, 2017; Hess, 2013; Sasińska-Klas, 2014), Stig Hjarvard (Guzek, 2015a) or André Jansson (Kopecka-Piech, 2015). However, existing positions treat the keyword *mediatization* in an intuitive sense. The few monographs based on the theoretical perspective related to mediatization (Łach, 2015; Molęda-Zdziech, 2013) indicate the need for more complete studies that would include applying the theory to the specificity of Central European countries. This study of the mediatization of the idea of a secular state provides a modest attempt to respond to this demand. We are primarily asking about the dynamics of the process. As a prerequisite for this goal, we set a framework for understanding mediatization, choosing the right analytical approach, and identifying key phenomena that accompany the process.

The aim of the book

The aim of this work is to examine the process of the mediatization of the idea of Poland as a secular state. The analysis will be delivered on the empirical study we have conducted on three nationwide media (the dailies *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita*, as well as the news channel *Wiadomości TVP*), supplemented by the contents of the election programs of political parties and religious law in Poland in 1989–2015. To this end, we used mixed methods of research, which

included an analysis of the legal acts and electoral documents of political parties, media content analysis, and investigation based on the grounded theory and media reception survey.

An argument here is that when analyzing the collected material towards the secular state, in the years 1989–2015, we see the progressive accommodation of political and religious actors to the logic of the media. This is a peculiar process in which the dynamics of changes in political actors leads to articulating strong coverage of the postulate to establish separation of religion and the state. Meanwhile, religious actors are accommodating to the changing media conditions, emphasizing the aspect of the professionalization of the Church's communication. Comprehensively captured mediatization, however, does not significantly affect the state of public awareness.

In the following parts of the book, we prove this argument based on the answers to five questions. Specifically, the first two questions addressed concern the secular state and Church-state relations.

Q1: Does the case of Poland fit the secular state category, and to what extent?

Q2: What do Church-state relations look like in practice?

The following three questions which we ask refer to the process of the mediatization of the secular state and its reception among research participants.

Q3: What does the media's representation of a secular state and Church-state relations look like?

Q4: Do the processes of the mediatization of the secular state and Church-state relations take place and in what way?

Q5: What does the reception of the mediatization of the secular state look like?

The answer to these questions reveals a series of dependencies that the process of mediatization in the religious and political spheres evokes in the context of Poland, culturally located in the West, yet for a long time politically belonging to the Eastern domain.

This book consists of the theoretical part (Chapters 1–3) and the empirical part (Chapters 4–7). Specifically, in its first part, it is analyzed particular aspects of the phenomenon of the secular state and the Church-state relationship. Here it is also presented the foundations of the growing theory of mediatization. As it will be clarify, the institutional approach to mediatization studies which we apply is placed in the context of post-communist Poland.

When we want to talk about a secular state, we need to look at the problem in a broader context. This concept, in its various forms, is only one of the many possible options for shaping the relationship between the state and religion. That is

exactly why the first chapter tackles different approaches to shaping the Church-state relationship. When referring to Benjamin Neuberger's (1999) popular division of these accounts, Poland is considered to be in the prism of the endorsed Church model.

Since the endorsed Church model is far from the concept of hard secularism, we try to clarify what a secular state actually means. To this end, we refer to the four features of the secular state by Ryszard Małajny (2013). His perspective evolved in the Polish context. Reading subsequent characteristics that Małajny illustrates before us, we become convinced that the ideal type of concept differs from the realities in Poland. Entering further into the concretization of the concept of a secular state, we differentiate it from similar yet essentially separate concepts, such as *laïcité*, the state's worldview neutrality, and state impartiality towards religion.

In the last part of the contextualization of the secular state, we begin a journey through four elements of the secular state theory, which allow to deepen the specificity of the Polish case. First of all, we show the openness of the secular state towards various approaches to accommodating conscientious exemptions. In this way, we provide the reader with a panorama of the complexity of the raised issues. Focusing on the issue of the fusion of religious and national identity, we show how a clear relationship between patriotic values and Catholicism in Poland excludes many of the previously presented secular state models. Next, we compare the discussed case of Poland with the concept of a civil religion. We point to the clear inconsistencies in these formations. Finally, we accommodate this case into a public religion and José Casanova's three levels of public religion (state-polity, a political society, and a civil society). We complete this view with a look at Polish religiousness in the context of the modernization of society after communism.

The second chapter begins the journey through a selected aspect of the theory of mediatization. It consists of reading the basic elements of the theory of mediatization and re-reading them according to the case discussed in the book. We provide the reader with an answer to the question about which trend of research on mediatization belongs to this study and which concepts are relevant. Of the three separate approaches to mediatization, we place this study in the institutionalized mediatization process and its related definition of the phenomenon. Then the reader is suggested to reflect on the epistemology of the analyzed process. This allows one to understand better the levels of social life (micro, meso, macro) and what kind of mediatization processes take place.

Applying the institutionalized approach to mediatization, we are limited to using three terms related to it: *media institutions*, *media differentiation*, and

media logic. Therefore, we are opening the reader to reflect on the understanding and functioning of these three components of institutional mediatization. First, we refer to their current foundations in the scientific literature setting the media as social institutions. Next, we point to differentiation as the heterogeneous process for the media to obtain more or less autonomy. We apply a few divisions related to the specificity of media systems and the role of media autonomy in these systems. The highest concept of institutionalized mediatization refers to media logic, and we put emphasis on understanding the rules of this logic and its basic components.

Within the study on mediatization, the debate on what should be examined and how this should be done is still taking place. Here, we try to face this problem by answering the question about the subject of mediatization that can be grasped in an empirical study. In other words, we are reviewing the scholarly literature in terms of what constitutes a characteristic change under the influence of the media. Next, we complete these considerations by discussing the relationship between the mediatization effect and the media effect.

This book is about interrelationships between the media, religion, and politics. In the third chapter, we analyze the mediatization of religion and the mediatization of politics as two separate branches of research on this phenomenon. Thanks to this, we are able to focus the reader's attention on the most important theoretical issues that shape the mediatization of politics and religion. This chapter is beginning with a discussion on the subject of the mediatization of religion and its specific foundation based on the agency of religious actors. Subsequently, we place the research problem of interest to us in the space of three forms of the mediatization of religion and various spheres of the phenomenon. As it has been shown earlier, the Polish example somewhat corresponds to the phenomenon of secularization. Meanwhile, secularization is essentially connected with the phenomenon of mediatization. From this, we once again refer to mediatization as it relates to the process of secularization. We also add the perspective of republicization of religion, and refer to the consequences that mediatization of religion brings to society and institutional religions.

When presenting the problem of political mediatizing, we take three basic steps. The first comes down to the conceptualization of mediatization as a mechanism of adapting to media logic, which accounts for political logic and the incomplete differentiation of media from the world of politics. The second boils down to the primacy of media logic over political logic. On the other hand, the third step proves that the mediatization of politics is a complex process of mutual connections between political decisions and media performances.

Specifically speaking, the second part of the book, is focused on empirically based mediatization of the secular state in Poland in the years 1989–2015. In the fourth methodological chapter, it is explained the empirical background of the study. First, we introduce the reader to its design. Next, we describe in detail the material used in the analysis, which concerns the transfer of selected media, the electoral documents of political parties and applicable legal norms. This study is based on mixed research methods. The first stage concerns content analysis, the second the grounded theory, and the third an audience reception study. These methods provide qualitative and quantitative data, which is why in the last part of this chapter we perform their triangulation and establish the dominance of the qualitative perspective in the analysis.

The fifth chapter of the book presents the results of media coverage on the subject of the secular state and the Church-state relationship. It should be treated as a reference point for subsequent analyzes according to the grounded theory key. It starts with an overview of the percentage distribution of individual categories present in the media material. Next, it concerns the presence of the secular state category and related terms in the examined media. The previously presented theory proves that mediatization is a process shaped by the agency of religious and political actors. With this in mind, in the following sections of this chapter, we discuss the coverage of political and religious actors. In addition, we refer to the results of the media coverage of individual confession as well as non-believers. The last point that we touch upon in this analysis concerns the clearly dominant religious themes in media coverage.

In the sixth chapter, it is presented the grounded theory of secular state mediatization. It starts with a general description of the axial categories that build the analyzed research material. After this, we point to incoherence on the subject of the secular state. The legal analysis indicates that the endorsed Church is grounding. Meanwhile, political parties, especially leftist, crystallize their radical positions towards state secularity. Next, we head towards analyzing the agency of political actors, revealing the evolution of the approach of political actors towards the dynamic context of the merger of the nation and the state. We point to the mechanisms of their operation in this merger and accommodation to the progressing logic of the media. When touching upon the agency of religious actors, we point to mediatization in the context of the professionalization of communication among religious institutions and the mediation of the agency of individual religious actors only in the second decade of this analysis. We complement this picture by changing the media coverage of the endorsed Church model implemented in Poland. It consists of the existence of clear traces of banal religion in the research material in the context of the fusion of religion and the state.

In the seventh chapter, it is completed the previous investigation of the traces of mediatization of the secular state based on the results of the reception study. The debate over the mediatization effect in relation to the media effect leads to analyze whether the clear signs of mediation in the media coverage's agency of religious and political actors are also accepted by society. First of all, we show that social knowledge about the secular state is primarily taken from the media. Respondents unanimously identify the media as their basic source of knowledge about the secular state. Their insight into the subject of reported Church-state events, however, turns out to be negligible.

In three subsequent thematic areas, it is shown no media effect in relation to the reported content. Here we ask questions about the reception of religious symbols, about the banalization of the cross and the visits of world religious leaders to the Polish parliament. Next, we ask about the attitude of the respondents towards the practice of the state's worldview impartiality. Taking into account the critical media approach towards this issue, we check whether the media variable really dominates here. Finally, we undertake a re-reading of the mediatization effect in the light of the results obtained.

Instead of a conclusion, we confront the grounded theory and reception study with the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. Based on the results, we provide some interesting insights into the current theory, especially in the aspect of banal religion and agents within the mediatization process.

Part I

1 State secularity in context

Analyzing the relationship between religion and politics is no easy task. The 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation in 2017 confirms that recent decades have not radically changed the weak ties between the Church and state after the turbulent entanglement of these institutions due to Martin Luther's actions up till 1517. Religion, which at that time determined the functioning of individuals and entire societies, can now be interpreted as irrational, oppressive, and dividing people (Furbey, 2009). In the first chapter of this book, we undertake efforts to comprehend subsequent views of what remains of this engagement, describe the backbone of Church-state relations, the related ways to understand it, and the praxis of the secular state. We do this by explaining models of Church and state relations and focusing the attention on the notion of a secular state, its further characteristics and associations with other areas of the social world. Thanks to this, it is possible to embed the seemingly abstract idea of a secular state into the context of reflections on Poland. As a result of these considerations, we prepare the ground for the subsequent conceptualization of the secular state's mediatization process.

1.1 Shaping the Church-state relationship according to models

The subtitle of this book, *Media, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Poland* reveals our intention to look at the relationship between the world of religion and politics through the prism of the media. Before we examine the mutual relationships among these three components, we must first refer to the key Church-state relationship. It is the Church that directly determines the area for reflecting on the notion of a secular state. When we recall the simplest divisions regarding the discussed Church-state relationship, in practice we are talking about a religious state and a secular state that remains no more than a *religious state à rebours* (Małajny, 2013). Examples of shaping the relationship between the Church and state from different geographical regions prove, however, that mixed models can also function successfully (Iversen, 2006; Künkler, 2013).

Keeping in mind the numerous proposals of Church-state relationship models (Hirschl, 2010; Marczevska-Rytko, 2010; Riedel, 2008), let's refer to Benjamin Neuberger's (1999) six classical divisions: *secular-absolutist*, *theocracy*, *separation of Church and state*, *recognized communities*, *established Church*, and *endorsed Church*. Each of these models comes from a set of peculiar state practices in

dealing with institutional religions. To a great extent, these models result from specific events and historical processes. Our goal is to assign one of these models to Poland. Finally, we also want to determine how the model negotiates its shape in practice.

The first *secular-absolutist model* in the past was characterized by the Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern Bloc associated with it. It assumed an oppressive attitude towards institutional religions and religious practices in the public sphere. Since it promoted Karl Marx's (1974: 70) view in the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, religion became "the opium of the people." The next model, a theocracy, has been known since antiquity as based on the intertwining of religious and secular rights. Today, it occurs mainly in Muslim countries led by Saudi Arabia. The example of this theo-monarchy shows that it is still alive, providing its rulers with enormous power founded on well-established religious and cultural rights (Al-Atawneh, 2009).

Neuberger's *model of separation* is definitely a softer approach to Church-state relations. Naturally, here the secular state does not show interest in the life of Churches and religions. The state does not enter into dialogue with religions, treating all of them equally. Depending on the version of this separation, we can assume that the state excludes the participation of religion and religious symbols in the public sphere. This type of *hostile separation* functions in France as *laïcité*. In a milder version, the so-called *open separation* occurs, among others, in the United States, where the state permits religious rituals to be held in public life. However, it prohibits supporting any one of the denominational groups.

We can notice the clear role of religion in the public sphere in the next three models: *recognized communities*, *the established Church*, and *the endorsed Church*. The oldest of them, the *recognized communities*, emerged as a result of the Reformation in 1517 and the religious division of Germany into the continuation of the older order under the leadership of the papacy on the one hand and supporters of denominations led by Martin Luther on the other. The state then developed a specific mechanism for the recognition of religious communities. It was based on the fulfillment of certain legal conditions. As a result, the recognized Churches obtained certain powers from the state regarding activities in the public sphere. Every *recognized community*, however, obtained equal rights and obligations.

The *established Church* model appeared as a consequence of the Act of Supremacy of the English parliament from 1534. It essentially deals with the treatment of a particular Church as being official or having a constitutional position (Bradney, 2011). This corresponds to the current situation in the Church of England, officially headed by the ruler of Great Britain. The last of the *endorsed*

Church models is characterized by ambiguity. On the one hand, the *endorsed Church* model excludes granting any religion status as established. It creates laws that equally distribute rights and obligations to all religious institutions. On the other hand, it grants one of the Churches the position of a privileged religion: slightly preferred, preferred, or supported in a symbolic way. We can easily identify these types of cases in Europe. They concern the Roman Catholic Church in Italy, Spain, Ireland, and the national Orthodox Churches in Bulgaria and Romania.

We can also include Poland in this model due to the cited article of the Constitution of Poland: “The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by an international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute” (“The Constitution of the Republic of Poland,” 1997, Art 25 § 2). What is important in the Polish Constitution, besides granting freedom of religion, only the Catholic Church was mentioned in the formula above. Indeed, we can note the fact that the Holy See is a subject of international law and at the same time represents the interests of the institutions of the Catholic Church on a global scale. Additional mention of this confirms, however, that Polish legislation in a special way treats the issue of the nation’s relations with this Church.

This essentially raises two questions. First of all, how is the *endorsed Church* model negotiated in social practice? We must remember at this point that the ambiguity of an *endorsed Church* clearly flows from the separate sources that lead to it. In the case of Spain, this model was adopted after the end of General Franco’s dictatorship. Roman Catholicism then moved from the position of the state Church to the position of a supported Church. The situation in Poland was just the opposite. As a result of the transformation from the communist regime to a liberal democracy, the *endorsed Church* model replaced state atheism. Another question concerns the relation of the *endorsed Church* model to the titular mediatized secular state. The ambiguity of the *endorsed Church* model which we expressed will have a significant impact on our understanding of a secular state.

1.2 Understanding the secular state

The notion of a secular state does not appear in scientific literature as a hard concept that can be attributed to a finite set of features. A few attempts to define it clearly come from the non-Western context (Małajny, 2013), which has both advantages and limitations. Explaining this issue will help us to understand the very term. The starting point is to view the diversity of the European

case that raises the question whether a secular state is an option for Poland? Ryszard Małajny claims that the European and Anglo-Saxon context has only one model of the relationship between the state apparatus and Churches: separation, meaning the secular state. However, the question concerning a secular state with regard to the United Kingdom for a lawyer in this area remains pointless (Bradney, 2010). Within the legal and social tradition in such a country, it is impossible to reconstruct the situation typical for the pre-established Church context. This brings up a hypothetical question: is a secular state worth pursuing? The real issue concerns how to shape Church-state relations in the face of a high level of secularization and social diversity (Davie, 1990, 2015; Hill, 2015).

We will give a different answer by looking at countries based on the separation model (McClay, 2001). In the case of France, the basis of its *laïcité* flows from the legacy of the Enlightenment and the need for efficiently managed state organizations, in which the religious factor has not played a significant social role for many generations. In the case of the United States, it is more about a strict separation of state organization from institutional religions. However, it is accompanied by confusion in the ideological sphere visible in a civil religion, meaning the national values cultivated in a religious way. We will discuss this civil religion phenomenon later on in this chapter.

In the explicitly homogeneous religious and ethnic context of Poland, as measured by Neuberger's (1999) endorsed Church model, Małajny (2013) conceptualizes a secular state as a type of state organization that realizes worldview neutrality and consequently remains separate from institutional religions. Our task is not to assess to what extent his proposal results from the reaction to the religious sphere saturated with religion in Poland. Małajny's definition, however, strikes resentment at the non-religious context. In this sense, the question asked earlier about whether the secular state is an option for Poland finds its justification.

When the postulate of a secular state appears in the public sphere, it is difficult to clearly determine what its formation would consist of. It mainly concerns the practical implementation of worldview neutrality. Małajny's four points help us create this ideal model. First, he assumes the organizational and functional separation of organizing the Church and state. This means the lack of competence of the Church or, more broadly, all institutional religions to act on matters specifically relating to the state. Thus, religions lose the state's ability to perform public functions and the need to refer to instruments of state coercion. Małajny indicates that the practical mechanism implementing the functioning of religious institutions be based on private law, not public legislation. Such a formula deprives institutional religions of the ability to exercise specific

administrative authority. In turn, the state obtains full independence from religious denominations in the process of exercising power.

From the state's position, the principle discussed concerns two areas. The first reveals the state's abstention from implementing religious assignments and worship rituals. The second means that the state guarantees autonomy to religions. This does not mean immunity for representatives of religions who are subordinated to state law. Rather, it applies to the state abstaining from interfering in the internal affairs of religious associations.

The second feature of the model is connected with the implementation of the principle of freedom of conscience and religion. Małajny emphasizes that the communist system showed in practice how separating the state apparatus from religion does not guarantee religious freedom. His type of ideal religious freedom appears as a consequence of state neutrality towards any worldview. Ensuring neutrality is possible by creating a state that allows every citizen the free choice of a religion or lack of religion (in the individual dimension) and association for religious purposes (the collective dimension). From the cradle to the grave, a citizen's religion is not of interest to the state (Pietrzak, 2010). The state does not, however, hinder institutional religions from speaking out on public matters. It also takes into account their voice when shaping social institutions.

The next point addressed by Małajny concerns *laïcité* understood as a consequence of the policy of state neutrality towards worldview issues. Because the idea of a secular state is often associated with such terms as *laïcité*, *state worldview neutrality*, and *the state's impartial worldview*, we will include this topic in a later part of the book. Instead, we will immediately address the last characteristic of the mentioned ideal type (Małajny, 2013). It concerns the state's relation to religious institutions, which grants them the status of associations. The actual status of institutional religions in the state practically takes place in several forms. In the most convenient form for the state, institutional religions operate on the basis of associations (as in the United States or France). In a less convenient form for the state, the position of institutional religions is based on one common law or many statutes, and even concordat treaties with the Holy See. The last case transfers the Catholic Church and state relations to the level of international law. This sets clear limits to the state's ease in relation to the Catholic Church shaping its position on the nation's territory.

We suggest treating the notion of a secular state in a wider way, which we referred to based on the pure type according to Małajny. When we put together these types of presented features, it becomes clear that the concept of a secular state means a proposal for the optimal shaping of relations between citizens who represent religious diversity. We see in this a *reflexive modernity* (Beck, Giddens,

& Lash, 1994), which shows that over time, societies are becoming more and more aware of how to shape their future based on real risk (Giddens, 1990). As it will be shown in the later analysis of media content, it appears as a reference point many times in the current context of the Church-state relationship.

The concept of the secular state perfectly fits into the individualization that is entering into society (Mariański, 2010). On the one hand, religion in society is losing its monopoly as the binding function (Berger, 1967). In turn, the state now maintains the established defragmented order. In its ideal form, however, it lacks a different ideology than one which ensures harmony in the face of diversity. In practice, civil religion takes on the role of such ideologies. On the other hand, an individual's agency regarding religion confirms the expanding view that religion is socially created rather than being a result of the intervention of divine providence (Giddens & Sutton, 2013).

1.3 Differentiating *laïcité*, neutrality, and impartiality

As the reference to the ideal type of secular state has shown, the issue we are analyzing in this book undertakes several terms: *laïcité*, *state ideological neutrality*, and the *state's impartial worldview*. To maintain terminological consistency with regard to the notion of a secular state, it is good to show the specificity of each of the mentioned concepts and show their relationship to the subject of interest.

The first of the terms that we mentioned is *laïcité* derived from the Greek word *laos*, which directly means the *people*. It has a broad political sense referring to state regimes that respect an individual's freedom of conscience (Haarscher, 2004). In addition, the laicist state does not give privileges to any one religion or concept of a good life but grants everyone freedom within set limits.

In the narrow sense of the term, *laïcité* concerns a separation between the state and religion. It was based on the willingness of liberalists to overcome the Church's influence on the state since the Church was considered to be a refuge for conservatism (Dufault-Hunter, 2008; Haarscher, 2004; J. Mazur, 2004). In this sense, the laicization process was closely bound to the context of Catholic countries. However, the understanding of this division has changed over time, as illustrated in the case of France (Willaime, 2008). In 1905, when the law on the separation of Church and state came into force, the country ended up with a concordat system that radically separated religion from state power. In 1946, legislative (statutory) secularity gained a constitutional character. The text also confirms the currently binding basic legislation of 1958. The significance of "laïque" appears in its original French notation: "La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale" ("Constitution de la République

Française,” 1958, Art 1); in English, this word is translated as “secular”: “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic” (“French Constitution of October 4th,” 1958, Art 1).

During the course of this historical process, however, there has been a change in the structure of the phenomenon. *Laïcité*, originally based on separation, gave way to a new form based on neutrality (Barbier, 1995). The modern version of *laïcité* in France is also perceived as being in confusion with limiting whatever is religiously allowed. This particularly concerns protecting women and the free provision of the right to choose a religion or lack thereof (Barras, 2017).

Neutrality as the main category of a laicist state pursues an attitude of not promoting and not discriminating views related to an individual’s faith and convictions. Neutrality distances people from the messages of specific religions and philosophies. In this sense, it is also ungradable, it either is or is not present. The practice in many European countries shows, however, that a neutral view towards institutional religions implies indifference towards the contents of these religions, and not just ignoring their actual significance in society (Małajny, 2009).

Therefore, how can a neutral state be created in practice? The first element is to keep away from any argumentation referring to God’s law present, among others, in the legislation of many Churches, for example, the Catholic Church (*Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches*, 2001; *The Code of Canon Law*, 1983). A neutral worldview state functions when political power does not determine the law based on internal denominational laws, religious or materialistic contents (Małajny, 2013). Attacks concerning symbolism also lack religious references, such as *invocatio Dei* in the Preamble to the Constitution. In practice, therefore, the endorsed Church model is excluded. The second element concerns restraint in using religious symbols by public authorities, such as a cross hanging in offices. The third element denotes the state refusing to provide material support to both institutional religions and atheistic organizations. The fourth element assumes equality of citizens in exercising their political and civil rights regardless of their worldview or religion (Pietrzak, 2010). The fifth element, however, boils down to the recognition of religion and worldview as a private matter. It also gives the citizen the right to remain silent about his religion and beliefs.

Against the background of neutrality understood in this way, the last of the concepts arises, meaning an unbiased worldview. It appears in the Constitution of Poland in Art 25 § 2 instead of neutrality and it bases our general reflection on the legal category of impartiality on the decisions made regarding the case in Poland. Some specialists in the field of Polish constitutional law claim that impartiality and neutrality are different things (Szymanek, 2006). There are, however,

lawyers who find these identical (Garlicki, 2004). Józef Krukowski (2000) treats the neutrality in a closed way. To distinguish it from unbiased impartiality, he understands it as being a type of open neutrality. This is supposed to eliminate the threats caused by a radical understanding of neutrality, which, as the communist period has shown, can be used by the state to fight religion (Borecki, 2008).

According to the interpretation of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal from ruling No. K55/07 on December 14, 2009, the provisions of the Constitution confirm that unbiased impartiality allows for the possibility of state involvement in order to ensure the widest freedom of conscience and religion for all people. Therefore, if neutrality is about not interfering in the internal affairs of religion, in this respect, impartiality presupposes the active attitude of the state in resolving worldview disputes.

The situation of hypothetical interference by the state is linked with the postulate that all religious, worldview, and philosophical beliefs should be treated equally by public authorities. This point of view, according to Wojciech Brzozowski (2011), is misbegotten. Another provision of the Polish Constitution mentions the fact that the nation of Poland remains the common good of all citizens, regardless of their religion, religious beliefs, and worldview. Meanwhile, the state's concern for the good understood in such a way means that the government has no position on matters of belief and religious convictions (Małajny, 2013).

In addition, an unbiased worldview gives the impression of a tailor-made endorsed Church model. In order to clarify this, let's again recall art. 25, § 2 of the Polish Constitution, which confirms the symbolic privileged place of the Catholic Church in its relations with the state. Its contents show that, consequently, impartiality brings about a transition from rewarding the Church in a symbolic way to it actually being privileged. In Poland, the matter looks as follows (Małajny, 2013: 21):

“The constitutional practice in this matter indeed corresponds not to the neutral but impartial approach of public authorities towards the issue of citizens' convictions. It looks as if the authorities have in fact initially examined the statements of supporters of theism and atheism, and after giving rights to the first, they then preferred to favor Catholicism, constantly muttering the slogan of Christianity.”

Comparing the three discussed concepts with the idea of a secular state, we perceive several significant dependencies. First, the concepts operate on two ontological levels. The secular state and laicist state represent general notions, thanks to which we can characterize the state model presented from the position of its relations with religious institutions. At this level of our analysis, the secular state is identified as a more general formation in which the issue of religion remains

indifferent to state authorities. In a laicist state, on the other hand, we see a more concrete form, oriented towards the separation of state institutions from religious institutions and restricting the role of religion to the private sphere.

When to speak of a neutral or impartial worldview, in fact, we touch upon the characteristics specific to a secular state. When to disregard impartiality, we can assume that we also refer to the specific characteristics of a laicist state. At this level of the analysis, therefore, we point to the basic characteristics of the state in its activity in relation to the phenomenon of religiosity: refraining or even impartial interference in matters of religion, ideology, and philosophy.

1.4 The secular state's ways of accommodating conscientious exemptions

The models of the Church and state relations and the concepts of *laïcité*, neutrality, and impartiality towards worldview by the state presented so far must be supplemented with arguments on the subject of conscientious exemptions, which today constitute the basic way for the secular state to accommodate religion or religious demands. We do so in the face of the growing expectations of individuals and collectivities to include conscientious exemptions at least when it comes to compulsory military service. The reasons for these expectations can be expressed in different ways.

Social sensitivity increases when it comes to discourses related to human rights. Many countries are strengthening their diversity policy. The modern state regulates the sphere of one's private life in a way incomparable to the past. When pointing to the ways liberal democracies in their broad mechanism of incorporating the religious element grant conscientious exemptions, we will focus on five groups of possible approaches according to Yossi Nehushtan (2015). He accepts the following traits concerning this matter: *neutral*, *equal regard*, *liberal value-based*, *pro-religion*, and *anti-religion*. Next, we will refer to the previous conception of the secular state.

In the case of *neutral approaches*, the issue of religiosity is not a prerequisite for granting or not granting conscientious exemptions. A person's autonomy determines whether such exemptions should be granted depending on the situation. Within these approaches, the first option assumes that the individual has or should have a choice regarding conscientious exemptions. The task of the state is to watch over those conscientious exemptions so that they will not result in real harm to others (Kugler, 1997) or be engaged in burden-shifting (Leiter, 2013). In the second variant, the state assumes a utilitarian position against harming an individual. This means a situation in which a higher public interest justifies

harming an individual. Neutral approaches have one burning element when we compare them with the demands of religion. Here we are talking about the case of a strong individual for whom religion is a basic element for organizing their life. The more religion in people's lives, the more frequently it contrasts with the demands of the law towards which they remain neutral (Nehushtan, 2015).

The principle of *equal regard approaches* denotes that the conscientious exemptions granted to X belong to all who are similar to X. Granting exemptions to a non-religious subject, therefore, requires an analogy in relation to the religious subject. This multi-faceted approach assumes maintaining a balance. According to some researchers, it allows counteracting demands put forward by religion, aimed at favoring or discriminating against non-religious people (Bradney, 1993). It concerns granting priority to religious people for their conscientious exemptions over the non-religious. This group of approaches also includes the controversial view that religion in the public sphere should have as many rights as, for example, the General Motors Company (Kramnick & Moore, 1997).

Such equating of institutional religion with an ordinary enterprise points out that a balance requires the state to apply the same importance to religious values as to the respectable values of the laity. When we shift the center of gravity from the contents of religious values to their equality, we can talk about the *equal regard approach*. It assumes that the state cares about the religious values of minorities with a commitment equal to that which it exhibits in relation to the whole (Eisgruber & Sager, 2007). In this approach, various values and central beliefs in the lives of individuals will be equally protected by the state.

The next group of *liberal value-based* approaches assumes (1) a hierarchy of values, rights, and interests and (2) the inability to tolerate certain contents that refer to conscience. Its development reflects several autonomous approaches based on the primacy of liberal principles and the liberal perception of the law over any conscience dilemma. The foundation of the first rests on the principle that in a liberal democracy, there is no agreement on illiberalism violating human rights, for example, women's rights (Raday, 2003). The second assumes a balancing test between religious freedom and other human rights. The state can limit this freedom when it comes to protecting its citizens' greatest opportunities (Nussbaum, 1999). Another approach assumes that freedom of conscience balances on the intensity of values protected by special laws. Restricting someone's conscience can, therefore, occur when the matter concerns violating special laws (Gans, 2002).

When considering *pro-religion approaches*, we mean all the positions for which religious reasons justify granting conscientious exemptions (Nehushtan,

2015). Religious reasons can be the basis for distinguishing religion itself or deprecating non-religious people. Religion is treated in a special way for social, cultural, and psychological functions. According to this approach, it is also impossible to find equivalents for distinguished religious values among non-religious values.

The last in the group of *anti-religion approaches* stands in opposition to the liberal constitutional theory towards religion, which grants religion a place in the public sphere. These people oppose the equal treatment of various religious consciences. They do this by emphasizing that many religions sustain or spread intolerance. By seeing a broad perspective in the meaning of life among non-religious people, they also stand in opposition to religion as providing people with sense in life. They suggest, therefore, focusing on two questions that do not take into account religion: how should one behave properly and how should one behave among others. Nehushtan summarizes this approach in a precise way: the limit of liberal tolerance ends with illiberal intolerance, which has strong links to certain religions. In cases where religion engages intolerant and anti-liberal values or practices, he suggests sharp opposition to accommodating conscientious exemptions.

The presented approaches to conscientious exemptions display the traits of a secular state that have not quite strongly resounded so far. We are thinking of openness to various ways of accommodating religious demands in the area of conscience, characterized by several elements. First of all, in the majority of cases, it takes into account the primacy of freedom and individual choice. In a fewer number of cases, it shows the positive values of religion. Second, it treats religion mainly in a functional way, assuming that the vector of religion is directed towards community-building functions or towards discrimination. The essential aspect of religion arises when it can be characterized in pejorative terms as the basis for limiting individual rights. Therefore, we should look at the secular state as a concept whose specific contours result from the attitude towards individual freedom. In this sense, therefore, the concept reflects a clearly liberal nature.

The presented variants of accommodating conscientious exemptions in a secular state have some limitations. Both a secular state and secularism represent Western perspectives. Their transfer onto the specific context of CEE possesses no problem. In non-Western and non-European countries, models of religion-state relations imply different principles (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, & Van Antwerpen, 2011). It is not possible, therefore, to transfer this clearly Eurocentric perspective onto a more general level.

1.5 The secular state on the fusion of national and religious identity

We tried to clarify what the notion of the secular state is all about and referred to the pure type of secular state to do this by pointing to synonymous concepts. We also pointed to the liberal foundations of a nation's secularity in the context of conscientious exemptions. Now let's contextualize the notion of a secular state with reference to Poland. The current tendency in post-communist countries to combine religiosity with being a good citizen can serve as a starting point for this task (Pew Research Centre, 2017). In the past, this partially coincided with the mechanism recognized in many contexts, which Anna Grzymała-Busse (2015) described as the fusion of national and religious identity. In the previous section, it was shown how the secular state sets limits on religion based on the primacy of freedom and the right of the individual to decide. Here, we will change the perspective to show that the secular state also faces the challenge of pressure from religion, which to a certain extent builds the national identity of its citizens.

Roger Brubaker (2012) recognizes that religion and national identity consist of separate worlds and signs. They represent different ontologies and justification structures. In practice, however, we see that some of these differences blur. This long-term process comes from the historical interpretation of the popular place of religion in a nation (Grzymała-Busse, 2015: 23):

“The fusion of religious and national identities is a culmination of a process of historical interpretation: the careful tending of national and religious identity at home, in schools, and if possible, in public conversation. It is a product of favorably homogenous demographics and historical political opportunities. Fusion relies on the notion that a religion stands on the same side as the nation, that when oppression threatened the nation in the past, religion protected national representatives and safeguarded national identity.”

Thus, the common origin of religion and a nation denies that they walk together holding hands. Instead, we speak of religion as a protector of national interests when the nation itself is under repression. This conception perfectly reflects the situation of Poland during the partitions and communist era. Especially in the latter case, the Catholic Church headed by the charismatic Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński managed to convince the nation to side with him. As a result of this merger, whoever held on to the Church also sided with the Polish nation. Religious symbols, like the icon of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, set the basis for national legitimacy (Kubik, 1994). The Church buildings provided physical space and the freedom to act as a democratic opposition. As a consequence, national identity was maintained and renewed in the Church environment (Hervieu-Légér, 2000).

Apart from the discussed case of Poland, one can find a fusion of religious and national identity in countries such as Croatia, Ireland, Malta, Lithuania, the Philippines, and even the United States. These examples, however, confirm the occurrence of degrees of fusions, which results from the real influence of institutional religions on politics. According to Grzymała-Busse (2015), we can measure the scope of this merger based on three factors. The first concerns the number of current supporters of religious fusion and nationalism, checked by using public opinion polls. The second raises the problem of the Church's historic role in relation to the Church-state relationship. The third concerns the number of mutual references between religion and the nation in the functioning of national symbolism.

What has been said so far regarding the fusion of religion and nationality intuitively seems to coincide with the idea of a secular state. In order to explain these assumptions, we will introduce the basic variants of the relationship between the two phenomena. Following Grzymała-Busse, we will rely on the criterion of source and duration. When we trace the historical formation of the state, we can see that it has a secular character by nature. From the beginning, however, it is constituted on the basis of clear clashes with religion representing the perspective of the sacrum. In the first approach, the state and the Church clash over the possibility of establishing and maintaining a hierarchy of control over an individual's behavior. Arguments for the Church may have a revealed nature. On the other hand, arguments for the state usually concern effective management by a professional bureaucracy. The formation of the nation's identity as opposed to state organization does not require reliance on authority or secular bureaucracy (G. M. Thomas, 1989). From the very beginning, a nation quickly incorporates religious contents into its identity. In times of threat to the nation's sovereignty, religious contents shape national myths and provide additional strength to fight the oppression. A good example of this is present in the veneration of the Icon of the Black Madonna at the Jasna Góra Sanctuary in Częstochowa (Kubik, 1994).

As a result of this process, three possible patterns of relations between the state, nation, and religion appeared. The first describes the case in which the historically recognized Church maintains and defends national identity against an enemy state (D. Martin, 1991). The second refers to the situation in which the state appeared first. Only later did religions find a place for themselves in the framework of the state and supported its construction. In this way, religions became a keystone of the emerging identity of the state. They also allowed for the creation of a civil religion in the state (Atran, 2002). The third pattern concerns a specific situation in which the Church opposes the binding of the state and the nation, while the state takes action to unite the nation. An example was the clash

of the papacy with the united kingdom of Italy emerging in the nineteenth century (Zieliński, 2007).

The discussed relationship between the state government, a nation's people, and religion can also be undertaken from the position of duration. This precisely concerns the mechanisms that allow the discussed fusion to overcome changes in the social context, including the process of the succession of generations. Grzymała-Busse (2015) points to education, comparisons with the past, and national rhetoric in a seemingly religious context. In the case of education, she primarily refers to catechism classes. In communist Poland, the Church used to treat them as a conveyor belt for teaching the truths of the faith and the transmission of national identity, and these remained outside of state supervision. Another mechanism depends on comparisons to actors from the past or current opponents. In Poland, when the Church assumed the role of the nation's defender, it could refer to its actual role in communism.

At that time, the Church allowed the entire anti-communist opposition to hide in its space. The last mechanism consisted in applying national rhetoric in a seemingly religious context. In practice, however, this was about the appearance of religious symbols that took on the role of national symbols. This case in Poland concerned the national shrine of Wawel Cathedral at the royal castle in Cracow, as well as the annual Catholic pilgrimages to Jasna Góra Sanctuary in Częstochowa. But it also takes into account the liturgy for the Polish Army's ceremonies falling on August 15 which collide with the Solemnity of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

Previous literature shows that the seemingly secular identity, in practice, may have significant religious components (C. Mitchell, 2006). This is clear in the cited cases of religious and national fusion. As a result, we can correct our previous understanding of the secular state by adding to what was previously an element of negotiation between the secular and sacred. The fusion of national and religious identity primarily demonstrates that the religious and social context fosters specific system solutions. In the case of Poland, this leads to the endorsed Church discussed earlier.

1.6 Understanding civil religion

When we look at the three mentioned types of relations between the state, nation, and religion in the context of the secular state, there are several significant issues regarding *civil religion*. However, their discussion requires prior characterization of the very term. In order to stress its significance, let's present the circumstances of its beginnings, a specific feature for the consequences of *civil*

religion. As a result, we will provide the reader with materials that will refer them to the frequently mentioned endorsed Church.

This issue begins quite provocatively with Reinhold Niebuhr's (1952) centuries-old comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union. The author of *The Irony of American History* finds some surprising similarities between these two nations. Both assumed they would create an ideal society thanks to the progress of knowledge. Both assumed the achievement of this state thanks to their economic system. The myth of their own virtues appeared in both nations. The fundamental difference in the implementation of their plans resulted from the attitude of these nations towards religion. Soviet ideologists made communism the basis of their proclaimed transcendence. Americans, on the other hand, used their religious background to support the values of humanism and materialism in something that is easily expressed by the "American Way of Life" or "The American Faith," (Marsden, 2001) which actually concerns the concept of a *civil religion* we are dealing with.

Let's take a look at it from a historical perspective. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's discourse on the Republican government in the essay *The Social Contract* introduced us to modern social thought on this idea. In reference to the Platonic idea of *civic religion* based on state control, he postulated the functioning of purely civil faith, which would ensure the social order and at the same time be voluntary. Understood in general terms, it would also maintain tolerance for the diversity of private faiths. Rousseau's concept appeared in a contemporary form first as *religion-in-general* (Marty, 1959) and as the *religion of the republic* (Mead, 1963). *Civil religion* itself gained the greatest publicity after Robert N. Bellah's publication of the essay entitled *Civil Religion in America* (1967). The author argued by comparing the inaugural statements of Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy that, despite their time difference, both of these discourses confirmed the divine purpose of the American nation.

The basis of this religious anointing of the nation should be sought in the American Civil War of 1861–1865. During this war in the United States, two equal forms of faith expression were sanctioned. The first concerned religious groups and individual denominations. The second was about the *religion of the republic* (Mead, 1963) and recorded in the nineteenth century on the basis of the non-denominational version of Evangelical Protestantism (Casanova, 2003). At that time, it appeared in the America model as being a Christian nation. In the twentieth century, along with the weakening of liberal Protestantism, the discussed model of a *civil religion* grew into a Christian-Jewish formula (Hollinger, 1997). Currently, it faces the challenge of secularization and multiculturalism.

After taking into account the historical aspect, it is worth referring to the civil religion thesis, which reads as follows (Booth Fowler, Hertzke, Olson, & Den Dulk, 2004: 301):

“The one important religion in the United States has nothing to do with specific denominations or religious traditions. Instead, the important American religious dimension is a shared but vague political religion – a religion of America and its culture.”

This concept clearly separates the true religion of the United States from individual institutional religions. It reflects Will Herberg’s (1955) division into a *professed religion* associated with one’s declared confession and the *operative religion*, which sets the highest values of the citizen incorporated in the “American Way of Life.” At the same time, it points to common American religious dimensions. Following the suggestion of Catherine L. Albanese (2013), we see them as a system based on one’s personal theology (creed), ethics (code), and a set of rituals and symbols (cult). The creed means the fundamental assumption that the United States seems to be the chosen nation. This chosen status can be considered in various ways: as God’s decision, by nature, or a historical twist of events.

The code is contained in the nation’s creed. Being chosen provides the basis for being active and confirms one’s chosenness. This activity goes beyond operating on the country’s territory. It also defends America’s presence throughout the world. However, the cult associated with civil religion results in sacred places marked by the activities of the country’s founding fathers, for example, George Washington’s house. It applies to relics that testify to the foundations of the country, such as the original Declaration of Independence and the Constitution (Booth Fowler et al., 2004). It also includes rituals that connect people, like fireworks, during the Fourth of July (Albanese, 2013).

Combining civil religion with the ideal type of secular state presents a potential collision between religion in the United States and the citizen’s right to choose a religion or not. Explaining the complexity of this problem requires taking into consideration several elements. First, civil religion operates on the sidelines of the paradox enshrined in the Constitution of the United States of America. The First Amendment states the separation of state and religion, while at the same time confirming the right to exercise freedom of religion. This record reflects the specificity that evolved in the American nation: the lack of superiority of one of the denominations in the state administration and the simultaneous mutual tolerance of religious denominations (Wolfe, 2003). However, we are not talking about the statute of yet another natural element for Americans such as “the American Faith.” Although civil religion takes the form of a public religion, it

clearly needs to be separated from institutional religions that are playing the role of public religions.

The civil religion functioning in the United States is, therefore, something more than an established or endorsed religion. It represents a superior state cult that does not accept compromises just like the cult of Caesar in Ancient Rome. This functions not due to an apparatus of legal oppression but to social awareness and the resulting affirmation or stigmatization. Without a doubt, love for his or her country fundamentally determines a good American. Second, he must be a believer, which results from the conviction that “religion is a precondition for morality” (Wolfe, 2003: 246). The quality of this faith does not play a fundamental role. While Peter L. Berger (1967) postulates understanding religion as a *sacred canopy*, protecting people from the chaos of the inexplicable, Christian Smith (1998) reduces it in the case of Americans to *sacred umbrellas*. Religion should provide portable worlds that already now offer full meaning.

Civil religion cannot be properly translated into contexts outside of the United States. Its characteristics, treated in terms of a model, instead indicate a cult, codes, and rituals, which in a secular state may constitute a passage or wall for the popularization of institutional religions. From the perspective of the model of clear separation, the national holidays, relics related to the foundation of the state and the rules of conduct determine the material object of patriotism. Examples can be found in Europe on every corner, like Marseillaise and celebrating July 14 in France. At the same time, we can see an easy temptation in the endorsed Church model to combine religious rituals with secular state celebrations. The aforementioned Polish Army Day celebrated on the most important Marian ceremony on August 15 in Poland is a perfect example of this. Such a situation, however, does not give grounds for claiming that Poland is dealing with a civil religion. Traces of this concept present in Poland’s endorsed Church variety show that one can only talk about a religion that has found a permanent place in whatever is civil or public rather than a typical civil religion.

1.7 The place of public religion

The narrow issue of civil religion in the United States refers to a broader term, *public religion*, which turns out to be much more useful for the conducted analysis. In this section, we will deal with explaining the concept of a *public religion* and its associations with the case in Poland. When asked about the meaning of a public religion, José Casanova (2003) simply responds that it is a religion that assumes a public character. The difference between such a concept and the meaning of civil religion we have put forward indicates that (1) every institutional religion

has the potential to become public, and (2) it is impossible to put an equal sign between civil religion and public religion. The former captures certain spaces in social life, which cannot be equated with institutional religions (Jones, 1988). The latter assumes transposing the content of the institutional religion onto the level of what is public. Therefore, the key to understanding this term concerns the operationalization of what is public.

Casanova, in his influential book *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994), draws attention in a different way when comparing private and public religion. He presents them on three levels. The first is organizational and concerns the division into individual and group religiosity. Individual religiosity remains first and foremost personal religiosity. Meanwhile, group religiosity comes down to a system of practices uniting a group of followers. The next level is interactional and takes place within the religious community as a result of the merging of individuals in response to a specific message and the community worship which they belong to due to birth. The last level referring to societal levels concerns the distinction between religion and the world.

In another work, Casanova (2003) argues that the importance of a public religion should be considered based on three levels: state-politics, political society, and civil society. The first type refers to the models of states that we have already mentioned, which assume the marriage of power and religion, meaning established Churches. Public religion at the level of political society concerns religions that engage their resources in the political game, cooperating with political parties, social movements or lobbyist groups. However, on the level of civil society, we can speak of public religions when we notice they have specific demands at public squares and streets, as well as leading open debates on public topics.

In his study, Casanova (1994) presents Poland as an example of public religion along with Spain, Brazil, and the United States. He believes that Poland will stay in the public religion model for many years. The last two decades have confirmed this prediction. However, it is worth briefly looking closer at the specificity of the public religion in Poland. This task must be kept open to a greater degree. Only further analysis based on the empirical material will allow us to explain how the actions of representatives of the Catholic Church influenced the shape and awareness of the idea of the secular state.

When we refer to the state-policy level, we see that the country functions according to the endorsed Church model. The starting point for this state concerns the fundamental change that affected religion after the fall of communism in CEE. Churches that in the past were not granted legal status now gained a sense of freedom and support due to free expression (Borowik, 2007). In Poland,

Catholicism under the leadership of Józef Cardinal Glemp, however, had to change its public discourse. Catholicism entered into a period of transformation as a kind of winner over the regime (Janowski, 2004). At the same time, the progressing democratic changes meant that it ceased to play the role of the guarantor of the political scene (Grabowska, 2001). As pointed out by Krzysztof Kowalczyk (2012), the Church, as the deposit of proper values, found itself in tension with the democratic principles of secularism, deliberation on axiological issues, worldview pluralism, and tolerance. As a consequence of the resistance by society and silence on the part of the Vatican, the Church in Poland unwillingly recognized its formal separation from the state, adjusting to pressure from less official channels (Casanova, 1994).

In public speeches, the bishops articulated the need to normalize Church-state relations by a concordat treaty with the Holy See. Moreover, in their pastoral letters and the Episcopate's messages, they suggested that these relations should be based on autonomy and cooperation. This was to ensure freedom of conscience and citizens' confessions, at the same time not removing the sacred from public life (Kowalczyk, 2012). The confusing matter of the concordat signed by Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka on July 28, 1993, ended with its ratification on February 23, 1998. In the meantime, the provision on the regulation of relations with the Catholic Church in the form of a concordat was written as art. 25 of the Constitution of April 2, 1997.

This symbolic privilege granted to the Catholic Church in practice sanctioned a specific understanding of the earlier general records of respecting Christian values in public media under the Radio and Television Act of December 29, 1992. Christian values were decoded before the Constitution, for example, as a "universal and fundamental system enriched with evangelical truths, which together with European culture have grown into our being persons" (Glemp, 1993: 1). After its approval, logic suggested referring to the values presented by the endorsed Catholic Church. In addition, this is confirmed by the rules set in cooperation with the Church in the field of normalizing abortion legislation and religious education in schools.

Public religion at the level which Casanova describes as the political society in Poland was characterized by periods of the Catholic Church's involvement in the political game and periods of neutrality (Kowalczyk, 2012). In the period of 1989–1995, the bishops represented a heterogeneous position within which the idea of supporting the building of a Christian Democratic Party dominated. First of all, the bishops declared over-politicalness. In practice, however, they undertook attempts to integrate right-wing parties and set the system of values that these parties should follow (Gowin, 2002). Second, they presented various

approaches. Józef Cardinal Glemp acted for the unification of the right-wing camp. Bishops Tadeusz Gocłowski and Józef Michalik supported the Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe – ZChN). Bishops Tadeusz Pieronek and Józef Życiński revealed their distance towards parties and politics (Kowalczyk, 2012).

The Church's approach changed after the defeat of the right-wing parties in the parliamentary elections of 1993 and Lech Wałęsa in the 1995 presidential election. At that time, the Polish Bishops' Conference reached a unified stance on matters of political involvement. It claimed that lay Catholics themselves bear moral responsibility for their party activity, and the Church remains non-partisan. At the same time, they indirectly suggested who not to vote for in the 1997 and 2001 elections, depreciating the left wing. In 2005, in the face of the survey advantage of the right-wing Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS), the demonization of left-wing parties by the Church decreased. After PiS (27 % of votes) and PO (24.14 % of votes) won, the Church engaged in mediation between both formations. In the residence of Gdańsk's Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski, unsuccessful talks between PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński and PO leader Donald Tusk took place. In the following years, the Church's approach returned to the non-partisan formula that clearly distinguished Catholic values and their protection (Leśniczak, 2016).

On the last level of civil society, we can speak of Catholicism in Poland as a public religion in reference to two different areas: (1) the changing Church discourse on social issues, and (2) the great manifestations affiliated with the Church. The first area connects with the assumption that being Polish means being a Catholic (Grzymała-Busse, 2015). In 1989, the number of Catholics in the country came out to 94 %. For the bishops, this was a sufficient reason to identify the nation of Poland and society with Catholics, thus implying that the people would vote for Catholic candidates. The Bishop's Conference erroneously assumed that Catholics would be politically united (Borowik, 2000). This fusion of state and religion created the Church's authoritative discourse, which fell with successive elections.

Subsequent years showed the Church functioning in two discursive models characteristic of the post-conciliar era (Borg, 2009). The first, *the incarnation model*, assumed an open formula in the debate based on using non-Church arguments. It was mainly represented by the so-called open Church and the opinion-forming Catholic environments of the weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Znak*, and *Więź* magazines. The second, the *intra-Ecclesial devotional model*, functioned in Poland as the closed Church. It followed the discourse of Toruń's Radio Maryja, using the inter-Church arguments.

Both formations took on a more unequivocal form in 2006. Ewa Czaczkowska (2006), then a columnist for the *Rzeczpospolita* daily, pointed out that in connection with the controversy surrounding Radio Maryja, the Episcopate divided itself into two positions: the *Toruń Church* and the *Łagiewniki Church*. The *Toruń Church* emphasized supporting traditional Catholicism and its functioning in the public sphere according to the Catholic-national model, especially promoted by Radio Maryja (Guzek, 2015b; Krzemiński, 2017).

On the other hand, the *Łagiewniki Church* fully represented the openness of the Second Vatican Council and preach moderate social positions. On the political level, it was associated with supporting PO's political party. From the perspective of Church administration, it was identified with the figure of Stanisław Cardinal Dziwisz from Cracow, Pope John Paul II's former secretary. The division began to become outdated in 2012 at the time of the dispute over the multiplex site for TV Trwam, a station owned by Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk. Cardinal Dziwisz then showed support for the TV Trwam website.

On the civil society level, one should also speak about Church-affiliated manifestations. The basic expression of the presence of the Church in city squares and streets were marches organized for granting space on the Multiplex for Fr. Rydzyk's TV Trwam. The station did not receive a place on the Multiplex, so it appealed to the mobilization capabilities of the social movement focused on Fr. Rydzyk's media network (Secler, 2013). Next, it received the support of the Episcopate and a special delegate in the person of the Archbishop of Gdańsk, Sławoj Leszek Głódź. As a result, TV Trwam found itself on the MUX-1 multiplex.

1.8 Lasting Polish religiosity in context

Earlier, we discussed Casanova's (2003) distinctions of the three levels of public religion in Poland. We focused the reader's attention on the shape of these formations. In the description, however, we placed insufficient emphasis on Polish religiosity. In the face of the radical political and economic changes in Poland after 1989, it turns out that the attitude of Polish society towards religion is just beginning to change. At the level of its religiosity, it confronted secularization and the conviction of secularism in Europe. In this section, we will draw attention to the fundamental meaning of religiosity in the context of the discussed matter on the secular state. Following Irena Borowik (2010), we will give a report on the five hypotheses regarding this state of affairs. Next, we will combine these solutions with the context of the discussion on the idea of a secular state.

The first refers to the historical hypothesis. It assumes that stable religiosity appeared during the transformation thanks to the place of religion according to the “historically established pattern” (Borowik, 2010: 264). It shows a fundamental conviction that historically formed relationships between Poles and Catholicism would remain valid even after the 1989 transformation. Borowik draws attention to the two periods that built this historical relationship and ultimately contributed to its durability. The first comes down to a period of more than a hundred years of partitions. The Polish nation adhered to the Catholic tradition. This helped it particularly oppose Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia. At that time, Polish messianism arose. After 1989, traces of this messianism began to appear again. This happened in the context of Poland’s accession to the European Union (Leszczyńska, 2002, 2009), and later in relation to the activity of the movement for the enthronement of Christ as the King of Poland (Perka, 2009).

The second period, which affected the strong relationship between Poles and Catholicism, followed the Second World War when Poland was under Soviet influence. At that time, the Church represented the voice of the opposition and was an actual symbol of freedom. In Borowik’s (2010: 265) opinion, it brought about “a particular social experience of religion extending to non-religious areas, and in particular in religious life and in the Church’s activities.”

Another of the proposed hypotheses treats Catholicism like a civic religion, which manifests itself in its vitality by implementing extra-religious functions. Borowik begins by looking at the Polish case in the key of a civic religion according to Bellah’s (1967) concept. She also immediately sees a fundamental inconsistency between the two formations. Christianity in Poland stays strictly Catholic in the form of a cult characterized by deep devotion to the Virgin Mary in the icon of Black Madonna of Częstochowa. This contradicts the basic premise of the universality of a civil religion. On the other hand, Catholicism in Poland possesses most of the features that characterize a civil religion. It functions in connection with patriotism, as evident in using “God–Honor–Fatherland” that is quoted at various times, or propagated in recent years by some of the right-wing circles of the “Church–School–Artillery–Mint.” Other social functions also connected with Catholicism in Poland especially refer to the historical memory and the overlapping of national and Church holidays as in the case of the August 15 celebration.

When adopting the hypothesis of a civil religion as the basis for the continual level of high religiosity in Poland, political topics gain importance. The combination of state and sacred topics takes place in order to integrate society.

Borowik (2010) sees a parallelism here between (1) the past integration of Catholicism in opposition to communism and (2) current integration, which somehow occurs despite capitalism. This hypothesis, however, does not take into account that the political activity of the Catholic Church has a broader dimension than just social integration. Like any institution, it also wants to maintain or increase his influence on the state. We find an example of this activity in the organization of the 1050th anniversary of the baptism of Poland (Guzek, 2017).

The third one, called the social hypothesis, assumes that religiousness persists because of little social security. Borowik starts from the regularity noticed in more than 80 countries about a strong relationship between religiosity and social security (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). She explains the high degree of Polish religiosity due to a combination of two factors. The first comes down to the small share of the richest people in society's structure. The second concerns the aging of society. In the imagination of aging citizens, stability can be linked to the memories of rural and small-town religiosity. This confirms the regularity in relation to the relationship of religiosity patterns and places of birth (Piwowarski, 1971).

According to the socialization hypothesis, religiosity persists as a result of effective socialization. Borowik evaluates Poland's cultural context as unambiguously religious. She states that for a Pole, prayer is seen as natural as brushing one's teeth. In other words, through socialization, Poles not only learn to function in their society, but also maintain a regular relationship with God. The process finds additional reinforcement in the fact that it is not accompanied by religious criticism characteristic of other confessions. Doctrinal questions can hardly be found in the field of public interest. It is not really about being a believer but more about formally being a Catholic.

The last privatization hypothesis assumes that "religiosity retains continuity on the surface, while underneath privatization is progressing" (Borowik, 2010: 271). This flows from the conviction that in Poland, there are two paradoxically different processes taking place. On the one hand, we can see a strong expression of institutional religiosity, yet, on the other hand, a selective approach to faith takes place. First of all, this means incomplete acceptance of dogmas, for example, disbelief in the devil and hell. The next issue refers to applying ethical principles. This is particularly evident in the selective approach of Poles towards contraception, divorce, and cohabitation (Slany, 2002; Zaręba, 2008). The last element connects with the growing detachment towards the Church's political role.

Such a state of affairs causes that Borowik sees in Poland the opposite of Grace Davie's (1990) *believing without belonging* thesis which describes the United

Kingdom. Instead, Poland seems to show explicit *belonging without believing* (Borowik, 2010). This scheme also functions in the Scandinavian countries (Bäckström, 2015). In contrast to Scandinavia, however, the Polish case does not include a vicarious religion, meaning a model in which representatives of religious institutions replace the majority of believers in regular practices. The uninvolved majority alone accepts the activities of a designated minority.

We will treat the hypotheses about Pole's continually high religiosity as a context for analyzing the idea of a secular state. Thanks to this, we can draw some interesting conclusions. In the case of the historical hypothesis, we can ask the question: are Poles ready for a secular state? During the partitions, national ideas were preserved largely due to the Catholic Church's role as a guardian of our memories and traditions. Religion, therefore, played a key role in the nation's survival. Functioning in the atheistic system imposed by the Soviets has shown that, in Poland, society functioning without a public religion will not work. Therefore, breaking relations between the nation and Catholicism, which have been formed over many generations, still seems unrealistic.

The idea of a secular state clearly does not coincide with the hypothesis of a civic religion. Although it is impossible to introduce one universal religion in Poland, Catholicism at many moments performed general social functions. Depriving it of this function would introduce a gap that we would need to fill in at various levels, in particular during the celebrations of national holidays and patriotic events, in the history and martyrology of the nation. Taking into consideration that the country functions according to the endorsed Church model, the total secularization of state rituals would build a culture of celebrations foreign to the majority of citizens. When we combine the idea of a secular state with the socialization hypothesis, we notice that, despite everything, these are going in separate directions. The secular state deprives citizens of the opportunity to appeal to the deep layers of religiosity and the traditions of their forefathers. Bringing religion into the private sphere makes it difficult to learn its principles in the public space, for example, in school.

The link between the idea of a secular state and the religiosity of Poles functions as a part of the privatization hypothesis. It assumes that privatized religiosity has reached its best moment. The number of people who declare that they believe in their own way or do not practice at all is steadily growing (CBOS, 2015c; ISKK, 2018; Mariański, 2011). At the same time, in the public sphere, knowledge about the secular state model is becoming more popular. Poles are able to more clearly separate the state's order from the religious order. The whole process reveals the long-term decline in religious practices. As this process indicates, there appears to be room for discussion on the role of the media.

2 The notion of mediatization

The term *mediatization* sounds quite awkward in English. Mediatization, however, won the race among other competitive terms and enters into a growing research perspective based on the consequences of media action. Mediatization theorists, even though they do not take up a common position regarding what the concept is, assume that mediatization “has matured theoretically as well as empirically” (Hepp et al., 2015: 315). At the same time, they refute its alleged functioning as a conceptual bandwagon (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014). For this study, the framework of mediatization forms the analysis of the idea of a secular state but not from the perspective of *mediation*. Rather, we undertake an analysis of how the selective media relate to the idea of a secular state and the way it changed over the years.

2.1 Traditions of mediatization research

The development of mediatization research basically takes different directions, whose foundations were set by two earlier research trends. The first concerns the *medium theory* developed by theorists like Harold A. Inis (1964), Marshall McLuhan (1962, 1964), and Joshua Meyrowitz (Meyrowitz, 1994). It mainly focused on the influence of the media and technical aspects of the means of communication. The second trend, *ecology of communication*, relates to David Altheide and Robert Snow (1979, 1988) and concerns the formatting power of the media expressed in the *media logic* concept (Altheide, 1995). Current studies on mediatization research make it possible to distinguish three traditions which the theorizing of the concept of mediatization follows: the institutional perspective, the social-constructivist approach also called the cultural perspective, and the material perspective (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Lundby, 2014).

The institutional tradition, or institutionalist, as Couldry and Hepp (2013) put it, grew out of the study of journalism and political communication. It is based on the distinction between structure and agency, derived from the theory of structuration and institutions developed by Anthony Giddens (1984). Represented primarily by Stig Hjarvard (2008b, 2014a, 2014b), it relies on a specific perspective for looking at the media as being more or less independent social institutions and their accompanying principles. It assumes that the social system or specific social areas, including politics and religion, adapt to the media, taking into account the game conditions they determine, meaning the so-called media logic

(Altheide & Snow, 1979). In simplified terms, representatives of a non-media social institution or the institution itself want to be actively represented in the media, so they must turn to this logic and start acting in accord with the forms present in the media.

The social-constructivist approach, also interchangeably referred to as the cultural perspective (Lundby, 2014), developed from Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's (1967) theory of social construction of reality. It includes questions concerning "how the communicative construction of reality is manifested within certain media processes and how, in turn, specific features of certain media have a contextualized 'consequence' for the overall process whereby sociocultural reality is constructed in and through communication" (Couldry & Hepp, 2013: 196). In contrast to the institutional approach, which emphasizes the development of media institutions following the spread of media logic, the cultural perspective relies on the analysis of the role of individual media in the process of communicating the construction of the social world. Mediatization understood in this way particularly characterizes the works of Andreas Hepp (2012) and Friderich Krotz (2009) associated with the German University of Bremen.

There is also a third approach to the study of mediatization, whose representatives do not fit into any of these traditions (Lundby, 2014). The foundation of mediatization they developed refers to the medium theory (Meyrowitz, 1994) and the phrase coined by Marshall McLuhan (1964) that medium is the message. In recent studies, the approach also refers to Pierre Bourdieu's (1977) theory of social fields. The perspective represented mainly by André Jansson (2014, 2018) and Niels Ole Fiennemann (2011) emphasizes that media always appear in a materialized form. As a result, the mediation process deals with specific technologies of human communication. Mediatization boils down to a transformation under the influence of changes in the material aspect of the media. An example of this process can be illustrated by digitalization (Jansson, 2014).

The tension present among particular perspectives of mediatization research leads to the necessity to choose a tradition whose components will constitute our research. In this book, it is adopted the institutional perspective. As we will show in further chapters, the media representation of the idea of a secular state and the related Church-state relationship in the long-term research indicate the process of adaptation of representatives of state institutions and Churches to the media logic intuitively perceived by them. Another reason that prompted us to choose the institutional approach comes from its greatest coherence with the spatial and structural paradigm (Jachimowski, 2006, 2012), which founded our earlier research perspective. It results from the conviction that the media as social institutions and entities of the media system build the communication

infrastructure that permits the existence of the so-called media space. This space includes related networks of mutual relations: a community inhabiting a given area, media institutions, and subjectively understood recipients of these media. Communication, therefore, requires a media space that operates on the basis of media infrastructure and a culture of using these media (Jachimowski, 2006). In contrast to the materialistic approach, here the existence of media is not its essence, but only a prerequisite for building and maintaining social communication and society's communication subjectivity (Szostok, 2017).

2.2 Defining mediatization

More and more original mediatization conceptualizations are taking place within the mentioned research traditions. There are also proposals that go beyond these traditions. Andrea Schrott notes in this regard that "having so many descriptions of the term used can lead to the impression that everyone is talking about the same or at least very similar processes and aspects" (Schrott, 2009: 44) and combining the results of various empirical studies turns out to be very difficult. The theorists of mediatization, however, agree that "mediatization is a concept used to critically analyze the interrelation between changes in media and communications on the one hand, and changes in culture and society on the other" (Couldry & Hepp, 2013: 197). Mediatization reveals itself in terms of processes and functions rather than in an essential manner. In particular, proposals for its conceptualization and any change that is intertwined with factors such as time, technology, or theory are crucial for understanding this process (Lundby, 2014).

Mediatization understood based on the dimension of time refers to long-term changes in society under the media's influence. For Krotz (2014), this process has accompanied our species from the moment of the existence of human communication. Hjarvard (2013), on the other hand, narrows down mediatization to full media saturation at the end of the twentieth century. Fornäs (2014) suggests that mediation understood as a long-term process contains essentially different, progressive mediatizations rooted in mediation patterns typical of a given time. This is clearly contradicted by Hjarvard's (2014a) approach, for whom full saturation has led the media to the state of semi-independent institutions whose logic means the *modus operandi* of the whole process. Livingstone and Lunt (2014) present a lighter position, according to which traces of mediatization occur throughout human history, but only high modernity provides evident proof of the influence of the media on other areas of social life.

The three known definitions fit well into the considered mediatization factor. For Winfried Schulz (2004), mediatization denotes a process of social change

resulting from the functioning and development of communication media on the basis of extension, substitution, amalgamation, and accommodation. Although it does not stress the explicitly temporal aspect, its definition engages the process-oriented in a specific spatial and temporal context. Advances in mediatization, according to Schultz, are inevitably linked with the media relay function, which refers to the transfer of information combining time and physical distance. According to Friedrich Krotz's (2001, 2003) approach, there is a mediatization meta-process, which has separate historical phases, implemented in a specific way in every culture and society. The change occurs as a result of the historical modification of communication as a basic human practice. However, this is not about the dominant role of communication technologies in the process of change, but rather about "the changes in how people communicate when constructing their inner and exterior realities by referring to media" (Krotz, 2009: 25). The concept of mediatization based on Kent Asp's (1990, 2014b) approach points to the process in which individual actors and social institutions adapt to the various constraints and formats imposed by the media. This social learning process increases the power of the media over time. In other words, the more individuals and institutions adapt to the media, the more they are mediatized. The greater their mediatization, the stronger the power of the media.

In technology-based definitions, the basis for conceptualization concerns the transition from an analog to a digital environment, which progresses through the development of communication technologies. In contrast to previous phrases in communication technologies, for example, from handwriting to movable type, the transition to the digital environment meant that media entered into previously unattainable areas. Johan Fornäs (2014: 499) sees this clearly in the mediatization of popular culture, which "has gone through a series of stages, where new technologies, institutions, and genres of mediated communication have stepwise affected the forms and modes in which popular culture developed." Niels Ole Fiennemann (2014) points out that the process of change under the influence of the media follows the media constellation available in a given social context, which is defined by the term *media matrix*. In contrast to earlier stages, the digital space should be considered as mediatization along with the digitization process.

For the definitions based on theory, the understanding of mediatization affects the "process by which activities of various social spheres come to be conducted under the influence of the media, with the media, through the media, or by the logic of media" (Rothenbuhler, 2009: 279). The key term of these definitions remains, therefore, media logic considered as the driving force of the process. The

fixed definition of mediatization authored by Stig Hjarvard (2008b: 113) proves helpful in illustrating this mechanism:

“The process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to or becomes dependent on the media and their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the operations of other social institutions, while they also have acquired the status of social institutions in their own right. As a consequence, social interactions – within the respective institutions, between institutions, and in society at large – take place via the media.”

As Hjarvard points out, mediatization not only means the dominance of media logic but also the constitution of the media as independent social institutions that function on their own terms. Hjarvard’s approach, therefore, indicates that media logic initiates and then strengthens the institutional side of the media.

In addition to the dominant perspective, media logic is part of the theory-based mediatization concepts that benefit from a systemic approach. Michael Meyen (2009), using the term *medialization*, points to the reactions caused by structural changes in the media system or the general increase in the importance of public communication that take place in other social subsystems. For this approach, mediatization means the process of imposing the logic of the media on a selected sphere of social activity. When talking about the mediatization of politics, it should be defined as the process of imposing the logic of the media on the political system. When we accept religion as the domain, the logic of the media will dominate this sphere.

This conceptualization also corresponds with the idea of mediatization based on the *sensitizing theory* (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016). It assumes Herbert Blumer’s (1954) distinction between *definite concepts*, which precisely indicate the common features of a given class of phenomena, and *sensitizing concepts* that provide guidelines and references in a specific empirical study. As pointed out by Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, mediatization sensitizes researchers to greater historical awareness, social transformation realized within or through particular areas of social life (such as politics or religion) and the intersection of metaprocesses such as globalization, individualization, and commercialization.

Combining the results based on different concepts of mediatization turns out to be difficult (Schrott, 2009), so for the purposes of this book, we adopted its meaning according to dimensions of Hjarvard (2008b), Asp (1990), as well as Couldry and Hepp (2013). We assume that the idea of a secular state and Church-state relations are subject to mediatization. This means that changes in the media and communication also affect how the problem is addressed in the media. Regarding the issue of the secular state and Church-state relations, it can be seen that individual actors and political and religious institutions adopt

the logic of the media. A precise answer about the essence of the mediatization of these phenomena, and, more broadly, religion, is given in the next part of the book.

2.3 Mediatization epistemology: The grand theory or the theory of middle range?

Although we mentioned that Sonia Livingstone (2009) considers mediatization to be a broader concept than mediation, we have not pointed out the level of the social sphere on which the whole process takes place. Two conflicting positions exist on this point: mediatization as the grand theory and the theory of middle range.

The division of theories should be the starting point of our considerations. For the purposes of this book, we accepted Stefan Weber's (2010) proposition, who distinguishes four types: paradigms, super theories, base theories, and theories of middle range. Paradigms denote an attempt to organize the image of the world based on generalizations of science and ideology. They work on shaping philosophical systems and provide answers to basic ontological and epistemological questions. Super theories, as Weber calls them, mean essentially interdisciplinary grand theories understood in a twofold way. First, they indicate metatheories or second-degree theories. Second, theories are defined in such a way as to capture the whole. Niklas Luhmann's (1996) society as a self-producing or autopoietic system of communications is an example of a super-theory.

The next level includes base theories, or theories based on a certain part of reality, the so-called base category, that fulfills the condition of an empirical study. As a result of empirical research, definitions and models are formulated here. This case is illustrated by research in the area of, among others, cultural studies (Hall, 1973), communication theory (Habermas, 1985), and semiotics (Foucault, 1994). The fourth type, referred to as the theories of middle range, was introduced to the social sciences by Robert Merton (1968) to describe narrow empirical studies that do not claim the right to global narratives but help describe the conditions of social life. Examples illustrate agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004), uses and gratifications (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973), and the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1984).

As we already mentioned, a lack of agreement among mediatization theoreticians regarding the scope of the theory takes place. First of all, the meta-process of mediatization, as Friedrich Krotz (2001) puts it, situates the concept next to individualization, characteristic of high modernity, globalization, and commercialization. Mediatization understood as the grand theory excels other types of communication, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1.

Mediatized forms of social and cultural life	The relevance of media in everyday life, work, societal relations, groups, institutions, society, and parts of social activity (i.e., politics, economy)
Mediated communication	Three forms: mediated interpersonal communication, interactive communication, mass communication
Communication as human practice	Language, gestures, face-to-face communication

Fig. 2.1: Face-to-face-communication, mediated communication, and the mediatized conditions and forms of life. Based on Krotz, 2009: 24

Generally, we face two objections to the grand theory of mediatization. The first one states that understanding mediatization as a metatheory based on the long-term process of social transformation accompanies the temptation to build “a general theory that integrates and explains processes of mediatization across time and sociocultural contexts – a grand theory of mediatization that incorporates most other social theories of relevance” (Ekström, Fornäs, Jansson, & Jerslev, 2016: 1095). Such a view on mediatization arises difficulties in stimulating multidisciplinary research, which helps to better understand the whole process in separate contexts (Rakow, 2013). Second, when mediatization approaches the metatheory, Deacon and Stanyer’s (2014) accusation of being media-centric and the lack of a non-media argument is more clearly heard. In their opinion, there exists the possibility that effective mediatization only takes place in conjunction with other cultural, social, and political factors. Regardless of the topic related to the level of the theory on which we want to base mediatization processes, Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby respond to this objection, accepting Livingstone’s (2010) distinction between the media-centric and media-centered perspectives:

“Being ‘media-centric’ is a one-sided approach to understanding the interplay between media, communications, culture, and society, whereas being ‘media-centered’ involves a holistic understanding of the various intersecting social forces at work at the same time as we allow ourselves to have a particular perspective and emphasis on the role of the media in these processes.” (Hepp et al., 2015: 316)

They understand mediatization as a media-centered process in which the role of the media, while remaining crucial, takes into account the simultaneous participation of other social factors.

When we treat mediatization as the middle range theory, we have the choice of a mid-level analysis or a sub-process of mediatization. In terms of Hjarvard’s (2014b) institutional perspective, mediatization takes place at the mid-level of the cultural and social affairs. Thus, this process does not indicate the general

influence of the media on culture and society (as in the case of the grand theory) and at the same time remains above the analysis of individual social interactions (as in the case of the micro-level). Instead, mediatization indicates some general patterns of these interactions created by the media. Hjarvard perceives the process at this level as being non-media-centric, which not only allows media logic to work but also the logic of other social institutions. Therefore, he postulates using the terms in the plural, media logics, and institutional logics, in order to emphasize the complexity of the process.

In the circle of middle-range theories, mediatization remains a sub-process (Krotz, 2014; Schulz, 2004), whose advantage is due to the direct measurability of the change in the scope of extension distinguished by Schulz (2004) (the increase in media opportunities), substitution (non-media practices become dependent on the media), amalgamation (media practices begin to intermingle with other practices) and accommodation (non-media actors start to operate based on the media's terms of the game). The advantages of this approach include a clear division of categories, which enables more precise measurement of the mediatization process (Ekström et al., 2016). Its disadvantages include a lack of transparency regarding the functioning of media logic (Hjarvard, 2008b).

In the general division of the possibilities of analyzing mediatization, Knut Lundby (2014) points to three levels of micro/meso/macro and the fourth possibility, across levels. Micro-level studies deal with the mediatization practices of individual actors or small groups. The meso level focuses on institutions. On the other hand, the macro level works in particular fields of human activity, meaning culture and society. As we can see, this division does not fully reflect the differences from the communication theory perspective but introduces some valuable insights useful for implementing this theory.

In this book, it is used the analysis of the mediatization of the idea of a secular state as a study in the area of middle-range theory. Along with Hjarvard (2014b), we assume the possibility of the co-occurrence of many media logics and institutional logics that shape general patterns of interaction in the area of the secular state and Church-state relations. At the moment when we undertook to describe the process of mediatization and to capture the social change, we considered it necessary to focus the reader's attention on the processes submitted by Schulz (2004), especially those related to the logic of media accommodation. The specificity of the described processes means that this analysis takes into account, first of all, institutional changes related to the idea of the secular state and the dynamics of Church-state relations. At the same time, the analysis includes the agency of individual actors representing state and religious institutions.

2.4 Understanding media institutions

Theorists on mediatization tend to consider this process as a perspective rather than a strict theory (Rothenbuhler, 2009). It assumes loosely interrelated concepts that collectively determine the processual mechanism of mediatization. In the institutional perspective, the key to theorizing on mediatization comes down to the “institutional, aesthetic, and technological affordances” (Hjarvard, 2012a: 30) of the media. In this paragraph, we can discuss the basics of understanding the institutionalization of mediatization processes. We put special emphasis on explaining the very concept of a social institution.

Along with Hjarvard (2014b), our starting point in considering the notions of an institution is reflected in the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). It assumes that the structure represents both a medium and the result of social practice. This peculiar duality avoids the extremes of distinguishing institutions at the expense of a social practice or favoring the social structure over the agency.

When conceptualizing social implications, one must start with time and space, which “are not just the dimensions of the context within which the human agent acts, they are an essential part of the design of action” (Hauer, 2014: 91). When we translate social practices into the continuum of time and space, we create an episode with two clear boundaries. The first concerns *idiosyncratic practices* which represent the lowest level of the time-space extension. On the other hand, social institutions embody “practices which have the greatest time-space extension” (Giddens, 1984: 17). They consist of individual interactions but have the ability to last longer than individual persons in a solid and material form or as principles embodied in human action. In other words, social institutions rely on the rules of social life, meaning “techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices” (Giddens, 1984: 21) and the resources that are present in a material or symbolic form and provide infrastructure for social practices and thus cement social life.

For presenting his theory, Anthony Giddens was criticized for excessive abstractness, an ontological character, and ambiguity in the field of structural duality (I. J. Cohen, 1989). His strong structuration theory reduced this criticism by creating a strengthened version of the original theory developed for the needs of more recent empirical research done by Rob Stones (2005). It assumes the interdependence of social institutions and the human interpretation of these structures. In it, Stones postulates a departure from the abstract consideration of the structure and activities for their observation in specific situations and understanding the disposition and practices of social agents. In the original version of the theory, Giddens indicates that in the process of socialization carried out

within various institutions (i.e., family, religion, education), individuals acquire certain rules and resources and then reflect on them in a retrospective way in a specific situation. It was only Stones who introduced the theory of the meso-level ontological concept, which allows observing this structure and the operation of social actors. He treats it as a sliding scale on which a particular study is placed and analyzes the activities and structures in relative terms, omitting the abstraction of ontologies.

Unlike Giddens's two dimensions of rules and resources, Stones (2005: 85) puts forward four process components that make up the *quadripartite nature of structuration*: external structures, internal structures, active agency/agent's practices, and outcomes. External structures determine the conditions of the game. Regardless of whether social agents recognize them or not, external structures allow or hinder the operation of social actors. In the situation of autonomy of external structures towards social agents, the influence of external conditions and general social conditions may ignore the will of social agents. Internal structures are divided into two components. The first term, known as *conjecturally-specific knowledge of internal structures*, covers the acquired over time "knowledge of interpretative schemes, power capacities, and normative expectations and principles of the agents within context" (Stones, 2005: 91). The second component includes *general-disposition structures* or *habitus*, which are accepted unreflectively as (Stones, 2005: 88):

“(...) transposable skills and dispositions, including generalized world-views and cultural schemas, classifications, typifications of things, peoples and networks, principles of action, typified recipes of action, deep binary frameworks of signification, associative chains and connotations of discourse, habits of speech and gesture, and methodologies for adapting this range of particular practices in particular locations in time and space.”

Active agency concerns the way in which social agents engage in structures. They answer the question whether this “dynamic moment of structuration” (Stones, 2005: 86) occurs routinely or reflexively. Outcomes, on the other hand, indicate the effect on internal and external structures in their stability or change.

The structuration theory can serve as a good framework for understanding the key concept of mediatization. According to Hjarvard (2014b), the theory shows how the media are located both inside and outside the human agency. When we consider them as external structures, on the one hand, they remain independent of the individual agency, and on the other, they rely on external rules (law, market rules) and communicative resources (the media environment). The media that we see as internal structures rely on our internal rules and resources in the form of patterns for action, familiarity with formats and genres.

Internal conditions understood in this way may allow social agents to operate in other ways than those provided by external structures.

The concept of institutions given by the structuration theory as being structured by rules and resources in such a way that they have the ability to survive beyond individual persons in a material form or as principles embodied in human action proves useful for properly understanding mediatization. On the one hand, this process precisely means the transformation of various social institutions under the influence of the media, yet on the other hand, the media themselves gain the status of semi-independent institutions (Hjarvard, 2014a).

News institutions, as Mark Ørsten (2004) defines these media institutions, base their principles on two levels. The first boils down to media ideology, which assumes three postulates: independence, objectivity, and facticity. The second level concerns media logic, meaning rules and procedures in the form of formats and genres that constitute the functioning of media institutions. The conceptualization of media institutions, therefore, leads to the belief that actors adapt not only to media logic but also to media ideology. Some media institutions are also subject to change based on the scenario of spontaneous changes or evolution (Asp, 2014a; Sjöblom, 1993). Meanwhile, the reasons for institutional change should be seen in economic, political, or cultural factors (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999).

2.5 Differentiating media

Mediatization's essential element includes the process of the structural differentiation of the media. According to Rothenbuhler (2009), the concept of mediatization indicates a process in which previous independent social activities became dependent on the media and the institutions they created. The root cause of this thinking, however, is the belief that the media themselves are independent. The historical process of mediatization, therefore, is clearly linked with the mechanism of obtaining and maintaining independent media. This view is reinforced by Strömbäck and Esser (2014c), according to which structural differentiation plays the role of one of the three dimensions of the mediatization policy.

In the historical perspective, structural differentiation ends within the limits imposed, on the one hand, by the process of the release of the media from the direct influence of the political world, and on the other from its dependence on the currently progressing corporate power. Such a boundary may raise doubts whether in practice today media in Europe possesses wider autonomy. This complex problem requires deeper reflection. We will begin with a series of questions about whether, when, and to what extent the media have gained autonomy.

Answering these questions will allow us to properly address the phenomenon crucial for the mediatization process, which applies structural differentiation.

A comparison of 18 media systems in Western Europe in *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* prompts Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) to two claims in the area of differentiation. First, the authors recognize that the process of structural differentiation of the media occurred at different times depending on whether the country was represented by the media and political culture as a *polarized pluralist*, *democratic corporationist*, or the *liberal model*. Second, depending on the particular model, the media of a given country is characterized by reaching full political autonomy or not.

The liberal model developed the most moderate form of pluralism, to which Hallin and Mancini include such European countries as Great Britain and Ireland, which creates favorable conditions for the expansion of universal commercial media and the neutral professionalism of journalists. Already in the sixties of the last century, pluralist media regulations functioned dictating clear freedom from political groups. However, in the eighties, business representatives began to influence telecommunications policy (Horowitz, 1989).

Countries belonging to the democratic corporationist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), meaning the Scandinavian countries as well as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, although to a lesser extent, also represent moderate pluralism. On the one hand, they indicate a strong attachment to the observance of the law, on the other hand, with the exception of Austria and Belgium, show ignorance of clientelism. The independence of public electronic media characteristic of this model is subject to additional protection thanks to the functioning of an administration based on rational and legal power according to Weber's ideal bureaucracy (Humphreys, 1994). The sixties and seventies clearly consolidated the independence of the media and journalists. At the same time, however, they did not overcome the current high political parallelism. In Germany, in particular, the involvement of journalists in focusing on politics and commenting on the political life remained high (Maurer & Pfetsch, 2014; Pfetsch, 2001). As a result, we can talk about the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory orders: journalistic professionalism, which persists thanks to strong and apolitical press councils, and political parallelism. On the one hand, journalism possesses the status of a profession of public trust. On the other hand, political parties continue to play a strong role in the social system.

In the case of polarized pluralism, which describes countries such as France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the strong involvement of the press on the side of one of the political options and public media susceptibility to the influence of

the political world proved to be extremely persistent (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In addition, a real and extensive press has never developed in these countries. Appropriate political and economic conditions for differentiation appeared only in the mid-twentieth century. However, when at the turn of the seventies and eighties there was a change from the press being oriented towards political parties into a market-oriented press, differentiation did not bring about the expected autonomy from the world of politics.

Differentiation in the CEE countries looks different. When discussing this issue, we can use the division by Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska (2015). In correspondence to mainly Western models of media systems (Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Peruško, Vozab, & Čuvalo, 2013; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956), she developed four proposals of media and politics in the CEE: *authoritarian*, *hybrid liberal*, *politicized media*, and *media in transition*.

The hybrid model is of interest to us, which includes Western Slavs (Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), highlights the high standards of democracy, and a weaker level of media policy. The politicized media model present in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Serbia points to the strong connections between media and business people with the world of politics (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014). In the case of Romania, it additionally has the character of a factor replacing the professional identity of journalists (Milewski, 2013). Here we have to take into account that the changes in the Polish media system after 2015, so after the end of this analysis, brought the country to a tension between the hybrid model and politicized one.

When talking about the media in the transition model, which refers to Moldova, Macedonia, Ukraine, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of strong opposition parties means that media replace them when opposing the government. This model shows a clear lack of transparency regarding capital and the functioning of media outlets. The last of the models, called authoritarian, refers to Belarus and Russia, which according to subsequent Press Freedom Rankings belong to the non-free category. Its basic elements include poor competition on the media market and absolute dependence on the capital of the oligarchy. The proximity of the world of politics and business causes that the media “are not close to politics or business but to politics and business. Business is politics” (de Smaele, 2010: 58).

In the case of all CEE types, we can talk about a jump in structural differentiation only after the democratic transformations initiated in 1989 in Poland. The existence of post-Soviet systems that had aspirations related to a liberal democracy and the free market forced sudden changes in the approach to differentiation.

The examples of Poland and Romania show the ambiguity of this process. On the one hand, those responsible for the new order emphasized (1) the issue of media autonomy or control, and (2) the ownership of media capital (Jakubowicz, 2007; Marinescu, 1995). On the other hand, they have shaped the media law by opening gates for politicians to influence public media (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014). The dynamics of differentiation in Russia looked different. After the collapse of the USSR, the formal framework of political culture changed, but there was no change in the practice of politicians towards the media industry (Khvostunova, 2013). In addition, due to the important role of the state in the Russian media system, the media themselves became simultaneously involved in the market and other functioning social non-market institutions.

Differentiation turns out to be problematic from the perspective of the evolution of media systems. As Hallin and Mancini (2004) emphasize, the diversity of media within the national media systems is diminishing due to the homogenization of contents and media convergence. The authors point out that the increase of content homogenization, first of all, occurs when media institutions follow the principles of neutral professionalism. The discussed cases, however, point to the slight possibility of such a situation occurring. In addition, findings from three large-scale projects based on a global approach can hardly prove the global progress of the homogenization of contents (Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Weaver, 1998; Weaver & Willnat, 2012).

At the same time, two phenomena supported by the economy (1) increase the importance of media corporations and their power in information access networks (Castells, 2009) and (2) media hybridization (Chadwick, 2013). Can we speak of structural differentiation as the basis for the expansion of the general logic of the media? On the one hand, media conditioned by a given media system provide contents that visually indicate a specific logic of action, such as tabloidization. On the other hand, the same media systems did not create the basis for full media independence. In many cases, they revealed mechanisms of media politics. Wherever politics was overcome, market logic took its place. Therefore, differentiation itself should be thought of in terms of a postulate that we aspire to rather than a state that we are able to achieve quickly. Consequently, our view of media logic must take into account its mingling with the political and economic spheres.

2.6 Understanding media logic

Various attempts to conceptualize mediatization indicate that the key to the process of media logic is not necessarily limited to the aforementioned principles

and procedures of the functioning of media institutions (Ørsten, 2004). However, the concept remains ambiguous to the extent that it appears both in the singular as media logic as well as in the plural as media logics or does not appear at all, giving way to other propositions. In this book, it is adopted an institutional approach that assumes the key role played by media logic, and this section will try to show the various possible ways that this term operates. Here we apply the general assumption that the prerequisite for understanding mediatization means understanding media logic (Mazzoleni, 2008a).

The starting point of our considerations is Harold Innis's (1964) intuition, which in the discussion on media bias points to inherent logic, accompanying the media's structure and technology. In David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow's (1979: 10) *Media Logic*, Innis's intuition adopts a theoretical concept that allows us to understand the role of the media:

“In general terms, media logic consists of the form of communication; the process through which media present and transmit information. Elements of this form include the various media and the formats used by these media. Formats consist, in part, of how the material is organized, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular characteristics of behavior, and the grammar of media communication. Format becomes a framework or a perspective that is used to present as well interpret phenomena.”

The authors point out that the process of presenting and transmitting media relies on the perception and routine of the media, their coverage, and the resulting social interpretation. On the one hand, media logic processed logically is not external to the media itself (Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). On the other hand, effective media formats primarily result from the overlap of media logic and commercial logic in many areas (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; Schlosberg, 2017).

The concept introduced and developed by Altheide (1995) and Altheide and Snow (1988, 1988) becomes an inspiration for later, more or less far-fetched definitions. Altheide's (2004: 294) independent notion reduces media logic to “assumptions and processes for constructing messages within a particular media.” Schrott's (2009) conceptualization considers media logic as an implicit regulation system that serves as an orientation and interpretation framework for public communication. However, Mazzoleni (2008a) sees in media logic the reference framework for the production of media culture, especially news.

Understanding media logic as initiated by Altheide and Snow (1979) confronts the serious charge of elusiveness, which results from the media-centric process that remains linear and singular (Asp, 2014b; Couldry, 2008; Hepp, 2009; Lundby, 2009b). First, when we talk about being media-centric, the problem of

exclusion of the possibility of shaping society by a logic other than the logic of media appears, which we referred to earlier when we mentioned conceptualizing mediatization. According to Couldry (2003), various dimensions of society result from processes that are not necessarily based on the media. Second, the weakness of media logic according to Altheide and Snow (1979) includes its linear characteristic. Transformation under the media's influence passes from the stage staring before media intervention to the final mediated form, and this prevents us from analyzing the process itself. Third, media logic appears in the singular. Altheide and Snow assume that although it contains many interpenetrating processes, in essence, they all create one form of communication. As Lundby (2009b) argues, instead of talking about the general logic of the media, one should look for patterns of specific media in social interactions.

There are three ways to counter the allegations against the weak media logic concept. The first way relates to the institutional approach and assumes searching for such a conceptualization that will overcome problematic issues. The second assumes the transition to the analysis within the so-called new institutional perspective. The third, practiced as part of the social-constructivist approach, brings complete resignation from media logic. The institutional approach we have adopted does not mean completely resigning from the new achievements of institutionalism and the social-constructivist approach. Therefore, in this part of the paragraph, we refer briefly to each of the mentioned proposals, and then we will try to point out their useful and common elements.

When describing media logic according to the institutional trend, we are leaving behind Hjarvard's theoretical concept that has not been discussed until now, which, although it is inspired by the original approach to media logic, at the same time overcomes the previous accusations. In this approach, Hjarvard (2008b: 105) initially defines media logic as "the institutional and technological *modus operandi* of the media, including the ways in which media distribute material and symbolic resources and make use of formal and informal rules." On the other hand, in his last works, he applies the understanding of media logic as "shorthand for the various institutional, aesthetic, and technological *modus operandi* of the media," while assuming that the "logic of the media influences the social forms of interaction and communication" (Hjarvard, 2013: 17).

The specificity of Hjarvard's conceptualization goes from the location of the accent on the dimensions of the *modus operandi* of the media and its impact on communication in the form of a symbolic reaction. Recalling that mediatization is based on "institutional, aesthetic, and technological affordances," Hjarvard (2012a: 30) practically refers to the space of shaping media logic. First of all, it assumes that mediatization occurs in specific institutions based on the logic of

the specific media which these institutions are subject to. Therefore, we should talk about different media logics more than about a single rational logic. Second, emphasizing that the concept looks like a conceptual shortcut, Hjarvard (2013) refuses to understand the whole process in a linear way. Finally, he points out that the mid-level institutional analyses are key elements for him and can capture the pattern of social interaction that forces change under the influence of the media. Assuming a non-media-centric approach here, Hjarvard (2014b) takes into account several simultaneous and mutually intertwining logics from various institutions and media logics (in the plural).

At the same time that Hjarvard was developing his concept, Asp's proposal appears in the current scholarship and tries to narrow down media logic to *news media logic as an institution*. He assumes that institutions operate at different levels of generality (Sjöblom, 1993), and that is why the discussion should be reduced to news media and, as part of their framework, ask about news media logic. Asp (2014b) next establishes news media logic as an institution in itself, analyzing it in the perspective of two approaches: the normative (March & Olsen, 1989) and rational-economic (North, 1990). It does so by understanding an institution as "rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions" (North, 1990: 3).

Based on these assumptions, Asp (2014b) states that news media logic is still an institution that reduces uncertainty and makes it possible to effectively produce news for recipients, which consists of two groups of rules: professional norms and professional standards. It assumes that professional norms include "normative rules based on shared values that are taken for granted by the members of the institution" (Asp, 2014b: 261) such as independence and objectivity. Professional standards, on the other hand, concern "shared and taken-for-granted rules for the production of news suitable for an audience" (Asp, 2014b: 261) which include craft rules (rules regulating the media routine), constitutive rules (novelty, importance, interest), regulatory rules (rules for adapting the news to its recipients), and form rules (contents and forms adapted to a given medium). Despite the criticism of the singularity of media logic, Asp claims that in the case of the evolution of news media logic, single media logic follows, based on common professional norms and standards and not many media logics.

The last proposal, developed as part of the social-constructivist approach, replaces the media logic concept with a more contextual moment of communication change, which takes place as a result of the *molding forces* of media (Hepp, 2009, 2012, 2013a). The German term *Prägnanzkraft der Medien* [*molding forces*] used by Hepp expresses certain pressure that the media exert on the way people communicate. This means that changes under the influence of the media are

dependent on the specifics of these media. As a result, mediatization processes take place in various ways in different media and can influence each other (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016).

These different approaches have some elements in common. Therefore, by adopting the institutional perspective, we can use the selected elements of the other proposals. As indicated by Hepp (2009) and Ekström et al. (2016), conducting analyzes of mediatization at the micro- and meso-levels, we also illustrate the different specificities of certain media. Consequently, we show how different *modi operandi* work together or against each other. Here we can see a common element in the institutional approach. The connection between institutional, aesthetic, and technological affordances and professional rules and standards takes place. We make a clear indication of the boundary between these concepts in the next section, in which we try to identify the basic components of media logics.

2.7 Components of media logic

The theoretical concept of media logic, which has been practically adopted in the study of the mediatization of politics (Brants & van Praag, 2006; Esser, 2013; Maurer & Pfetsch, 2014; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; C. O. Meyer, 2009; Schrott, 2009; Schulz, 2004; Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009; van Aelst, Maddens, Noppe, & Fiers, 2008), causes considerable confusion. Different authors point to its individual components. As a consequence, they also accept separate positions on the topic of the universality of mediatization itself. According to Rothenbuhler (2009), progress in media differentiation creates the opportunity to mediatize on a global scale. This would be a reply to the earlier call for international studies on the broad consequences of media on everyday life (Curran & Park, 2000; Sreberny, 2000; Thussu, 2009). However, Hjarvard (2009) cools this enthusiasm when claiming that mediatization does not characterize all societies, but only high modernity countries. At the same time, he admits that globalization creates the potential to spread mediatization processes beyond the context of highly developed countries.

In opposition to Hjarvard, we assume that in the CEE countries that belonged to the communist bloc, we can say that the seeds of mediatization were sown in the nineties. The process of shocking transformations in the political (Ekiert, 2003) and media systems (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013) in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, unmatched by other cases, concerned a sudden inundation of media into Western normative theories: libertarian and

social responsibility (Siebert et al., 1956). This was accompanied by more or less predatory capitalism (Kieżun, 2012) and a form of media differentiation specific for this region. Foreign capital and media formats very quickly dominated the local media markets (Dobek-Ostrowska & Głowacki, 2008; Dobek-Ostrowska, Głowacki, Jakubowicz, & Sükösd, 2010; Pokrzycka, 2012). For this reason, we assume that, when speaking about media logics, we can see a pattern whose components will be most consistent both with the mediatization of Western countries, as well as Poland, representing the post-communist context of Central Europe.

When pointing out the components of media logics, let's start with the three ideal-aspects listed by Esser (2013) referring to professionalism, the market, and technology. The first group, professional aspects, concerns one's orientation in journalistic principles and standards. Esser's approach turns out to be consistent with Asp's (2014b) proposal, which, when speaking of professional norms, indicates the independence and objectivity of news media. By independence, it should be understood that the media freely serve the public interest based on their autonomy. They do it in a twofold way. First, they perform a controlling function, which means that they enter into the role of a fourth estate (Carter, 1959). Second, they interpret facts, which means that they become a social interest group (Cook, 2006). The demand for objectivity, although it is not deemed to be necessary (McQuail, 1987), organizes our view of the world of facts by appealing to the use of honesty and the primacy of information (Lichtenberg, 2000). Fair journalism does not yield to outside influences and avoids favoritism or discrediting any one of the parties in the dispute that it describes. In addition, informative journalism stays accurate and unambiguous, which amounts to separating facts from opinions.

Another group in Esser's (2013) typology indicate the commercial aspects. These apply to economic imperatives that the media implement as market institutions focused on viewers watching their programs and selling them products. Undoubtedly, autonomy towards the world of politics favors deepening the media's dependency on the economy (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Linards & Lucht, 2014). At the same time, this makes it possible to doubt the contradictions between the commercial and professional aspects. This results mainly from the assumptions and processes of constructing messages (Piontek, 2011), whose goal is to provide entertainment for the recipients (Postman, 1985). Commenting on Esser's work, Magin (2015) points to techniques such as personalization, negativity, and visualization. Other viewpoints identify personalization, accentuation, confrontation, concretization, and simplification (Asp, 1990, 2014b; Strömbäck, 2008).

The first personalization technique mentioned in the media occurs in two ways: centralized and decentralized (Balmas, Rahat, Sheaffer, & Shenhav, 2012). When we talk about centralized personalization, we assume that the media focuses their attention on the leaders of events and in constructing media leadership (Casero-Ripollés, Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016; M. Mazur, 2014; Patterson, 1994). In the case of decentralized personalization, the media's attention concerns people who do not play the role of leaders (Piontek, Hordecki, & Ossowski, 2013).

Research in the fields of psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, and economics confirm the disproportionately greater interest of individuals on negative rather than positive news (Herwig, Kaffenberger, Baumgartner, & Jäncke, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Vonk, 1996; Weinstein & Crowds, 1968). Such a conviction is related to the negativity technique widely used by the media. This is why the question about why a fact becomes a news theory, news values clearly indicate events that contain bad news. Another face of negativity in the media is revealed in materials related to politics. Election campaigns abound in countermeasures used by political opponents in the form of cynical and disarming news that disrupt the fair-play conditions of the political game (Kepplinger, 2000; Kerbel, 1999; Thompson, 2000).

The technique of confrontation, especially in political communication, reveals the use of the "confrontation genre," which covers conflict and scandal instead of compromise (Esser, 2013; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In contrast, the simplification technique, which appeared along with the decreased interest in high-quality content, provides a narrow image of the world that satisfies the largest number of recipients (Katz et al., 1973; Lasswell, 1935). It is associated with appealing to the emotions (Casero-Ripollés et al., 2016). However, it brings about a negative effect by dulling the recipients' imagination and limiting intellectual work in response to the message (Kinz, 1998; Kristeva, 1995).

The last of Esser's (2013) technological aspects refers to the way in which communication technologies shape the media's contents. Each medium forces journalists and media workers to adopt the appropriate technology and grammar in a different way (Meyrowitz, 1993). The technology involves using specific formats on the basis of the text, audio, images, or digital media. Grammar, on the other hand, organizes the temporal aspect and spatial structure to which Asp (2014b: 262) includes "formative rules (e.g., article length); narrative rules (e.g., the inverted pyramid); and rules related to the composition of the particular media (e.g., domestic-foreign news)." As Schulz, Zeh, and Quiring (2005) point out, in the case of policy mediation, the progress of grammar reveals the unprecedented expansion of new genres. Technological aspects, therefore, play a significant role in shaping media logic.

2.8 Forms and objects of mediatization

The concept of media logics and indicating their most important components leads to the conclusion that the degree of mediatization between institutions may vary, depending on the adaptation of these institutions to media logics. Franz Marcinkowski (2005) speaks in a similar manner about mediatization, indicating that not all political institutions mediatize in the same way in a given system. The problem pointed out by Marcinkowski is related to unresolved till now issues about what should be examined and how this should be done. In this section, let's review the scientific literature in terms of what constitutes a characteristic change under the influence of the media. The starting point in this reflection is the divisions of mediatization according to Hjarvard (2008b) and Hepp (2009).

When thinking about the possible forms of mediatization, Hjarvard (2008b) divides it into *direct* (strong) and *indirect* (weak) processes. The first form appears when previously unmediated institutions and activities transform into a media form, as exemplified by electronic banking or virtual bitcoin currencies. In the second form, the media and the associated world of symbols clearly affect current activities, which can be seen in narrow empirical studies in the field of mediatization (Hepp & Krönert, 2010; Hjarvard, 2004). From this perspective, the mediatization of the idea of a secular state emerges as a result of media pressure and thus falls into the indirect and weak forms of the process.

Hepp (2009) has a different approach to the forms of mediatization, pointing to its quantitative and qualitative aspects. When he talks about the quantitative perspective of mediatization, he focuses on the countable and noticeable history of the growth of media technologies and the various ways they are used. Along with Krotz (2007), he assumes observing this non-linear growth of mediated communication on three levels: temporal, spatial, and social. The temporal level refers to the growth of media technologies over time, now becoming permanently available as in the case of 24-hour news channels or the Internet. At the spatial level, the media occur in different locations or become independent of a fixed location, as illustrated in the case of a mobile phone. Finally, the social level indicates that the social context stays intertwined with the use of the media. Hepp (2009) defines the qualitative perspective of mediatization as qualitative changes resulting from changes in specific media. He points to the material dimension of such change (Gumbrecht & Pfeiffer, 1994), which consists in the fact that media technologies give communication practices their structure.

Hepp's division turns out to be useful in two aspects. First, by analyzing the mediatization of the idea of a secular state, we may look at the process, focusing primarily on *mediatized moments*, identified thanks to temporal, spatial, and

social dimensions (Hepp, 2013b). Second, the result of mediatization has a clearly qualitative character, primarily determined not by the number of growing media but by the quality of interaction between political and religious actors and journalists.

When recalling *mediatized moments*, we have to embed them in the context of communicative figurations, meaning “patterns of processes of communicative interweaving that exist across various media and have a ‘thematic framing’ that orients communicative action” (Hepp, 2013b: 623). This concept is based on Norbert Elias’s (1978) figurations as networks of individuals, which constitute large social units as part of their mutual interactions. Thanks to the references to figurations, an individual remains connected to society, and the society itself has a structure that is not external to the individual. Figurations appear sporadically in research on media and communication (Couldry, 2011). However, thanks to Hepp’s conceptualization, it can be assumed that a single communication network creates a specific communicative figuration. From the perspective of the subject of mediatization, when speaking about change in the social world, we are thus thinking about changes in communicative figurations.

For Kent Asp (2014a), the subject of mediation to be investigated is not present in mediatized moments but in the causal mechanism of the mediatization process, that is, adaptation considered in close connection with the context in which it occurs. Following Habermas’s (1985) division into a *lifeworld* and *system*, the author makes two assumptions. First, he claims that entities adapting to media logic have different action logics (1) in the *lifeworld*, meaning the horizon of the everyday world, which is lived and not subjected to problems and (2) in a system that operates in an instrumental way. Second, Asp treats adaptation as a one-dimensional learning process.

How do we answer the question asked at the beginning about the subject of mediatization? Previous replies suggest that the right solution can be found in the alternative mediatization moments or the causal mechanism of adaptation. The institutional approach, which we assumed in the analysis of the mediatization of the idea of a secular state, inclines us to take the causal mechanism of adaptation side. Nevertheless, even though we assumed along with Hjarvard that the mediatization process does not have a linear character, we will adjust the concept by permitting the possibility for it to have mediatization moments (Hjarvard, 2013). When analyzing mediatization, our idea of a secular state includes the subject of research, which considers the adaptation mechanism of the political and religious actors to media logic. It is assumed that, in the framework of non-linear adaptation, we can identify some moments of tension, meaning mediatization moments, during which the consequences of this process appear visible.

2.9 Operationalizing mediatization research

In the previous section, we pointed to the subject of the research on mediatization. In the present section, we will focus on possible ways to study mediatization. We want to specify the path of process analysis, which in the next part of the book will translate into the study of the idea of a secular state and the Church-state relationship. As the starting point of this reflection, let's refer to three types of postulates that formulate Ekström's et al. (2016) mediatization research.

Based on the analysis of long-term studies on mediatization, we are convinced that the following elements should be considered when examining the characteristic changes: historicity, specificity, and measurability. The first of the postulates assumes the temporal recognition of mediatization as a response to the state in which "too much of the existing research has hypostasized the existence of mediatization and then focused on analyzing the contemporary effects of this taken-for-granted process" (Ekström et al., 2016: 1098). These authors point out that mediocrity understood as a process immersed in time is tested in the area of appropriately selected mediatization moments, meaning the selection of a set of points in time which will ensure a systematic comparison of the use of particular media.

The second postulate in specifying mediatization, according to Ekström et al., refers to the analysis of various media in the perspective of their *media specificity*, that is, the characteristics resulting from the type of media, genres, technologies or institutions, and the *context specificity*, meaning their social and geographical dimensions. Ekström et al. see three options for insight into both processes. The first puts research into a specific social context and narrows it down to one type of medium. We can then capture the subject, time, place, and way of mediatizing given social interactions (Fornäs, 2016). The second solution narrows the study down to some particular focus or approach and conducts a comparative study of different types of media. The third approach, on the other hand, is to grasp how different media mediate and next mediate the selected area of life or social practices. The last of the postulates by Ekström et al. concerns measurability. The authors call not only for quantitative but also qualitative empirical analyzes of mediatization as a media-related change, which takes place within "certain realms of activity" (Ekström et al., 2016: 1103).

According to Andreas Hepp (2013b), the study of mediatization can be undertaken by following one of the two perspectives. The first, described as *diachronous mediatization research*, refers to popular comparative studies over time. They relate to the analysis of "the communicative figurations of certain mediatized worlds at different points in time and comparing their results"

(Hepp, 2013b: 624). These provide conclusions about the changes in the media and social changes that have occurred over time. Their implementation fulfills the postulate of historicizing, meaning the reconstruction of the communicative figuration from a given period in the past.

The second approach, or *synchronous mediatization research*, involves comparisons within *mediatization moments*. Hepp (2013b: 625) assumes that mediatization has moments that he himself describes as “eruptive moments” or as “mediatization waves.” They characterize the development of media, which results in a qualitative change in the media environment. The author suggests two ways to study mediatization from this perspective. The first is to focus attention on communicative figuration before and after the wave of mediatization and then comparing them. The second method concentrates on comparisons between generations, assuming that generations bring together groups of people with common experiences and even a common form of media socialization.

In the approaches taking into account media logics, the perspective of mediatization research looks different. In the classic proposal by Winfried Schulz (2004), the process of social change results from the development of media in the form of extension, substitution, amalgamation, and accommodation. Thus, the study of mediatization boils down to media analysis in each of these modes. The solution that bypasses these modes brings into operation the mediatization research by Kent Asp (2014a), paying attention to the causal mechanism of adaptation.

In his opinion, the study of mediatization focuses on the extent to which individuals and institutions outside of the media adapt to media logics. In contrast to previous proposals, Asp assumes that the analysis should take into account the whole of mediatization as a one-dimensional process from social learning, rather than individual process modes. In practice, he sees the four modes of mediatization proposed by Schulz (2004) as various manifestations of adaptation to media power.

Among the three forms of media and context specifics submitted by Ekström et al. (2016), our study touches on the process in which various media mediate and mediatize the idea of a secular state and the relationship between the Church and state. We are inclined to study the causal mechanism in mediatization. Therefore, we focus on the extent to which political actors and representatives of religion adapt to media logics. Based mostly on the research material from the media, we essentially get the media coverage for the analysis, which keeps a trace of clear interaction between the parties. It will not be an overestimation to accept that a systematic qualitative analysis of these materials will point to mediatized moments. However, one issue is worth clarifying. Strömbäck and Esser (2014a)

see certain degrees of political mediatization, depending on the involvement of the media and political actors in the various logics of action. In this study, we move away from looking at mediatization in the context of degrees in favor of a long-term adaptation analysis, in which we perceive clear moments of tension, that is, already described mediatized moments.

2.10 Mediatization affects the media effect

Theoretical and empirical studies on mediatization increasingly indicate that the analysis of the effects of this process goes beyond the simple division of the world into dependent and independent variables. However, there is still a lack of agreement among researchers whether mediatization can be simply reduced to the media effect, as we usually describe the consequences of media operations. On one side of the dispute, Schulz (2004) claims that mediatization simultaneously contains and exceeds the media effect. On the other hand, Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby (2015) maintain that mediatization focuses not on the media effect, but the mutual relationship between changes in the media and communication and changes in culture and society.

Early studies on the media effect draw our attention to two aspects. First of all, Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton (1960) indicate that the first consequence of the media effect comes down to the existence of media institutions. Therefore, in the case of mediatization, it is impossible to assign it to already founded media institutions. Mediatization is itself the consequence of the expansion of these institutions, followed by the driving force for their operation. In this sense, we cannot treat it in terms of the simple media effect. Second, Walter Lipmann (1922) recognizes that the media plays the role of a bridge between images in and outside our heads. In recent years, some studies clearly return to this intuition (Guo et al., 2015). Their results compared with the mediatization process do not clearly indicate whether it goes through a simple translation of the message into the recipient's thinking.

What, then, does the effect associated with mediatization consist in? The best answer we can give is based on the three levels of a society's functioning. When it comes to the level of individuals and small groups (micro) and institutions (meso), they include the division into the *media effect* and the *mediatization effect* (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Kepplinger, 2008). According to this distinction, mediatization does not assume to influence the audience on the basis of the models of direct media influence known to us (Carey, 2002; Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Jansson-Boyd, 2010; Katz et al., 1973; McCombs, 2004; McLuhan, 1964; McQuail & Windahl, 1993; Noelle-Neumann, 1984). In turn, the mediatization

effect points to the non-linear interplay of media changes on the one hand and changes in culture and society on the other (Hepp et al., 2015).

However, we cannot omit Schulz (2004), who claims that mediatization also includes and exceeds the media effect. At the micro level, there function individual social interactions that can be geared to submission to media logic or other institutional logics. The researcher determines whether the logic of the media dominates. If the answer is positive, an open way to analyze the media effect appears. Earlier, we assumed along with Hjarvard (2014b) that mediatization points to some general patterns of interaction created by the media that take place at the meso level. Rational actions of individuals focused on submitting to the logic of the media may have an effect not only on an individual but also on social institutions. The process remains clearly non-media-centric, which means the possibility of not only media logic acting, but also the logics of other social institutions to act. The basic consequences of this non-media-centric approach include a significant weakening of the possibility of observing the direct media effect.

In this study, it is examined the mediatization of the idea of a secular state at the micro and meso levels. The result of the analysis will therefore not directly provide knowledge about the correctness of macro mediatization. This follows James Coleman's (1994) assumption that any effect on a macro level of society has always been indirect. Therefore, the formulation of conclusions regarding the social macro level is possible only on the basis of empirical data from the lower levels, "which are not empirically verifiable in their entirety" (Hepp, 2013a: 49).

Collecting the whole, we can assume that the mediatization effect means a specific form of influence that at the micro-level enables the media effect to occur, but at the meso-level it clearly exceeds it, concentrating on general interaction patterns that emerge in the mutual relations between change in the media and changes in society. This mediatization effect reveals itself in the five dimensions proposed by Schrott (2009). They allow predicting the probability that individuals and institutions will be pressured to adapt to media logics.

The first concerns the dimension of *causes and rational criteria*, meaning the evoked principle and accompanying rationalization in a given case based on which the justification for adjusting to mediatization in a given matter arises. The second dimension concerns the *context* that indicates the limits of the influence of media logic and determines the way to present a given idea. Schrott defines the third dimension as *control*, which triggers sanctions related to mediatization. In democratic media systems, this comes down to the fear of not being covered, or not speaking out. The fourth dimension, or externalization of *contingency*, points to a group of problems that can be resolved using

media logic and the remaining ones which should be quieted. The fifth dimension concerns *competing institutions*. It assumes that the greater the competition between institutions, the greater the possibility for actors to find a balance between these institutions. This is related to the question concerning what other institutions may be against the behavior of the actors.

3 Mediatization of religion and politics

So far, we have presented issues related to the general theory of mediatization. In the third chapter, we will introduce the mediatization of religion and the mediatization of politics as specific fields for a subsequent analysis of the idea of a secular state and the Church-state relationship. The research on the literature on mediatization of religion and the mediatization of politics is proceeding in autonomic directions. It reveals the specifics and separate achievements of both areas of research. Given these differences, we discuss each area separately. In the first part, we recall key phenomena related to the progressing mediatization of the religious sphere and emphasize the appropriation of media logic within the agency of representatives of religion. In the next part, we address the problem of mediatization in relation to politics. We point to the possibilities of shaping this relationship on the one hand in the scientific literature based on media dominance, and on the other hand from the perspective of media politics. Applying theoretical solutions in the mediatization of religion and the mediatization of politics, we consider the problem of mediatization according to the idea of a secular state in the broad context of social change exerted by changes in the media and communication.

3.1 Designating mediatization of religion

Mediatization as a double-sided process (Hjarvard, 2012b) follows two basic directions of development. First of all, the media have gained relative autonomy in comparison to other social institutions such as education or religion. Second, the media are linked with these institutions to such an extent that in a sense they impose new rules on their functioning. This view also refers to the realm of religion. This specific form of mediatization, meaning the mediatization of religion, however, has a separate theoretical background and a growing number of edited volumes with empirical studies (Furseth, 2018; Hjarvard & Lövheim, 2012; Lövheim, 2013; Lundby, 2018).

At the beginning of the research on religious mediatization in *Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture* (Hoover & Lundby, 1997), its editors departed from a simplified combination of media studies and religious studies in favor of more sophisticated forms of creating religious meanings and their transformation within limits set by the media. The prospect of a joint study of the media space and religions outlined by Steward M. Hoover and Knut Lundby has revealed

two major conclusions. First, undoubtedly, contemporary religion articulated by both religious and secular actors “cannot be grasped without understanding the media and how it influences society and culture” (Hoover & Lundby, 1997: 553). Second, the popularity of research on the interaction between the media and religion has clearly increased in the academic world, which can easily be attributed to the so-called religion and media turn (Engelke, 2010).

In this context, a fundamental thesis should be set that marks the space for analyzing the mediatization of religion. As Hjarvard notes (2008a: 11) in *The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change*:

“[...] modern media not only present or report on religious issues; they also change the very ideas and authority of religious institutions and alter the ways in which people interact with each other when dealing with religious issues.”

Mediatization of religion, therefore, affects religious institutions and people functioning in the context of religious issues. This characteristic change, which takes place under the influence of the media, refers directly to the ideas and the authority of the former, as well as the interaction among the latter. This case raises the question of the direct causes of change in religious institutions and the environment of people associated with religion. For precisely designating the area of religious mediatization analysis, Hjarvard uses Meyrowitz’s three metaphors of communication media: *media as conduits*, *media as language*, and *media as environments* (Meyrowitz, 1993).

First, the metaphor of media as conduits hides the ability of the media to transfer symbols and messages from the sender to the recipient at a distance. In Hjarvard’s (2008a) analysis, this metaphor refers directly to the media content. As such, the media distribute a number of religious symbols. They consist of the public side of religious rituals and sacred events (Dayan & Katz, 1994; Hoover, 2006; B. Meyer & Moors, 2005). They point to the existence of secular contents of a religious nature in society’s imagination (Knott et al., 2013b). However, it should be remembered that the metaphor of media as conduits is mostly based on educated media genres, which to some extent also determine the religious symbols presented, depending on whether we are dealing with news or entertainment.

The second metaphor, media as languages, first of all reflects the “various ways the media format the messages and frame the relationship between the sender, content, and receiver” (Hjarvard, 2008a: 12). In the context of the mediatization of religion, the basic mechanisms that organize this space should include using genres of popular culture. This takes place on two levels. The first concerns media property. Public media that provide religious institutional representation in their programs function

with certain tension among formats of popular culture, the mission of public radio and TV, and high ethical standards. Commercial media, generally being profit-oriented, follow the primacy of entertainment. The second level concerns directly used genres. Religious representation in public news goes in a different direction than the entertainment media (Hjarvard, 2008a; Nybro Petersen, 2013).

The last of the metaphors that affects the media as environments focuses on the way in which relatively set features of a given medium determine individual human interactions and social communication. Hjarvard (2008a) recognizes that in contrast to fleeting messages, the media themselves are a stable environment that is changing and spreading to other areas of social life.

From the perspective of the metaphors used, the mediatization of religion in question turns out to be an important tool in media analysis as a factor influencing the transformation of religion in society (Lövheim & Lynch, 2011). At the same time, however, the mediatization of religion requires clarification, which helps us to overcome a simplistic view of the phenomenon.

3.2 Understanding mediatization of religion

As noticed by Hoover and Lundby (1997), the regularity that the media uses religion more often than religion uses the media gives us a glimpse of the phenomenon of religious mediatization developed in this chapter. Intuition suggests that the concept of the mediatization of religion indicates a certain instrumental treatment of religion, which after all has been present among people since time immemorial (Eliade, 1959). Complicating this problem requires careful operations and understanding the concept. We solve this problem based on our reflections on the essence of the mediatization of religion. We next refer to the agency involved in this process and its consequences.

Accepting the perspective of media as playing the role of agents of religious changes along with Hjarvard (2008a, pp. 10–11), we understand the mediatization of religion as:

“The historical process in which the media have taken over many of the social functions that used to be performed by religious institutions [...]. Through the process of mediatization, religion is increasingly being subsumed under the logic of media, both in terms of institutional regulation, symbolic content and individual practices.”

Due to its general tone, such conceptualization requires an explanation. First, it is clear that the basis for the definition determines the influence of media logic on the changes in religious institutions. Taking into consideration that these institutions take part in transformation under the influence of various contemporary phenomena, for example, individualization and secularization,

it is necessary to clarify that the mediatization of religion, as a process that accompanies it, does not go in one direction (Hjarvard, 2012b; Lövheim & Lynch, 2011). Liv Ingeborg Lied observed that this process “may be truer for some cultural sectors or discourses than for others” (Lied, 2012: 187). As we can remember, in the previous chapter, it was assumed that the mechanisms of mediatization also appeared in CEE after the collapse of the Soviet regime, and the media jumped into differentiation. We suggest, therefore, that looking at mediatized religion from this perspective has to be embedded in the context of a particular society and its national or regional media culture.

The presented concept (Hjarvard, 2008b) does not directly determine the nature of the changes that occur in religion, understood here in an essential way. Hjarvard (2012b) supplements this gap in his later work by pointing out that as a result of mediatization processes, a new religion does not appear, but new social conditions for privatization and understanding the current religion appear. When he mentions that media logic determines changes in “institutional regulation, symbolic content and individual practices” (Hjarvard, 2008a: 11), he clearly ignores the importance of the agency of mediatization participants. Following the suggestion of Mia Lövheim (2011), when we accept the perspective of mediatizing religion, we face the problem of analyzing and understanding the role played by religious actors. In this way, we transfer the center of gravity from the difficult intangible social process to the agency of religious actors (single institutions, religious groups, individuals, but also symbols and narratives).

In the matter of the agency of religious representatives, Günter Thomas (2016) takes a further step by pointing out that religious institutions anticipate the media’s representation of religion. In his view, the mediatization of religion results from the activity of religious actors and institutions, influenced by the media’s representations of religion. Such a thesis brings about two fundamental consequences. First, it confirms the previous criticism of the lack of agency in the discussed concept. In fact, empirical studies on the mediatization of religion are able to add something to the current theory from the perspective of the analysis of religious actors as participants in the process. Second, Thomas clearly specifies that mediatization is something in the form of a mirror process in which the power of religious actors reflects images and narratives from the media.

3.3 Three forms of mediatized religion

To understand what is going on in the concept of mediatizing religion means to describe the forms of its occurrence. In his taxonomy, Hjarvard (2012b) accepts a clear division into three forms that require separate discussion and

	Institution in primary control	Role of religious agents	Religious content	Basic genres
Religious media	Religion	Owners, producers, performers	Interpretations of religious and moral advice	Religious services, preaching, discussions
Journalism on religion	Journalism	Sources	Utterances and actions of religious actors framed by secular news values	News, moderated debate
Banal religion	Media	Fictional representations of ministers and believers	A bricolage of texts, iconography, and liturgy of various religions	Entertainment, fiction, self-help service, consumer advice

Fig. 3.1: Hjarvard's three forms of mediatized religion. Source: Based on Hjarvard, 2012b:40

criticism: *religious media*, *journalism on religion*, and *banal religion*. As Fig. 3.1 indicates, each of these three concerns a separate way of communicating religion in the public sphere. Each one also points to a specific type of power and control when representing religious content.

The first form of mediatized religion proposed by Hjarvard concerns religious media. The author refers to organizations and practices performed and controlled by religious actors. He also points out that religious actors include religious institutions as well as individuals. Hjarvard assumes that religious media are primarily subject to the supervision of religious institutions, but at the same time, they must adapt to media logic in various ways. As a result, as confirmed by studies from various geographical areas in Europe, religious media strive for standards recognized by all media, including professional journalism and technology. In this perspective, the issue of religious actors turns out to be problematic. Religious organizations are able to control their media and fine tune their editorial policy according to media logic. The practices of religious individuals, however, remain limited to the possibilities set by media interfaces (H. A. Campbell, 2010a; Cheong, 2013; Kołodziejska, 2018). Their practices should, therefore, be seen not as the expression of religious media but as the religious users' activity in the media (Borg, 2009; Guzek, 2015b; Rončáková, 2013).

Such a narrowly defined perspective of religious media turns out to be problematic due to one more reason. As Thomas (2016) points out, as long as religious actors administer religious media, they will represent the form of technologically advanced mediation rather than mediatization. Continuing with what was said

earlier, Lövheim (2011) only sees changes in the agency of these actors towards media logic that are able to show the ongoing process of mediatization.

The second form of mediatized religion defined by Hjarvard (2012b) as journalism on religion affects the visibility of religion in the public sphere. Numerous empirical studies confirm the significant position of religious issues in media agendas (Cole, 2006; Knoblauch, 2014; J. Mitchell, 2010; Sumiala, 2013) and the increase of media content related to the religious sphere (Knott et al., 2013b). At the same time, the media coverage of religious issues takes into account the logic of the media and the workshop of journalists, not the perspective and motivations of religion. Hjarvard (2012b) states that since journalism is associated with secular values in the service of society, news media can, therefore, take on the role of instruments for modernizing religion. This approach to matters indicates a clear change between past and contemporary societies. Whereas in the past, religions reacted relatively cautiously to the emergence of subsequent media (Pokorna-Ignatowicz, 2002; Vian, 2012), presently, the many new forms of communication force changes in the activities of religious actors in a penetrating, fast, and effective way (H. A. Campbell, 2010b).

Journalism on religion in practice relies on a certain logic of framing. Based on Hjarvard's (2016) observations, we can notice that this type of framing is due to several principles related in particular to the primacy of economics in the media. Religious content, above all, must be worth publishing. Religious actors must be willing to serve only as a source of information for a journalist. In non-factual genres, religious representatives must agree to such a position of religion, which places it in line with many cultural resources used to attract the attention of recipients.

In relation to journalism on religion, one more postulate appears. The context of North and South America indicates that placing the media in the center of the religious movement leads to the mutual joining of both orders to the extent that from the organizational perspective, their separation turns out to be unnecessary (Hoover, 2006; Martino, 2013). The Catholic and Orthodox faiths prevailing in CEE clearly water down the possibility of radically joining all areas of their Church life, especially the sacraments, with the world of the media. In turn, both denominations emphasize the real liturgy as the center of community life (Grube, 2003; O'Collins, 2008). The religious culture of the geographical region in question, therefore, limits access to the transformation of religious rituals according to the key of media logic.

The last of the described forms of mediatized religion concerns the so-called *banal religion*. Hjarvard (2008a) introduces this term into his theory of mediatizing religion by using the earlier concept of *banal nationalism* by

Michael Billig (1995). In his original approach, Billig emphasizes that various national symbols remain in use, but not as a result of the expansion of national culture. After moving the mechanism to the area of religion, Hjarvard identifies numerous banal religious representations and experiences that have no relation to or a limited relationship with institutional religions. They maintain their religious dimension, but they lose their connection with the original symbolism. Hjarvard calls them banal, precisely because of their non-affiliation with institutional religions. Consequently, he attributes extraordinary mobility to them and points out that the banal religious representations have a certain value of decontextualization and a “non-propositional character” (Hjarvard, 2012b: 36), which allows their imperceptible functioning in society, while enriching the social context with whatever is religious.

The concept of banal religion submitted by Hjarvard has particularly deep connections with the way high modernity societies function. On the one hand, the presence of banal religion in the social imagination connects with the process of secularization. When religious institutions lose their monopoly on the worship of symbols and gods, the elements of banal religion replace the imaginations created by these institutions (Hjarvard, 2008a). On the other hand, the traces of banal religion in the media point to the daily perceptions and practices of members of society. Banal religion, therefore, plays a significant role in understanding how daily religious practices really take place.

Finally, it must be mentioned that the banal form of mediatized religion turns out to be doubly problematic. First of all, the concept clearly ignores the key perspective of metaphysics for religion and the order of life (Lied, 2012). Banal religion arises as a result of combining meanings and stripping symbols of their original sense. When considering banal religion, we see that the supernatural space is replaced by action, emotions, and acted contexts. Second, the ideas and experiences on the basis of which the representations of banal religion appear in the media can arise without any links to the source of representation (individual persons, collectivity) and institutional religion (Lynch, 2007). This is confirmed in the media coverage of religious issues in the UK, where the so-called *secular sacred* elements also emerge within the religious content (Knott et al., 2013b).

3.4 Spheres of mediatized religion

After reviewing the forms of mediatized religion, let's now focus on the spheres in which the whole process takes place. Mediatization of religion, regardless of its form and direction, affects specific spaces of social life. We must take into account that the public sphere is becoming more and more mediatized. The initial

Type of actor	Type of religious activity	Type of non-religious activity
Religious	Performing religious communication	Performing non-religious or secular communication
Secular	Performing religious communication	Performing secular communication

Fig. 3.2: Typology of religion communicated in a public sphere. Source: Based on Lövheim, 2012; Lövheim & Axner, 2015: 39

debate regarding this sphere, marked by Jürgen Habermas’s (1991) key concept of the role of the media, was underestimated. This resulted in the fact that Habermas perceived the media not so much as forming a public sphere but performing specific functions in it (Butsch, 2007). In this sense, his concept clearly does not match the growing role of the media and changes related to the digital revolution in the last two decades. Consequently, when considering the public sphere, we should first seek to understand it in an appropriate way to the current realities of the dominant communication method of mediation. Starting from these assumptions, we now move on to the proposal by Terje Rasmussen (2014), who defines the public sphere as a space created by “communication about public matters in journalism, opinion, and argumentation, in face-to-face communication as well as in mediated communication.” In the public sphere understood as such, the position of religion changes dynamically. We even see that religion transforms in several ways, as revealed in specific spaces of the public sphere.

As a starting point in terms of these specific spaces, let’s focus on Lövheim’s (2012) typology of religion communicated in the public sphere (Fig. 3.2). She highlights the possibility of the overlap of religious actors and content in the public sphere.

Categories appearing in the adopted typology allow us to designate spaces in public communication within which religious actors occupy a certain position, define themselves, and take action (Lövheim & Axner, 2015). Three criteria adopted by Axner (2013) prove helpful in finding this position: (1) claims, authority, and legitimation, (2) types of issues/framing of these issues, and (3) the use of religious language/arguments. The first concerns the question of who these religious actors taking part in public debates are? Is it their personal opinion or the voice of a religious community? Do they place themselves in the position of authority over their community or the whole of society? Another criterion assumes looking at the issues currently being undertaken by religious actors. The question is whether religious actors frame issues in such a way as to reach a larger number of recipients than a fellow believer. In practice, Lövheim

and Linderman (2015) indicate that it is about appealing to values that are more than particularly religious, while Axner (2015) sees this in actors changing the position of their religious discourse, for example, how to participate in defending democracy to show how we should build a democracy. The third criterion refers to the language and argumentation used by religious actors. It concerns specifically checking the use of religious language and religious symbols in a particular type of media. Here an important element refers to the determination of possible negative attributes assigned in this religion process.

The position of religious actors can be located in several separate spaces of the mediated public sphere: *the religious media sphere*, *journalism sphere*, *cultural sphere*, and *digital sphere* (Lövheim & Axner, 2015). The religious media sphere includes the first of the three forms of mediatized religion, or religious media, identified by Hjarvard (2012b). In the original approach, it expresses the coexistence of religious actors and religious contents. The context of the Catholic world indicates the erosion of this regularity in at least two areas. First of all, the number of *hybrid events* increases, which connect the sacred issues of individual communities and the dynamics of media events (Hepp & Krönert, 2010). Second, as the example of Poland illustrates, Catholic media are able to enter the role of first-class news sources at every level of the media system in areas where saturation with secular media makes this nil or insufficient (Guzek, 2016a).

The second space of mediatized religion, called the journalism sphere, refers to Hjarvard's category of journalism on religion. In this sphere, religious contents do not necessarily interact with the active role of religious actors. Its organization connects with the primacy of establishing the order of information by journalists publishing in the news, editorials, and columns. The key to understanding the position of religion in this sphere lies in religious language and religious argumentation sifted through the journalist principles of newsworthiness and the principles of media logic (Lövheim & Axner, 2015). The third concerns the discussed cultural sphere of mediatized religion which refers to the areas of media content that do not tackle the spheres of news, editorials, and columns. Here, we are talking about the entertainment space provided by the media, especially the stories of banal religion.

When discussing this topic, however, it should be noted that the division between the journalist and cultural spheres calls for precision. Individual studies related to mediatized rituals or agenda-setting reveal the combination of news and entertainment and the smaller or greater presence of a banal representation of religion (Aksamit, 2012; Sumiala, 2014). The last of the addressed spaces by Lövheim and Axner is called the digital media sphere. The authors point to its new and original philosophy of action, separate from previous media. In the

digital media sphere, the private space mixes with the public space, which favors the establishment of the so-called mass-self communication (Castells, 2012). In their analysis, apart from the religious contents and religious actors, the accent falls on users who do not formally represent religious institutions, yet for whom religion becomes an element they identify with.

The above-outlined spheres of mediatized religion coincide to a large part with previously presented forms of mediatized religion. However, we see in this section that regardless of the form adopted by mediated religion, environmental variables shape the positions adopted by religious actors.

3.5 Mediatization in the context of secularization

The transformation of religion, when influenced by changes in the media, indicates connections of mediatization with gradual secularization. The increasing number of references to religious issues in the media seem to suggest de-secularization (P. L. Berger, 1999; Hjelm, 2012) or re-sacralization (Demerath, 2003) processes. However, the previously mentioned studies (Künkler et al., 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2004) confirm Hjarvard's (2008a) approach, in which the mediatization of religion plays the role of an element of secularization. Collective and individual religious actors accommodate themselves to the dominant media logic. At the same time, (1) the religious content becomes independent from the control of religious actors and begins to function on the principle of a banal religion, and (2) the actors themselves lose control over the rank-and-file representatives of their religion. As a result, religion clearly loses its presently important social role.

When it comes to the relationship between mediatization and secularization, Hjarvard (2012b: 24) specifies in a separate way that "the mediatization of religion involves the decline of institutionalized religious authorities (and the rise of media as authorities) at the same time as the mediatization of religion also reflects the continued presence, transformation, and significance of religious imaginations in secular societies." If the religious authority in Hjarvard's resolution does not raise doubts, then talking about media authority raises the need to clarify what we actually mean. We can clarify this issue based on the concept of religion in the understanding of the Czech theologian and philosopher Tomáš Halík.

In one of his lectures on the role of Christianity in Europe, Halík (2004) adopts a functional perspective in which it is not religion that integrates society, but what integrates society is its religion. He assumes that from this point of view, the word *religion* can be replaced with the Latin equivalent *religio* to express the

power of building social cohesion. Halík identifies successive forms of *religio* in the history of European civilization.

In the Roman Empire, he perceives *religio* in the ritual practices of the inhabitants of Rome. In the period between Constantine's reform and Charlemagne, he sees a change towards the political *religio* that is slowly becoming Christianity. Halík states that in modern times, the Christian *religio* is separated from the Christian faith, and the lack of justification for the functioning of the Christian *religio* brings about secularization. In his opinion, in the eighteenth century, science has become Europe's *religio*. At the beginning of the twentieth century, its place is taken by the political *religio* of totalism and national socialism. On the other hand, after the Second World War, the media are growing and adopting the role of a force that integrates society.

The fact that, according to Halík, the media remain the *religio* of modernity should be considered in two ways. First, assuming the truth of the thesis presented by the author, the media determine the most lasting current social order. In this sense, they are, therefore, authoritative. Second, Hjarvard (2012b) would agree with Halík that the media appropriate a number of aspects traditionally attributed to religion (Halík, 2004). The progressing phenomenon of mediatization, therefore, gives grounds to assume that the globally mediated world will not change to a different type of *religio* for a long time.

Such an outlined view on mediatization and secularization leads to several fundamental decisions regarding the mutual dependence of these phenomena. Hjarvard (2011) reports that mediatization secularizes religion. This process, however, differs depending on the social level which we analyze. He himself refers to the three levels of secularization according to Karel Dobbelaere (2002): *societal secularization*, *organizational secularization*, and *individual secularization*. In the case of secularization at the social level, Hjarvard perceives that in his native Danish context, the role of the Church and faith have been minimized. Religious rituals continue to play a role in the lives of marginal social groups. However, media have dominated the binding and communication function of Lutheranism. In the Polish context, the situation is different. The country still functions in the context of a public religion (Casanova, 1994).

At the organizational level, Hjarvard (2011) recognizes that the Danish Protestant Church has adapted to the logic and media formats. On the other hand, it has also developed its online communication channels. In Poland, it can be seen that the problem of the adaptation of religion to media logic is just beginning to crawl, according to research studies (Guzek, 2012; Przybysz, 2008). However, unlike Denmark, the Catholic Church in Poland has developed its own media structure, which complements or replaces secular media at all levels of the

media system (Guzek, 2016a). Yet, when referring to the level of individual secularization, Hjarvard (2011) claims that the media pose a challenge concerning individual religious orientation. This takes on two dimensions. Individuals use the media during their religious practices. The units are themselves responsible for the production and circulation of banal representations of religion. This production process can go both towards secularization and the subjectivization of religious imaginations. In the case of Poland, the whole process is more difficult, since the media enter into pastoral practices based on the principles set by the Church's teachings. Therefore, laxity in the sphere of creating banal representations of religion takes place.

Mediatization of religion understood as an agent of secularization, when we consider it against the backgrounds of Denmark and Poland, will resolve one fundamental postulate. The contexts of both countries clearly diverge from the common measure. On the other hand, in both cases, similar mechanisms can be seen in the field of banal representations of religion. Therefore, in order to consider Poland's case, we have to refer to this dominant feature of mediatization when we look at its secularization potential.

3.6 Mediatization in the context of republicization

As some studies in Europe show, instead of religion being weeded out from high modernity, we can see their coexistence (Davie, 2007; Woodhead & Catto, 2012). This postulate of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2002) gives grounds for seeking the context of mediatization appropriate to the case in Poland. In undertaking this analysis, we ought to clarify two basic doubts. The first concerns the accuracy of the argument undermining the mechanism of accommodating media logic by religious actors. The second comes down to the contextualization of the process of mediatizing religion in Poland.

I mentioned that some scholars see the origins of mediatization in Luther's occurrence. Subsequent centuries confirm that their mechanism of accommodating media logic by religious actors has a universal value. In opposition to this view, David Morgan (2011) proves that in the context of Evangelical print in Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth century, religious actors did not have to adapt to the logic of secular media. Also, the nineteenth-century case of the Polish-language religious press of Upper Silesia showed this type of regularity. This case, however, requires a short description.

Between 1795–1918, Poland did not exist as a nation, and Poles functioned within the framework of three invading countries: Austria, Russia, and Prussia. In the industrialized Upper Silesia, which belonged to Prussia, families and

Polish priests were responsible for maintaining Polish culture and traditions. Thanks to the initiative of Rev. Jan Alojzy Ficek, in 1848, at the then Deutsch Piekar (today's Piekary Śląskie), a group of parishioners organized moral and educational work to fight drunkenness among the local Polish population. One of the elements of this activity was publishing *Tygodnik Mariański* [*the Marian Weekly*]. The functioning of this first religious magazine in Upper Silesia pointed to mutual tensions between religious actors and representatives of the public administration. Rev. Ficek imposed mechanisms and models for transmitting patriotic contents to Poles during the partitions (Guzek, 2010; Pater, 1991; Wuwer, 2002). The local authorities responded to his activity by using repression as general Prussian hostility towards the Catholic Church and Polish identity.

In the light of the presented cases, reservations should be kept towards the general mechanism for accommodating media logic by religious actors. The best solution, therefore, turns out to be Morgan's (2011) thesis that the standard mechanism of mediatization will be limited only by the specifics of the analyzed case. Studies on the mediatization of religion in Poland are fledgling, therefore, it is worth referring to David Herbert's (2011, 2015) concept of *republicicization of religion*. Herbert points to three separate contexts (post-colonial, post-communist, and Western society) in which the visibility of public religions has increased in the last three decades. At the same time, he sees this republicicization of religion "as a result of a combination of developments in communications, media markets and socio-political factors in different contexts across the world."

Herbert emphasizes that the increase in the visibility of religion relates to the specific activity of religious and political actors. First of all, the functioning of religious institutions on the commercial media market takes place thanks to the increased involvement of representatives of religion. The Polish example of Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, director of Radio Maryja, proves that the agency of this religious actor in the sphere of the media can stimulate and consolidate a nationwide audience, which will eventually turn into a massive community supporting its medium (Guzek, 2015b).

Second, the activity of political actors boils down to initiating and maintaining discourses on religion as a public matter. However, religion plays a role in these discourses mainly for the political elite and a secular audience. It is therefore embedded in the context of conflict and controversy. Herbert draws this conclusion on the basis of studies, which point to a clear tendency of the media's interest on the Islamic issue, especially in Great Britain (Knott, Poole, & Taira, 2013a; Poole, 2002, 2012). In the case of Poland, the involvement of political actors in religious discourse boils down to the question of the presence and role of the Catholic Church in the public sphere. However, one must remember

about the specific context of such a presentation. First, during the communist period, the Church was the basic space for expressing anti-communist opposition. Second, after the system change, the Church co-formed the parareligious state, in which it formally functioned in separation from the state, and thanks to its moral authority, it strengthened its political position. We can thus clearly see that republicization comes as the result of the agency of religious actors.

Although Lövheim treats republicization as an approach to mediatization, Herbert postulates their dissociation. In the discussed case of mediatization, the key to understanding the broader media coverage of religion comes down to accommodating to media logic. Herbert points to some areas of publicization, for example, the parliamentary debate about a denominational law that does not reach the public space. In the light of his assumptions that political actors make religious issues a pressing problem in the public sphere, the example of a parliament debate turns out to be inappropriate. As a last resort, the visibility of religion in the public sphere boils down to what comes to our attention through the media. It is therefore impossible to get to mediatization symptoms in any other way than through the agency of religious and political actors who increase the visibility of religion.

3.7 Conditions and consequences of the mediatization of religion

So far, we have outlined the basic concept known as the mediatization of religion. However, we did not have two elements needed to present a complete picture of this phenomenon: the conditions in which the entire process may take place and the consequences it brings about. Apart from republicization of religion, current theories narrow the mediatization of religion down to Western Europe. When applying the concept to the case in Poland, we keep in mind that CEE countries depart from the context of high modernity countries. In addition, we take into account that Poland is specific when we consider its socio-religious formation.

Let's start with Gordon Lynch's (2011) observation that mediatization of religion occurs when four features dominate in a social context. First, non-confessional media institutions dominate in the system. Few media with a clearly confessional attitude function outside the mainstream and in a limited form. Second, society lacks a direct relationship with religious institutions. For this reason, access to religious and even sacred contents mainly happens through the media. Third, it is extremely easy to identify the dominant religious institution in society. Finally, a high degree of secularization occurs at the individual, institutional and social levels.

When transferring Lynch's division on the discussed case in Poland, it seems difficult to judge how many features remain in common. As in other European countries, non-confessional media dominate the Polish media system. However, it should be remembered that in no other country is the position of religious media so significant (Guzek, 2015b). Three elements illustrate this: (1) the operation of Catholic media within a separate media subsystem, (2) supplementing and in some cases even replacing other media when implementing the information function, and (3) consolidating the auditorium.

The lack of connection with religious institutions outlined by Lynch turns out to be exaggerated when we look at the context in CEE. This works well in the case of public religion in Poland. We are referring to the relationship between the nation and the dominating Catholicism consolidated during the communist period and the political system that has been firmly established after the transformation. When we look at other post-communist countries, especially the former members of the Soviet Union where Orthodoxy prevails, we also think about the growing tendency to combine religiosity with being a good citizen (Pew Research Centre, 2017).

The third of Lynch's (2011) determinants is present in CEE countries, especially in the last two decades. In Poland, the Roman Catholic Church has continually taken the dominant position ever since the Polish People's Republic. In countries that previously functioned as part of the Soviet Union, religiosity linked with Catholicism or Orthodoxy is re-emerging after the fall of Communism. However, we cannot look at the mediatization of religion through the prism of established Churches or folk Churches who have lost their social position. Rather, we are talking about the Church as an element that maintains great social significance despite the formal separation of Church and state. This is due to the last of the conditions that Lynch combines with the possibility of mediatization, which concerns secularization at the individual, institutional, and social levels. Poland can be considered from the viewpoint of ongoing secularization (Borowik, 2010), but the clear religious emancipation of individuals, institutions, or society is not happening here. When we add Russia to this case, we can see that the region should be referred to as having a moderate pace of secularization (Künkler et al., 2018).

The prerequisites for the mediatization of religion turn out to be incompatible with the CEE context. At the same time, a few studies on the media and religion in this region directly or indirectly concern the issue of mediatization (Kołodziejska, 2018; Kołodziejska & Neumaier, 2017). This incoherence turns out to be justified when we look at both contexts from the viewpoint of treating contemporary times not as a monolith but as a bloom of multiple modernities

(Eisenstadt, 2002). As a result, when talking about the preconditions for mediatization of religion in CEE countries, especially in Poland, we must use the agency of religious actors presented along with the concept of the republicization of religion.

This concerns revising Lynch's (2011) postulate about the lack of society's relationship with religious institutions and the domination of religious content submitted by the media. By adding the agency of religious actors, we will see two new elements. The first one boils down to the coexistence of religious representation in a society based on two channels: the Church and the media. The degree of consistency of these representations is different, and their colliding with each other cannot be ruled out. The second element assumes the entanglement of religious and political actors. Actors representing religious institutions do not formally have instruments that influence the actions of political actors. In practice, their personal authority or the authority of the religious institution they represent enables them to influence political actors.

In addition to these conditions, the mediatization of religion also reveals some effects. By closing the argument about this concept, we recall the basic consequences that flow from the discussed process. Hjarvard (2012b) points out that the process causes a multi-dimensional transformation of religion that crowns it with a new social condition. Thus, the mediatization of religion ultimately changes religious texts, practices, and social relations. However, individual studies indicate a number of specific regularities. In the area of religious rituals, the process reveals shared ideas about *insiders* and *outsiders* in society (Sumiala, 2014).

From the perspective of thinking in terms of the media system, the mediatization of religion boils down to a process in which religious institutions and their agents change in anticipation of the media's expectations. In practice, as Thomas (2016: 42) assumes, this process shows a "structural and processual response to the expectation of the media system's expectations." From the position of process dynamics, mediatization of religion causes three elements: the structural transformation of religious authority, changes in religious identities and changes in traditional devotional practices, and communication practices (Herbert, 2011).

In a more general way, Thomas (2016) considers the issue of the consequences of mediatization of religion by describing the four main trends associated with the process. The first consists in the self-development of media contents on the subject of religion by the media. This is clearly confirmed in most European media systems. The second points to the functional differentiation of society that dethrones religion. Recalling the earlier point of view by Halík, the media

has become the *religio* of Europe, replacing all previous *religio*: science and Christianity. Third, he sees the passage from the Church's faith to an infatuation with the media, ending with banal representations of religion. Fourth, the life of religious institutions at all levels of its activity takes place in the perspective of being under the scope of the media. This provides the basis for understanding the accommodation of religious actors to the logic of the media.

3.8 Conceptualizing the mediatization of politics

In this chapter, it is limited the previous considerations to the phenomenon of mediatizing religion. Looking at the relationship between the Church and state according to changes in society under the influence of changes in the media, however, requires us to refer to the second specific part of the theory of mediatization, the mediatization of politics. Here, a basic difficulty arises. When we talk about mediation in the context of politics, Jesper Strömbäck and Frank Esser (2014a) suggest cautiously treating it in terms of a theoretical perspective rather than a complete theory. Undoubtedly, works in the field of the mediatization of politics (Brants & van Praag, 2006; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011; van Aelst et al., 2008) confirm that the specificity of this area requires individual treatment.

At the very beginning, we can refer to Strömbäck and Esser's (2014b) popular concept. They perceive mediatization of politics as a long-term and progressive process of the growing importance of the media, whose effects transfer onto political processes, institutions, organizations, and political actors. As they specify, mediatization of politics refers to the reactive or proactive adaptation of political entities to the logic of the media in order to meet their communication needs through the media.

This approach to the matter entails several fundamental decisions. First of all, the accent on the change in society or religion presented in earlier concepts that results from changes in the media has been narrowed down to the growing importance of the media. However, the emphasis on the results of mediatizing policy more than on the process itself does not interfere with the previous decisions. In addition, it reveals the important results of mediatization in the form of the coupling of the political and media sphere. A problem arises concerning the question: what should be treated as political? Clarifying this issue further allows us to separate the mediatization of politics within the framework of the mediation of society.

In the narrow sense, when we touch upon political phenomena that are the subject of political science (Skarzyński, 2012), we distinguish between the

political (narrower) and the social (broader). When we think about politics in a broader way, we see an “ensemble of practices and institutions whose aim is to organize human coexistence” (Mouffe, 2013: XII). In the first approach, the mediatization of politics reflects the process of increasing the importance of the media in the functioning of political phenomena such as power, elections, participation, and so on. In the second, the mediatization of politics coincides with the mediatization of society, emphasizing the functions of social structure. In order to maintain the specificity of mediatizing politics, we must, therefore, move towards a narrower understanding of what is political and maintain rigor at the level of analyzing the political phenomena and not social phenomena.

Based on the presented definition of mediatization policy, Strömbäck and Esser (2014a) articulate its four dimensions. Reference to these dimensions sheds additional light on the whole concept. The first dimension emphasizes the degrees to which the media constructs sources of information on politics and society. Keeping in mind the recent decisions on the essence of politics, we should rather talk about the process of creating sources of information on political phenomena. Therefore, it concerns the extent to which political actors adapt to the logic of the media so that they are able to be newsworthy sources of information.

The second dimension touches upon the degree of media differentiation in social and political institutions. As we explained in the second chapter, this is about capturing the media in the current context: (1) their incomplete differentiation from the world of politics and (2) their partial dependence on the business world. The third dimension indicates the extent to which coverage of political issues is based on the results of either media logic or political logic. The fourth, on the other hand, concerns the extent to which political institutions and political actors submit to these logics. In the light of a narrow view of politics, it can be seen that the last two dimensions of mediatization clearly coincide with that which is invoked as the first one. As a result, we can comprehend the mediatization of politics as a phenomenon taking place at the interface between issues such as the mechanism of adaptation to the logic of the media, the inclusion of political logic and the differentiation of media from the world of politics.

3.9 Media logic versus political logic

Referring to the dimensions of the mediatization of politics (Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014a), we mentioned that political issues appear in media coverage following the implementation of media logic or political logic. In the

previous argument, however, we omitted the topic of understanding political logic. This could have led to the impression that mediatization is quite homogeneous in terms of theory and practice. In this part of the book, we fill up this gap by juxtaposing media logic and political logic. In this way, we try to show how both concepts interfere with each other.

The issue of media intervention in political events helps us to understand the relationship between media logic and political logic. In one of their earlier papers on this subject, Strömbäck and Esser (2009) paid attention to three elements. First, the media have become a key source of information, including news on political topics. Second, the media have gained partial autonomy from the world of politics and media-external institutions. Third, as a consequence of the previous two, the media's control and intervention have grown stronger. These authors assumed that "medial logic trumps political logics" (Strömbäck & Esser, 2009: 220). Thus, in the light of the dominance of the media's control function over the political sphere, they have perceived the primacy of media logic in opposition to political logic.

Under the influence of the critics of the concept that media logic is too elusive and vague, Strömbäck and Esser (2014b) have clarified that their perspective concerns the news media logic based on the dimensions of professionals, commercialism, and media technology. On the other hand, they perceive the actions of political logic formed by *polity*, *policy*, and *politics*. At the same time, they have conceptualized these constituents as follows: *polity* as the "system of rules regulating the political process in any given country," *policy* as "the process of defining problems and forming and implementing policies within a certain institutional framework," and *politics* as "the process of garnering support for one's candidacy, party or political ideas" (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014a: 5). Such a case indicates a change from the dominance of media logic over political logic towards tension between the two logics.

Zbigniew Oniszczyk (2011) draws attention to the alternative option in four possible contexts of media politics, which he understands as Janusz W. Adamowski's (2007) explicit entry into the space of media operation. The first context refers to media concentration on political leaders, the dramatization of political contents and appealing to emotions. As a result, the media become a contribution to a specific symbolic policy. Second, Oniszczyk moves towards a policy of a staff of political parties in the media. It operates on the basis of loopholes and inaccuracies in law in order to secure media positions for representatives of political parties. The third context concerns focusing the media's attention on pseudo-events, staging, and exaggerating the effects of PR activities. The last, fourth context, boils down to the direct or indirect influence of political

actors on the media, whose implementation leads these actors to achieve set political goals.

So what does mediatization of politics have to do with politicizing media? Is it possible to equally treat the primacy of the media over politics, the tension between the two spheres or the primacy of politics over the media? As we have mentioned, mediatization is based on incomplete media differentiation. The degree of this differentiation varies depending on the media system in question. However, the regularity of the independence of the media from the clear influence of policies in favor of dependence on business remains common. We see a loss here on the side of political actors. On the other hand, it does not escape our attention that the media develop their own logic, and so they do not reflect the logic of outside institutions. On the basis of this logic, the media distributes material and symbolic social resources, a reference point for political actors. The fact that political actors adjust to the ways in which the media operate confirms the primacy of mediatization of politics over politicizing media.

3.10 Results of the mediatization of politics

In the general theory of mediatization, we argued that the results of the process cannot be spoken of in terms of a simple media effect. We also tried to highlight the possible levels of analysis of the so-called mediatization research. However, when we look at this issue in the mediatization of politics, a few remarks should be made. First of all, the repeatedly referred to media differentiation is the precondition for considering the results of the whole process (Meyen, Thieroff, & Strenger, 2014). Only in a society that allows relative media autonomy can there be a need for political actors to adapt to the logic of the media. Its existence means that these actors are convinced that their presence in the media's agenda affects their political legitimacy. In the case of authoritarian rule or dictatorship, it is the media that function on the basis of political logic, imposed by the government or ruling parties holding political power. In a liberal democracy, political logic, however, gives way to media logic.

In the previous chapter, we referred to three levels of mediatization research (micro, meso, macro). Here, we would like to mention the proposal by Michael Meyen, Markus Thieroff, and Steffi Strenger (2014), in which the three levels of mediatization mainly concern the results of mediatization in the political space. In this proposal, mediatization of politics boils down to changes in political strategies. Political parties shift their focus to leaders and figures known in the media. The party's program functions in the shadow of a charismatic leader, who provides its voters mostly with entertainment rather than a good example

(Brzoza, 2014). In addition, the parties select candidates for parliament using the criterion of popularity and media expectations (T. Meyer, 2002).

Schrott's (2009) previously mentioned five dimensions of mediatization presented how individuals and societies adjust to the logic of the media. In the case of political mediatization, Meyen et al. (2014) narrow this mechanism down to resources. In their opinion, political parties primarily care for the infrastructure that will provide them with good quality media materials. They rebuild their PR departments, catch talented journalists, and find appropriate locations for their election conventions. In the case of the macro level, mediatization of politics results in the formulation of programs and restrictive guidelines in the field of expressing party members and parliamentarians.

The results of the mediatization of politics require considering two additional perspectives: media visibility and the systemic approach. In referring to the first concept, we go back to what Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech (2013: 101) outlined:

“Media visibility has contributed to the emergence of a second type of political legitimacy. In addition to existing electoral legitimization, there is media legitimization (catholic) obtained through telegraphy (good looks and one's image disseminated by the media, especially television).”

In the author's opinion, the mediatization of politics leads to the formation of a new, less formal approach to politicians. In practice, political activity functions according to the mechanism of continuous verification by media users and potential voters. This new form of legitimacy is also associated with the growing popularity of research on electoral preferences (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2006).

Separate results of policy mediatization reveal the analysis of the system perspective. The term *reflexive mediatization* appears in the thesis by Marcinkowski and Steiner (2014). They describe the specific situation of a political system that consists in its being based on mass-media performances. In practice, non-media systems, such as the political system, appropriate the media's ability to focus the public's attention. This laconic grasp of the systemic approach to mediatization engages specific terminology.

First of all, Marcinkowski and Steiner recognize that as a result of the functional differentiation of modern societies, we can talk about media and politics as two among many other subsystems (including economics, religion, education). A paradox arises here. On the one hand, each of these subsystems is different. Every person also creates within their boundaries their own image of society. On the other hand, the systems in question are equivalent. Referring to the systemic approach by Luhmann (2012), these authors (Marcinkowski & Steiner, 2014: 76) state that:

“[...] the social system as a whole appears to be the sum of multiple perspectives. In other words, the functionally differentiated society recognizes no preferred perspective from which a whole generally accepted ‘true’ description of society can be gained.”

Next, Marcinkowski and Steiner distinguish a *function* or the subsystem role in the whole system and *performance*, or the relation of this subsystem to other parts of the social system. In the media perspective, the first one understands the ability to provide the system with self-observation. On the other hand, they reduce the second to creating public interest and acceptance for specific social issues. Marcinkowski and Steiner recognize that, although individual subsystems have autonomy, they simultaneously receive stimulating stimuli from their environment. In this sense, the mediatization of a given social sphere has somewhat of a *performance relationship* to them. These authors also have no doubt that other subsystems remain focused on using the effects of media performance and in their strategic communication. They define this relationship using the term *reflexive mediatization*.

All elements of the social system today need to be embedded in public attention resources. They are setting themselves up for media performances and then adjust their strategic activity to their activity. The mediatization of politics is very specifically present here. This political subsystem directs people towards mass-media performances and what we previously defined as the media logic. In the sense of reflexive mediatization, the political subsystem begins to reflect what the media are able to easily identify and pass on. However, this does not mean a process of political colonization by the media or a decline in political culture. The initiative and the causative power still persist on the side of politics, which provides ideas and proposals for change so much that in these conditions there are growing mutual dependencies among particular parts of the social system. The systemic approach thus proves that the mediatization of politics equals a complex process of mutual connections between political decisions and media performances.

Part II

4 Methodological background

We will now present the next part of the book whose contents are based on the empirical findings in the area of media representing the idea of a secular state. The current reflection generally referred to two phenomena. The first chapter was concentrated on the concept of a secular state and the Church-state relationship. The second and third chapters were referred to the theory of mediatization. By drawing attention to the theory of the mediatization of religion and politics, we brought up the approach used in the prospective analysis of the idea of a secular state. Let's now begin the next part, whose contents are based on the empirical findings in the area of the media covering the idea of a secular state.

4.1 Introduction to the research design

The final title of the book, *The Mediatizing Secular State: Media, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Poland*, was formulated at an advanced stage of this study. It is noticed that our attempt to look at the dependencies between media contents and the idea of a secular state are clearly part of the theoretical proposals for mediatization. We conducted the research according to the mixed methods based on the qualitative and quantitative analyzes of the collected material. In this part of the book, therefore, we will present the design of our research, paying particular attention to the subsequent elements of the research, characterizing data sources and the adopted methods and foundations for their triangulation.

In order to reassure the reader, we must point out that the epistemological conclusions in the field of combining methods and individual approaches are presented below. At this stage, let us refer just to the research period and the general presentation of the three stages of this research design.

We undertook an analysis in the years 1989–2015 and have supplemented it with data from 2017. The starting point of the analysis refers to the partly free elections to the Polish parliament on June 4, 1989. The fact that Solidarity won and focused on Lech Wałęsa's party allowed the former anti-communist opposition to create a government headed by the first non-communist prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. This symbolic separation from the Polish People's Republic created a new context for the category of a secular state and its Church-state relationship. We concluded this analysis on October 25, 2015, with the latest elections to the Polish parliament, when the nation's political power for the first time since 1989 entered into the hands of just one political formation, the United Right (an informal coalition of parties PiS, PT and PR).

This closure of the analytical framework, of course, has its limitations. After the takeover of power by the camp centered around Jarosław Kaczyński, there was a marked change in the quality of Church-state relations. The specifics of this fusion of political power and institutional religion can be seen as material for another publication. Here we treat the timeframe adopted in a flexible way. First, the results of this study based on such a long period collide with the data from the 2017 questionnaire, which deals with the issues of the secular state and Church-state relations after 1989. Second, we also approach the collected material on media analysis in a flexible way, which is shredded and incomplete. We will talk about the specifics of this limitation later.

The basis of this research design is determined by three subsequent research stages. The first one begins with a media contents analysis. Its results are used here in a double way. First of all, they provide a general quantitative understanding of the distribution of categories used in the material of the studied media. Second, they serve as a reference point in the subsequent qualitative analysis of media contents. Together with the content analysis, we analyze legal acts and campaign documents of political parties in the field of Church-state relations.

The second stage of our research comes down to the grounded theory. We perform procedures related to this approach and describe the material and its dependencies in order to build the seeds of our own theory. In the process of the saturation of the media material and grounding the theory, we select essential findings from the content analysis, the analysis of legal acts and the campaign documents of political parties. As a result, we present larger descriptions of the phenomena, their actors and the regularities forming them in the framework of these issues. The theory we build is embedded in the parallel phenomena present in the scientific literature on mediatization. As a result, we read the results in the key of the mediatization of religion and politics.

The third stage of research, it is referred to the questionnaire methods. With the quota sample of the population, we analyze the current attitude of the respondents towards the idea of a secular state and the Church-state relationship. This helps determine to what extent the media belong to the basic sources of information on the subject matter. We also checked whether knowledge about the secular state is associated with media representations or other professional sources, for example, law and electoral programs. In the analysis, We also try to grasp the respondents' knowledge about past events that have influenced the way the idea of a secular state in Poland is shaped.

The further stages of this research allow us to capture the multi-faceted process of the mediatization of the idea of a secular state. In essence, we provide the reader with information about the evolution of the secular state category in the

analyzed media, Poland's legislation and politics. We lead the reader through the meanders of shaping the specific approach of Poland's authorities towards religion, especially towards the Catholic Church. It shows the process of the mediatizing of religious and political actors when it comes to Church and state relations. Finally, it points to the issue of narrowing down the perspective of the secular state to the model promoted by the media.

4.2 Materials

By initiating this research study, we wanted to show the process of the media's development of its presentation of the secular state and Church-state relations. To achieve this goal, it is assumed that the material to be analyzed should include the contents of selected media, Polish legislative acts, political party programs and materials, and a questionnaire survey.

The basic research material analyzed and presented in this book consists of a wide media contents sample concerning the issue of the secular state and the Church-state relationship. The non-probability sampling of media and the texts themselves were specifically chosen. Within a wide range of media contents, information and news are the basis for knowledge about the changing reality. Important studies prove this practice is successful in obtaining knowledge about social phenomena, including political and religious information (Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2013; McCloskey, 2010). Keeping this in mind, we have reduced the media material in this study to news from the daily press and television. We omitted publications, assuming that the news will provide the current picture of the dynamics of the state's secularism and its association with religion.

Selecting our material was based on the temporal criterion, its range and contents. We initially included the media that have been continuously functioning nation-wide since 1989 and undertook issues concerning the Church and state. In the case of leading news television services, the sample included the *Wiadomości* [News] broadcasted by public TVP1. Subsequent websites did not qualify as samples because they appeared in the media relatively late, such as TVN's *Fakty* [Facts] broadcasted for the first time in 1996 and Polsat's *Wydarzenia* [Events] in 2004. In the case of *Facts*, it should also be remembered that TVN's broadcast technology for many years did not cover the entire territory of Poland.

TVP1 Wiadomości was broadcast for the first time on November 18, 1989. The main reason for using this TVP1 service in the sample was its long-term leading position among Polish news programs, its wide range of topics and

most balanced political contents (Gackowski & Łączyński, 2015). At the time of the emergence of competitive services, the *Wiadomości* in an evolutionary way adopted formats characteristic of TV stations from the United States, including the dominant infotainment present today (Fras, 2013). Their slow change towards a more dynamic site was accompanied by maintaining the characteristic discreet narrative style for public media. The service itself repeatedly attempted to describe Church-state events. Its inclusion in the sample under investigation was therefore well-founded.

When it comes to the printed press, the daily criterion was met by two general-information editions, *Gazeta Wyborcza* [the Electoral Gazette] and *Rzeczpospolita* [the Republic], acknowledged as belonging to the prestigious journalism class (Oniszczyk, 2011). The remaining titles were characterized by either a short period of issuing, as in the case of the sensational *Fakt* [Fact] journal created in 2004 or the clearly weak coverage of the secular state topic and the Church-state relationship, as in the case of the sensational *Super Express* daily.

The first edition of *Gazeta Wyborcza* appeared on May 8, 1989. Initially, it was published by the opposition gathered around *Solidarity Movement* in connection with the elections to the Contract Sejm. Next, the daily came into the hands of the Agora Company. *Gazeta Wyborcza* quickly began to clearly speak out on political matters (Mielczarek, 2007). Thanks to this, for over two decades, it served as a front supporting the democratic left. It maintained a significant position among other daily newspapers despite (1) the reconfiguration of the daily press market caused by the appearance of the sensational journal *Fakt*, and (2) the general collapse of the press market, declining readership and expenditures caused by the development of digital media.

The *Rzeczpospolita* daily mainly appeared during the interwar period in Poland. In 1982, it was resumed as the press body of the communist government. After the June 4, 1989, elections, it became independent from direct ties with the government. Since 1991, the Presspublica Company published it, with 51 % of its shares in the State Treasury. In the following years, the remaining shares were bought by the French syndicate owned by Robert Hersant (1991–1996), Norway's Orkla (1996–2006), and the British Mecom (2006–2011). The ownership structure of the newspaper was also overturned from the state's 49 % share. In 2011, the entire share of *Rzeczpospolita* entered into the hands of Gremi Media publishers.

Rzeczpospolita has never received such high sales and readership results as *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Due to its characteristics, however, it can be assumed that in the group of prestigious newspapers, it provides a counterweight to the leftist views regarding the subject of a secular state and the Church-state relations.

Since the beginning, this daily functioned as a national liberal-conservative issue, clearly including legal and economic contents.

In the course of gathering the research material, we assumed that as a consequence of choosing some media for analysis, we would extract all the contents from them relating to the idea of a secular state from 1989 to 2015. In practice, collecting all of the material turned out to be impossible. We started organizing the research project assuming that in the digital archives of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Rzeczpospolita*, and TVP's stationary archive at the Powstańców Square in Warsaw would provide us with all the materials available from this analyzed period.

Based on the thematic search engine available in *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s digital archive, we obtained materials from November 12, 1991. In the analogous procedure at the *Rzeczpospolita*'s digital archive, the first material for analysis was dated June 2, 1993. In the case of the TVP News archive, the attempt turned out to be narrower. In an electronic correspondence on June 7, 2016, Ewa Borkowska from the TVP Archive informed that the available collections contained *Wiadomości* recordings starting in March 2007, and other samples of previous materials were included in the National Digital Library. All acquired materials had a full transcript written in the signature. However, in the same databases, there was no information about the place of a given news item in the release schedule structure. Similarly, in the case of press texts, the archives of *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita* omitted to note the place of the text in the structure of the newspaper. Access to only part of the material sought and their incomplete descriptions limited this analysis.

We selected materials for analysis based on keywords referring to the Church-state relationship and the joint agency of Poland's religious and government authorities. It was used the following keywords: concordat, secular state, Church-state relations; the cross in public places; Bartholomew I in parliament, John Paul II in parliament, the Dalai Lama in parliament, and Kirill in parliament. The obtained material included 836 items, with 463 articles from *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 247 from *Rzeczpospolita*, and 126 items from TVP's *News*.

Additional research material allowed us to place the analysis in the legal and political context of the state's functioning in its relationship with religions. To this end, the analysis covered the provisions on Poland's religious denominational laws implemented after 1989. This group of materials included the Constitution, the Concordat with the Holy See, and laws on the relationship between the State and particular religions and religious associations. In addition, it was collected and analyzed the campaign materials of various political parties from the parliamentary elections in 1989–2015, as well as electoral materials and candidate

programs in the subsequent presidential elections after 1989. This data included the parliamentary elections in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015 and the presidential elections in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015.

In the analysis, we used materials published regularly in the form of a report by the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN). At the same time, materials from the presidential and parliamentary campaign of 2015, which have not yet appeared in the next volume of the report, were obtained directly from the employees of the Archives of the Political Parties of ISP PAN. Finally, we completed the collected materials with a survey carried out on our behalf by a pooling company.

We prioritized the selection of research material based on media content. The basic point of the study referred to the mediatization of a secular state. It was analyzed first of all based on the changing representation of media content and related changes in the legislation and programs of political parties. Therefore, it was accepted that in the media material we would search for patterns of representing the idea of the secular state and the relationship between the Church and the state. We went beyond the level of analyzing media mediation itself, since we wanted to place this media representation in the context of the dynamics of the postulates of political parties regarding religious issues and the binding legal frameworks. Such a procedure allowed us to confront the question about the principles of the mechanism of mediatization in the ideas of the secular state. The final analysis of the survey questionnaire's data serves as an attempt to check the potential mediatization effect of the secular state.

4.3 First stage: Media content analysis

Among the research methods used in media studies since the mid-twentieth century, content analysis undoubtedly takes first place. It also remains popular in other disciplines (Franzosi, 2008), inter alia, political science and sociology of religion. Anders Hansen and David Machin (2013: 85) describe it as “one of the most efficient and the most widely used research methods for the systematic and qualitative analysis of media output/content.” In addition, content analysis belongs to a group of tools that are suitable for integrating with other research methods. We also used this form in this study as a reference point for the qualitative grounded theory.

In Bernard Berelson's (1952: 18) classic approach, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, the method means “the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of the communication.” Subsequent attempts to develop it have brought about the appreciation of the quantitative

aspect (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2013; Neuendorf, 2002), but on the other hand, also a departure from the assumptions of objectivity (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). In relation to the first process, it is mainly about the frequency of the appearing of specific content and the potential impact of media on recipients postulated on this basis (Pisarek, 1983). Hansen and Machin (2013: 89) sum it up as follows:

“Content analysis can help provide some indication of relative prominences and absences of key characteristics in media texts, but the inferences that can be drawn from such indications must be firmly anchored in a theory that articulates the relationship between media and their social contexts.”

With regard to the second issue, awareness of the research process requires a great deal of humility in admitting that the analysis fulfills the researcher’s design and the specific research context. The results of the study itself are limited to social regularities, not the hard laws typical of science. Regardless of whether we accept Holsti’s (1969) or Krippendorff’s (2013) definitions as the basis for contents analysis, we consider the systematic and replicable examination of messages within a given theoretical framework.

Instead of applying the chosen theory to the problem of the media’s representation of the idea of a secular state, it was assumed that content analysis refers to the later grounded theory. We left the theoretical decisions for the second stage of the research. At this stage, we will set up a unit for analyzing the articles in newspapers and news items from TV services. Next, based on Atlas.ti’s text data analysis support software, we designated the coding frame of 206 categories for specifying and describing references to the secular state and Church-state relations (Fig. A.1). We approached the process of creating a coding frame in an emergent way, meaning after a preliminary examination of the data (Wimmer & Dominick, 2015).

Normally, the selection of the category results from the purpose of the conducted research and the limitations in access to the analytical material. In this study, the external conditions narrowed the choice of the analytical categories. First of all, the materials obtained from the digital archives of the newspapers did not allow identifying the publication page, the layout of the pages, the size of the space intended for particular articles, or illustrations accompanying the texts. In the case of the TVP archive, the scheduled time of a news item, important for a media researcher, was missing from the agenda of the given issue. However, from the perspective of the whole project, the lack of such data did not turn out to be a great loss. During the process of grounding the theory from the data, we used the frequency of individual subjects, themes, and issues in conducting the content analysis.

4.4 Second stage: The grounded theory

As already mentioned, it was approached the content analysis as a reference point for the grounded theory, which works well in the study of social processes (Konecki, 2009) and ways of interpreting reality by its participants (Suddaby, 2006). In recent years, more media studies have appeared based on the methodology of the grounded theory (Hijmans & Peters, 2009; Neumaier, 2015; V. B. Martin, 2008; Tucker-McLaughlin & Campbell, 2012). In their case, it mainly concerned material obtained from conversations and in-depth interviews. Therefore, the usefulness of the grounded theory in this project needs justification.

As Ellen Hijmans and Vincent Peters (2009) have noticed, the grounded theory belongs to one of the best-developed methods for qualitative research. From the outset, its founding fathers, Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss (1967), assumed conducting social research based on two procedures: a continuous comparison of the research material and theoretical sampling. The development of the grounded theory caused the articulation of the third assumption: the lack of initial hypotheses (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The theory established as a strategy for conducting qualitative research is thus based on three principles (Hansel & Glinka, 2012). First of all, it does not undertake the initial hypotheses. This prevents the researcher from looking for phenomena characteristic of the applied theory. Second, it requires constantly comparing the collected fragments of the research material, completing them with notes, and contrasting them. This will lead the researcher to create successive codes and categories on their basis and the theory itself for the analyzed phenomenon. Third, the grounded theory implies a theoretical sampling strategy. This means that the researcher is not set on obtaining a representative research sample but broadening their knowledge on the issue by selecting research material.

These frequently repeated steps (data acquisition, analysis and reflection on observations through continuous comparisons, and theoretical samplings) used in this approach first of all lead to providing an appropriate theory based on the collected data. In this sense, the grounded theory clearly draws from the gains of symbolic interaction, which Blumer (1969) best summarizes in three points. (1) Human agency in relation to objects results from the meaning that these objects have for them. (2) The importance of subjects arises in social interactions. (3) This meaning remains contingent, as it changes under the influence of the interpretation of and interaction among individuals.

From the point of view of this study, we should ask in what way the grounded theory is able to serve in the analysis of the mediatization of the idea of a secular state? We see two key issues that speak for its implementation. First, this research

boils down to the reconstruction of the process of shaping the idea of a secular state and the Church-state relationship in the media discourse. At the basis of this process remain the agency of the state and Church institutions, especially their representatives. While content analysis only indicates the frequency of specific topics, the grounded theory allows for the integration of the media content as well as legal documents and political materials into a coherent story about the mediatization of the idea of a secular state. The dominant qualitative component is, therefore, key to understanding how the entire process and the agency of the representatives of both parties proceeded.

The second element that confirms our attitude toward the analysis according to the grounded theory comes from the integration of its results with this mediatization research. The scholarship on the subject of mediatization has been dominated by quantitative studies. Their quantitative dimension consisted in considering mediatization by comparing two points on the time continuum, the state of matters from before the process and the state at the time of obtaining the material for comparison. Thanks to the grounded theory, we are able to depart from this type of comparison in favor of a process characterized by specific dynamics, upheavals and previously mentioned molding moments, or mediatization waves. By approaching the collected research material in this way, we are now able to say more about the process of accommodating political and religious actors to the changing conditions of the mediasphere. We focus on the possibility of creating a theory that will refer to the key agency of these actors and changes in the very method of articulating the postulate of a secular state.

The research procedure of the grounded theory appeared in literature in numerous variations. We based this analysis on Hijman and Peter's (2009) proposal adapted to the needs of media research. Here, the research process co-creates four phases of theory development: exploration, specification, reduction, and integration. The first comes down to defining the research problem and the derivation of relevant concepts from the research material. The second specification phase consists of precisely defining the concepts based on research material and providing arguments for defending the discovered concepts. The third phase, which comprises the key issue in the entire procedure, meaning reduction, refers to limiting the topics from the analysis in order to form the core theory. In contrast, the last phase, integration, consists in grasping the units of the analysis in order to identify their specific features and the relationship between these features.

In applying this grounded theory's procedures, it was used the Atlas.ti program for computer-aided analysis of the qualitative data. The software clearly improved our further use of analysis techniques: coding, summarizing, and

displaying. We assumed two stages in coding. The first was carried out as part of pre-coding, and so we applied the codes of the sequence of events to the collected material expressed by means of verbal nouns (Glaser, 1978). As a result, we completed this stage of analysis with a group of 214 codes and 268 notes based on the encoded material (Fig. A.2). The second stage of concentrated and selective coding consisted of working through these codes. Here we used the most frequently emerging codes to integrate and organize large batches of material.

The additions and notes prepared during the procedure turned out to be useful in the next stage of the study. We contrasted their contents with the previous content analysis, material from the legal analysis, and political documents. This allowed us to establish the *axial categories* or conceptual themes. These build a comprehensive presentation of the problem of the secular state and the Church-state relationship. While summarizing the results, we clearly reduced the analytical perspective to the agency of political and religious actors. Finally, in the course of the phase of displaying, we extended the analytical perspective of the previous solutions in the area of the theory of mediatization.

4.5 Third stage: Survey questionnaires

Media messages seem to be the most visible elements of the social debate on the issue of the secular state. Scientific reports based on opinion polls in Poland have frequently addressed our attitude towards Church-state relations and the place of religion in the public sphere (CBOS, 1994a; CBOS, 2013; CBOS, 2015a; CBOS, 2015b). However, these studies have significant limitations for this project's perspective. First, they bypass sources of knowledge and opinions about the Church-state relationship and state secularism. As a consequence, there is a gap to fill with regard to (1) the place of media in the catalog of these sources, and (2) the relationship between the opinions of respondents and the contents provided by the media. A problem arises concerning the results of mediatizing the idea of a secular state. In other words, the question arises whether the mediatization evident in the earlier analyzes enters into social consciousness. We based the third stage of the study on a questionnaire survey whose results come close to answering this question. We conducted research in such a way as to be able to postulate the degree of the relation between the mediatized secular state and the society used by the media.

At this stage, it was based the research on data from a study commissioned to the *BBS Obserwator*, a Polish social research laboratory. The questionnaire survey took place between April 19 and May 19, 2017, on a sample of 1,000 adult Poles (569 women and 431 men). Trained and supervised telephone pollsters

collected research material using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). During the procedure, they were assisted by the CATI Support 4.0 computer program. The database used in the study relied on the telephone book for the residents of Poland. It covered both landline and mobile phones. Prior to the study, the numbers were validated.

The prepared questionnaire (Fig. A.3) was tested in a pilot study, which was carried out on May 18, 2017. Nineteen pilot interviews were conducted, in which all interviewers conducting the research took part. Each interviewer performed one interview. The pilot study did not show any errors in the prepared research tool. As a result, the unchanged questionnaire was used in completing the actual poll.

The questionnaire, which was included in the final annex, consisted of 44 single and multiple choice questions. The questions concerned the subject of the secular state, Church-state relations, the religiousness of the respondents and the sources of obtained information on the issues discussed. We formulated questions about the religiousness of Poles in such a way that they remain consistent with the tools from the previous research on religiosity conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), the Institute of Sociology at the University of Warsaw (IS UW), and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN). In the questionnaire, we included questions about opinions on the secular state, the Church-state relationship, the religiousness of the respondents and sources of knowledge about the secular state. The last group of questions we asked addressed the knowledge of respondents associated with the secular state and practices concerning Church-state relations. Depending on the issues raised, the respondents answered by choosing from among specific facts based on the Likert scale with five positive responses: “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree,” or “hard to say”; or based on the answer from the three-item list: “yes,” “no,” or “hard to say.”

The test for the study was based on the initially assumed gender and age numbers and the place of residence, which reflected the structure of the adult residents of Poland taking into account the surplus (Fig. 4.1). As a result of weighing the differences, we obtained a representative sample of adults in Poland based on sex (women: $N = 569$; men: $N = 431$), age (18–24: $N = 61$; 25–34: $N = 91$; 35–44: $N = 125$; 45–54: $N = 182$; 55–64: $N = 256$; ≥ 65 : $N = 285$), and place of residence (village: $N = 356$; town: $N = 644$). The sampling error was $\pm 5\%$ with a confidence interval of 95.

56.9 % of women and 43.1 % of men took part in the sample. The largest age groups were represented by respondents aged 65 and over (28.5 %) and those over 55 years of age (25.6 %). The division of respondents to cities and

Age	Women		Men		Total	
	Number	(%)	Number	(%)	Number	(%)
18–24	28	4.9	33	7.6	61	6.1
25–34	45	7.9	46	10.7	91	9.1
35–44	60	10.6	65	15.1	125	12.5
45–54	108	19.0	74	17.2	182	18.2
55–64	159	27.9	97	22.5	256	25.6
Over 65 years	169	29.7	116	26.9	285	28.5
Total	569	100.0	431	100.0	1000	100.0

Fig. 4.1: Sample selection: Age and sex of the respondents (%). Source: Own research

Place of residence	Number	(%)
Countryside	356	35.6
Cities with up to 20,000 residents	162	16.2
Cities from 20,000 to 100,000 residents	179	17.9
Cities from 100,000 to 500,000 residents	156	15.6
Cities with over 500,000 residents	147	14.7
Total	1000	100.0

Fig. 4.2: Sample selection: Place of residency (%). Source: Own research

the countryside reflected the structure of residents in Poland (Fig. 4.2). The percentage of rural residents included 35.6 % of the respondents, where 16.2 % lived in cities of up to 20,000 inhabitants, 17.9 % from 20,000 to 100,000, 15.6 % from 100,000 to 500,000, and 14.7 % in cities with over 500,000.

In the statistical analysis, variables such as education, social and occupational group, place of employment, income per person in a household as well as the assessment of material conditions and income per person in the family were also taken into account. However, these did not control variables in the selection.

As shown Fig. 4.3 the largest number of people in the survey included those from the groups with higher education (43.8 %) and secondary education (39.7 %). The least numerous representation were people with only primary or junior high school education completed.

In terms of social and professional structure (Fig. 4.4), the group of retirees predominated (24.4 %). The second highest group was the management staff and specialists with higher education, accounting for 15.5 %. The least numerous representation of respondents were unskilled workers (0.9 %) and housewives (1.9 %).

Education		Number	(%)
Important	Higher	438	43.8
	Average	397	39.7
	Technical or professional	125	12.5
	Elementary/junior high school	40	4.0
	Overall	1000	100.0

Fig. 4.3: Quantitative and percentage structure of education (%). Source: Own research

Social and Professional Group		Number	(%)
Important	Management staff, specialists with higher education	155	15.5
	Medium staff, technicians	70	7.0
	Administrative and office employees	104	10.4
	Service employees	60	6.0
	Skilled workers	40	4.0
	Unskilled workers	9	.9
	Farmers	26	2.6
	Self-employed	78	7.8
	Unemployed	33	3.3
	Retirees	244	24.4
	Pensioners	30	3.0
	Students	63	6.3
	Housewives	19	1.9
	Other groups	69	6.9
Overall	1000	100.0	

Fig. 4.4: Quantitative and percentage of the social and professional structure (%). Source: Own research

Considering the income of the respondents per person in a household (Fig. 4.5), it can be seen that the highest number of respondents earned over 2,000 PLN (27.4 %). The least number of respondents had incomes not exceeding 649 PLN per person in a household (6.6 %). Quite a significant number of respondents (19.8 %) refused to state their earnings, which may be associated with the current belief in Poland that these remain sensitive data (Dyoniziak, 1997).

The last variable (Fig. 4.6) indicates the optimism of the respondents regarding their material conditions. 49.9 % of the respondents assessed their material conditions as average, 39.7 % assessed their financial situation to be good, and only 6.6 % as being poor.

Income per person		Number	(%)
Important	From 649 PLN	58	5.8
	From 650 to 999 PLN	127	12.7
	From 1000 to 1399 PLN	134	13.4
	From 1400 to 1999 PLN	209	20.9
	2000 PLN or more	274	27.4
	No reply	198	19.8
	Overall	1000	100.0

Fig. 4.5: Quantitative and percentage income structures per person (%). Source: Own research

Material conditions		Number	(%)
Important	Poor	66	6.6
	Average	499	49.9
	Good	397	39.7
	No reply	38	3.8
	Overall	1000	100.0

Fig. 4.6: Quantitative and percentage structures of material conditions (%). Source: Own research

4.6 Triangulation of the methods

The reader may have noticed that we based the three successive stages of the research design on qualitative and quantitative methods. It is true that the majority of the methodological textbooks focus on selected methods from one branch. However, the broad traditions of combining qualitative and quantitative studies date back to the beginnings of social sciences (Hesse-Biber, 2010; Plano Clark, Huddleston-Casas, Churchill, Green, & Garrett, 2008). Within their framework, these procedures can be called, among others, convergent validation/triangulation (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966), and convergent methodology/multimethod/multitrait (D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Proponents of this connection share the conviction that “qualitative and quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than as rival camps” (Jick, 1979: 602). The ultimate goal of this approach illustrates and deepens the depth of the studied phenomenon (Mertens & Hesse-Biber, 2012).

Following this directive, the study undertook the issue of triangulation. According to Norman K. Denzin (2017), triangulation concerns a wide

combination of different methodologies within the framework of the same phenomenon. Kenneth R. Howe (2012) points to two possible ways of doing this. The first includes disjunctive mixed methods/triangulation, in which the researcher may attempt to integrate the qualitative and quantitative data. The second, referred to as the conjunctive approach to mixed methods/triangulation, is not so much about the integration of different types of data, but rather the designation of a wider explanatory framework (Denzin, 2017). Howe (2012: 93) specifies that he follows this triangulation at the paradigm level, which assumes “removing positivism from the scene, long since abandoned in philosophy” or “removing the grounds for paradigm incompatibility.”

After accepting the second of the presented perspectives for undertaking this research, we have to explain what exactly the interpretative framework we used relied on. First of all, we agree with the view that language differences in the qualitative and quantitative approaches refer to epistemological differences (Brown & Colton, 2001). Differences in the language and epistemology of both approaches, therefore, inclined us to apply Howe's postulate. This means that the postulate of objectivity and the representation which we carried in the first and third stages of research lose importance at the moment of inference based on all data. Consequently, the analysis departs from a research study on the classical type of positivist paradigm.

At the level of the triangulation of the material and research methods, we assumed that the tension between the quantitative and qualitative results would resolve the problem of granting priority to the latter. In setting the hierarchy of the analysis, we relied on Joachim Cohen's (2014) suggestion that the use of the quantitative material in a project dominated by the qualitative method is a starting point in formulating research questions and the grounded theories. In practice, this involved two more issues. First of all, we started our grounded theory procedures only after performing a content analysis. The second is that the results of the content analysis were a reference point for the grounded theory analyzes. Similarly, we completed the final survey after the content analysis and grounding the theory. Finally, we conducted the analysis not on the principle of attempting to combine antagonistic approaches, but rather by focusing on strengthening the analyzed material. As a result, this allowed us project to be oriented towards “capturing a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study” (Jick, 1979: 603).

5 Covering the secular and Church-state relationship

Let's start the reflection on the mediatization of the idea of a secular state based on the analyzed media. We will now consider the media coverage of the secular state and the Church-state relationship in the years 1989–2015. We can treat the results of this content analysis as a reference point for the later applied grounded theory. The primary sources of this analysis are taken from two newspapers, *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita*, and the public television information *Wiadomości TVP* service. Although today the media remain hybrid (Chadwick, 2013), in the last 25 years, the source of knowledge about the secular state primarily referred to traditional media, including television and the press. Their contents, therefore, provide significant intuition in understanding the discussed issue.

In 1989, Poland entered the path of systemic changes. The legal and political situation concerning the nation's Church-state relations was characterized by separating the Church from public life. The Church adapted to the unfavorable conditions of the communist regime, and could hardly have dreamed possible what was actually happening. As a result of the contractual election on June 4, 1989, a practicing Catholic who represented the interests of the opposition became the prime minister. There immediately appeared demands for shaping religious issues based on cooperation and even compensation for the harm suffered by the Church. The early years of political transformation brought a new kind of challenge for relations between the Church and state. The developed idea of the secular state and the variant of a state with an unbiased worldview were yet to come.

In May 2015, Andrzej Duda won the presidential election in the second round. In October of that year, the political formation that promoted the new president took over power. The United Right gained the majority in parliament (an informal coalition of PiS, PR, and SP), allowing it to form an independent government. In a short time, radical changes in all areas of social life began to take place under the motto of "good change" in the social consciousness. Along with the PiS and coalition power takeover, Church-state relations took on new colors (Guzek, 2017).

This analysis refers to the period between the two aforementioned moments from the years 1989 to 2015. At that time, the media provided a clearly differentiated




Fig. 5.1: Groups of topics in all examined media (%)

coverage of religion, the idea of the secular state, as well as the Church-state relationship. In order to look at this coverage in a deeper way, we will start with a quantitative analysis based on the frequency of references to various spaces of the secular state.

5.1 The secular state and the Church-state relationship: A quantitative overview

Let's now turn to a general recognition of the presence of various categories related to the secular state and Church-state relations. Of course, we cannot generalize on the basis of incomplete material. However, we can see how the available material worked in the categories of analysis. We are primarily referring to gathering the basic groups of categories and other categories that were distinguished according to their frequency in the collected material.




Fig. 5.2: Groups of topics in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)

Content analysis results indicate that the dominant categories in the surveyed media referred to political players. As Fig. 5.1 shows, political actors, state and political institutions and political parties comprised 46.6 % of the categories present in the analysis. At the same time, the largest group of analyzed categories, amounting to 19.5 %, referred to political actors. The category group that found itself on the other side of the Church-state relationship was associated with representatives of religion and amounted to 19.3 %. In the analyzed quantitative material, the frequency advantage of the coverage of political players over the coverage of religious players thus determines the view of the media through the prism of the domination of political actors and their agency.

Fig. 5.2 indicates that in the case of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the dominance of the categories associated with political players (43.2 %) over religious players (22.9 %) is




Fig. 5.3: Groups of topics in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)

comparable to the material from the general media analysis. The domination of categories based on Church-state relationships (21.0 %) characterize this newspaper. Looking for a pattern to understand the contents in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, we can see the need to emphasize not only the agency of political and religious actors but also their mutual reference.

In *Rzeczpospolita*, categories referring to political players amount to slightly more than the data for all media. In the case of all media, it was 43.4 %, while Fig. 5.3 indicates that in *Rzeczpospolita*, this number is 45.9 %. Interestingly, in this newspaper, as much as 66.4 % of the coverage category is occupied by representatives of the political and religious spheres. Another 20 % includes the Church-state relationship. Their sum in the form of 86.4 % allows us to assume that the *Rzeczpospolita*'s analyzed material draws from the operation of entities related to the shaping of religion and state relations.

In the case of incomplete material from *Wiadomości TVP1*, the advantage of political players over the religious players differs from the other media.




Fig. 5.4: Groups of topics in *Wiadomości TVP1* (%)

According to Fig. 5.4, the disproportion of political players (60.2 %) as compared with religious players (11.1 %) is more than fivefold. The group of categories related to political actors dominating in the content analysis is as high as 38 %. In contrast to other media, a lot of space remains devoted to religious symbols, 12.7 %. Such an excess of the average for all media (1.2 %) shows that *Wiadomości TVP1* accentuates not only the agency of political actors but also objects representing ideological content.

A general look at the groups of dominant categories in the analyzed media can be supplemented with specific, most frequently appearing categories of coverage. This operation in our overview allows us to answer two basic questions. First of all, which categories of analysis are dominated by frequency? Second, are we able to see a pattern in these categories when we look at them?

According to Fig. 5.5, only the issue of the concordat plays a primary role in all the collected material. From the dynamics of this category, we know that it is




Fig. 5.5: Key categories of the general analysis (not adding up to 100 %)

about the postulates appearing in subsequent periods of the analysis: the signing of the concordat, its ratification, renegotiation, or termination. This category occupies 8.5 % of the entire analysis and leaves behind a sequence of occurrences by the Sejm and deputies (4.9 %) and the government (4.7 %). However, this is a misleading representation. From the quality of the material analyzed later on, it follows that the concordat rather functions as a reference. This means that politicians especially articulate the need for its signing or suspension. However, they do not provide justification for such a proposal.

In a similar way, based on the principle of reference, successive categories also operate, namely constitutional (3.7 %) and the Holy See/Vatican (3.6 %), that function in terms of frequency. They appear in the broader narratives of politicians as key slogans in the form of whether or not the given resolution will be consistent with the Constitution? How will the Holy See react to changes in the area of religious law?

In the group of the most frequent categories, we see a regularity regarding the occurrence of other agents in the Church-state relationship. In the first place,




Fig. 5.6: Key categories in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (do not add up to 100 %)

these are institutional entities that hold real political power in Poland: the government, the Sejm and its deputies (9.6 %), and political parties (5.5 %). Next in line remain the Polish Bishops' Conference or bishops speaking on social issues (5.1 %). Then there appear two individual actors: on the political side, Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1.9 %), and on the religious side, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek (1.4 %). Such a pattern points to two issues.

The advantage of institutional actors over individuals in the analyzed material proves that the idea of a secular state and its Church-state relations result from dominant collective interest groups rather than by implementing individual strategies. Second, the agency of Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek occurred in the nineties. In the second decade after the systemic transformation, activists from individual political and religious institutions are the primary spokesmen.

In Fig. 5.6, it can be seen that the categories that dominate in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, excluding references to the concordat, amount to 14.8 % and particularly concern institutional actors. Considering the significant number of appeals to the Holy See (4.7 %), this mainly refers to the government, Sejm and deputies




Fig. 5.7: Key categories in the *Rzeczpospolita* (do not add up to 100 %)

(10.1 %). Only one individual actor in the group of dominant categories appears (Aleksander Kwaśniewski with 2.4 %). Therefore, *Gazeta Wyborcza* focuses on the efficiency of the institution.

What describes the key categories in *Gazeta Wyborcza* are references to the presence of two clusters. The first of the clusters concerns media coverage of the Sejm and deputies (5.3 %) and the government (4.8 %) as the two most common categories of political institutions and the Holy See/Vatican (4.7 %) as the most frequently present in the material about a religious institution. The second cluster results from a similar percentage of contents on the subject of Aleksander Kwaśniewski (2.4 %), which represents political individuals and groups of bishops speaking out on social issues (2.5 %). This shows a clear perspective in *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s texts that includes two sides of the Church-state relationship.

The percentage distribution of the dominant categories in *Rzeczpospolita*, presented in Fig. 5.7, to a significant degree approach the distribution in *Gazeta Wyborcza*. The difference becomes clear when it comes to the representation of religious institutions. We draw attention to the presence of the relatively high




Fig. 5.8: Key categories in *Wiadomości TVP1* (do not add up to 100 %)

position of the Polish Bishops' Conference (3.5 %) in references to the bishops' activity on social issues. The collected material additionally indicates that the activity of the Polish Bishops' Conference appears more often than references to the Holy See (3.0 %).

In addition, the most frequently appearing categories in *Rzeczpospolita* should be seen as an element of negotiations between the Episcopate and the state authorities. Data in Fig. 5.7 indicate such regularity when we take into account three factors. First of all, the issues of the concordat, the constitution, and the law of denomination occupy a total of 16.3 % of the frequency of all categories. Second, here we can notice the priority of political and religious actors, where the government and the parliament together get 10 %, while the Polish Bishops' Conference and the Vatican get 6.5 %. Third, in the case of the joint Church and state committee among the media investigated, *Rzeczpospolita* has the highest frequency of appeals to the agency of this entity (4.1 %).

In the case of material from *Wiadomości TVP1*, Fig. 5.8 clearly expresses the incompleteness of the scope of the collected material. The material covers the Smolensk crash, which dominated *Wiadomości TVP1*'s broadcasts for several months. When we ignore the Smolensk news, it turns out that the most material concerns political actors (19 %) and the two main parties, PiS and PO.




Fig. 5.9: Church-state relations in general (%)

5.2 Placing the secular state and secularity in the quantitative material

In the analyzed media material, the secular state and its variants clearly gave way to the political and religious agents shaping Church-state relations. A look at the quantitative material, however, turns out to be the basis for the subsequent analysis of various categories of the secular state in the field of the grounded theory. Let's, therefore, trace the available data, focusing primarily on the frequency of the variations in the understanding of the state's approach to religion.

The group representing the categories of the types of secular states turns out to be dynamic when we look at the analyzed media material from Fig. 5.9. These dynamics consist of periods associated with the ratification of the concordat and the enactment of the constitution. Debates appear on various options for shaping the relationship between the state and religion. Of course, it cannot be seen on a simple list of the frequency of various types of secular states. There is no indication of the moment in time when the media coverage was limited to the slogan about the secular state.




Fig. 5.10: Church-state relations in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)

What appears in the analyzed material concerns the slight frequency advantage of secularity, secularism, and the separation of Church and state (58.1 %) over various forms of the autonomy and neutrality of both entities (41.9 %). When we look at the second group, we see a kind of unique category relating to state impartiality (7.2 %). This results from the process of negotiating the significance of Church and state autonomy, which in Poland's conditions ultimately took the form of a declaration of impartiality of the state towards religion. Ultimately, it also complements the category of state ideological neutrality (12.6 %), occurring with considerable frequency among the Church-state relations models.

The categories in question occur in *Gazeta Wyborcza's* materials in proportions reflecting the distribution of the categories of the media analyzed in their entirety (Fig. 5.10). The difference only affects the increase in the frequency in the coverage of the autonomy of the Church and state from 18.9 % to 23.3 % and the decrease in the coverage of the secular state idea from 32.4 % to 26.4 %. At the same time in the mentioned daily, 18.6 %, meaning a similar value, in the media generally refers to the category of separation of Church and state. This leads us to believe that in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the dominant narratives in the




Fig. 5.11: Church-state relations in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)

field of the secular state and the Church-state relationship primarily concern the sphere of building the mutual independence of both institutions. However, when we compare the mention of state ideological neutrality (11.6 %) with the Church's neutrality towards the state (3.1 %), then we see the dominating coverage of the state agency.

The material in *Rzeczpospolita* shows the domination of the category of a secular state. We learn from Fig. 5.11 that as much as 42 % of the frequency of the categories related to the Church-state relationship concerns the secular state. Against this background, 44.3 % of the categories related to separation, neutrality, and autonomy in total turn out to be relevant. Definitely much less is mentioned about state impartiality (3.4 %). We can draw one conclusion from this distribution of the frequency of the categories in question. The *Rzeczpospolita* accepts the secular state as a starting point in the published contents of the Church-state relationship. A specific counterbalance to this perspective seems to be separation, neutrality, or autonomy. However, the daily avoids a clear coverage of state impartiality.




Fig. 5.12: Church-state relations in *Wiadomości TVPI* (%)

Models of the Church-state relationship in a small way appeared in the analyzed material of *Wiadomości TVPI* with a 0.4 % share of the entire list of frequencies of the categories used. As a consequence, as Fig. 5.12 indicates, their distribution remained even. Based on this, we can see that the main edition of *Wiadomości TVPI* to a small extent supplements the dominant qualitative material from the surveyed newspapers. Seeking answers to the reasons for this, we are inclined to give two competitive answers. The first states that the fragmentary nature of the material is not able to reflect the specificity of the TV coverage of the categories in question. The second assumes that television, as a medium of dynamic narrative, avoids going into details and differences in the Church-state relationship. This means that both mentions of autonomy, impartiality, and separation appear on the surface of the analyzed discourses and not in the area of their essence.

In addition to the discussed models of Church-state relations, the content analysis also provides us with knowledge about the distribution of topics that appear within these relationships. Therefore, we refer to the material that functions in harmony with what was presented in Fig. 5.1 that takes up as much as 16.5 % of the frequency of all the analyzed categories.




Fig. 5.13: Church-state relations contents (%)

Let's take into account the frequency of the occurrence of categories in the Church-state relationship group. According to the data from Fig. 5.13, three categories dominate there: the concordat (47.6 %), constitution (20.6 %), and laws and policies on religion (15.5 %). In total, their turnout in this group of categories is as high as 83.8 %. Earlier, it was shown that the research outcomes depend on the agency of political and religious institutions and individuals. When we add the current findings to this, we come to several conclusions. First of all, the Church-state relationship, and consequently the way in which the idea of a secular state is shaped, results from the discussion on the shape of legal regulations and the relationship between the Church and state. Activities in this area take place through the involvement of religious and political actors. The compromise between the Church and the state (3.1 %) plays a relatively important role in the whole process, which is combined with the provisions guaranteed to the Church in the legal system (3.1 %).

Fig. 5.14 shows a similar distribution of the categories among all the media and in *Gazeta Wyborcza*. In the case of this newspaper, Church negotiations with the state (8.5 %) are also important in addition to the main themes from the Church-state relationship category, which indicates the dynamics of Church-state relations in media coverage. At the same time, this category is ahead of the compromise and provisions provided to the Church.

Rzeczpospolita, which also presents a common scheme of the three dominant categories, differs in one detail from *Gazeta Wyborcza*. According to Fig. 5.15 in *Rzeczpospolita*, negotiations, job searches, compromises, provisions, and interpretations appear at a similar level of frequency. In total, these comprise 14.6 % of the categories in the group. It additionally testifies to the relative complexity of the topics raised within the framework of the issue of the mutual references of the Church and the state.

According to Fig. 5.16 in *Wiadomości TVP1*, the material collected contains three specific features. First of all, the basic reference point of Church-state relations rests on the Constitution (35.3 %) and not the Concordat (17.6 %) as in the past. Just as in the concordat, provisions issued to the Church also appear (17.6 %). This directly relates to the claims of various parties regarding the degree of cooperation between the Church and the state, especially after the period of ratification of the concordat and the constitution. Second, the material shows the occurrence of consultations between the Church and the government on a similar scale, including the compromise between the Church and the state. Both occur with a frequency of 5.9 %. Third, we see the clear agency of the president as the host of meetings related to the subject of religion and the place of religion in public life in Poland (5.9 %).




Fig. 5.14: Contents of Church-state relations in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)




Fig. 5.15: Contents of the Church-state relationship in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)




Fig. 5.16: Contents of Church-state relations in *Wiadomości TVP1* (%)

5.3 Who is important: Political actors

So far, we have tried to show the general distribution of categories in the collected research material, the types of Church-state relations and the issues raised within this relationship. Now we will present issues concerning political actors made up of state institutions, individuals, and political parties. As we wrote earlier, the agency of political actors appears in the surveyed media with the highest frequency. At the same time, the percentage distribution of individual state institutions and individual political actors enriches the later grounded theory.

The list included in Fig. 5.17 illustrates two regularities. First of all, the frequency of the emerging political individuals goes hand in hand with their huge diversity. The list contains the names of representatives of all the leftist or right views scale, including successive presidents of the country, prime ministers, ministers, representatives of the parliament, representatives of political parties, and local government politicians. Second, the frequency of these groups operates in certain clusters. Presidents appear most often, next are prime ministers, deputies, senators, and politicians from parliamentary parties and non-parliamentary parties. Thus, the list clearly shows the domination of the coverage of the president's and the parliament's centers.

Actor	%	Actor	%	Actor	%
Aleksander Kwaśniewski	9.9	Marek Borowski	1.0	Przemysław Gosiewski	0.4
Lech Wałęsa	4.7	Jan Olszewski	0.9	Beata Mazurek	0.4
Józef Oleksy	4.6	Jerzy Buzek	0.8	Michał Boni	0.4
Lech Kaczyński	4.4	Władysław Bartoszewski	0.8	Ryszard Czarnecki	0.4
Bronisław Komorowski	3.9	Jacek Kuroń	0.8	Jan Jankiewicz	0.4
Donald Tusk	3.9	Jarosław Gowin	0.8	Bogdan Klich	0.4
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	3.8	Marian Krzaklewski	0.8	Janusz Kurtyka	0.3
Waldemar Pawlak	3.3	Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz	0.8	Adam Strzembosz	0.3
Jarosław Kaczyński	3.0	Alicja Grzeškowiak	0.8	Jolanta Szczypińska	0.3
Józef Zych	2.6	Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz	0.8	Zbigniew Wassermann	0.3
Maria Kaczyńska	2.5	Marek Siwiec	0.7	Janusz Piechociński	0.3
Hanna Suchocka	2.3	Aleksandra Jakubowska	0.6	Armand Ryfiński	0.3
Dariusz Rosati	2.1	Anna Komorowska	0.6	Jan Krzysztof Bielecki	0.3
Zbigniew Siemiątkowski	2.0	Ewa Kopacz	0.6	Artur Dębski	0.3
Jadwiga Wiśniewska	1.8	Joanna Senyszyn	0.6	Piotr Ikonowicz	0.3
Janusz Palikot	1.7	Jacek Rostowski	0.6	Krzysztof Janik	0.3
Tadeusz Mazowiecki	1.7	Jacek Sasin	0.6	Jerzy Jaskiernia	0.3
Jerzy Szmajdziński	1.5	Andrzej Balicki	0.6	Stanisław Żelichowski	0.3
Michał Kamiński	1.4	Bogdan Borusewicz	0.6	Bolesław Piecha	0.3
Ryszard Bugaj	1.4	Wojciech Olejniczak	0.5	Andrzej Stelmachowski	0.3
Izabela Sierakowska	1.4	Longin Pastusiak	0.5	Paweł Zalewski	0.3
Krzysztof Skubiszewski	1.2	Anna Sobecka	0.5	Marek Kuchciński	0.3
Mariusz Błaszczak	1.2	Jerzy Wenderlich	0.5	Zofia Kuratowska	0.3
Bronisław Geremek	1.2	Aleksander Małachowski	0.5	Stefan Niesiołowski	0.3
Grzegorz Schetyna	1.0	Antoni Macierewicz	0.5	Tomasz Kalita	0.3
Andrzej Olechowski	1.0	Roman Giertych	0.5	Roman Jagieliński	0.3
Ryszard Kalisz	1.0	Tadeusz Iwiński	0.5	Zbigniew Bujak	0.3
Paweł Graś	1.0	Ryszard Kaczorowski	0.5		
Radosław Sikorski	1.0	Aleksander Bentkowski	0.5		

Fig. 5.17: Individual political actors (%). Source: Own research




Fig. 5.18: Key political individuals (not adding up to 100 %)

As shown in Fig. 5.18, Aleksander Kwaśniewski is the most frequently appearing figure in the context of the study. It is necessary to combine his presidency with the period of the ratification of the concordat and the adoption of the constitution. The overall compilation shows that the presidents mentioned above (in the following order: Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Lech Wałęsa, Lech Kaczyński, Bronisław Komorowski) and former prime ministers (in the following order: Józef Oleksy, Donald Tusk, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Waldemar Pawlak, Jarosław Kaczyński) comprise the basic group of politicians covered by the media. This gives grounds to believe that media coverage throughout this period contains significant threads related to individuals. Here we can see the presence of mediatization strategies.

The results from *Gazeta Wyborcza* presented in Fig. 5.19 show that mediatization appears here especially in relation to the main actors of the political scene from the nineties. Apart from Kwaśniewski, Oleksy, Wałęsa, and Cimoszewicz, key political figures for all the surveyed media remain leftist politicians (Dariusz Rosati, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski) and the right-wing's strongly exposed Hanna Suchocka. Their coverage falls on periods of tensions and negotiations between the Church and the state. This gives us the basis for asserting that the agency of individuals especially dominates during the period of establishing the systemic foundations of the Church-state relationship. In




Fig. 5.19: Key political individuals in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (not adding up to 100 %)

contrast, in *Rzeczpospolita* daily, the frequency schedule reflects the general statements of the media coverage of individual politicians, already presented in Fig. 5.18.

Incomplete material from media coverage in the news by *Wiadomości TVP1* presented in Fig. 5.20 shows the dominance of presidents and prime ministers from competing parties. These include Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński and the people associated with PiS (31 %), Donald Tusk and Bronisław Komorowski from PO (17.6 %) and Waldemar Pawlak from PSL (3.3 %). Characteristic of equal succession amounting to 7.1 % is the prime ministers most often covered on the *TVP1* news service, namely Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk. This suggests their significant participation in the media coverage of religion and the state.

After individual politicians, this analysis also distinguishes categories of key state and political institutions, with the exception that we treat political parties separately. As a result, Fig. 5.21 indicates the dominance of the Sejm and its deputies (32.8 %) and the government (31 %). The joint Church-state commission is also quite high (21.6 %) on the list. Such a turnout of attendance leads us




Fig. 5.20: Key political individuals in *Wiadomości TVP1* (not adding up to 100 %)

to believe that in the case of political actors, the media coverage includes the clearly formalized agencies of the Sejm, government, and a joint Church-state commission on the one hand, and the less formal agency of the Sejm's deputies on the other.

Comparing the severity of state and political institutions based on Fig. 5.22 leads to several insights. First of all, the dominant frequency of the Sejm and deputies in the case of *Wiadomości TVP1* occurs 9.5 % higher than average. The government category in *Wiadomości TVP1* is 8.2 % more common than average. At the same time, coverage of the Constitutional Tribunal turns out clearly weaker (it amounts to 2.1 % on the TV website with an average of 5.3 %). Television material is quite saturated with state and political institutions, however, the result relies on the partial material.

Considering the importance of political parties in shaping Poland's structure after 1989, we placed them in a separate group of content analysis categories (Fig. 5.23). The PSL obtained the highest frequency, 17.8 %, in the material being studied. However, this is mainly based on an appeal. This party does not play the main role. The case looks different when indicating SLD (11.8 %) and PiS (11 %), both characterized by an extremely different approach to the place of the Church in the state. Worth paying attention to seems the




Fig. 5.21: State and political institutions (without political parties) (%)

Category	In general (%)	Gazeta Wyborcza (%)	Rzeczpospolita (%)	Wiadomości TVP1 (%)
Constitutional Tribunal	5.3	4.7	6.9	2.1
Government	31	30.5	29.8	39.2
Joint Church and State Committee	21.6	22.5	23.6	7.2
The Sejm and deputies	32.8	34.1	28.6	42.3
The Senate and senators	9.3	8.2	11.1	9.3

Fig. 5.22: State and political institutions in comparison (without political parties) (%).

Source: Own research

presence of a short-term initiative called *Ruch Palikota* [Palikot's Movement]. It occurred with a frequency of 4.5 %, and the vast majority of the statements of this movement's ideology refer to the call to implement the postulate of a secular state.




Fig. 5.23: Political parties in general (%)

5.4 Who is important: Religious actors

The postulate concerning the secular state transfers various approaches to shaping the Church-state relationship. Among the actors who are greatly interested in its implementation or not satisfied with its implementation are religious representatives. After indicating the results of the content analysis regarding the basic political actors, in the present paragraph we focus on their adversaries. In this part, therefore, we characterize the interrelatedness of the occurrence of categories associated with religious actors, both individuals as well as religious institutions and groups. As in the previous paragraph, here we emphasize the individual actors of the drama. However, we are referring to individuals and institutions lobbying for a particular status of religion in society.

In the case of individual religious actors, Fig. 5.24 mainly refers to the three most frequently emerging categories obtaining a total of 49.7 % within this group. At the same time, we see that Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek and Pope John Paul II appear in the material with similar frequency. There is no significant difference here showing who comes out in the qualitative analysis. In a large number of cases, John Paul II functions as a reference. Meanwhile, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek always has clear agency in the Church-state relationship. He works on the same




Fig. 5.24: Individual religious actors (%)

principle as Cardinal Józef Glemp (15.2 %), and next on the list are Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk, Nuncio (6.8 %), and Archbishop Józef Michalik (6.2 %).

In *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the frequency scheme of three key persons, such as John Paul II, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, and Cardinal Józef Glemp, is repeated. According to Fig. 5.25, however, references to John Paul II prevail (20.2 %). Among the visible figures, but with a lower frequency, appears the aged Catholic Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk (8.6 %). In addition, a certain role should be attributed to Fr. Tadeusz Rydzek, who runs Radio Maryja along with several archbishops. These included the metropolitans from Przemyśl (Józef Michalik with 5.5 %), Lublin (Józef Życiński with 3.7 %), and Gdańsk (Sławoj Leszek Głódź with 2.4 %).

Unlike *Gazeta Wyborcza*, in *Rzeczpospolita*, the number of significant religious individuals is growing. Fig. 5.26 indicates the presence of Cardinal Kazimierz Nycz from Warsaw (4.3 %) and Archbishop Wiktor Skworc from Katowice (2.2 %) in the research material alongside the aforementioned great




Fig. 5.25: Individual religious actors in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)

three Church leaders. The daily also shows a relatively high frequency of religious leaders, Pope John Paul II (15.8 %), Pope Francis (4.3 %), and Patriarch Kirill (2.7 %).

After the content analysis results presented in Fig. 5.27, we can see that *Wiadomości TVP1* presents the most diverse coverage of religious individuals. In addition to three popes (20.5 % of the group), the Polish archbishops (37 %) appear in the materials, representatives of the Holy See (8.2 %), but also the current spokesman of the Polish Bishops' Conference, Rev. Józef Kloch (12.3 %). We cannot forget about the most-frequently appearing person of Cardinal Kazimierz Nycz (16.4 %). The way he replaces Cardinal Józef Glemp points to the continuing long-standing significance of the Warsaw Church in the dynamics of shaping Church-state relations.

The Church naturally has an institutional structure. The content analysis presented in Fig. 5.28 allows us to see two religious institutions dominating in frequency. The Holy See/Vatican and the Polish Bishops' Conference occupy 84.3 % of all the mentioned religious institutions. This gives us grounds to believe




Fig. 5.26: Individual religious actors in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)

that for key political institutions such as the government and the Sejm with its deputies, the Vatican and the Polish Episcopate are the counterweights.

When in the remaining material we are looking for further religious institutions with a relatively frequent presence in media coverage, a certain regularity appears. First, the Cracow Curia (3.9 %) and the Katowice Curia (3.4 %) function in the media material more often than the Apostolic Nunciature (1.9 %). Second, Radio Maryja also appears (3.1 %). Religious institutions, therefore, include those which have a specific political agency.

A comparison of the coverage results of religious institutions based on Fig. 5.29 points to some interesting probabilities. First of all, we note that references to the Holy See and the Vatican take up half of the percentage of attendance in the analyzed group in the case of *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Similarly, 48.6 % of the religious institutions group refer to *Wiadomości TVP1* in the Polish Bishops' Conference. At the same time, the frequency of the Vatican (25.7 %) reveals itself as the lowest. The perspective of the Bishops' Conference over time gains importance in media




Fig. 5.27: Individual religious actors in *Wiadomości TVP1* (%)

coverage. In the research material, this implies the transition from individuals to institutional actors, previously noticed in the case of the frequency of political actors.

5.5 Locating the agency: Believers, non-believers, and covered confessions

In the collected quantitative material, our attention is drawn to two significant groups of categories that allow us to clearly specify the context of the entire project. We will mention the group referring to particular religious denominations. Next, we will mention the categories of followers belonging to particular faiths, but also non-believers. In this way, we want to understand better the circumstances of asking whether a secular state is possible and if so, what should it be like?

Based on Fig. 5.30, we learn that the Catholic Church predominates in the religious denominational groups (53.5 %). This shows that the debate concerning the secular state and the way of shaping the Church-state relationship comes down




Fig. 5.28: Religious institutions in general (%)

Category	In general	Gazeta Wyborcza	Rzeczpospolita	Wiadomości TVP1
The Holy See/Vatican	44.8	49.2	39.4	25.7
Polish Bishops' Conference	39.5	35.8	45.6	48.6
The Katowice Curia	3.4	2.4	2.8	17.1
Radio Maryja	3.1	4.3	1.1	0.0
The Cracow Curia	2.9	2.7	3.3	2.9
Catholic University of Lublin	2.6	2.7	2.8	0.0
Apostolic Nunciature	1.9	1.9	2.2	0.0
Pontifical Academy of Theology	1.2	0.8	1.7	2.9
Military Ordinariate of the Polish Army	0.7	0.3	1.1	2.9

Fig. 5.29: Religious institutions in comparison (%).




Fig. 5.30: Religious denominations in general (%)

to Catholicism. The element of diversity appears in the second dominant category, which generally concerns Churches in Poland. When it comes to shaping the media coverage of the Church-state relationship, we go beyond the perspective of the dominant Catholic religious group. Among the remaining Christian denominations, the Orthodox Church (12.5 %) prevails over the Lutheran Church (4.7 %) and Seventh Day Adventists (1.2 %). It should be connected with the larger covered agency of Orthodox representatives and the coverage of apostolic visits to Poland of the Orthodox Patriarchs Bartholomew I and Kirill.

What characterizes *Gazeta Wyborcza* concerns the increased frequency of references to the Catholic Church at 55.8 %. As we can see in Fig. 5.31, the frequency of Churches in general (27.9 %) is slightly smaller than the general list of media. This still confirms the participation of religious diversity in narratives about the Church-state relationship. When we take into account that the number of references to Catholicism is over three times greater than all other religions put together, we can assume one regularity. *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s basic narrative about religion in Poland is primarily from the perspective of Catholicism.

According to Fig. 5.32, in the *Rzeczpospolita* daily, the perspective of Churches in general grows in comparison with data from the general media to 31.3 %. At the




Fig. 5.31: Religious denominations in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)




Fig. 5.32: Religious denominations in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)

same time, the frequency of references to the Catholic Church drops to 49 %. This makes it possible to notice that the Commonwealth is based on a more diverse narrative. The problem of Church-state relations and understanding the secular state are built based on the election of Christian Churches as the people forcing changes. Characteristically, with a decline in the attendance of all religious groups, the Adventist Church (1 %) still appears in the media coverage. This shows that this small community performs a significant activity in the public space.

Media coverage in *Wiadomości TVPI* has a very homogeneous structure. Fig. 5.33 indicates that in the vast majority of the analyzed research material about religion, as many as 91.7 % of references in the category of religious denominations concern the Catholic Church or the Orthodox Church. At the same time, both denominations receive the highest percentage of appeals in previous lists, with the Catholic Church at 66.7 % and the Orthodox Church at 25 %. In the remaining 8.3 %, references generally cover all Church denominations in Poland. This state indicates a clearly narrow perspective of the analyzed materials. It omits the voices of the Churches that grew out of the Reformation. This practice is also repeated in the case of the followers of individual reformation denominations.

Continuing the previous idea, Fig. 5.34 shows no references to Protestant believers, especially Lutherans. In turn, the dominant groups are the Roman and Greek Catholics (58.7 %) and non-believers (27.5 %). Orthodox believers appear in the third place (13.8 %). The characteristics of this category group can be seen in the significant turnout of non-believers in the collected material. Their presence reveals the agency in favor of a secular state.

Issues concerning the conflict between religion and the state are expressed by non-believers or on behalf of non-believers. We are thus dealing with the over-representation of non-believers visible in the media in relation to their actual participation in the population. We perceive this practice as typical of the struggle for minority rights.

Based on Fig. 5.35, we see that *Gazeta Wyborcza* is clearly over-representing the frequency of non-believers (34 %). The dominant frequency of Roman Catholics (52.8 %) additionally suggests a certain polarization optics. According to the content analysis, the clash between postulates of two interest groups appears: Roman Catholics and non-believers. Such an approach suggests viewing the contents of *Gazeta Wyborcza* through the prism of two doubts. The first concerns the shape of the proposed secular state. The second concerns the way of protecting the rights of non-believers to have freedom from religion.

Fig. 5.36 shows that *Rzeczpospolita* clearly avoids over-representation of non-believers. The frequency of their occurrence in this group (12.5 %) clearly




Fig. 5.33: Religious denominations in *Wiadomości TVP1* (%)




Fig. 5.34: Groups of believers, non-believers (%)




Fig. 5.35: Groups of believers and non-believers in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)

contradicts expanding the idea of a secular state. A significantly larger share of Catholics (66.6 %) and Orthodox (20.8 %) suggests narratives dominated by appeals to denominations with a large tradition of cooperation with the political authority. Taking into account the widest availability of *Rzeczpospolita* for people within the trusted Church circles, we suggest looking at the entire material of this newspaper concerning the agency promoting Church-state relations.

As shown in Fig. 5.37, incomplete material from *Wiadomości TVP1* shows a balance between the views of non-believers, Roman Catholics, and the Orthodox. All three groups perform with the same frequency of 33.3 %. This indicates that in groups of categories referring to individual denominations and representatives of believers and non-believers, it is Catholics, non-believers, and to some extent Orthodox Christians who are visible enough in media coverage to provide material for the general context of the analysis.

5.6 Religion becoming public

The last of the contents analysis topics concerns issues through which religion gains public visibility. The categories we have distinguished here basically include




Fig. 5.36: Groups of believers and non-believers in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)




Fig. 5.37: Groups of believers and non-believers in *Wiadomości TVP1* (%)




Fig. 5.38: Public visibility of religion in general (%)

three areas. The first-refers to the events where religion and politics meet. They mean the joint presence of religious and political actors. The second area to a great extent reflects the controversy surrounding the secular state and creating the place of religion in the legal and social system. The third of the areas refers to religious symbols in the public space. Due to the frequency of these three domains, we particularly explain the dynamics of the debate on state secularity and the extent of topics that the discussed idea touches upon.

Among the categories that we have included in the public visibility of religion (Fig. 5.38), the highest frequency refers to three issues. As much as 32.2 % of the material contains references to bishops' statements on social matters. Next, 20.9 % concentrate on clergy in the public space and 20.7 % on the Smolensk crash. It can be seen here that the public visibility of religion comes especially through the coverage of members of the Church's hierarchy. The relatively high frequency of religion in school (7.4 %) and the joint celebrations of the Church and the state (4.9 %) are also important in the debate about the secular state. They show that in the category of groups referring to public visibility of religion, there is a significant 36.1 % of contents that joins the matters concerning the Church and state.




Fig. 5.39: Public visibility of religion in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)

Fig. 5.39 indicates that in the case of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the frequency of the agency of bishops and priests is 70.4 %, which remains even higher than the general material in this category. In addition, a lot of space is devoted to the issue of religion teachers and religious education in schools (9.4 %). Relatively little space falls on religious issues in connection with the Smolensk crash (2.8 %). It turns out, therefore, that for events related to the Smolensk crash, the religious framework does not matter.

Based on Fig. 5.40, it is noticed that in *Rzeczpospolita* we are dealing with the frequency of more topics related to religion and Church-state relations. The newspaper covers the visits of Bartholomew I, Patriarch of Constantinople to the Polish Sejm (2.4 %) and the confusion of political and religious agency that occurred during the would-be ingress of Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus in Warsaw (3.2 %). The lustration lie of Archbishop Wielgus became the basis for the discussion on the cooperation of the clergy with the apparatus of the communist security services. However, this topic was not able to overcome the regularly raised issues of religious education in schools or chaplains in the army and hospitals (4 %).




Fig. 5.40: Public visibility of religion in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)

The research material collected from *Wiadomości TVP1* archives presented in Fig. 5.41 clearly contains an over-representation of the coverage of the Smolensk crash (61.5 %). The other topics from this area indicate, however, that the largest percentage of respondent participation was found in the common Church and state celebrations (11.5 %) and the activities of priests in the public space (10.1 %). This allows us to assume that in the case of *Wiadomości TVP1*, the media agenda rewards Church and state events that take place together. We can read it as the endorsed Church's intuition, where media coverage treats the presence of representatives of the Catholic Church as a stable element of public order.

By setting this order, we now want to refer to the religious and national symbols that function in the public space, creating clear associations between what is religious and secular. According to Fig. 5.42, we particularly use the representation of the cross in the group of symbols (81 %). In the background, the frequency of other symbols does not play a significant role. However, if we look at the following objects, such as the preamble to the constitution (5.9 %) and




Fig. 5.41: Public visibility of religion in *Wiadomości TVP1* (%)

Wawel Royal Castle in Cracow (5.9 %), we must keep in mind the agency linking them. These three are based on the unbreakable entanglement of the religious and secular spheres.

The third perspective we have announced earlier concerns the Church-state relationship controversy. At this stage of the analysis, we have to simply point out the frequency of the appearance of particular issues in the analyzed media. Let us draw the reader's attention to the fact that in the literature on the subject of the meeting point between the Church and the public sphere, in Poland we can find important issues in the media debate, among others abortion and in-vitro (Budnik, 2016; Desperak, 2003; Laska-Formejster, 2013).

As we can see from the data in Fig. 5.43, references to controversies concern three issues: permitting abortion (32.1 %), the Catholic Church's finances (25.5 %), and the specific issue of the state financing the Church (23.1 %). Poland has the most restrictive anti-abortion laws in Europe. A large number of references to the subject of abortion mainly result from the vitality of this topic and its variable dynamics in the analyzed years. It is characteristic that




Fig. 5.42: Religious symbols in general (%)




Fig. 5.43: Controversies in general (%)




Fig. 5.44: Controversies in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (%)

subjects on in-vitro and abortion appear with a 5.2 % frequency. Thus, these occur much less frequently than the burning issues of the Church's finances and state co-financing. The main results, therefore, lead us to assume that the perspective of abortion itself and the state financing the Church remains an important place for negotiating the type of secular state in Poland.

In the case of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the distribution of references to controversies basically seems similar to the general results of the analysis. However, after a closer look, we can notice a difference. Fig. 5.44 points to *Gazeta Wyborcza* as having the highest number of references to abortion among the studied media (43.2 %). As a result, looking at the controversial issues, we can see two basic clusters of topics. The first concerns the management of life and quality of life, with the problems of abortion and in-vitro taking up 49.5 %. The second involves the Catholic Church's property and finances, taking up 43.2 %. Thus, *Gazeta Wyborcza* focuses on moral and economic controversies.

Fig. 5.45 shows that the *Rzeczpospolita* daily contains the most references to finances and Church property (60.8 %). Moral issues occupy the next positions with the following frequency: abortion at 21.7 %, in-vitro at 4.3 %, and moral support for free Tibet at 3.3 %. This newspaper puts emphasis on the Church entering the area of possessions, economics, and financial ties with the state.




Fig. 5.45: Controversies in *Rzeczpospolita* (%)

Materials from *Wiadomości TVP1* allow us to basically see three controversial areas from the perspective of Church-state relations. Fig. 5.46 points to the dominance of the concerns about the Catholic Church's finances and the state helping finance the Church. Such a high frequency of 88.9 % confirms that we cannot remain indifferent to the question of the material situation of owning a Church and to what extent the state helps in the Church building's expansion. Besides, the wide presence of categories joining religion, politics, and economics indicates the interconnection between the Church and the political sphere. This opens the field for analyzing to what extent the previously presented endorsed Church model is in comparison to the declaration of an impartial worldview by the state.

When it comes to summarizing this part of the book, we face the question of what can we learn from this contents analysis? We will answer this question on two levels. The first concerns the usefulness of this method in a project such as mine. When we think about contents analysis, we see its results as a set of data on the frequency and tone of the analyzed media materials. In this study, we omitted the assumption that contents frequency are an important reference in the grounded theory process. The results of such a narrow contents analysis allow us to see categories and regularities that, like sensitizing concepts, support




Fig. 5.46: Controversies in *Wiadomości TVP1* (%)

the subsequent qualitative analysis. The second level boils down to describing the patterns emerging from the contents analysis. They appeared in each of the paragraphs of this chapter. We will recapitulate a few that explain the further part of the analysis in a more general way.

First of all, the basis for building the theory on the development of the idea of a secular state concerns the agency of political and religious actors. The activity of political and religious individuals and institutions leads to the second conclusion. Over the years, there has been a transition from coverage of individuals to coverage of institutions. This prompted us to concentrate heavily on individuals from the beginning of the analysis, a time when the political foundations of Church-state relations are being built and the institutions are being stressed. Third, wanting to know how the idea of the secular state develops and what the dynamics of the Church-state relationship consist in, we look at the collected material as a media representation where each of the parties builds its autonomy. Fourth, we take into account that postulates about the secular state sound like in the context of the controversy surrounding the activity of the Churches in two fundamentally distant domains: finance and moral order. Fifth, we take into account the current agency in favor of the secular state (*Gazeta Wyborcza*) or Church-state cooperation (*Rzeczpospolita*).

6 On the way to the secular state

Everything that has been presented to the reader about this research on media so far comes down to the frequency of the set categories. We will now refer to the grounded theory and “go beyond previously established categories” (Tucker-McLaughlin & Campbell, 2012: 7) to take an in-depth look at media contents in order to give it meaning. The analysis allows us to more dynamically view the process of the mediatization of a secular state.

6.1 The secular state and Church-state relationship: A qualitative overview

When we take a look at the Church-state relationship in media coverage, frequency itself does not reflect its complexity. It is worth supporting the earlier quantitative content analysis with qualitative data from the media content, supplemented with the analysis of denominational law and electoral documents of various political parties.

We also used the Atlas.ti software in this part of the media analysis, starting with pre-coding the results of 214 codes and 268 notes supplementing the codes. Then, in the course of concentrated and selective coding, we worked through the initial codes. From material integrated with the results of quantitative media analysis, legal documents, and electoral programs, we selected some conceptual themes, meaning ten *axial categories*, to which we attributed a primary role in the process under investigation. They need a brief description.

(I) *Actions regarding the concordat*. The basic place of revealing the representation of the secular state and the Church-state relationship is a long-standing debate concerning the concordat. From the beginning of the country’s political changes, the idea of normalizing relations with the Vatican appeared. Over time, it took on the form of a debate about the shape of a common treaty, and later the consequences of its renegotiation or possible termination. The research material includes eight clusters that organize this category.

When we look at the matter from the procedural perspective, the first five clusters are revealed: (1) works on the treaty, (2) signing the treaty, (3) disputes over ratification and the ratification, (4) examining the treaty’s constitutionality, proposals for its renegotiation or termination, and (5) observing the treaty. The contents of these clusters indicate that the concordat became the litmus test

of the Church-state relationship. First of all, the dynamics of its creation, ratification, and functioning boil down to multi-stage and strategic negotiations between political and religious actors. Second, the concordat and related denominational laws determine the privileged position of Catholicism in Poland as the endorsed Church and limit the state's ability to decide about the religious life of its citizens. Third, the chance to break with the contract or fear of breaking it becomes essential arguments for each of the parties. This is illustrated by the following example ("SLD chce przeanalizować konkordat [The SLD Wants to Reanalyze the Concordat]," 2008: 1):

"SLD wants to check whether the concordat records were broken and lead to their strict adherence. According to SLD politicians, this is necessary, because 10 years have passed since Poland ratified the concordat."

When we look at this issue from the symbolic side, three more clusters appear: (6) the meaning of the concordat for the Catholic Church and the state, (7) the meaning of the concordat for other religions, and (8) public support for this treaty. It turns out that the agreement between the Church and the state is connected with an extensive system of meanings revealed by political and religious actors. The concordat functions in social discourse in a bipolar way. For some, it proves the Church's independence from the arbitrary shaping of religious law by the state. It authenticates the changes that have taken place in the country since its transformation. It also provides social stability. For others, the concordat means permitting a religious state. Two examples illustrate these positions:

"The Holy See has been in existence for two millennia and the Polish State for one millennium, and they are again associated in this old and tried legal form of a concordat. We bind what has been broken. But first and foremost, this paves the way we will take' said Minister [Krzysztof] Skubiszewski yesterday just after the signing of the concordat" ("Mamy konkordat [We Have a Concordat]," 1993: 3).

"From the beginning, the concordat aroused great controversies. 'The lack of ratification of the concordat put into question the credibility of our country,' said Minister Olechowski in June. The opponents of the quick ratification of the concordat, however, consider that it is the first step towards a denominational state. They do not want to strengthen the position of the Church in Poland." ("Nie czekać z konkordatem [Do not Delay the Concordat]," 1994: 1).

In the background of the dispute over the concordat, there is the issue of its importance for non-Catholic denominations. For them, the treaty functions as a specific point of reference. The concordat provides them with an argument for the equal rights of religion, and since the Catholic Church has certain rights,

other Churches advocate granting them these same rights. What is more, its provisions contain solutions that later reproduce further acts on the relationship between the Polish nation and specific Churches and religious associations.

(II) *Religious and state events.* The basic element that functions in media messages, but is missing in the supplementary material, concerns events involving religious and political actors. A joint event carries a significant symbolic charge. There are many factors that determine the association in the Church-state relationship: which party dominates, where the event takes place, whose agency reveals this event, and what kind of agency it has. A joint political and religious event belongs to the significant components of this theory.

There are seven clusters in the media that organize this category. Speaking of religious actors, we see three clusters here: (1) spiritual leaders in the parliament, (2) spiritual leaders for the president, and (3) clergymen in the secular public space. There are several regularities in this group. First, spiritual leaders operate efficiently in a secular or important political environment. Figures such as Pope John Paul II, Orthodox Patriarchs Bartholomew I, and Kirill I, or the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political leader of the Tibetans, visit presidents and appear before particular chambers of the Polish parliament. This is part of the regular practices of Polish authorities, consisting of hosting world leaders and making the parliamentary tribune available to them.

In the case of clergy in the public space, meanwhile, it is about realizing their civic right to freedom of expression rather than speaking on behalf of their religious institutions. The problem concerns the attitude of their Churches or political actors towards the public activities of these clergymen. This is well illustrated by the example of Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk from Radio Maryja:

“The government – we read in the communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – ‘decided to protest against this harmful image of Poland’s statements.’ Poland asked the Holy See ‘to undertake actions leading to the cessation of frustrations by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, affecting the good name of Poland and harming the Church in Poland.’ The head of Poland’s diplomacy, Radosław Sikorski, also talked about this with the Primate of Poland, Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk, and the apostolic nuncio in Poland, Archbishop Celestino Migliore” (Szacki, 2011: 4).

Two clusters emerge from the perspectives of political actors: (4) politicians at the audience in the Vatican and (5) politicians participating in religious celebrations. The first of the clusters presents the efforts of politicians to obtain an audience with John Paul II. In the nineties, this was problematic for the left-wing politicians, particularly including President Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The situation improved after the ratification of the concordat. When it comes to

politicians participating in religious rituals, this especially concerns their participation in the mass. The physical presence of a political representative at mass is their symbolic recognition of the Church's social significance.

The third group is clustered referring to (6) religious and political events and (7) occasional discussions and meetings of representatives of the religious and political parties. The dynamics of this group indicates a balance between the parties. Especially after the Smolensk crash in 2010, there was a smooth transition towards friendly cooperation. The reason for this state may be the extraordinary circumstances of this event.

(III) *The Church participating in the process of creating law.* This category reveals the key areas in which the Catholic Church exerts indirect and direct influence on the law-making process. It includes three clusters that concern the Church's involvement (1) in the constitutional process, (2) in the creation of ordinary statutes and administrative reform, and (3) in enforcing practical solutions in the field of moral-social issues (family, sexual education, in-vitro). Another cluster (4) concerns the agency of political actors. It points out that, for fear of the Church, some political actors refrain from specific decisions regarding the liberalization of abortion.

(IV) *Ties regarding the finance and property of Churches.* Religious institutions can count on numerous conveniences in Poland. Their legal status also allows them to function as a separate type of company, so-called legal Church person. In addition, their activities in various areas are co-financed by the state. In this category, it is clearly evident that such a state gives grounds for public debate about the position and privileging of Churches and unions, especially for the Catholic Church.

Within this category, there are three clusters related to the discussion about the finances and property of religious institutions. The first two concern all Churches and emphasize (1) that the state repay for Church property looted during communism, and (2) proposes changes in the co-financing of Churches from the state budget. Their contents show the clear actions of particular religions in order to regain the stolen property. They also concern lobbying by Churches to recognize some of their activities as public activities, for example running health centers.

These clusters also include discourses around the liquidating the Church fund, the elimination of concessions for religious associations, and the taxation of clerical activities. The third cluster points out the generosity of the state towards the Catholic Church and the lack of transparency of these subsidies. Clear rewards for the initiatives of the Church are revealed here. The sphere of the endorsed

Church, therefore, takes the form of financial support for selected activities by the Church, especially charitable and educational works.

(V) *Religion in school*. Essentially, two clusters function in this category: the status of religion as a school subject and the nature of school education. They point to the tension resulting from the introduction of religion to schools and the slow change in status as an optional subject requiring extra hours. It is within this category that the question about the secular nature of the school system arises. On the one hand, the bishops express their opposition to the atheist school. On the other hand, some politicians articulate their statements to the media and party programs and demand to withdraw religion from schools or provide a choice between religion and ethics. This is illustrated by the following example (“Hall: Etyka w szkołach od 1 września 2009 [Hall: Ethics in Schools as of September 1, 2009],” 2007: 4):

“Minister Hall reminded us that participation in religion classes is the free choice of children and their parents. She also announced that as of September 1, 2009, the Ministry of Education will try to give students in all schools the practical opportunity to attend ethics. ‘I think it should be a student’s right,’ she said.”

(VI) *Religious symbols in public space and social awareness*. The complexity of the secular state in the Polish context is revealed in the category devoted to religious symbols in public space. Three clusters build its foundations. The cluster (1) devoted to the self-agency of the cross dominates. Politicians and citizens give the cross a clear agency. The Catholic side uses it to emphasize that the country functions as a Catholic society. Thus, the cross is not only a religious symbol but also a symbol of the political domination of Christianity. On the other side of the barricade are political actors for whom the exemplary cross in the plenary hall of the Sejm confirms the unjustified entry of religion into the public sphere. They define the public space as a non-religious space.

Another cluster (2) points to giving Catholicism and the Catholic Church the status of a national symbol. This is especially so in the speeches of leading politicians, who show respect and attention to this Church as the foundation of Polish identity. Politicians of various options, not only right-wing, apply the strategy of accenting the nation’s Catholic tradition. Catholicism itself limits the space of discussion about the secular state.

The last of the clusters (3) concerns declarations and postulates regarding various religious symbols. It illustrates the agency of political actors regarding the

presence of these symbols in the public sphere. It shows the instrumental attitude of political parties, for example, to denominational invocation in the constitution or the postulate of the enthronement of Christ as the King of Poland.

(VII) *Negotiating the Church's position in the state.* The postulates regarding the secular state and a specific form of Church-state relations simply reflect the long-term process of negotiations between the political authority and religions, in particular negotiations on the position of the Catholic Church. It essentially consists of four large thematic clusters: (1) postulates on the model of Church-state relations, (2) characteristics of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state, (3) discussion on the rights of non-believers, and (4) discussion on the inequality of religions.

In this category, we leave the discussion on the shape of the Church-state relationship. Further years show the development of the model of the state's impartiality towards Churches. The dynamics of negotiations go from the postulates on neutrality to impartiality. At the same time, the analysis proves that in the media and programs of political parties, the secular state is identified with the separation model. To a great extent, this is due to the context in which the state made efforts to develop a common path along with the Catholic Church. By the same token, the Church has gained a number of actual and symbolic privileges. Over time, they became problematic from the position of the question about the deepening religious diversity of society.

This is why diversity reveals two other strong threads: other denominations and non-believers. Media messages indicate doubts about the equality of denominations. They reveal the privileges of the Catholic Church at the expense of other denominations. The dynamics of media coverage on atheists is even more specific. First, the researched titles point to the growing presence of atheists in society. Next, in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, atheists are presented as victims of the system that rewards the dominant Catholicism. Postulates are made to protect them and fight against their discrimination.

(VIII) *Criticism of the Church's agency.* Another category concerns public criticism of the activities of the Catholic Church. Two variants of this criticism appear: (1) attacks and disapproval on the part of the public, especially politicians not related to the authorities, and (2) attacks by the state. The first concerns increasing media coverage of anticlerical voices over time. However, this is not a constructive critique, but depreciation of the Church's public action.

The matter turns out to be more complex in the case of state attacks against the Church. The leftist governments in the early nineties revealed clear antagonism

towards the Catholic Church and its governmental rulings related to the “management of Catholic society.” This did not translate directly onto the regulations in force at that time, but to suspending work on the concordat. In addition, media coverage proves that the Church responds to this strategy by publicly dramatizing its situation. On the other hand, the left uses rationalization tactics. Two examples of this are given below (“Ostre słowa Kościoła [The Church’s Strong Words],” 1994: 2):

“Pope John Paul II called it ‘rejecting your best friend’s hand’ when the Sejm postponed the ratification of the Concordat by the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Józef Glemp. Bishop Alojzy Orszulik of Łowicz states that this is a ‘frontal attack on the Church.’”

“Szmajdzinski writes: ‘Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek accuses supporters of the resolution adopted by the Sejm of low-motivation and undemocratic behavior. He practices clear political agitation by revealing the great difficulty of the Catholic Church in democratic Poland, which consists in the lack of ability to treat the will of voters with peace and respect.’”

(IX) *The Church’s agency.* The Church’s tactics based on playing the role of the victim should be supplemented with the significant category of the Church’s agency. It is evident how inconclusive the position of the Catholic Church turns out to be. This category is essentially formed by clusters such as (1) the agency of minority Churches, (2) the agency of the Catholic Church regarding the moral sphere, (3) the Catholic Church interfering in the field of politics, and (4) antagonism of the Catholic Church towards political authorities.

In the case of the first cluster, we see that not only the Catholic Church plays an active role in the environment of the process of denominational law. Minority Churches are also negotiating their social position. Depending on the case, they postulate being treated on equal terms with the Catholic Church, or at least be distinguished because of their minority character. Such an agency always appears as a consequence of the postulates of new religious rights. In the case of the Catholic Church, the situation differs. The Church itself articulates its unambiguous position on social issues, especially moral ones. It uses radical comparisons. The prohibition on abortion illustrates this example (“Życie zagrożone bardziej niż w totalitaryzmie [Life is More Threatened Now than During Totalitarianism],” 1996):

“A ‘national drama’ and ‘a greater threat to human life than legal regulations from the period of the totalitarian state,’ said the bishops assembled at their plenary meeting in Rzeszów to amend the law on protecting life, which allows, among others, a so-called abortion for social reasons. In their statements, the hierarchs postulate that the new law should basically refer to God and protect life.”

Finally, the Catholic Church shows political agency. It supports and depreciates parties and politicians, cooperating with the “Solidarity” trade union. Its various agencies, such as Radio Maryja, clearly interfere in current political activity. In this category, we should look at the Catholic Church as a clear player on the political scene.

(X) *The agency of the state and political actors.* The last of the analyzed categories answers the issue of the Church’s agency. It points out that in the area of relations with religions, the state and politicians refer primarily to matters related to the Catholic Church. The next four major clusters refer to: (1) state interventions in the affairs of the Catholic Church, (2) the place of the state and politicians in relations with the Catholic Church, (3) showing a negative attitude towards the Catholic Church, and (4) exclusive/anti-exclusive discourses.

There are also a few moments of state involvement in the internal life of the Church. As the crisis connected with the vetting of Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus – a candidate for the post of Metropolitan of Warsaw – shows, the state can use its constitutional right to an impartial intervention against the Church. It was then that President Lech Kaczyński intervened in the Vatican to remove a bishop accused of collaborating with the communist security services. At the same time, it acts in situations of explicit violation of symbolic interests of the state.

In this category, we also learn about the process of negotiating the state’s position towards the Catholic Church and justifying the public position on this matter. This refers to the situation of the counter-rule of left-wing governments towards the Catholic Church and the explanation that the secular state is not identical with atheism. The Church often responds with accusations of their so-called bad agency, namely discrimination against Catholics, allergy towards Catholicism, or treating Church representatives as politicians.

6.2 The incoherent debate over the secular state

The ten categories presented above function based on a certain dynamics for modeling the Church-state relationship. Going deeper into the process of these dynamics, let’s now refer to part of Art. 34. established in 1936 and the binding – until now minor – amendments to the law on the relationship between the State and the Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of Poland:

“During the service every Friday and on the day of solemn feasts, Muslim imams will say prayers for the prosperity of the Republic and its President, and during public holidays

they will celebrate a solemn devotion for the intentions of the Republic, its President, Government and Army” (Act on April 21, 1936 On the State relations to the Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of Poland, 1936, Art. 34).

This peculiar fragment illustrates the basis of our theory of the development of the studied representation of the secular state. It leads to the intuition about the inconsistency of the state of social awareness, political declarations, and the actual legal status.

In 1989, in one of the first laws regarding religious matters, a statement appeared that “the Republic of Poland is a secular state, neutral in matters of religion and beliefs” (Act on May 17, 1989 On Guaranteeing Freedom of Conscience and Confession, 1989, Art. 10.1). In later legislation, this wording clearly mutated towards an impartial state and a specific form of the endorsed Church model. Therefore, after the legislative process of 1989–2015, the statement that we are dealing with a secular state should be treated as insufficient or even as a truism. The complexity of this matter requires a clarification about the way this secularity is revealed. Analyzing this phenomenon in the research material, we see that it is built on three separate but to varying degrees corresponding processes of the evolution of the law, postulates of political parties, and media representation.

The first of the processes refers to a specific change in the sense of secularity. The record from the mentioned law was modified over time by successive laws, more favorable to religion. We are moving from a formula about a secular state that remains neutral towards religions and religious associations to a state that promotes Catholicism in a symbolic way. At the same time, the state maintains a general impartiality in its actions towards all religions, but it is not neutral.

The second of the processes indicates a change in understanding Church-state relations in the media and the dominating model in media messages. Before the Constitution of 1997 and the concordat come into force, the basis of media representation was determined by discussions on the right formula for the coexistence of religion and the state. Disputes concern whether Poland is to be based on *laïcité*, secularism, neutrality, or impartiality. As a result, this impartiality becomes the obligatory note. Nonetheless, over time, the media mainly focuses on discussions of the model of secularity as causing division.

The third process, parallel to the media trends but not always consistent with them, reveals two successive stages. Before the Constitution and concordat entered into force, the matter concerned wide interest in religious issues in the declarations and election programs of some political parties. With the commencement of the validity of both acts, a stronger articulation of the postulate to separate the Church and the state and the revision of the existing arrangements began among the left.

When we focus on the first of these processes, we return to the entry on freedom of conscience and religion on May 17, 1989, which defines Poland as a secular state, neutral in matters of religion and beliefs. This shows that even before the elections to the Contract Sejm (June 4, 1989), the Polish People's Republic accepted a neutral attitude toward religion, pointing to its secularity and religious neutrality. As we remember from the first chapter, separation and neutrality rely on the state's distance towards particular religions and worldviews. It is not gradable, meaning that it practically functions or it simply does not exist.

This property, over time, is perpetuated as a certainty in social imagination. However, this seems wrong. The decisions of this law turned out to be exceptionally vivid for later norms, which first remove the radical separation and neutrality, and later make it even more difficult to think about secularity. The term "separation" appears in Art. 9 § 2.1 of the Act of May 17, 1989. It denotes a separation of the Churches and religious associations from the state. However, this separation remains inconsistent in reducing Churches to private initiatives. Art. 19 § 3 of the Act entitles Churches to conduct public worship.

The record of the possibility of celebrating public worship also appeared in another law (Act on May 17, 1989 on the State Relations to the Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland, 1989). Art. 15 § 2.2 of this Act refers to the possibility of conducting religious celebrations on roads, public squares and in public buildings after obtaining agreement from the relevant governing body of the place of celebration. The same applies to laws regarding other Churches and religious communities. The positive attitude of the state towards religious worship in public space is also confirmed later on by the Law on Assemblies on July 5, 1990, where the legislator states in Art. 4 point 2 that the provisions regarding assemblies do not apply to the Catholic Church and other religious associations. As we can see, at the beginning of the post-communist system, legal provisions preclude the possibility of *laïcité*.

The state also gives a hand to other religions in terms of non-working days granted to their followers. In statutes on the relationship between the state and individual Churches and religious associations, catalogs of non-working days for the followers of particular religions appear (Act of February 20, 1997 On the State relations to the Mariavite Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland, 1997, Art. 9; Act on May 13, 1994 On the State relations to the Evangelical-Augsburg Church in the Republic of Poland, 1994, Art. 14; Act on February 20, 1997 On the State relations to Jewish Communities in the Republic of Poland, 1997, Art. 11; Act on April 21, 1936 On the State relations to the Karaim Religious Association of the Republic of Poland, 1936, Art. 27.2; Act on April 21, 1936 On the State relations to the Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of

Poland, 1936, Art. 34.2; Act on February 20, 1997 On the State relations to the Pentecostal Church in the Republic of Poland, 1997, Art. 12; Act on February 20, 1997 On the State relations with the Mariavite Old-Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland, 1997, Art. 9; Act on July 4, 1991 on the State's Relations with the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1991, Art. 14; Act on June 30, 1995 On the State relations with the Baptist Church in the Republic of Poland, 1995, Art. 11; Act on June 30, 1995 On the State relations with the Evangelical-Methodist Church in the Republic of Poland, 1995, Art. 12; Act on June 30, 1995 On the State relations with the Seventh Day Adventist Church in the Republic of Poland, 1995, Art. 11; Act on May 17, 1989 on the State Relations to the Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland, 1989, Art. 17). This accommodation of religion within the legal system also indicates the positive attitude of the state toward religion. It also shows that what is religious is not treated as foreign to whatever is public.

A state characterized in this way does not fit into several points in the model of the ideal secular state discussed by Małajny in the first chapter. Małajny notices (1) the distinct separation of the state apparatus from the Church apparatus in Poland. However, religious institutions do not function as (2) private associations. The concordat and analogous laws with Churches and religious associations establish a legal Church entity, a type of legal person reserved for religious institutions. Of course, the state does not care what religion its citizens adhere to. However, when they confess a certain faith, the state also secures their right to religious practices in the public sphere.

Art. 53 of the Constitution and the international conventions in force in Poland guarantee citizens (3) the freedom of conscience and religion. The accommodation of the context of cooperating with religion results in regulating the position of particular denominations by registering in the proper court. Religions with a regulated status have the right to their own catechesis classes in school. More importantly, violation of the freedom of conscience and religion of other people limits this law.

(4) *Laïcité*, or the last element of the secular state mentioned by Małajny, does not function in Poland. Along with the development of denominational law, the transition from neutrality to impartiality takes place. The Constitution clearly leaves the gate open to state interference in matters related to religion and worldview, but this must be an impartial intervention:

“Public authorities in the Republic of Poland shall be impartial in matters of personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life, and shall ensure their freedom of expression within public life” (“The Constitution of the Republic of Poland,” 1997, Art. 25 § 2).

In the next paragraph of the Art. 25 § 3 of the Constitution appears a reference to respect for the autonomy and independence of the Church and the state. However, this indicates that such interference is extraordinary. We can see, therefore, that Małajny's model does not correspond to the legal regulations in force in the country.

Of course, the provision on impartiality does not exclude intervention in the life of a religion. However, there is no detailed regulation about such intervention. In turn, political practice indicates a few moments of tension in which the state interferes in the life of the Catholic Church. The specificity of this mechanism will be presented in the next part referring to the contents of the media. Meanwhile, we now move away from legal documents to political party documents.

A party's approach to the model of Church-state relations is based on electoral programs in three characteristics. First of all, a clear part of political parties and formations seeking seats in the parliament does not refer to the issue of secularism and the denominations in Poland. Their postulates boil down to economic issues and the way of shaping democracy. Second, from the perspective of time, it can be seen that the leftist parties consistently maintain postulates for the separation of state and religion. The basics of this identification, however, changes over time. Third, problems in the area of secularity and denominations are revealed in electoral programs, especially in the years of shaping the constitutional order. After the adoption of the constitution and the ratification of the concordat, they are disappearing from the perspective of the leading slogans of the right and the center.

In justifying the petrification of the postulates of the secular state in the leftist documents, let's turn to the parliamentary elections of 1991 and 1993. The National Electoral Committee of the SLD, composed of the SdRP, PPS, trade unions, and several associations, supports the secular state and neutral worldview based on separation (Słodkowska, 2001b). The SLD maintained its course on the secular and neutral state in the 1997 election. In the program of another leftist party, the UP, there appears an element closer to the formula *laïcité*:

"The Polish state should preserve its secular character, but not avoid cooperation with Churches. The religious mission of Churches cannot be supported by means of coercion from state institutions" (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2004: 27).

The postulate of preserving the secular nature of Poland does not fit the law from 1997. There is no mention of secularity. At this point, however, we can see a trace of the later radicalization of the leftist postulates. The 2001 elections already showed that the SLD and UP continued to sustain their efforts in favor of

a secular state. In addition, these parties attached to this postulate the themes of the right to conscious motherhood, which seek the liberalization of anti-abortion laws (Słodkowska, 2002). The significant agency of the Catholic Church in the protection of life, manifesting itself in pressuring politicians, means that from now on, conscious motherhood should be treated as belonging to the topics of secularity and denominationalism. This approach also confirms the clear presence at the initial stage of coding of a large number of materials in which abortion and the concordat are connected.

During the elections in 2003 and 2005, the SLD's postulates consistently returned to the idea of a secular state characterized by worldview neutrality. In addition to the postulates related to the right to conscious motherhood, a new postulate appeared in the program, which assumed "equal property and tax rights for partnerships" (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2006a: 153). However, the SDPL was in favor of liberating anti-abortion laws (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2006c). The accelerated elections of 2007 confirmed the strong tendencies of leftist parties to support the idea of a secular state. Meanwhile, LiD (consisting of SLD, UP, SDPL, PD) upheld the postulate of the secular state and the separation of the apparatus of political power from institutional religions.

During these elections, this repeated postulate became the identifying mark of the ideology of the Polish leftists. However, in the 2011 elections, it appeared as the basic element identifying the SLD on the political scene. Yet, a fundamental change appeared in the party's discourse. The SLD invoked the constitutional principle of impartiality instead of the old postulate of neutrality. At the same time, the demands put forward by the party headed towards a radical separation, meaning the liquidation of traces of religious symbolism in national symbols, a reduction in the number of chaplains, etc. (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2013a).

In addition to the role the SLD played, the 2011 elections were largely devoted to Church-state relations thanks to the radical postulates created by the Palikot Movement. This new liberal-leftist group's program assumes the implementation of a secular state in its electoral program. The party also makes a specific diagnosis of the then state of the Church-state relationship (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2013b, pp. 333–334):

"The [Palikot] Support Movement is not hostile towards the Church; it does not fight against it, nor even fight against religion, faith and people of faith. However, in our opinion, in the relations between the state and the Church in Poland, there is an incomprehensible and radical privilege of the Church at the expense of the secularity of the state. This applies to the many ways of financing the Church, incompatible with the constitution, religion lessons in schools, the renovations of temples, but also the everyday functioning of the state and life of the country, where almost everything is related with

the Church. This is because the Polish state after 1989 did not attempt to create secular forms of functioning in the most important institutions. Both political elections, the swearing in of political authorities, the transfer of power after the elections, the funeral ceremonies, and the usual small investments such as in 'Orlik' buildings are appropriated by religious symbolism."

What can be seen in this passage refers to the discourse that the Palikot Movement founded in the space of political communication. This cannot be treated as a general formula in the form of "we are striving for a secular state." In turn, the Palikot Movement pointed to areas in which the Church-state relations departed from the idea of separation and impartiality. For the development of the idea of a secular state, this means a milestone in the new narrative. Henceforth, speaking about the merger of the Church and the state was based on an argument that included cases of violating the principles of constitutional impartiality and neutrality.

The Palikot Movement also created the idea of performing secular equivalents of religious rituals. It was to be a new form that will replace the existing Roman Catholicism and function as a civil religion. In this way, the secular state begins to live not only in terms of preventing the role of the Church as dominating the public sphere. The secular state becomes a postulate for a new quality of public life.

Let's contrast this view of the secular state with Grzymała-Busse's (2015) previous views on the fusion of religion and the nation. By looking at her observations, we see that the Palikot Movement's proposal seems utopian. It assumes that the historical relations between the nation and Catholicism can be overcome in Poland by establishing substitute rituals. The Palikot Movement is probably thinking about a format of civic religion typical of the United States.

In the 2015 elections, when the SLD presented its electoral postulates, it placed the issue of a secular state in a clear counter position to the Church. The SLD program no longer postulated preserving state impartiality towards religion, but the secular state was to be based on separation. In the party's program appears a quote from the Act that guarantees freedom of conscience and religion from 1989, which indicates secularity. As we can see, this trace of the change in discourse made earlier by the Palikot Movement is reflected in the SLD program. The party postulates solutions thanks to which "Poles should on a daily basis feel that the Republic of Poland is a secular state" ("Program Wyborczy Zjednoczona Lewica SLD, TR, PPS, UP, Zieloni [Electoral Programs of the United Left, SLD, TR, PPS, UP, and Greens]," 2015: 33). At the same time, the SLD in a negative way defines the areas of struggle against the Church's domination. This can be illustrated by the phrases from the SLD's program such as the struggle for schools being free of

“religious indoctrination” or the postulate of reliable knowledge about sex education and not “religious prejudices” (“Program Wyborczy Zjednoczona Lewica SLD, TR, PPS, UP, Zieloni [Electoral Programs of the United Left, SLD, TR, PPS, UP, and Greens],” 2015, pp. 8, 10).

Not only does the left wing undertake postulates regarding the Church-state relations in the analyzed period, but the question of denomination appears also in the right and in the center, especially in the first years of transformation. After the adoption of the constitution and the ratification of the concordat, religious issues disappear from their leading slogans. In order to illustrate this topic better, let's go back to the first elections after 1989. The Polish Catholic-Social Association proposed following the instructions of the Episcopate (Ślōdkowska, 1995). Such radical ideas of the lack of separation did not take place in the case of other election committees. Instead, the parties tend to work together and cooperate.

In the 1991 elections, both the Catholic Election Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka – WAK) and the Civic Center Agreement (Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum), composed, inter alia, of the Kaczyński brothers PC, postulated the autonomy and cooperation of the Church and the state (Ślōdkowska, 2001a, 2001c). A much more diverse approach appeared in the program of the PChD. It postulated having reservations as to accommodating religion in public life. The PChD is opposed to the privileged role of the Church in Poland, but wants to cooperate with two autonomous institutions of religion and the state (Ślōdkowska & Dołbakowska, 2001). A similar position to PChD is held by the UD. It professes Christian values and at the same time postulates the independence of cooperation between the Church and the state (Ślōdkowska, 2001d).

In the 1993 elections, the KPN mentioned that autonomy and cooperation should characterize Church-state relations. Individual right-wing parties as part of the “Fatherland” postulated so in the context of the concordat in the form of autonomy, cooperation, and independence. The ZChN assumes the implementation of the autonomy of the Church and the state. The Conservative Party PK insists on cooperation, which is based on the autonomy of both entities. However, the PChD postulates all three at once: cooperation between the Church and the state, their autonomy concerning action, and independence.

The next elections in 1997 were characterized by the lack of reference of right-wing parties to shaping the relations between the Church and the state. The denominational theme disappeared from the demands of the right-wing parties. We could see their satisfaction with the situation that developed in the law and social practice. Traces of its presence can be seen in 2005 in the program of the LPR in connection with the issue of protecting life and opposing same-sex

unions (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2006b). The last trace of the religious issue in the electoral programs of the right wing and the center is also the postulate of the PO in 2015 to revise the principles of the Church fund (“Polska przyszłość. Program Platformy Obywatelskiej [Poland’s Future. The Civil Platform’s Program],” 2015). Indirectly, the party touches upon the privileged position of religious associations in tax matters. This postulate, however, means a breakthrough in the right-wing and center approach to forming relations with various Churches, particularly with the Catholic Church.

As we can see, the party’s programs in the field of the secular state and relations between the Church and the state go far beyond the current state of legislation. The leftist parties postulate a secular state or its maintenance. Over the years, they also present arguments that show a clear lack of secularity. For the right wing, this subject disappears with the consolidation of the constitution and the ratification of the concordat. The overall picture of this puzzle is therefore uniquely painted. On the one hand, the state is based on impartiality and the model of symbolically favoring the Catholic Church. On the other hand, leftist parties maintain a revision of this condition on their banners. They want secularism in a more radical form. This sketch now serves to relate the media’s practices in the area of covering the secular state and the Church-state relationship.

The portrait of a secular state in the image of the media boils down to extreme dynamics. Returning to the quantitative data from Fig. 5.9, we can see that a secular state, separation, and autonomy are inferior in terms of frequency. The qualitative material, however, leads us to a more nuanced image, in which a dynamic change starting from neutrality through impartiality to secularity takes place.

Actions regarding the concordat, or the basic axial category of the introduced theory, cover the issues of Church-state relations. Here we work out ways to understand this relationship. The foundations of thinking about the shape of the Church-state relationship in the new post-communist Poland appear in Jacek Kuron’s agency. According to *Gazeta Wyborcza* in the December 12, 1991 edition, this leader of the UD proposed an idea in the presence of the then President Lech Wałęsa and Prime Minister Bronisław Geremek, seeking to form a government independent of the Church but based on Christian ethics (“Sojusz trzech? [Alliance of Three?],” 1991).

Therefore, there exists a characteristic tension between the arguments of the followers of the secular state and propagators of the denominational state. This is revealed when we ask the question of whether the Catholic foundations of Polish culture can be a sufficient argument for granting this religion primacy. In response, the idea of a secular state became popular. However, it occurs in

association with the legalization of abortion and the separation of the state from the Church.

On September 15, 1993, a report from the symposium of canonists at the Catholic University of Lublin appeared in the *Gazeta Wyborcza*, during which the participants discussed cooperation as proposed by Pope John Paul II (“Kościół nie zagraża [The Church is not a Threat],” 1993). This marked a new stage. The debate over the secular state, negatively set towards religion and its demands for the defense of life, moved for a debate on the meaning of state cooperating with the Church.

In further transmissions, the media examined the term “cooperation,” especially in the information from 1994. We learn from these that the representatives of the Catholic Church understand cooperation as an independent activity, as a good alternative for separating both institutions. The analysis of these threads shows that the framework for cooperation is to primarily be a concordat. The arguments of the opponents of this formula come down to financial matters. Opponents show that establishing co-operation means huge costs on the part of the state.

However, cooperation is not the supreme concept when it comes to media coverage shaping the relations of the Church and the state. We see it more as a starting concept that provides the basis for the debate over the secular state. First, cooperation is quickly built into the nation’s enforced law. This illustrates the preamble of the recently signed but not yet ratified concordat of July 28, 1993, indicating the pursuit of the Catholic Church and the Polish state for “permanent and harmonious regulation of mutual relations” (The Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland, 1993, no. 1) due to the fact that Catholicism remains the dominant religion of Polish society.

Second, the concordat becomes the reference point of the emerging postulates of the chapter. In *Gazeta Wyborcza*, on March 3, 1994, there appeared a general and non-argument accusation that the concordat gives grounds for the development of an ideological state (“Alergia na Kościół [Church Allegies],” 1994). However, the separation itself is interpreted in different ways. For example, Cardinal Józef Glemp understands this potential separation as dependence on the state. He argues that the separation of the Church and state does not automatically mean a separation of the state from the Church (“Biskupi o postawach Polaków [The Bishop on Poles’ Attitudes],” 1995). Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the then SLD presidential candidate, who saw the separation in modern terms, including liberalizing abortion laws and renegotiating the concordat (Nowakowska, 1995), had a different position.

At the same time, concern over the separation brings the postulate of Catholic and Orthodox Church experts to talk about the mutual autonomy and

independence of Churches and the state. Discussions on such a concept soften the idea of separation that bombards the Catholic side. However, these also bring confusion. The terms are so ambiguous that some of the actors in the dispute decided to understand them directly as a separation and lack of Church presence in the public space. Barbara Labuda's agency from the Association for Rights and Freedoms illustrates this ("Stowarzyszenie Labudy na rzecz praw i wolności [The Labuda Association for Rights and Freedoms]," 1993: 1):

"We do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the Church,' said Barbara Labuda at the Tuesday press conference. 'We are interested in its activity when it concerns all citizens. That is why we want to create a group that will oppose the growing influence of the Church on public life.'"

Autonomy and independence are clearly dominated by the term neutrality. In the period of 1994–1995, contemporary left-wing leaders Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Józef Oleksy treat the tactics of taking the side of the neutral state worldview as the ability to come out with a constructive solution in disputes with the Catholic Church. In Józef Oleksy's exposition of February 3, 1995, neutrality became a top priority. After this, the term began to clearly appear in the media debate. Traces of this can already be seen in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on March 25, 1995, where Arkadiusz Foerster (1995) reported that the SdRP excluded compromises towards the postulate of state worldview neutrality.

Neutrality, however, turns out to be problematic for the Catholic Church, which sees its introduction as sanctioning a secular state. The authorities at that time, knowing the importance of the Church, approached the matter concretely. The bill by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, based on "impartiality" authored by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was passed very quickly. The solution satisfied both the state authorities and the Catholic Church. It also brought three significant consequences. (1) The state does not favor indifferent religious attitudes that are unequivocally derived from neutrality, which satisfies the Church side. (2) The state has the right to intervene wherever its religious interests are threatened. In the future, it will also be used in a few cases. (3) The state expresses its attitude towards religion by means of a category derived from political negotiations. This includes the potential for contestation.

The controversy about the religious character of the state changed in 2004. In *Gazeta Wyborcza* on November 12, the author indicated that the existing legislative solutions were too burdening for state finances. Poland is defined in terms of a "religious denomination" because it supports the Churches in various spheres of activity (Szacki, 2011: 4). We could see at this time the announcement of a clear trend in the media coverage of the secular state that dominated in the years 2009–2011 and 2013–2015.

This trend assumes two parallel and interrelated processes. The first consists in using the term “secular state” as the keyword. Second, in the discourses of leftist parties (the SLD and the Palikot Movement), the postulates of the secular state are not explained. However, their understanding is limited to the form of significant separation of the Church from public matters. Western countries are examples of such a practice (Gursztyn & Miłosz, 2010: 1):

“Constitution, it sounds so proud! There must be a clear border: since the state existed, there was also religion,’ said [SLD – DG] party chairman Grzegorz Napieralski at Warsaw’s Constitution Square. So, as politicians assure us, it was the idea of the leader himself. ‘We are only concerned that such standards should apply in Poland regarding relations between the Church and the state as in Western European countries,’ says Rzeczpospolita’s Napieralski.”

The clear border between the Church and the state, mentioned by the then SLD leader Grzegorz Napieralski, clearly stands out from the practice of cooperation between the two entities. The dominant Catholic society mentioned in the concordat determines the conditions of the game, not a constitutional clause on impartiality. This state of affairs calms down after the 2011 election. The SLD lost at that time, and it was the main party postulating a secular state, but ceased to emphasize the worldview disputes. However, they returned to it in 2013 under the leadership of Leszek Miller. The demands he proposed concerned separation.

We know from the current narrative that the law, programs of political parties and media coverage differ when it comes to the development of a secular state. The title of this section reflects as an incoherency at best. Indeed, we can speak of a fairly unambiguous model of a state open to cooperation with Churches and interfering in their operation in the case of threats to its interests. At the same time, we can notice the postulate of a secular state and a state neutral to religion in the postulates of the leftists. Political demands are a proposal to change not only the law but also political and social practices. This clearly distinguishes the party’s declarations from the legal status. After all, media coverage itself shows the complexity of properties attributed to the Church-state relationship. It refers to gradually narrowing it down to the form of a secular state and the separation of public order from Church order. In this sense, it seems that legal order is disappearing in the media’s representation.

Trying to find a common denominator for these three areas, we therefore direct the analysis towards the mechanisms of institutional mediatization. It is noticed that when we treat the concept of the Church-state relationship as a social institution, there is a fundamental change in this institution. Various models of Church-state relations find their place in particular moments of our analysis. However, the mechanism of mediatization appears quite later.

The change in the media coverage of a secular state does not correspond strongly with the legal status. Generally, we cannot say that the law imposes thinking about a particular model. This happens only as a consequence of the introduction of regulations regarding the formation of Church-state relations. At the same time, specific regulations and specific actions by politicians are reported by *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita*. We are talking here about the mechanism of neutral mediation (Mazzoleni, 2008b) of the idea of a secular state.

In the course of the analysis, however, media narratives take a path that is not consistent with the law or provoked by applicable laws. Content reporting appears based on the actions of politicians and their parties. The agency of a party evokes changes in the discourse about the secular state. However, the basics of this process are not present in the political parties themselves.

Tuning a party's strategy to the media logic is illustrated by the example of the SLD and the Palikot Movement. We see that the SLD's programs consistently return to a secular state rule. However, this functions as a slogan that does not translate into political practice. The Palikot Movement suddenly appears on the political scene, with a message clearly tuned to the logic of the media. The secular state becomes the subject of a first-class controversy that can be well understood both in the perspective of newsworthiness and media logic. Such an adaptation caused a reaction in the SLD itself. The party changed to the logic of the media. It radicalized its message to voters, pointing to the need to abandon the clerical context and strong separation. The SLD is now directed towards stressing the social conflict. Traces of this can be found both in the statements of party politicians after 2009 and in its 2015 election program. Such a mechanism brings effects in the form of clearly narrowing the debate about the secular state precisely to the idea of separation.

6.3 Political agents get mediatized

As it was pointed out earlier, the idea of a secular nation in the media results from the agency of individual and collective political actors who fine-tune their messages to the logic of the media based on the dominance of whatever is controversial. In this section, let's go much deeper into the agency of political actors in the Church-state relationship. This will help us to identify their mediatory strategies regarding religion.

Our argument is that individual political actors associated with political power and the opposition, as well as their centers of authority, change their strategies in terms of religion and religious content in an evolutionary way. This process consists in accommodating a new logic in making matters of religion and

state public. At the same time, we argue that this process seriously started to take place during Aleksander Kwasniewski's presidency. In the case of political parties, however, it gained momentum in 2008. We are particularly concerned about the radicalization of the anti-religious SLD postulates and the clerical approach of PiS. We justify our theory on several motifs and the phenomena of summing up the diversity of the observed processes.

One of the basic axial categories of this analysis concerns actions regarding the concordat. The clusters that make it up reflect the tension between political and religious actors: negotiating the concordat, disputes over its ratification, attempts to investigate its compliance with the constitution, and finally accusations of non-compliance and the need for revision. What is revealed in the research material refers to the time-varying capability of political actors to read the rules of media logic and political logic.

In 1992, concordat procedures had a very simplified representation in the media. Political actors, including representatives of the right-wing authorities, namely Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka and Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski, were responsible for the efficient conduct of the procedures. Their agency also depended on publicly justifying the agreement with the Vatican. The media content was the framework for the subsequent dispute. The right-wing, founded on the fusion of the Church and the state, articulate the interests of the Church as the interests of the state. A fragment illustrates this motif ("Mamy konkordat [We Have a Concordat]," 1993: 3):

"Archbishop Kowalczyk expressed the hope that the concordat's provisions will be adopted by the new parliament, regardless of the political system. Skubiszewski added that this is a cross-party document that protects the interests of the state, not just any one political group."

The matter of the concordat became complicated as a result of the premature elections of September 19, 1993. Political power went to the coalition of the leftist SLD and the PSL. An extraordinary parliamentary committee was appointed to draft a bill on ratification. The process of adapting the internal law to the obligations included in the concordat continues. The matter seems to have no end.

Subsequent media outlets reveal the lack of communication strategies among political actors, especially the ruling political parties. The media regularly inform us about the subsequent activities of groups of deputies. The analysis, however, indicates that there is more talk about the agency of members of a given party than specific political actors. The following example illustrates this ("Unici skarżą uchwałę [Uniates Complain about the Resolution]," 1994: 2):

“UW parliamentarians yesterday complained about the bill needed for the ratification of the concordat based on the adoption of a new constitution. BBWR deputies, German Minorities and independent members also signed the petition.”

After the central-left power takeover, a clear communication disorder occurred among individuals associated with the SLD coalition. It had two dimensions, the first of which boiled down to many voices in the party's position. Individual SLD politicians expressed separate opinions and postulates. They often undermined the previous interpretation by their party colleagues. The second dimension comes down to juggling, depending on the situation, the progress on the work of ratifying the concordat, or declaring the inability to overcome differences with the Church. In the following excerpt, it is illustrated the first of the cases described (“Konkordat tak, ale... [Yes for the Concordat, but...]” 1995: 2):

“Ratification of the concordat requires changes in only four laws,’ believes Siemiatkowski. ‘This is not true, we have to change 20–30,’ replied Sierakowska, his friend from the SLD.”

This specific ambiguity transformed over the following years. Many voices within the ruling party gave way to the two voices at the presidential center and the parliamentary majority. President Kwaśniewski himself and deputy Szmajdzinski from the ruling party presented this matter in the example below (Nowakowska, 1995: 3):

“The Secretary-General of the SDRP, Jerzy Szmajdziński, confirmed that the position of the party towards the concordat had not changed, despite Kwaśniewski's announcement of the possibility of its quick ratification. ‘First the constitution, then the concordat,’ said the SDRP politician.”

The state of the two voices did not last long. Even in the initial phase of Aleksander Kwaśniewski's presidency, the quality of articulation of postulates of political power towards the Church changed. The SLD then referred to the argument of social transparency in relations with the Church. Longin Pastusiak, an SLD deputy, silenced the dispute over the concordat revealing the basis of antagonism on the part of his party. He stated that the SLD questions the treaty since it was signed without consulting the Sejm and society.

President Kwaśniewski's agency was changing. When we need to refer to work on the concordat, Kwaśniewski himself began to be visible in the media. Simultaneously, the presidential camp took up behind the scenes actions (“Widziane z łoży [Viewed from the Lodge],” 1996). As a result, already in 1998, President Kwaśniewski functioned in media coverage as the father of agreement with the Church. His visibility in media came to a new coherent agency. The president ratified the concordat, giving it meaning in the area of peace and reconciliation (“To wydarzenie niesie pokój i pojednanie [This Event Brings Peace

and Reconciliation,” 1998). Then he regularly went to the Vatican to meet with John Paul II. He was even involved in preparing the Pope’s visit during the 1997 Eucharistic Congress in Poland (“Prezydent za reprezentatywnym Sejmem [The President is for the Representative Sejm],” 1996).

Why does Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s agency seem so important? In Fig. 5.17 from the previous chapter, we pointed out that among political actors, Aleksander Kwaśniewski was most often present in media coverage. In the course of the theoretical grounding, we gained the conviction that Aleksander Kwaśniewski was a typical figure, a model for later examples of accommodating media logic.

Back in 1994 when Kwaśniewski became the first actor in the media coverage of the Church-state relationship, his agency fit in with the communications and strategic disorder of the SLD party. He was the leader of the party and tried to articulate that the SLD did not give consent to accept the concordat in its present form (“Kwaśniewski o konkordacie [Kwaśniewski on the Concordat],” 1994). In 1996, Kwaśniewski, as the President of Poland, tried unsuccessfully to have an audience with John Paul II. He was also unable to resolve the disputed issue of the concordat. Kwaśniewski blurred the social memory of these failures by applying strategies of media presence. In a short time, he started to function in the media as the voice of reason. He spoke about subsequent meetings with the Church and calmed moods regarding the concordat and his visit to John Paul II. He emphasized his goodwill and steps towards reaching an understanding with the Church.

After the ratification of the concordat on February 23, 1998, Kwaśniewski’s agency covered by the media definitively ceased to function based on problematic issues, meaning the concordat and the lack of sympathy by the Pope. On the basis of the media contents, we can see that the president assumed the position of a mediator between the left and the Church. In addition, his agency was implemented in the area of the intentional entanglement of the political and religious spheres. This action seemed completely untypical of a leftist representative because it became the most effective strategy of the then head of state. As a result of the two terms of his presidency, media coverage provided evidence that Kwaśniewski also received the Church’s recognition (“Prezydent zaświadczy o świętości [The President Attests to Holiness],” 2005: 1):

“The president testifies to sanctity. Aleksander Kwaśniewski was invited to appear before the beatification tribunal. It is not known yet when and where this meeting will be held [...]. Aleksander Kwaśniewski met John Paul II several times. He was valued in the Vatican, not only because he is the head of state, a state that is the Pope’s homeland, but for his professionalism and style of representing Poland. He was the only politician who

was invited into the papa mobile along with his wife (in 1999, at the end of the Holy Father's pilgrimage to Poland), and the only president who spoke at St. Peter's Square."

Comparing Kwaśniewski with other political actors, we see that his success is determined by three elements to accommodate to media logic. First of all, Kwaśniewski reached the media with his position on the merger of religion and nation, appropriate for those times. It silenced the anti-clerical discourse of his party and focused on promoting patriotic values while respecting religious values. Second, the president represented a policy that was close and unambiguous. The messages that he gave were interesting to the media. They eased tensions and disputes between the participants of the Church-state relationship, easing uncertainty in moments of doubt. Third, he promoted himself as a model leader, a strong individual who fit well into the media's narrative.

Finally, Kwaśniewski's agency serves as a point of support in relation to the radicalization of the left wing's voice towards the Catholic Church in Poland. It is noticed that Kwaśniewski's specific position towards the Church and religion, with subsequent elections, is becoming less and less compatible with the anti-clerical demands of his SLD party. Since 2008, the negative attitude towards the current concordat has become a tool for the SLD's ideological identification led by the young leader Grzegorz Napieralski. When it comes to the anti-clerical position of the Palikot Movement, we can speak of a clear battle against the concordat.

The position of Grzegorz Napieralski in relation to the Church-state relationship is the opposite of Aleksander Kwaśniewski's long-term approach. When Napieralski appeared on the political scene in the role of the SLD leader, he immediately attracted media attention with the catchy postulate of liquidating the concordat ("SLD idzie w górę [The SLD is Rising]," 2008: 9):

"In the latest poll by *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the SLD received 10 percent. This is the best result for the Alliance since LiD fell apart in April. Since then, the SLD has doubled its support, but only 4 percentage points were gained in the last two weeks. At that time, the party leader changed. Wojciech Olejniczak replaced Grzegorz Napieralski, considered to be a more radical politician who managed to say, among other things, that the concordat is unnecessary in Poland."

Napieralski's agency outlined in this section is characterized by the radicalization of views and articulations on the abolition of the concordat. Subsequent media materials confirm this fairly precise strategy based on several premises. First, this young and energetic leader embodied the criticism of his party towards the Church in public space. He justified the need to liquidate the concordat due to the financial savings of the state and greater freedom for citizens. His narrative,

however, did not present a distinctive project to replace the current formula. Instead, the section on the Church and state discussed earlier is summed up in the slogan (“Wypowiedzieć konkordat [Terminating the Concordat],” 2008: 6):

“The concordat must be completely changed, and it would be best if it did not exist at all. Throughout its duration, the Roman Catholic Church has increased its influence and interferes in politics. In reality, the state budget has money to only finance a single religion. I am against our tax money going to retirement and disability pensions for priests, paying for catechists who teach religion or chaplains assigned to all uniformed services. The latter is my opinion and seems almost unconstitutional.”

Due to the lack of a complex program of changes, we are far from the view of political logic domination in Napieralski’s covered agency. As it is shown above, we can see Napieralski fits into the criteria of media logic.

Two basic motifs in his accommodation to media logic dominate. First, it passes from Kwaśniewski’s conciliatory narrative to his own confrontational narrative. The tactics of ease towards the Church brought Kwaśniewski a long-lasting effect at the price of diluting his earlier radical religious postulates. In the case of Napieralski, radical postulates in the sphere of the privatization of religion gave him immediate visibility in the media.

Second, such a transition means that Napieralski’s agency is in contravention to the SLD’s past strategy towards the Catholic Church. This was summarized by the PO’s deputy, Jarosław Gowin (“Religia w szkołach [Religion in Schools],” 2010: 1):

“The left is always very much against the Church when it is in opposition. When it comes to power, it is more helpful to the Church than we, moderate right-wing people.”

Gowin’s view is worth referring to in the media’s visibility and negotiating the position of individual actors in the face of the merger of religion and the nation. The material from the media shows that the new leader of the SLD clearly relies on the visibility of his party in the media. This is why the SLD returns to anti-clerical postulates, which over the years the party managed to hide. Napieralski’s position against the fusion of the nation and religion, however, is risky. On the one hand, the move seems useful from the perspective of media logic. On the other hand, it does not take into account the political context of Poland, which is duly conducive to Catholicism. In the longer term, the technique does not gain the support of voters, and in 2015, the SLD disappeared from the parliament.

Radical anti-clericalism without cooperation with the Church did not work as well in the case of another party that contested the concordat. In 2013, the Palikot Movement exacerbated the debate about the secularity of the state and the relations of the Church and the state by fighting against the cross and

contesting against the deputy members' Christmas Eve meeting in the parliament. The agency of this party in favor of the secular state and the separation of the religious realm from the public realm took on the dimension of a performance. The Palikot Movement took legal steps to remove the cross from the plenary hall of the Sejm. They demanded the dissolution of the Sejm's Christmas Eve vigil meeting.

The media message proves that the Palikot Movement is credited with artificially voicing a problem. The electoral demands of this party, however, confirmed their radical attitude towards combating traces of religion in the public space and transferring it to the domain of one's private life. No other party's program had such an extensive counter-religious narrative as the proposals of the Palikot Movement. It remained consistent with the public show of this party. Both the media coverage and electoral postulates can be easily read as being sewn into the needs of media visibility and increased popularity among people sympathizing with the secular state.

By opting to counter the union of the nation and religion, the Palikot Movement became an object of the media's interest. In addition, it resonated with other parties on the political scene. Their performance against the cross evoked the immediate reaction of the right-wing PiS party. Its chairman Jarosław Kaczyński stated that "it is such an expansion of savagery, that is, undermining our national and social functioning" ("Ruch Palikota [The Palikot Movement]," 2011: 1). This fragment of the PiS leader's statement shows the different attitude of the right wing towards the Church-state relation. We want to discuss its specificity by presenting the example of the constitutionally and legally acceptable impartial state intervention in matters of religion.

We can clearly perceive the state agency regarding the Catholic Church in the case of Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus at the turn of 2006 and 2007, the period of the presidency of Lech Kaczyński from PiS. After the appointment of Archbishop Wielgus to the post of Metropolitan of Warsaw, accusations appeared about his cooperation with the communist security services. The archbishop declared innocence and strove for his ingress. The solemn ingress and taking over the diocese did not take place. The mass was celebrated, during which Wielgus resigned from his function, and Cardinal Józef Glemp, Primate and also the previous head of the Archdiocese of Warsaw, explained the situation. Cardinal Glemp also tried to put Wielgus in the role of a victim of the communist system.

The event concerned the internal organization of the Catholic Church in Poland. For the presidential circle, however, it was a moment to take action. We know from the media contents, presented with a delay, that the ingress did not take place due to an intervention in connection with President Lech Kaczyński at

the Holy See. On the pages of *Gazeta Wyborcza* on February 1, 2007, fragments of the open letter were published, later shared by the then Polish Europe deputy of the LPR (Wiśniewska, 2012: 7):

“We are astonished and deeply concerned about the interference of the highest state authorities in the internal affairs of the Church in Poland, and even in the Vatican, which, if it actually took place, resembles the period of deep communism in which attempts were made to interfere in the personal decisions of the Catholic Church. We demand the vetting of journalists and the authorities of this media campaign. The activities of media circles are causing divisions in the nation.”

This case illustrates the practice of the principle of state impartiality in relation to the faith and institutions of the Catholic Church. The agency of President Kaczyński illustrated to what extent the state interfered in the internal affairs of religion. This applies to the common symbolic space, as a rule administered by the Church. In other words, the position of the Archbishop of Warsaw is a sufficiently important symbol for right-wing political authorities that it makes it possible for them to give it to a person suspected of cooperating with the security services.

On the second level, we point to the hidden agency of the president, which is revealed only incompletely after the Archbishop's resignation. This is not just about diplomatic cuisine. We can see here the expression of the adjustment of political actors to the tension-laden events involving the Church. The matter of Archbishop Wielgus is so delicate that the direct intervention of the state would immediately bring negative media coverage to political power. The experiences of interference in the life of the Church are media transmissions. They meet all the more important criteria of newsworthiness. The effects of such coverage are difficult to predict. The state therefore adopts tactics of pressure without involving the media. Combining political logic and media logic proves this.

The third level of analysis concerns the relations between the logics of the described event. When we talk about political actors in this dispute, we cannot separate one logic from the other. The combination of legal circumstances and the strong anti-communist feature of the presidential center indicate a clear participation of political logic. Meanwhile, hiding the social indignation due to state pressure on the Catholic Church clearly takes into account the logic of the media.

The element that brings together both orders turns out to be a symbolic basis for intervention. The fusion of religious and national values does not allow the president to refrain from doing something. Awareness of media logic, however, causes his agency to be based on discretion. In this context, images from the unsuccessful ingress emitted by *Wiadomości TVP* gained importance. In the material from January 7, 2007, the president was covered together with his wife

during a mass in the Warsaw cathedral. He only functioned as an uninvolved witness of a Church theater play (“Jak do tego doszło [How It Got to This],” 2007). This clearly stood out from President Kwaśniewski’s earlier active participation in disputes over the concordat, when the audience saw growing tension between the Catholic Church and the state. When we compare this moment of interest to friction due to the concordat, we see growing awareness of right-wing political actors concerning the rules of both the logic of the media and political logic.

Another element that characterizes this section refers to the right-wing politicians’ agency on the discourse that sustains the fusion of religion and the state. The professionalization of political communication, progressing in recent decades, also translates into the party’s ideological identification. So far, we have shown that left-wing groups clearly build their ideological identity based on their attitude towards the concordat. Religious identification has a different dimension in the case of the right wing.

The elections of the nineties abounded in parties with unambiguously Catholic roots that embraced the social doctrine of the Catholic Church as the basis for shaping the social order. Over the years, the programs of Christian parties were limited to the inspirational role of Church teaching. An example of this practice is the activity of the Kaczyński brothers’ new party: first is the exclusively PC, and then there is the inclusive PiS. Instead of the postulates of social teaching directly copied from the Church, there are arguments for maintaining the nation’s Catholic heritage.

The transition from one position to another has an evolutionary character. However, the clericalization of the PiS party does not result from a desire to respond to the radical postulates of the leftists made since 2008. They were motivated due to competition with the PO, governing the nation for two terms in 2007–2015 and showing a vague attitude towards the Church. First of all, both parties to a greater or less visible way allowed religion to creep into the public sphere. This is shown in the leftist statement published in the information for *Gazeta Wyborcza* on August 10, 2010:

“PO and PiS drew the world of religion into the area of public life. Today, they are accusing each other of who is more guilty of the fact that there is a cross in Poland; said the Vice-Speaker of the House Jerzy Wenderlich at the press conference yesterday” (Szacki, 2010: 6).

When we think about the differentiating strategies of both parties, however, we see that in the final moment of the analysis before the 2015 elections, both try to have a distinguished program and image. The PO and its government articulate the postulate of the revision of financing the Church, oppose religion being a topic at

high school final exams, and oppose regulations for in-vitro procedures, which are not allowed by the Church. The PO is not concerned with rebuilding all areas of the Church-state relationship. However, they touch upon issues that remain sensitive to Polish Catholicism (“PiS da Kościołowi egzamin z religii na maturze [PiS Gives the Church the Religion Exam for High School Matriculation],” 2015: 6):

“The Church has long wanted religion to be a subject in secondary education as an additional subject to choose from. It was said that the issue of religion in secondary school’s final exams will become another topic of debate between the Church and the PO government, apart from the Church Fund and in-vitro. However, the bishops did not put the matter in the fore, although this topic returned at the meetings of the joint government committee and the Episcopate.”

The PiS opposition at that time presented a separate position. It decided to even more strongly confirm the important ties between the state and the Church. They observed the status quo concerning in-vitro and the Church fund. They promised, however, that religion would be part of the high school graduation exam. This is illustrated in the following fragment (“PiS da Kościołowi egzamin z religii na maturze [PiS Gives the Church the Religion Exam for High School Matriculation],” 2015: 6):

“As we have learned, the Episcopate is already planning intensive action so that religion can be a subject on the high school graduation exam. This did not happen during the PO’s government. The bishops’ hope in this matter is that PiS wins in the upcoming elections. [...] Our information indicates that PiS is ready to meet the Church’s request if it wins the election.”

In this media auction, we can see certain unpredictability in the election promises. PiS used the media to submit another declaration on Church matters, which shows its good preparation for the final campaign. Of course, a sudden volta in one of the postulates cannot be read as political inconsistency. In this case, however, it proves that the party learned a lesson regarding the nature of media operation and accommodating media logic.

Let’s return to Fig. 5.21 from the previous chapter to remember that the Sejm, its deputies, and the government were most often the political actors covered by the media. The agency of these institutions appears as a result of media coverage going from the agency of individuals to the agency of institutions. Here, too, we can talk about professionalization and mediatization. From the beginning, governments and parliamentary clubs have their own representatives who are responsible for media advocacy. In the last decade, however, our analysis shows a change in the media from the regular coverage of politicians’ voices to the standard presence of the press spokesmen of political institutions in the media.

Professional communication forced by the media urges institutions such as the government and the Sejm as well as political parties to have their own spokespersons. In the case of media content from the area of the state-religion relations, the spokespersons primarily communicate negative matters that are controversial or sensitive issues for the religious side. A commentary about hanging crosses in Polish schools illustrates this mechanism (“Senyszyn: zdjęć krzyży [Senyszyn: Remove the Crosses],” 2009: 1):

“A dispute arose over the commemoration of the victims of the Smolensk tragedy and the cross in front of the Presidential Palace in Warsaw. [...] Joanna Senyszyn announced that she would ask the government to issue a regulation that will instruct public school directors to remove crosses from classrooms. The government does not approach this idea seriously and does not consider issuing such a regulation. ‘I do not comment on nonsensical ideas,’ says Rzeczpospolita’s government spokesman Paweł Graś.”

The spokesman here appears in a communication situation over which there is no dominion or which may evoke negative connotations. In contrast to the early nineties, political actors do not risk their unexpected loss of reputation. This matter is about providing a mechanism to protect certain institutions and their leaders from communication crises.

When we consider the agency of political individuals and institutions in the area of the secular state and the Church-state relationship, a certain mechanism appears. Political actors make efforts to adapt to changing social conditions and re-read the context of the merger of the nation and the state in different periods. Sometimes they take the position of gentle collaborators with a Church website, yet at other times, they assume a fight for the expressive place of religion in the public space or the struggle to bring it to the private space. The process is a combination of political and media logic. Their mutual relationship varies depending on the period and context. Media logic is dominant. Due to the fusion of religion and the nation, we cannot confirm this type of logic as the only one present.

6.4 Religious agents get mediatized

The political actors’ approach to the issue of the secular state and relations with religions clearly stands out from the perspective of religion. We are dealing with two worlds, different in terms of their motivation for functioning in the public sphere. Their media-engaging practices also differ.

The first association about the mediation of religious actors often comes down to the coverage of events on world religions leaders. Following this intuition, let’s now consider the cases of the visits of John Paul II, the Dalai Lama, Bartholomew I, and Kirill I to the Polish parliament and the president of the Republic of Poland.

Each of the analyzed events would fit well into the literature on the theory of media events (Dayan & Katz, 1994). Referring to the theory grounded in the analyzed material, however, we focus on the difference between the media mediation of religious leaders and the relations between their agency and the mediatization process. The first case that we examine in this way comes from June 11, 1999 and concerns John Paul II's speech in front of the combined chambers of the Polish parliament. The Pope appeared in the typical role of an honorary guest. The media reported this event in a conventional way. They fit it into a carefully supported scheme of media coverage (leader, celebration, majesty, etc.). As a result, they show the recipients the Pope's agency in Church-state cooperation.

Generally speaking, John Paul II works in all of the collected material in three ways. The first way assumes more or less the same pattern as the papal speech before the Polish parliament. The second, only pointed out in the media content, indicates the Pope's active agency in negotiating the concordat and shaping a general opinion on the Church's relationship with the state. The following passage shows this. The third view makes the Pope the reference, which defines the context of the statement, and especially the Church's negotiations with the political authority. An example of the dispute over the concordat illustrates this ("Ostre słowa Kościoła [The Church's Strong Words], 1994: 2):

"The Sejm's refusal to ratify the concordat was like rejecting Pope John Paul II, our best friend's hand, said the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Józef Glemp. Bishop Alojzy Orszulik of Łowicz thinks that this is a 'frontal attack on the Church.'"

Such a description lacks space for mediatization. Pope John Paul II appears in media contents based on the terms set by the report from the media event or the principle of shaping a press release. His religious visibility flows from the style in which he holds office. However, there is a lack of indication that the Pope undertakes action based on media logic.

The Pope's visits are analogous to the media coverage of other spiritual leaders to the Polish parliament. Of course, we see the proper style and characteristic elements of the religion that is being reported at the moment. Two different examples illustrate this. The first concerns several visits to Poland by the Dalai Lama, the spiritual guide for Buddhists and the political leader of Tibet. The Dalai Lama's simple lifestyle and conversations embellish the media coverage of his official meetings with parliamentarians and the president. This leads to the belief in the dominance of the personalization tactics in the messages of the leader's visit ("Dalajlama [Dalai Lama], 2008: 1):

"The Dalai Lama, leader of Tibet, climbs the stairs to the Sejm at a press conference: 'wherever I was at in Poland, I saw enormous joy and huge enthusiasm, and I think

this is the result of the freedom regained by your country, which is why I support the idea of a Free Tibet so strongly [...]. I do not care for protocol, it does not matter, since meeting face to face is most important.”

The second example concerns the analogous visits by Bartholomew I, Patriarch of Constantinople. Media coverage accentuates the political and religious dimension of the patriarch's presence. Politicians accept Bartholomew as the head of state. However, they note differences between him and Pope John Paul II (“Bartłomiej I wystąpi w parlamencie [Bartholomew I Speaks to Parliament],” 2000: 1):

“This is the second visit of the Patriarch of Constantinople to our country. The previous one, in 1998, was made at the invitation of Polish Orthodox faithful. The current visit is of a national character and is a response to the invitation of the Speaker of the Sejm, Maciej Płażyński. The most important point of the visit will be Bartholomew I's message to the deputies and senators with whom he will meet in the Sejm's column hall. Therefore, it will not be like John Paul II's visit to the Sejm with a solemn meeting of the joint chambers of parliament. The patriarch will talk about the attitude of the Orthodox Church towards the processes of European integration and the relationship between morality and politics.”

We see that regardless of whether the individualization or emphasis of the majesty framed during the visits of religious leaders to the Polish authorities, the agency of leaders of great religions does not change according to the needs of media messages. Rather, the media is trying to adequately mediate their presence. Visits by the leaders of world religions, however, reveal the specific agency of the representatives of Poland's authorities, which we have so far avoided.

The political power plays the role of hosting religious representatives. This provides a space of activity for religious actors and their postulates regarding peace, shaping the social order, and religious tolerance. Here we can perceive a significant mechanism for mediatization. In order to explain its specifics, let us refer to the material from the *Rzeczpospolita* on Patriarch Bartholomew I's visit to the Sejm on January 26, 2000 (“Nie narzucać prawnie dekalogu [Do not Legally Impose the Decalogue],” 2000: 1):

“The speaker of the Sejm, Maciej Płażyński, announced that other representatives of monotheistic religions will be invited to the Sejm and that they will present their views on international problems.”

Three important issues stem from this comment by the Marshal. First of all, political actors work for the fusion of religion and politics in the parliamentary space. We must keep in mind, however, that the unusually ceremonial character of the meeting of Pope John Paul II with both joint Chambers of the Parliament confirms the symbolic privileged status of Catholicism.

Second, the initiative of the executive branch in giving the leaders of monotheistic religions a place to speak in the Sejm points to a new, specific, and regular practice of state authorities towards religion. This shows traces of impartiality and respect for religion as such. Third, this procedure, which is established by regular practice, belongs to events meeting the criterion of newsworthiness. It allows for a greater presence in the media. We suggest looking at Patriarch Kirill of Moscow's visit to Poland in August 2012 in this way.

This analysis of the media content in connection with Kirill's visit to Poland leads to believe that we are dealing with a new approach to the presence of religious leaders in the media. We perceive the efficiency of this change (1) in the joint preparation of the visit by the Orthodox Churches in Poland and Russia, the Catholic Church in Poland, and representatives of Polish authorities and (2) in the explicit attitude of these entities to publicizing the event. The Patriarch's visit concerns a joint declaration between the Polish Episcopate and the Orthodox Church of Russia on the subject of intercession between the nations of Poland and Russia. It illustrates an example of popular reconciliation gestures, which include frequent manifestations of reconciliation policies in recent decades (Wigura, 2011).

Unlike the foremost religious leaders, we read Kirill's agency as tailor-made media. First of all, Kirill plays the role of the leader of the Orthodox Church, extending his hand to make friends (spectacular news). His discourse departs from the stiff and official language of other Christian leaders (a simplification). He seems closer to the easy style of the Dalai Lama. Kirill, however, includes the expressive majesty of his body language and social interaction (exclusivity). Second, Kirill refers to religious symbols that associate the fusion of nations and religions: Russia and its Orthodox Church as well as Poland and its Catholicism (in context). He gave the Polish Bishops' Conference a copy of the icon of the Mother of God of Smolensk, venerated in Russia. He announced that he will place the icon of Jasna Góra, Our Lady of Częstochowa, given to him in the new Church in Katyn, the place of the martyrdom of the Polish intelligentsia in the Soviet Union (Wiśniewska, 2012: 1).

The visit, although based on reconciliation, also evokes emotions in people who are not interested in religious matters. This is due to the controversy in the Church-state area. Kirill represents the Orthodox Church, whose history is based on a close relationship with political authorities. However, he himself calls for a sober chapter on the state realm and the realm of religion in Poland. The situation is ignited by the fact that Kirill signed an agreement with the Polish Episcopate in the marble hall of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, meaning a secular space. Here we can see the confusion of religious and political motives and the

discordant discourses regarding the Church-state relationship. In other words, representatives of Churches with different approaches to cooperation with the political authority signed the declaration on behalf of their people. However, they do so in the company of Polish authorities and in a secular public building. Such a strategy received a counter-attack on the part of the left (Czaczkowska, 2012).

Let's go beyond the visits of world religious leaders to Poland's authorities to get closer to another characteristic of the agency of religious individuals and institutions. When we combine their narratives with the axial categories about the participation of the Church in the process of shaping the law and negotiating its position in the state, we can refer to the argument of professionalization. In practice, the dynamics of religious agents in relation to shaping the place of religion in the state works on three interrelated and parallel processes that occur in relation to the country's dominant religion.

The first of these processes concerns the professionalization of the Catholic Church's communication. It involves the transition from the many uncoordinated voices of individual bishops to the balanced tone of several spokesmen and representatives of the Bishops' Conference presidium. The second process means changing the language of the actors representing the Catholic Church. They reformulate the arguments for the interests of the Church in the state. The third leads to a growth in the media visibility of the agency of religious institutions and groups of non-religious in the place of religious individuals.

Professionalism in the case of the Church has clear marks of institutional mediatization. Its dynamics, however, differs from what I have shown till now in the case of political actors. Fig. 5.24 from the previous chapter indicates the frequency domination of two individual religious leaders in media coverage: Bishop Pieronek and Cardinal Glemp. Tadeusz Pieronek's work in the years 1992–1998, when he was the Bishop's Conference secretary, reveals certain complexity. Pieronek is responsible for communicating on the course of the dialogue between the Church and the mainly leftist government. He clearly proposes a postulate of coming to an agreement, and the Church supported his line of thinking even after he resigned (“Stróż konkordatu [Guardian of the Concordat],” 1998: 4):

“I am glad because the Pope accepts the line of thinking of the former secretary of the Episcopate. This should not surprise anyone. Everyone who has recently observed the papal line of thinking, during last year's pilgrimage and later, sees that this is in line with Bishop Pieronek: an apolitical Church, which does not mean hidden in the sacristy, but present in public life, but not in a political party.”

Our analysis points to the agency characteristic of Bishop Pieronek, which reflects one of two types of religious actor approaches to religious issues in the state. It is about ambiguity in Bishop Pieronek's discourse. First of all, this actor can be seen

as a reliable source of information about the Church's position towards political power in disputes over the religious dimension of the state. He efficiently moves from the current state of dialogue with the state to possible forms of cooperation or future difficulties. This is illustrated in the following example ("Konstytucja niezgody [Constitution of Disagreement]," 1995: 1):

"The Episcopate twice presented its postulates for the constitution [...]. Bishop's Tadeusz Pieronek secretary of the Bishop's Conference said that the Church is satisfied and 'let's keep it so.' According to the bishop, after the commission 'cleared up' any doubts in the text that the Church had, 'there will be space in the state for believers.'"

In addition to this approach, Pieronek interweaved realism and hope in the difficult dialogue with the government during moments of strong tensions. At the time, he revealed that the Episcopate underwent antagonism and took a powerful position against the center of political authority. This is well illustrated by the following excerpt ("Traktować Kościół przyjaźnie [Treating the Church in a Friendly Way]," 1994: 1):

"The Constitution should contain a record of independence and cooperation between the Church and the state, not a record of the separation between them,' said Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, the Secretary-General of the Episcopate. He pointed out that if the Church in Poland is not to be 'an element of anxiety, it should be treated in a friendly way.'"

Cardinal Józef Glemp, the then Primate, showed another type of agency. It represented discourse that depreciated political power in the first place. He appealed to the rhetoric that established the Church as a victim of the state. The state attributed him bad agency in their fight against the Church ("Ostre słowa Kościoła [The Church's Strong Words]," 1994) by making Polish culture (Nowakowska, 1996a) and the continuation of the Polish People's Republic atheistic ("Szersze perspektywy Kościoła w Polsce [Wider Perspectives of the Church in Poland]," 1995). Glemp's sermons preached at grand ceremonies depreciated those who exercised political power. He also often recalled the context of the suffering that the Church experienced during the communist period. At the time when cooperation between the Church and the post-communist government began to bring tangible results, the cardinal blurred his earlier theses (Nowakowska, 1996a: 2):

"Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Józef Glemp, the Primate of Poland, talked with each other yesterday. Both left the meeting satisfied. The Primate suggested that no particular grouping was to blame for the atheization of the life of society."

It is difficult to compare the agency of Bishop Pieronek and Cardinal Glemp. Both, however, can be described as misunderstanding the nature of shaping the

public sphere and the role of the media in this process. Cardinal Glemp particularly stands on the side of the old way of thinking, which is clearly shown in the following fragment (Nowakowska, 1996b: 2):

“Yesterday Cardinal Józef Glemp revealed the state of negotiations regarding the ratification of the concordat between the Polish government and the Vatican. He stated that the mass media should once again publish the full text of the concordat so that everyone in society can become familiar with it. Primate Glemp added that ‘politicians should reach such a level of maturity that if they want to do something good for Poland, they must be in greater unity.’”

This opinion confirms that Glemp treats the media as an instrument influencing society. He does not see, however, that they are independent institutions based on their own logic.

As we can see, the primacy of religious individuals, dominant in the nineties, does not show the signs of the mediatization process. Indeed, the number of representatives of the Church undertaking public debate boils down to expressive personalities. However, these leading religious actors show a lack of deep understanding of how we can shape and stimulate media visibility by accommodating to media logic. They are guided by a clear strategy regarding the Church’s first-class place in the public space. At the same time, they lack knowledge of how to make a narrative about the Church newsworthy.

In 2005, after the death of John Paul II, Stanisław Dziwisz, the Pope’s long-time secretary, became the Archbishop of Cracow, and a clear change in the media coverage of the Church-state relationship took place. Bishop Pieronek, the leading Episcopal man, failed to replace the person with equally frequent media coverage. In turn, the visibility of the Episcopate increased, and its “lips” became spokesman Rev. Józef Kloch. In 2006, Cardinal Glemp retired. The central voice of the Church seemed to transfer from Warsaw to Cracow, where at that time Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz was already present. Over time, however, it turned out that in various parts of Poland in the circle of individual bishops there was professionalism in the approach to the media and a simultaneous intensification of behind-the-scenes activities.

The discourses of individual bishops and their spokespersons reveal the strong expression of this phenomenon, as well as the statements of the board and the Polish Bishops’ Conference spokesperson. Their public presence does not have to concentrate on the struggle for the concordat and the Catholic shape of the state. The basis of the Church’s agenda in its relationship with the political authority is the issue of expanding the sphere of the Church’s influence on society or at least maintaining its current state of ownership. Let’s look at this on the basis of *Gazeta Wyborcza*’s passage from February 6, 2013 regarding the

report of the Institute of Public Affairs on the problems of observing the concordat (Wiśniewska, 2013: 1):

“Why is the concordat not fully respected? According to the author, this is the effect of ‘procrastination on the part of the judiciary and the government administration apparatus, afraid of enforcing treaty obligations for the state.’ As we read, the problem is mainly about enforcing the independence of the state party, because ‘the independence and autonomy of the Church is guaranteed by many provisions of the treaty’ but ‘security is not provided for in the same degree in relation to the state.’ What do the clergy say about this? ‘Is the article about respecting the mutual autonomy of the state and the Church respected?’ we asked Rev. Robert Nęcek, spokesman for the Archdiocese of Cracow. ‘Yes, I think that the concordat is respected in this respect,’ replied Rev. Nęcek. Dr. Borecki said something else [author of the report – DG]: ‘by frequent letters and appeals to parliamentarians (e.g. threatening deputies who supporter in-vitro with excommunication), the Episcopate seeks to constantly supervise the actions of state authorities in matters unilaterally recognized by the Polish Episcopate as being in the sphere of interests or the powers of the Church’ and ‘this takes place with the real acceptance of the Holy See.’”

Let’s compare the statement of Cracow Curia’s press spokesman with previous statements by Bishop Pieronek and Cardinal Glemp. This demonstrates the Church’s professionalism in dealing with the media. In a matter that is sensitive to the Church, the Curia spokesman only focuses on handing over his institution’s position. He avoids expressing his own emotions. Another fragment related to the activity of another Church spokesperson adds an extra element of professionalization (“Śledztwo w sprawie katastrofy smoleńskiej [Investigation Regarding the Smolensk Crash],” 2010: 1):

“Monsignor Rafał Markowski, spokesman for the Warsaw Curia, in a telephone conversation says: ‘at this moment, this cross and its place in the courtyard of the presidential palace places the initiative primarily in the office of the president and the city authorities. For me, it would not be strange if this cross remained in front of the presidential palace. It seems to me that this is only a matter of agreement.’”

This passage illustrates the tendency that the professionalism of Church communication based on the press spokesmen leads to the establishment of the Church’s image as an institution that avoids extremes. This style of Church communication was seen in the nineties and was a significant change. It was based on an attempt to understand the principles of media logic by the institutional Church.

After discussing the dynamics of the professionalism of religious agents’ staff members, it’s time to show the change in the area of the language used by the Church. When we return to Bp. Pieronek’s agency, we easily find discourses and metaphors used by many hierarchs, especially in the first half of the nineties. Here are two examples:

“If the Sejm has any doubts, it has the right to add something...’ Bishop Pieronek replied” (Domosławski, 1994: 4).

“Bishop Pieronek blamed Oleksy’s government for delaying the ratification of the concordat. He added that the SLD’s postponing the ratification was playing cat and mouse with the Church” (Domosławski, 1995: 1).

I characterize this kind of expression as the emotional depreciation of the left-wing power by the Church, which did not yet accept the fact that it is doomed to engage in dialogue with the post-communist camp. The dynamics of negotiations around the concordat and the denominational law favor articulating such sentences by Church people. Political power turns out to be unpredictable in dialogue with the Church. At the same time, these discourses show that the Church is not blameless either. He maintains an overly demanding position towards the ruling party and the president. He refers to the thousand-year Christian heritage in Poland, but also to the depreciation of other values, cultures, and contexts, as in the following example (“Niech modlitwa złagodzi [Let Prayer Calm Us],” 1996: 3):

“Archbishop Michalik commented on the meeting with the marshal: ‘If African nations, like South Africa, two years after gaining independence obtain a constitution which preserves their tradition and culture, then over 1000 years of Christianity has the right to find in the constitution a reference to the Lord God.’”

The following years show that this language does not disappear from the statements of the bishops. The example of Archbishop Michalik points to its flourishing somewhere on the margin of the general professionalization of the voices of the Church and silencing the language of depreciation in the statements of Church personnel. So what do we get in return? It turns out that the argument of the majority is reformulated. In contrast to the nineties, the Church is no longer the administrator of Polish souls. It shapes its narration more delicately, referring to the fact that most Poles share the Catholic faith and want to keep it present in the public sphere. The following two fragments from before and after the changes refer to this type of strategy change:

“The archbishop warned that Poland is trying to return to the model of an atheist state. He mentioned abortion, social demoralization, problems with the ratification of the concordat, and the constitution ‘which would erase any trace of Christianity from public life. It is not acceptable for a Catholic to disregard these matters, or supporting them by voting for those who are far away from us’ he said” (“Model państwa ateistycznego [The Model of an Atheist State],” 1996: 2).

“Deputy Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki repeated him: ‘The strategy of secularization is to support minority rights, but by excluding the rights of the majority’” (Wiśniewska & Nowakowska, 2011: 6).

As we mentioned, the third process, which consists of changes in the agency of religious actors, results in an increase in the media coverage of religious institution. At the same time, together with the growth of religious institutions, there is a growing interest in non-religious groups in the media. Let's explain the first of these cases. Until the death of Pope John Paul II, the agency of the Holy See boiled down to media coverage of the Pope's agency rather than the Vatican state. The pontificate of Benedict XVI shows a change from the importance of the Pope's agency to the domination of the Holy See. The same applies to the Polish Bishops' Conference.

In the nineties, when considering the Polish Episcopate, we saw the media coverage of Primate Cardinal Glemp and the secretary of the Episcopate, Bishop Pieronek. After the era of John Paul II in media coverage, the agency of the Polish Bishops' Conference as a collective grew. The spokesman, the secretary, and the chairman spoke on behalf of this collective, but in close communication with the whole group. We can see this in the following excerpt, in which the chairman of the Episcopate speaks out ("Czy biskupi naprawdę wsparli LPR w walce o zmiany w konstytucji? [Did the Bishops Really Support the LPR in the Fight for Changes in the Constitution?];" 2007: 6):

"The constitution should include a record to completely protect life,' declared Archbishop Józef Michalik on Wednesday. He presented the first joint voice of the bishops in the debate on changes in the constitution. The bishops supported constitutionally strengthening the protection of life starting from its conception, but they cut themselves off from political disputes over the constitution and opposed the decision for this to be resolved by the referendum. The voice of the Episcopate was enthusiastically received by LPR's politicians yesterday. Is supporting the authority of the Church by politicians seeking to change the constitution legitimate?"

In the case of bishops, we are dealing with their independent agency. This situation is illustrated by, for example, Archbishop Sławoj Leszek Głódź's pastoral sermon ("Lustracja na pasterkach [Lustration on Christmas Eve];" 2006: 6):

"The bishops did not protect politicians either. 'Much harm is caused by the constant struggle for power and endless accusations during campaigns, which weakens the authority of the state and its institutions both in the internal dimension and in relation to other countries. In the circles of the media, culture and politics, many things require amending,' said Archbishop Głódź."

Among the themes related to the growth of religious institutions, we consider one to be particularly important from the perspective of shaping the idea of a secular state. It concerns a clear increase in the coverage of nones, or non-believers, in the transmissions of some of the analyzed media. In Fig. 5.34 from the previous

chapter, it can be seen that non-believers are given more than a quarter of the frequency in the category of religious and non-religious groups. Yet according to the grounding theory, it turned out that nones functioned in the research material in a more complex way. First of all, media coverage of nones increased with subsequent years of analysis, especially in *Gazeta Wyborcza*. This increase, however, is connected with an increased coverage of the institutional Church.

In this context, it can be seen that nones rarely function with their own agency. They appear more often as a reported victim of the consequences of dominance or the Catholic Church being privileged. This is illustrated by the following example (Chyż & Deryłko, 2015: 5):

“The report emphasizes that discrimination against atheists is not related to willingness to harm them, but is expressed in supporting one of the religious groups. Privileges for religion mean that atheists are not treated equally.”

In this specific case, newspapers promote a new concept of nones as victims. This type of presentation primarily concerns *Gazeta Wyborcza*. As the content analysis from the previous chapter also shows (Fig. 5.35), this newspaper over-represents nones.

Considering that nones are still a marginal group in Polish society, we look at their over-representation as *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s clear agency for promoting the idea of a secular state. The narration of the newspaper assumes that the domination of the Catholic Church's institutions causes significant discrimination against nones in the state. This clearly proves a lack of the state's impartial worldview. In turn, it also shows that the endorsed Church model implemented in Poland brings further consequences in the form of discriminating against nones.

We can summarize the current view of the agency of religious actors by referring to the process of professionalizing the communication of the Church's religious institutions. It is accompanied by moving the accents from the coverage of individual actors to the entire institution's coverage. When we think about the individual actors themselves, it is noticed that the mediation of their agency occurs only in the second decade of this analysis. As mentioned, Kirill I of Moscow functions in the media as part of the format and logic developed by them. These late years of analysis show, therefore, that religious actors also follow the path of mediatization.

6.5 Covering the fusion of religion and state

We have devoted much attention so far to changes in the media's approach to the secular state and the transformation of the agency of political and religious

actors. Let's go to the *crème de la crème* of the Church-state relationship in this analysis. We would like the reader to look at the endorsed Church model implemented in Poland through the prism of changes in selected mechanisms of its representation in the media. The basic undertaking in this section makes references to finding the key to changes in the coverage of fusion over religious and state matters.

Let's return to the contents of the axial categories outlined at the beginning of this chapter. It turns out that the presented changes in the representation of the model of Church-state relations and changes in the agency of religious and political actors do not exhaust in a satisfactory way the foundations of the theory we have set. Whatever remains in individual parts is read in the key of the fusion of religious and state matters. Two main sides of this fusion emerge from the analysis. We can call them *symbolic* and *practical*.

The symbolic perspective in the analyzed material particularly refers to two threads: the symbolism of the cross in public space and the status of religion as a school subject. The symbol of disagreement, as we should define the cross in this analysis, characterizes the mutual mixing of the state's domain with the domain of religion and the nation. Let's, therefore, analyze their possible meeting points to properly interpret the understanding of the cross present in this environment.

First of all, the creators of Poland's laws do not give the cross a privileged status. Both the current constitution and the amended Act of January 31, 1980, on the theme of the state emblem, state colors, national anthem, and seals do not bear a trace of reference to religious symbolism, including the cross. Social practice proves, however, that crosses hang in public buildings, yet for most Poles they remain unnoticed. For the significant and present minority in media coverage, they express the Church's domination and break the principles of state secularism.

Three key moments refer to the social transformation of the understanding of this symbol. The first is when on October 19, 1997, Piotr Krutul and Tomasz Wójcik, two members of the Solidarity Electoral Action, hung a cross over the door of the Sejm's Plenary Hall. A debate began on justifying its presence in the parliament. Among the commentators, the dominant belief was that the cross was more than just a religious symbol. As a result, the cross remained in the Sejm. It also functioned as having two levels of meaning: a religious symbol and a symbol of society winning the battle against the communist regime.

The second appearance of a cross was revealed in the context of the Smolensk crash on April 10, 2010. Among the spontaneous reactions of Poles after the disaster, Warsaw's scouts brought a simple wooden cross to the courtyard of the deserted presidential palace. It became the center of prayer and commemoration

of the victims of the presidential plane crash. After a few months and the stagnation of the nation's trauma, people raised the problem of removing the cross, spontaneously installed and without appropriate permission. City authorities identified with the PO party wanted to remove it. A group of defenders of the cross formed among the radical right-wing and PiS members. Political parties were in favor of or against the Smolensk cross standing opposite the presidential palace. The Church distanced itself from the matter. The cross itself became the center of a months-long dispute.

When looking at the previous results of the content analysis (Fig. 5.42 in chapter five), we admit that the vast majority of the 81 % devoted to the cross as such concerns the Smolensk cross. This peculiar – and strongly covered by media – case changes the media's perception of this object in general. It becomes a personification of a dispute over religious and secular values. It functions as an artifact of many social scenes: a symbol commemorating the Smolensk crash victims; a symbol of political struggle; and a religious symbol that began to be mocked by radical opponents of the presence of religion in public space.

The last of the moments of the great dispute over the cross concerns November 21, 2011, when the Palikot Movement's parliamentary group appealed to the Sejm authorities with a request to remove the cross installed in 1997 from the Plenary Hall. The first reports on this event already reflected the specifics of the third edition of the dispute ("Pytanie o krzyż w Sejmie [A Question about the Cross in the Sejm]," 2011: 4):

"The Palikot Movement petitioned for the removal of the cross. The decision to consult the Sejm's analysis office in this matter was made at the meeting of the Seniors' Convention. The RP's application read that the cross in the Sejm's hall was placed 'against the law' without a debate and at night. The presence of a religious symbol in this place is incompatible with the Constitution, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the Concordat."

The narrative here indicates the illegal nature of the symbol in question in the parliament's space. We can see, therefore, how its social meaning changes.

The three main issues of the dispute show how the media report individual cases of using the cross. This emerges from radicalizing the narrative on this symbol. Of course, the cross keeps its deep religious connotations throughout the case. At the same time, it is banalized at the social level. The cross goes from being a symbol of victory over communism to a symbol illegally pushed into public space. In this complicated matter, two interrelated threads are revealed. When we want to talk about the presence of a fusion of religion and the state, we must see the process of separating the two orders in the media. Second,

this process takes place in a typical media way, i.e. based on the correctness of media logic.

Media logic established the depreciation of the cross worth publishing. A scandal due to a religious symbol guarantees high recipient interest. The language of depreciating the cross makes it emerge from the standard role. It becomes a banal instrument that illustrates the dominance of Catholicism, which breaks the state's rule of law. Such banalization also causes the new meaning of the cross to resonate. Since the cross first of all becomes an affirmation of the Church's social dictatorship, supporting its presence in the Sejm or in front of the presidential palace may be read in a simplified way as supporting certain political forces. In this way, the cross also becomes the subject of whatever is political.

Religion in school is also banalized in media coverage. Here, as in the case of the cross, we do not want to enumerate subsequent moments of the dynamics of the dispute over the denominational character of school. Therefore, let's directly refer to the two points on the time continuum that prove this banalization. The first takes place under the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Religion appears in schools as an optional subject. It raises justified educational hopes ("Religia w szkołach [Religion in Schools]," 2010: 1):

"Catechesis, being the carrier of basic and universal values, enriches a person's whole educational process. (...) It is impossible to fully educate a person without considering their religious sphere as well."

In the meantime, the concordat and analogous laws on the relationship of the state to Churches and religious associations established the integral place of religion in the space of the lesson plan. Catechists gained full-time jobs and the possibility of career advancement as part of the promotion path typical of all teachers. Religion over time has become a part of the grade point average on the final report card. However, it did not obtain the status of a matriculation subject.

The outlined process is accompanied by a clear depreciation of catechesis in media coverage. The topic of religion in school loses the status of the subject of education and upbringing in the media's coverage. In an increasing number of statements by left-wing politicians and the increasingly frequent coverage of highly anti-religious and anti-clerical events, it becomes banal. Two examples below show the specificity of this mechanism:

"School catechesis rooms are to become IT rooms. Instead of spending money on religious education, it is better to spend it on computers or for learning foreign languages," proposed the SLD. The Alliance proposes a public debate on the elimination of religion lessons in schools and believes that the ruling parties are ready for it" ("Religia w szkołach [Religion in Schools]," 2010: 1).

“One of the biggest problems of religion in school has long been the dilemma about what students are actually assessed on: their knowledge or faith. In extreme situations, Friday in Polish schools was the day set for going to Mass” (Wiśniewska, 2015: 4)

Teaching religion according to this type of argument means less money for the development of students' computer and language skills. We can clearly see that we are moving from an educational issue to economics. In the case of the second fragment, even the cloudy educational basis of teaching religion is indicated. Students are to receive grades for participating in the Mass, not for their knowledge. Both narratives cause that the meaning of religion in the media changes from the subject to shaping values and to the subject of wasting money and the talents of students. This depreciation has the strong potential to create stories about wasting opportunities for the youngest students. Therefore, it meets the requirements of media logic.

The *praxis* of the fusion of religious and state matters is much more complex than simply a reference to the symbolic sphere. It arises from constant dialogue and negotiating positions between religions and the state in the area of common rituals, the creation of denominational law, determining privileges, and state of ownership of Churches. Let's trace each of these spaces separately to draw a number of broad conclusions from the area of mediatization.

Both the state and the Church function in the social space thanks to the agency of the institutions representing them. We spoke earlier about the specificity of changes in the agency realm of religion and the realm of politics. However, We have not touched on the space in which they interact most strongly with one another, meaning the space of joint religious and state rituals. Poland as a religiously impartial country enters into daily dialogues with religions. In addition, the public activity of a middle-class citizen does not mean hiding one's faith within the walls of their private rooms. In practice, meetings gathering what is private and public result in the meeting of equally embedded religions and state matters. This situation is especially illustrated by the religious and state funerals of recognized citizens covered by media, as in the case of the farewell celebration of Bronisław Geremek (Czaczkowska, 2008: 1):

“The prime minister undertakes the decision whether the funeral is performed as a state ceremony. The fact that it takes place in the cathedral is due to the bishop. The main organizer of the funeral was the Chancellor of the Prime Minister. Based on the 1990 regulation, the prime minister decided whether the funeral would have a state character. This happened when the deceased was particularly honored by the country.”

The situation outlined above illustrates how the state respects the religious affiliation of its members and the right of the deceased and his family to a religious

burial. This passage shows that neither the Church nor the state imposes their own narrative about the event. It is different when the ritual at the meeting point of religion and the state functions only in public space. The collected material leads us to believe that two paths are possible: either the balance or the domination of one of the parties.

When we think about this balance, an interesting story from Aleksander Kwaśniewski's speech on November 1995 comes to mind, that is, before his swearing into the office of the president of the Republic of Poland ("Polska neopogańska? [Neo-Pagan Poland?]," 1995: 3):

"The president-elect believes that the participation of the highest state authorities in certain religious ceremonies is necessary 'in the name of shared values and shared responsibility.' The Italian newspaper *La Stampa* said that 'he would be very honored if he could meet with the Pope, the greatest Pole in history: I am seeking permission in Poland and would like to ask the Pope to help me as a moral authority, recognized by all politicians.'"

The president-elect showed his approach to religious issues, which is missing from the earlier leftist narratives. It is about cooperation in order to realize common values. Kwaśniewski's practice is later taken over by successive presidents. The way in which this fusion appears in the media coverage also illustrates the mechanism that we have already seen at private and public events. Balance is born here from the state's need to discreetly enter the religious space in order to confirm common values.

Such an approach differs from the situation in which the media reports that the Church is entering the state's domain. Following the media coverage, this topic should be called the mixing of Churches, especially the Catholic Church, in the law-making process. Two basic stages should be specified here.

The first stage refers to the period before the adoption of the constitution. In 1994, information about the direct involvement of some bishops in supporting a specific constitutional project appeared in the media. The bishops themselves tried to find a balance between direct involvement in politics and the expression of moral opinions. They introduced a strange division at that time. They claimed that they support the "ethical" but not the "political" constitutional design authored by Solidarity. Then they suggested a meeting with deputies to convince them of the Catholic reasons for protecting life. Already in 1995, the bishops clearly opposed the constitution's draft procedure. They thought it was bad.

In this specific battle in shaping the law, the Conference of Polish Bishops clearly has no strategy of action. However, from the media contents, we learn about the strong confidence the bishops have that their voice in the political debate will be taken into account. Such coverage indicates the Church's claims

for the right to shape the social and moral order of Poles in the state. The bishops seemed not to respect the then binding law that presupposed the full secularity of the state and its neutrality in matters of religion and beliefs.

The second part of the dispute boils down to the debate on in-vitro. It clearly differs from the former by another type of argument postulated by the bishops. Some of the hierarchs are imposing on politicians using old methods. For example, Archbishop Henryk Hoser will not allow the following (Stróżyk & Czaczkowska, 2010: 1):

“Archbishop Hoser, when asked whether Catholic deputies who will vote for in-vitro fertilization, freezing and selecting embryos, must reckon with excommunication, replied: ‘If they are aware of what they are doing, and they want this situation to arise, if they do not act in the direction of limiting the harm proposed by such a law, in my opinion, they are automatically outside of the Church community.’”

Against the background of such voices, Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz is distinguished, who suggests normalizing this procedure in order to respect morality and human rights. He points out that the initiative belongs to the state, as can be seen in the following excerpt (Pezda, 2008: 6):

“Cardinal Dziwisz points out that this is about the rights of the human person. This means that this discussion cannot be reduced to a dispute between a religious and secular worldview. This is because human rights belong to the universal category, not being religious or secular. Of course, the cardinal also wants the Church’s teachings to be included. At the same time, he admits that, according to the principle of state and Church autonomy, legislation is entitled to the state, he explained.”

The controversy over the role of the Church in the law-making process will strongly expose the SLD’s opposition headed by Grzegorz Napieralski. In numerous discourses on the dominant role of the Church in Poland, Napieralski reflects his attitude towards the agency of the Church (Pezda, 2008: 6):

“The Catholic Church cannot be a subject of political life in the country, influencing the decisions of governments, for example by enforcing its position on in-vitro fertilization. Instead of convincing the faithful to its position, it puts pressure on the government. The Church’s interference in problems of family life is incomprehensible to me. What kind of experience in family matters can a priest have? Does he get up at two in the morning to feed a child or change a diaper?”

On the basis of the presented themes, the image of the Church emerges as a source of dispute with the political authority, which does not take into account its postulates. Are we therefore able to talk about a fusion between religious and state matters? The answer is definitely negative. When the state enters into a relationship with the Church, it does it in a sublime way. It treats Church representatives

rather as leaders of a ceremony. Media coverage, which accompanies this topic, appeals to gentle cooperation between both entities.

The opposite situation was the media coverage focusing on the Church's demands that violate applicable laws. We see this fundamental imbalance as founded on two elements. First, in the system of impartial worldview, the state plays the role of a leading operating entity, and religion remains the object of the possible operations of the state entity. Second, as the previous analysis indicates, political actors are much better at adapting to the logic of the media than representatives of religion.

There is one element of the above-mentioned imbalance, which essentially imposes an increase in negatively viewing religious actors. It comes down to the possessions and privileges granted to the Church. This issue starts from the moment Churches and religious associations obtained the right to regain the property stolen from them by the People's Republic of Poland. It passed through the period of securing the possession of institutional religions through paying taxes by priests teaching religion. It ended at the moment of attempting to review this state through the postulate of the PO at the 2015 parliamentary elections. At that time, the ruling PO party wanted to liquidate the Church fund, which ensures paying health insurance for priests.

Coverage of the Catholic Church's funds, but not for all other religious communities, causes the most ambiguity and prejudice against this community. What causes this reluctance? We perceived the basis of such activity starting in the period of the parliamentary election campaign in 2015. The PO was looking for a way to distinguish itself from PiS and attract the anti-clerical SLD electorate. However, the whole matter covered up a deeper content. This one case illustrates the general regularity in Church-state relations. The economic factor was the basis for antagonizing parties and Churches, proving that on the part of political actors, the fusion of what is religious and the state's does not belong to primary values. However, religion as such remains a tool they use in practicing the electoral game.

The symbolic and practical themes we have been talking about prove that the dynamics of media coverage of the fusion of religious and state matters takes place in the space of three important themes: reification, banalization, and demonization. When talking about reification, we mean "the process by which people come to treat other people and human actions as if they were things" (Billig, 2013: 103). In this study, the media and electoral materials of the party indicate that political power reifies religion in a direct and indirect way. In the case of joint religious and state celebrations, the observable balance of both kingdoms in the long run serves to achieve the particularism of power. The

religious agency during these ceremonies is part of a wider plan to achieve the state's goals (indirect reification). In the case of political activity, the authority refers to the arguments of limiting religion in order to achieve electoral support (direct reification).

The second mechanism consists in changing the meaning of important symbols associated with religion at the moment when they enter the field of politics. The agency of politicians, religious representatives and the media brings about their new understanding. Deep and extensive narratives about their religious and social functioning are partially or completely transformed. Religious symbols, therefore, narrow down their original understanding. Sometimes they completely lose their original meaning and gain a new symbolism, less significant but more catchy for the media.

The last of the themes we see here is connected with the demonization of religious entities within the media representation of Church-state relations. The mechanism of the media here leads to silencing the state's controversial statements and focusing on the bad agency of the Church and its institutions. Bad agency presented as such has quite complex grounds based on the lack of ability of some religious actors to look at their agency in the key of media logic.

When we gather what has been presented so far, it is clear that the process of shaping the idea of a secular state is subject to varying degrees of accommodating to media logic. Four basic elements should be emphasized here: professionalization of the party taking into account the perspective of media logic, mediatization of political actors, mediatization of religious actors, and the existence of banal religion.

Parties professionalize their discourses on the subject of the secular state and the Church-state relationship. This means that over time, they add more pressure to be more visible. They accomplish this by tuning into individual components of media logic. Analogous accommodation takes place in the case of religious actors. However, this process is much easier for political leaders than representatives of institutional religions.

Media transmission uses the process of two ways to banalize religion. First, the cross functions both as a religious symbol and as a symbol of a political dispute. In contrast, in the case of religion classes in schools, its banalization is connected with reification and demonization. The original meaning of religion in school is put aside. In its place enters the understanding of religion as the object of propaganda and the basis for fears about the nature of teaching children.

7 In search of the mediatization effect

By analyzing media contents, legal and party documents, we tried to show the mechanisms that mediatize the idea of a secular state. The last element of the communication process, meaning the content reception, was clearly missing in all of this. As it was pointed out, the mediatization effect cannot be identified with the media effect as such. The first mechanism points to a number of changes both in social institutions and among individual actors. From the perspective of the communication process, however, it also takes into account the mechanisms typical of the media effect. In this final chapter of the book, let's search for traces of the mediatization effect in society.

7.1 Sources of knowledge about a secular state

In the methodological part, it was mentioned that the last element of this analysis on the mediatization of the secular-state idea and the Church-state relationship applies to audience reception. Indeed, the analyzed media belong to the basic and uninterrupted sources of information about the secular state and the joint exercises between the Church and state, but can we find links between their contents and the audience's awareness? Let's face this issue by analyzing the sources of social information about the secular state.

The simplest answer about where to locate these sources leads us to the media. In Matthew Engelke's (2010) previously quoted essay, there even appears a suggestion that we view the social functioning of religion today mostly through the religion and media turn. We follow this perspective, taking into account the results of the reception study, which confirms the media's advantage among the declared sources of information about the secular state.

When we look at the data from Fig. 7.1 showing which communication channel provides basic knowledge about the secular state, we can see that more than half of the respondents point to TV (63.2 %) and the internet (54.8 %). The third source of information concerns the press (44.1 %). Interpersonal communication, which does not need media, takes fourth place (42.3 %). Thus, our intuition is not wrong. The media determines Polish society's knowledge about the meeting point of the realm of religion and the realm of the state.

In this case, however, geographical differences take on significance. Members of the public acquire knowledge about the secular state differently depending on where they live. We suggest to look at the diversity in village and a big city of over 500,000 residents. In the case of metropolitan residents, their knowledge about

Source of information about the secular state	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
Television	65.7	66.9	60.6	64.0	56.3	63.2
Internet	48.2	51.6	54.4	60.5	67.6	54.8
Press	41.5	42.1	43.4	45.1	51.4	44.1
Talks with other people	38.7	32.5	42.4	46.3	55.7	42.3
Radio	40.6	43.8	36.7	34.5	44.0	40.0
Social Media	32.2	35.3	29.7	31.0	33.5	32.3
Church – sermons and parish announcements	33.9	25.7	24.8	20.7	20.2	26.8
Other	4.4	3.7	1.8	5.0	7.1	4.4
None	2.6	1.7	6.8	2.3	4.4	3.4
Difficult to say	3.2	0.8	3.7	2.9	3.4	2.9

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100

Fig. 7.1: The sources of information on the topic of a secular state according to place of residence (%). Source: Own research

the secular state comes primarily from the internet (67.7 %), followed by television (56.3 %) and interpersonal communication (55.7 %). Although there is a lack of printed media in the top three, its share in sources of information about the secular state still remains significant (51.4 %). Based on this, it is argued that current knowledge on the secular state is shaped here in the process of receiving and reading traditional media together with the use of new media. Thus, this approach sets the foundations for further research in the field of the hybrid media environment representing the secular state.

When we look at the same problem from a rural perspective, different types of media dominate over interpersonal communication. The space of knowledge about the secular state is primarily shaped on the basis of information from television (65.7 %). The internet is a much less popular but also quite present source of such knowledge (48.2 %). Other sources of information are the press (41.5 %) and radio (40.6 %). Interpersonal communication ranks fifth (38.7 %). This shows that the approach of rural residents to a secular state is shaped to a great extent based on knowledge obtained from traditional media.

Sources of information about the secular state	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
Television	59.4	62.1	67.0	63.2
Internet	77.3	59.1	34.6	54.8
Press	43.5	46.7	42.2	44.1
Talks with other people	47.4	44.6	36.5	42.3
Radio	40.1	46.6	34.0	40.0
Social Media	39.9	37.2	22.3	32.3
Church – sermons and parish announcements	22.7	31.8	25.2	26.8
Other	5.2	2.1	5.8	4.4
None	1.7	4.8	3.4	3.4
Difficult to say	1.6	3.5	3.2	2.9

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100

Fig. 7.2: Sources of information about a secular state according to age (%). Source: Own research

In the analyzed material, the role of parish announcements seems to reflect the specific stereotype of religious villages and non-religious big cities. The highest point of this source of information about the secular state concerns villages (33.9 %), and the lowest includes cities of over 500,000 residents (20.2 %). This allows us to assume that the informational function of parish churches still belongs to the landscape of a large part of Poland.

When we complete the geographical perspective according to the division of the age of respondents seen in Fig. 7.2, we can see that following the age group; there appears a change in the basic source of information on the topic of the secular state. Young people declare that they mostly obtain such knowledge from the internet (77.3 %). The remaining groups get their information mostly from television (61.2 % aged 34–54; 67 % aged 55 and over).

The Church has a centuries-old tradition of communicating information from the pulpit. The results show that in the case of a secular state, this channel of communication also refers to the significant sources of information. In addition, there is a clear disproportion between the respondents aged 18–34 (22.7 %) and those aged 35–54 (31.8 %). This shows that the generation of parents and child are searching for answers at the meeting point of the Church-state relationship in other places. The fact that the internet decidedly dominates among the youth (77.3 %) strengthens this observation.

Main source of information about the secular state	Attitude towards religious faith (%)					Total
	Decided non-believer	Rather non-believer	Believer	Deeply Religious	No answer	
Talks with other people	11.1	10.0	5.4	8.1	6.1	6.5
Press	20.4	16.7	6.7	7.1	6.2	8.3
Internet	46.5	39.9	26.5	23.0	25.7	28.3
Social Media	6.2	3.7	4.5	3.7	0.0	4.3
Radio	0.0	8.5	3.9	6.8	16.6	4.6
Church – sermons and parish announcements	1.0	0.0	5.1	9.7	0.0	4.9
Television	5.2	15.1	36.2	26.5	21.7	30.9
Other	1.9	0.0	2.9	1.6	18.4	2.9
Difficult to say	7.7	6.0	8.9	13.5	5.3	9.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.3: The main source of information about the secular state in relation to religious faith (%). Source: Own research

Also, the division for religious faith reveals a number of regularities (Fig. 7.3). First of all, nones declare that they obtain information about the secular state primarily from the internet (46.5 %). The second but definitely less preferred source of information about the secular state's issues remains the printed press (20.4 %). They are also distinguished from the general public by the fact that by far they almost do not acquire this knowledge from television (5.2 %). This suggests the image of nones as being representatives of the culture of reading and clicking, not just the receptive viewing of messages through electronic media.

People who declare they have a stable or strong faith differ. Television provides them with basic knowledge about the secular state, and then the internet. Believers (36.2 %) watch TV, and the internet takes second place (26.5 %). In the case of deeply religious people, television gains 26.5 % and the internet 23 %. The primary role of television also coincides with the fact that the majority of society still remains mainly Catholic.

Here, we can see two interesting regularities that are worth noticing. First of all, with the increase of religious faith, the percentage of declarations related to acquiring knowledge from the internet is decreasing. The internet is being replaced by television, with the biggest increase among believers (36.2 %). Second, deeply religious people most often reach for the contents offered to them

in Church during sermons and parish announcements (9.7 %). However, Church influence is only slightly higher than interpersonal communication (8.1 %) and the printed press (7.1 %). We see, therefore, that the pulpit has long ago lost the status of the primary place of religious knowledge even among believers.

Respondents declare that the sources of their information about the secular state refer to the media. This confirms our assumption at the beginning of the book to analyze the contents of mainstream media in the last two decades. It also co-operates with the available studies on the preferred sources of information in the local environment (Gierula & Jachimowski, 2000). Whereas in previous studies the significant participation of interpersonal communication was demonstrated (Gierula, 2005), here its role definitely declines.

The internet appears in the results of reception studies, which raises certain challenges. It seems that such a result indicates a very narrow design of the study. We took into account the possibility of such a limitation when we started this research. Therefore, we carried out a content analysis regarding the secular state and atheism in the dominant information platforms of the Polish-language internet. The results we presented during the Polish Communication Association congress in 2015 suggest some reservations towards this approach of the respondents. The contents from which respondents declared that they gained knowledge about the secular state were slight. They are lost in the thicket of information provided by mainstream news services on the internet (Guzek, 2016b). Keeping in mind Lövheim's (2014) current findings in the context of high modernity countries, we can expect to see the internet's real growth as the primary source of information on religion.

7.2 Not very attractive Church-state issues

While in the previous section we referred to sources of knowledge about the secular state, let's now see if there is a basis for postulating the connection between the products of the media and the state of public knowledge about the secular state. We will omit the mechanism of transposing media images into mental pictures. Rather, we focus on identifying the traces of the media debate and its characteristics in respondents' views on the three issues that mostly resonate in recent years on the subject of state secularism. This concerns narratives about the concordat, state interference in the activities of the Catholic Church and the interference of the Catholic Church in state politics.

In the previous two chapters, it is placed strong emphasis on the importance of the concordat treaty on the development of the media's idea of a secular state and the Church-state relationship. The presented grounded theory proves that the

Most often heard opinions on the topic of the concordat	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
Don't know, difficult to say	26.8	29.9	2.2	14.9	16.5	23.8
The concordat restores Church-state relations	22.6	19.4	21.3	22.0	25.1	22.2
The concordat introduces a denominational state	11.6	19.7	7.9	20.9	20.2	15.1
None of the above	14.2	15.1	13.8	13.3	15.0	14.3
The concordat protects the Church from excessive state influence	12.3	8.0	14.5	13.4	6.5	11.2
The concordat protects the state from excessive Church influence	7.2	5.9	10.1	4.4	8.3	7.2
Other	5.4	2.0	5.2	11.1	8.4	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.4: Most often heard opinions about the concordat in relation to place of residence (%). Source: Own research

negative attitude towards the Church is growing in media coverage. Moreover, the SLD and the Palikot Movement publicize the postulates for withdrawing the concordat. Following this theme, it is possible to check how media viewers see the issue of the concordat and where they find their sources of knowledge about it.

The category of answers includes suggestions repeatedly postulated by politicians and their various options in reference to the concordat (Fig. 7.4). These postulates, however, characterize different periods of the public debate. They commenced with the statement by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1989–1993, who stated that the treaty is the restoration of

broken ties between the state and the Church (“Mamy konkordat [We Have a Concordat],” 1993). It concludes with a strong postulate by the leftist party that the concordat practically admits the denominational state (“Z pięciu zostały trzy [Three Remain out of Five],” 1997).

Taking into account the place of residence, 23.8 % of respondents are not able to identify the most popular opinion they hear about this treaty. Earlier, we tried to convince the reader that the nature of the debate around the concordat is changing. In practice, the concordat functions in media narratives after 2008 as a treaty which some politicians promise to revise or terminate. The representatives of the left wing see it as the main tool for building a religious state. Their views, however, do not translate into the declarations of respondents. While only 15.1 % of survey participants identify this view as the main concordat narrative, 22.2 % repeat what dominated the media coverage after signing the treaty on July 28, 1993.

Respondents tend to think that the concordat denotes a renewal of the relationship between the Church and the state. The problem is that this type of narrative appeared in the media and disappeared in 1993. Keeping this in mind, we cannot establish a connection between the contents of the media and the opinions of respondents. There is a clearly short time span in both discourses. The situation becomes more and more specific in the light of the results of Fig. 7.5.

Most often heard opinions on the topic of the concordat	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
Don't know, difficult to say	19.4	27.4	23.8	23.8
The concordat restores Church-state relations	20.4	22.7	23.0	22.2
The concordat introduces a denominational state	14.4	15.6	15.	15.
None of the above	19.3	16.4	8.7	14.3
The concordat protects the Church from excessive state influence	8.3	9.4	15.0	11.2
The concordat protects the state from excessive Church influence	12.1	3.1	7.4	7.2
Other	6.2	5.4	7.0	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.5: Most often heard opinions on the topic of the concordat according to age (%). Source: Own research

The main source of knowledge about the postulate to break ties with the concordat	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
None	51.9	47.5	47.5	47.8	51.1	49.7
Television	16.4	20.3	18.9	16.3	10.0	16.4
Internet	10.0	13.7	8.2	14.0	11.9	11.2
Difficult to say	6.9	3.8	12.8	5.9	10.9	7.9
Press	3.3	3.5	3.2	7.4	5.5	4.3
Social media	3.2	4.1	2.2	1.7	4.3	3.1
Radio	4.2	0.9	0.4	2.9	0.4	2.2
Talks with other people	1.5	2.7	4.2	2.3	1.3	2.2
Church – homilies and parish announcement	1.0	1.7	1.7	1.3	2.7	1.6
Other	1.7	1.8	0.9	0.5	1.9	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.6: The main sources of knowledge on the postulate to break with the concordat in relation to place of residence (%). Source: Own research

This illustrates the lack of awareness about the discussed topic and the pretended knowledge in the case of the youngest group of respondents. People aged 18–34 refer to the short-term interpretation of the 1993 concordat as the most frequently heard opinion on the topic (20.4 %). At the same time, the dominant argument for the revision or rejection of the concordat, meaning that it creates a denominational state, takes up only 8.3 %.

Fig. 7.6 shows that the leftist postulate, which heavily uses media messages to present the concordat, does not penetrate social awareness. As many as 49.7 % of the respondents are ignorant of the media-quoted postulates of terminating the concordat. From the perspective of the place of residence, the highest percentage of this group fall on village residents (51.9 %) and people from largest cities (51.1 %). When we mention the media, all of them together reach 37.2 % of respondents. What does this matter look like from the perspective of age? Details are provided in Fig. 7.7.

This category has a significant percentage of people aged 18–34 who do not have any knowledge about the postulates about liquidating the concordat

The main sources of knowledge on the postulate to break with the concordat	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
None	61.2	48.0	42.8	49.7
Television	10.6	12.9	23.7	16.4
Internet	12.8	15.2	6.4	11.2
Difficult to say	4.0	9.0	9.8	7.9
Press	3.1	4.4	5.1	4.3
Social media	3.7	2.5	3.2	3.1
Radio	2.1	2.7	2.0	2.2
Talks with other people	1.6	2.0	2.9	2.2
Church – homilies and parish announcements	0.4	2.0	2.0	1.6
Other	0.5	1.4	2.1	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.7: The main sources of knowledge on the postulate to break with the concordat in relation to age (%). Source: Own research

(61.2 %). On the other hand, respondents who have specific knowledge in this area declared that it particularly came from the television. In the case of the 35–54 age group, the internet provides them with information (15.2 %).

The results presented so far lead to several basic conclusions. First of all, the theme of the concordat is unattractive for readers and media users. The presented reports clearly indicate that respondents do not think about this treaty. Wherever they try to relate to it, they are more likely to suggest cafeteria talk presented to them rather than factual knowledge. This state as a rule precludes the possibility of a deeper analysis of how the debate over the concordat is taking place and its reception in Polish society.

The question that can be asked here concerns society's general approach towards top Church and state-related topics. In other words, does the secular state also function on the basis of guesses rather than knowledge? To answer this problem, let's look at the next two important themes that result from the data. They are limited to the state's interference in the activities of the Catholic Church and also the Church's interference in state practices and law-making processes.

We have to refer to the part of the grounded theory where it was analyzed a specific case of state interference and problems during the ingress, when Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus was accused of collaborating with the former security services. This spectacular example of the interference of political authorities in the

activities of a religious institution belongs to the few exceptions presented in the media's material. It also has the advantage of universality for interventions within the framework of impartial state involvement in the life of religion.

In asking questions about such interventions, we deliberately used the descriptive adjective "multiple" (Fig. 7.8). The results indicate that 49.5 % of respondents express negative opinions to different degrees about the proposal. At the same time, 32 % of respondents, or every third respondent, express the general conviction that after 1989, political authorities repeatedly interfered in the organization and life of the Catholic Church. This view is shared by almost half of the respondents from cities with up to 20,000 residents (43.8 %).

When we add the age variable to this (Fig. 7.9), it turns out that as many as 13.5 % of respondents aged 55 and over have a strong conviction about the state's repeated interference in the life of the Catholic Church. Such a distribution of respondent beliefs allows us to confirm that their image of the world is shaped far differently from the dominant influence of media contents. Therefore, non-media factors are involved, which cannot be predicted solely on the basis of the data available here.

It was mentioned the opposite situation, meaning the significant interference of the Catholic Church in politics and legislative issues, in the previous chapter. It dealt with the fusion of religion and the state. We also illustrated clear traces of the Catholic Church's pressure on the state with the help of formal and less

The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the state repeatedly interfered with the organization and life of the Catholic Church	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
Decidedly yes	10.5	17.1	14.8	7.6	5.2	11.0
Rather yes	24.6	26.7	14.9	18.1	16.5	21.0
Difficult to say	20.1	17.3	19.5	20.2	13.8	18.6
Rather not	31.3	27.1	32.7	33.9	38.3	32.4
Decidedly not	13.5	11.9	18.2	20.1	26.2	17.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.8: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the state repeatedly interfered with the organization and life of the Catholic Church based on the place of residence (%). Source: Own research

The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the state repeatedly interfered with the organization and life of the Catholic Church	Age (%)			Total
	18-34 year olds	35-54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
Decidedly yes	8.3	10.7	13.1	11.0
Rather yes	25.7	19.0	19.3	21.0
Difficult to say	20.3	19.4	16.6	18.6
Rather not	31.2	33.4	32.4	32.4
Decidedly not	14.6	17.5	18.6	17.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.9: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the state repeatedly interfered with the organization and life of the Catholic Church based on age (%).

Source: Own research

The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the Catholic Church repeatedly interfered in politics and legislative issues	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
Decidedly yes	32.8	38.5	42.0	41.7	46.8	38,9
Rather yes	25.3	31.8	26.1	25.5	25.0	26,4
Difficult to say	18.3	10.7	9.9	9.6	10.2	13,0
Rather not	16.3	12.9	16.1	15.4	11.9	14,9
Decidedly not	7.3	6.1	6.0	7.7	6.0	6,8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.10: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989, the Catholic Church repeatedly interfered in politics and legislative issues based on place of residence (%). Source: Own research

formal means of influence. There were also threats made by prominent hierarchs. What does this look like in the case of audience reception?

Two additional figures, 7.10 and 7.11, indicate that 65 % of respondents see the significant interference of the Catholic Church in state affairs. Only 21.7 % of respondents are of the opposite opinion. Data from Fig. 7.10 prove, however, that this opinion is especially dominant among the inhabitants of the largest cities (46.8 %). At the same time, the most and strongest opponents of such a view, 6.1 %, come from towns of up to 20,000 residents. When we look at this division

The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the Catholic Church repeatedly interfered in politics and legislative issues	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
Decidedly yes	35.2	40.8	39.9	38.9
Rather yes	33.1	25.8	22.1	26.4
Difficult to say	15.7	11.0	12.9	13.0
Rather not	10.7	14.9	17.9	14.9
Decidedly not	5.3	7.5	7.2	6.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.11: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the Catholic Church repeatedly interfered in politics and legislative issues based on age (%). Source: Own research

from the perspective of respondent age (Fig. 7.11), another interesting characteristic appears.

The oldest respondents aged 55 and over more often than others opposed the thesis about the significant interference of the Catholic Church in the political sphere and the legislative process. This group included as many as 25.1 % of respondents. This shows that the media do not provide them with a basic narrative about the subsequent zones of influence in the state appropriated by the Catholic Church.

The audience study gives us some insight into the area of the selected topics on the secular state. Looking at the inconsistent results of media analysis and respondents' opinions, we can immediately move away from combining the dynamic shaping of the concordat and Church-state relations in the media and their dynamics in the results of audience reception. Two fundamental reasons led us to make such a decision. It is about the lack of high interest among respondents on this subject matter and their arbitrary relation towards individual entities of Church-state relations visible in the material.

First of all, respondents unanimously identify the media as their primary source of knowledge about a secular state. Their knowledge on the strongly reported Church-state events, however, turns out to be negligible. They look for the basis of this process in the insufficient reception of media coverage in their audience. Second, some respondents are quite arbitrary about being able to comment on the mutual pressure of the Catholic Church and the state. We can search for the basics of this process in their ignorance and misunderstanding seen in the regularities associated with negotiating the concordat. Such easy predications on pressure from every side result from the fact that

the Church and the state have the status of institutions that to a certain extent oppress rather than keep to the actual dynamics of this process. The dynamics reported in the results of the grounded theory stand out from the unanimous assessments of respondents.

7.3 “Where’s the cross?”

Sacrilegious and scoffing material on YouTube entitled *Where is the cross?* has presently obtained over six million views. It boils down to a remix of the words of the defenders of the Smolensk cross accompanied by electronic music. This material has been imprinted in the minds of young Poles, and the slogan “where is the cross” for a while became something out of the Polish urban dictionary. Hurtful feelings in the religious remix are a strong and visible way of banalizing religion in the public space.

We can wonder when considering this matter if whether before the internet dominated the minds of the younger generation did banal representations break through into the social imaginarium? In this section, we will touch upon this problem regarding the matter disseminated in the book. However, we should ask a more general question about the visibility of symbols and events that stand out in the analyzed media. To this end, we will use references to representatives of world religions in the Polish parliament and the symbol of the cross.

As we showed in the previous chapter, the presence of religious leaders in the Polish parliament has always had strong coverage, thus revealing the strong agency of political and religious actors. These carefully planned events show the positive attitude of the state towards religion and religious values. As in the cases of the Dalai Lama and Patriarch Kirill, representatives of political power will not fail to care to meet with the media, during which they touch upon important matters of peace and moral order. How much of this, however, remains in the minds of recipients and media readers?

Based on the results in Fig. 7.12, we can note that among the respondents prevails general knowledge about Pope John Paul II’s visit to the Polish parliament (79.3 %). The media repeatedly turned to this fact. However, it should be remembered that the event took place in June of 1999. The vast majority of respondents managed to blur his image. Associating the Pope with a visit to the Plenary Hall of the Sejm may therefore result from the ordinary mechanism of imposing this type of agency on Pope Wojtyła. This would clearly correspond to the style of his pontificate. It should also be remembered that John Paul II in the Polish parliament has become a frequent snapshot in short materials published and issued on the occasion of various papal anniversaries.

Respondents' knowledge about the visits of religious leaders to Poland's parliament	Place of residence (%)					
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	Total
John Paul II	78.4	82.2	78.8	80.4	77.8	79.3
Dalai Lama XIV	19.8	27.5	26.1	33.0	40.6	27.5
Kirill I	4.0	2.7	2.2	5.2	9.6	4.6
None	4.2	0.0	2.2	1.6	3.1	2.6
Bartholomew I	1.0	0.0	3.0	0.9	3.5	1.6
I do not know	14.4	11.7	12.6	13.3	12.7	13.2

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100

Fig. 7.12: Respondents' knowledge about the visits of religious leaders to Poland's parliament based on place of residence (%). Source: Own research

The last visit of a religious leader to the Polish parliament took place in August 2012. As we have learned, the main actor of this event, Kirill I of Moscow, shows a new type of media agency. Media recipients, however, did not see this visit. Data from Fig. 7.12 indicate that only 4.6 % of respondents remember Kirill's presence in the Polish parliament. When we look at the breakdown due to the place of residence, the number of respondents increases slightly, up to 9.6 %. Respondents find it easier to remember the Dalai Lama. Although the meetings of this Buddhist authority with representatives of Poland's government were not as strongly implemented as Kirill's, many more respondents mentioned the Dalai Lama (27.5 %), and disproportionately many of these were residents of the largest cities (40.6 %).

The division according to the place of residence provides us with more important information. Among village inhabitants, it is difficult to find knowledge about visits to the parliament by leaders other than John Paul II. Only 19.8 % of them mentioned the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile, in the largest cities, the awareness of visits by the leaders of Orthodoxy and Buddhism remains at the highest level.

Bartholomew I, Patriarch of Constantinople and the spiritual leader of the world Orthodox Church, came to Poland several times. However, no trace about his visit to the Polish parliament in the respondents' declarations can be found. People from towns of up to 20,000 inhabitants do not identify Bartholomew's agency discussed earlier in the media. Inhabitants of the largest cities do so to a negligible extent (3.5 %).

Respondents’ knowledge about the visits of religious leaders to Poland’s parliament	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
John Paul II	68.2	81.5	85.3	79.3
Dalai Lama XIV	25.5	26.3	30.2	27.5
Kirill I	24.3	10.8	7.4	13.2
None	7.7	2.1	4.6	4.6
Bartholomew I	4.4	1.8	2.1	2.6
I do not know	2.1	1.3	1.4	1.6

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100

Fig. 7.13: Respondents’ knowledge about the visits of religious leaders to Poland’s parliament based on age (%). Source: Own research

When we take into account the age of respondents (Fig. 7.13), the first observation concerns the advantage of people aged 55 and over and their knowledge about the visit of spiritual leaders to the Polish parliament. Only in the cases of Kirill (7.4 %) and Bartholomew I (2.1 %) do they show less awareness of the issue discussed. On the other side are young people aged 18–34 who demonstrate the highest degree of knowledge about the parliamentary agency of these Orthodox leaders. Kirill appears among 24.3 % of respondents in this age group, and Bartholomew I takes 4.4 %. We can explain this in a prosaic way. The agency of these two religious leaders perfectly reflects the effect of novelty. For respondents, it is easier to remember John Paul II and the Dalai Lama than the leaders of the Orthodox Church. The presence of the Orthodox patriarchs in the media must therefore resonate due to the unknown and at the same time interesting nature of Orthodoxy.

The data clearly shows that the youngest age group (7.7 %) also cannot answer the question about the presence of religious leaders in the Polish parliament. What does such information give us? First of all, we learn that the perception of religious issues in the Church-state relationship is clearly weaker among the younger generation. Let’s take into account that in this group’s minds there are remixes such as *Where is the cross?* This age group also remains least interested in the contents associated with religion and the state. In this area, therefore, it seems most easy to banalize religious symbols, understood as depriving them of their original meaning and imposing a new understanding.

Such an approach brings us closer to examining the cause of the cross. Let’s start with the prosaic question of how respondents understand this symbol. The

Basic understanding of the cross	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
A religious symbol	85.3	86.7	86.9	89.3	84.7	86.3
A symbol that testifies to the nation's Catholic tradition	40.0	28.9	32.2	32.7	28.3	33.9
A symbol of the Smolensk tragedy	3.3	3.5	4.0	4.7	2.4	3.5
A symbol of opposition to the PRL system	2.6	2.7	4.0	5.3	3.6	3.4
Other	2.3	2.1	1.5	1.5	6.7	2.7
Hard to say	2.4	.4	3.8	3.0	1.8	2.3

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100

Fig. 7.14: The way of understanding the cross according to place of residence (%).
Source: Own research

answers they provide in an interesting way highlight the previously presented transformation of this symbol.

The cross, as shown in Fig. 7.14, functions in the respondents' declarations above all as a religious symbol (86.3 %). It works as the object of Christian cult with a minimum of 84.7 % in the largest cities and 85.3 % in the countryside. When we look at the description of the cross as evidence of the nation's Catholic tradition, we clearly differentiate the similarity of declarations in large cities and villages. It turns out that the cross most often functions as a national artifact in the countryside (40 %), and least frequently in the largest cities (28.3 %).

We have devoted a lot of space in the analysis so far to the clear change in the coverage of the cross, focusing the reader's attention on the banalization and demonization of religious symbols, including the cross. What surprises in the respondents' statements concerns the lack of a trace of these processes. First of all, the media are using this symbol both in a general understanding of the cross and specifically the Smolensk cross. As a result, when one thinks of the Smolensk cross, we first see a political dispute, and next we remember and hear the remix

Basic understanding of the cross	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
A religious symbol	86.1	87.6	85.3	86.3
A symbol that testifies to the nation’s Catholic tradition	31.4	34.2	35.4	33.9
A symbol of the Smolensk tragedy	2.3	2.9	4.9	3.5
A symbol of opposition to the PRL system	4.2	3.4	2.8	3.4
Other	2.2	2.6	3.3	2.7
Hard to say	2.0	2.9	2.0	2.3

Fig. 7.15: The way of understanding the cross according to age (%). Source: Own research

Where is the cross? Meanwhile, in studying people’s reception, there is no trace of this order. The cross remains an element of the Smolensk crash context for only a few people, because 3.5 % of respondents now primarily see it as a symbol of the tragedy. Even fewer so, because 2.7 % of respondents assign it a different kind of meaning, or have a problem with assigning it such a meaning (2.3 %). Therefore, we can speak of the failure to postpone the many-month-long dispute over the Smolensk cross in the minds of the media recipients.

When we take into account the change in age (Fig. 7.15), it turns out that the respondents express a similar position in understanding the cross. In this situation, we can ask if the cross is a neutral symbol for them. Treated first as a religious sign and next as a national sign, it expresses the fusion of Catholicism and Polishness. This merger in a specific way translates into the respondents’ attitude towards the cross in public spaces.

There are several interesting themes present in Fig. 7.16. First of all, the majority of respondents (79.7 %) do not see a problem with the cross being present in public buildings, such as a school or town hall. As much as 94.7 % of believers obtain information about the secular state from homilies. When the source of knowledge about the secular state remains the media, several regularities appear. Television viewer expresses a neutral attitude (85.7 %). The lowest, though still high, the percentage of respondents with no objection to the cross in public places is articulated by those for whom the press remains the basic source of knowledge about the secular state (67.2 %). We can see the negative impact of the press agency, especially *Gazeta Wyborcza*.

Let’s look at the results presented in this section according to the media effect. Our present analysis of the mediatization of religion as an accommodation of

Attitude towards crosses in public buildings	Source of information (%)										Total
	Talks with other people	Press	Internet	Social Media	Radio	Church – homilies and parish announcements	Television	Other	Difficult to say		
They offend	22.9	26.0	18.0	21.5	21.5	3.4	12.3	25.0	10.5		16.3
They do not offend	71.8	67.2	77.4	78.5	77.1	94.7	85.7	71.1	80.5		79.7
I do not know	5.3	6.8	4.7	0.0	1.4	1.9	1.9	3.8	9.0		3.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0

Fig. 7.16: The attitude towards the cross in public buildings according to the main source of information about the secular state (%).
Source: Own research

religious and political actors to media logic has been supplemented with the reception of visible religious events and symbols. The data show, however, that the respondents and the recipients of the media do not reveal awareness about the discussed religious issues. Media coverage and accompanying accommodation processes to media logic go in one direction, but respondents' declarations go in another.

In the case of the leaders of great religions visiting the Polish parliament as well as the banalization of the cross, it seems impossible to talk about the media effect. The subject of the secular state and the Church-state relationship clearly cannot provide this element, which at the micro level will normally be complemented by a multi-factor mediatization process. With this in mind, we keep clear of the perspective of banalizing the cross by media recipients. The extensive banalizing process visible in the media's content leaves no traces in the audience's reception. Consequently, when we refer to Schulz's (2004) viewpoint, who claims that mediatization concurrently includes and exceeds the media effect, it is difficult to confirm the results of mediatization in their audience.

7.4 Between secularity and state impartiality

This book mainly moves between the postulates of state secularism and the practice of state impartiality. Moving from one perspective to the other occurs quite freely. There is a lack of tension on both sides. Does something similar happen in the material obtained from the respondents? The answer given in this section is significant. It complements our current misguided search for the media effect in the collected material. Let us begin with a praxis, meaning a few issues taken from the respondents' declarations on the practical implementation of the legal provisions of the state's impartial worldview. Only then will we move on to the postulates for implementing the secular state.

Exploring the results from Fig. 7.17, we see the polarization of the respondents in relation to the way they perceive the practices of state impartiality in matters of religion and worldview. In the opinion of 43.3 % of respondents, Poland does not implement the principle of impartiality. A definitely more radical statement is voiced by 21.5 % of respondents on this topic. On the other hand, 42.7 % of the surveyed population remain proponents of the thesis regarding the implementation of the principle of impartiality, of which 16.7 % are radical supporters of this thesis. Quite a small number of respondents indicate the lack of a unanimous opinion on this issue (14 %). Earlier analyzes have shown that religious topics present in the media in an average way enter into the awareness of respondents. The difference revealed by Fig. 7.17 cannot therefore primarily arise from the

Poland as a country in which the constitutional principle of state impartiality is implemented in matters of religious beliefs	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
Decidedly yes	17.4	13.6	19.3	22.5	10.0	16.7
Rather yes	30.1	31.5	22.9	26.4	14.7	26.0
Difficult to say	17.1	15.9	12.9	10.2	9.9	14.0
Rather not	18.6	16.3	23.9	19.4	34.3	21.8
Decidedly not	16.7	22.6	21.0	21.5	31.1	21.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.17: The relationship to the state's implementation of worldview impartiality based on place of residence (%). Source: Own research

media. The fact that it occurs proves the presence of other factors affecting the respondents.

The characteristic of this division is revealed in several facts that we notice when the respondents are divided based on place of residence. First, there is discord between the inhabitants of villages, 30.1 % of whom moderately confirm the impartiality of state worldview, and the inhabitants of the largest cities. The latter recognize that the state really does not function (34.3 %) or that it definitely does not function (31.1 %) in an impartial way towards religion. Second, the most balanced opinions in this matter are revealed by city residents with 20 to 100 thousand inhabitants. It can be seen here that radically separate models of life are connected with the types of antagonized views. Meanwhile, people functioning in the realities of small cities have a less antagonistic approach.

If we take into account the division into age, as in Fig. 7.18, it will become clear that half of the surveyed respondents in the 18–34 age group (50.4 %) disagree with the opinion that Poland implements the constitutional principle of impartiality and religious beliefs. As a comparison, among respondents aged 35–44, the proportion of such people is 39.4 %, and among the oldest people it is 41.5 %. This leads us to a surprising conclusion. Based on the collected data, we previously attributed the least interest and knowledge about the secular state and the Church-state relation to the 18–34 age group. Now we find that the same group of respondents sees a problem with the implementation of state worldview

impartiality. In this situation, we raise the question: what did they base their declarations on? The only answer that we can see is the result of working with bits of information and building favorable narratives. Such a supposition, however, requires deeper justification.

A factor that naturally strengthens people's opinions on the implementation of state impartiality is the attitude of respondents towards religious faith (Fig. 7.19). The research shows that people who believe much more often than non-believers express the opinion that this principle is implemented in the country. Against the background of the results, a very high 52 % of non-believers hold the conviction that Poland definitely does not implement religious and ideological impartiality

Poland as a country in which the constitutional principle of state impartiality is implemented in matters of religious beliefs	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
Decidedly yes	11.2	18.1	19.5	16.7
Rather yes	28.0	29.3	21.7	26.0
Difficult to say	10.4	13.2	17.3	14.0
Rather not	28.3	18.0	20.5	21.8
Decidedly not	22.1	21.4	21.0	21.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.18: The relationship to the state's implementation of worldview impartiality based on age (%). Source: Own research

Poland is a country that achieves the constitutional principle of state impartiality in matters of religious beliefs	Attitude towards religious faith (%)					Total
	Decided non-believer	Rather non-believer	Believer	Deeply Religious	No answer	
Decidedly yes	1.8	4.3	17.5	28.8	2.2	16.7
Rather yes	16.3	3.5	27.6	32.5	29.9	26.0
Difficult to say	5.5	8.8	14.4	16.3	23.2	14.0
Rather not	39.0	31.5	21.3	14.3	8.7	21.8
Decidedly not	37.3	52.0	19.2	8.2	36.0	21.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.19: The attitude towards the state realizing an impartial worldview according to one's attitude towards religious faith (%). Source: Own research

Spearman's rho	Implementing the constitutional principle of state impartiality in matters of religious beliefs	Correlation coefficient	1,000	Relation to the faith	-.303
		Significance (two-sided)	.		.000
		N	1151		1119
	Relation to the faith	Correlation coefficient	-.303**		1.000
		Significance (two-sided)	.000		.
		N	1119		1119

Fig. 7.20: Correlation of attitude to religious faith with one's conviction about the implementation of the constitutional principle of state impartiality in matters of religious beliefs. Source: Own research

written in the law of impartiality. This small group of respondents primarily bases their stance on their daily practices.

Exploring the theme of religious faith, we can ask whether there exists a relationship between one's attitude towards it and being convinced about the implementation of the constitutional principle of state impartiality in matters of religious beliefs (Fig. 7.20). In this research study, it is not possible to carry out the Pearson correlation (variables are not measured on a quotient or interval scale, and for other tests the assumptions of the distribution of norms are not met). Instead, let's look at the potential relationship from the perspective of Spearman's rho. Our analysis of the relationship between one's attitude towards faith (operationalization: 1 – decided unbeliever, 2 – rather non-believer, 3 – believer, 4 – deeply religious), and one's relation to the implementation of the constitutional principle of state impartiality in religious matters (operationalization: 1 – definitely yes, 2 – rather yes, 3 – hard to say, 4 – rather not, 5 – definitely not) indicates that there is a significant correlation ($p \leq 0.01$), and the correlation coefficient is -0.3. We can therefore conclude that the more a person believes, the more she or he is convinced of the impartiality of the state in religious matters.

How do these matters concern a secular state? We researched this issue based on respondent attitude towards postulates which are strongly active in media coverage. Essentially, in the opinion of respondents (Fig. 7.21), the idea of a

Theses expressing the implementation of the postulate of a secular state	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
The withdrawal of religion from schools	26.8	30.0	39.3	48.8	44.9	35.8
Liquidation of the Church fund	30.3	32.9	33.7	39.6	44.9	35.1
Removal of religious symbols from public places	25.2	33.8	37.5	36.2	48.9	34.2
Liberalization of the abortion law	28.2	34.9	31.9	33.8	41.6	32.9
Breaking the concordat	21.5	23.3	28.5	24.8	37.1	26.0
Hard to say	27.3	26.0	18.7	16.5	11.8	21.4
Nothing	22.0	17.0	18.4	17.1	11.6	18.2

Fig. 7.21: Theses expressing the idea of a secular state according to place of residence (%). Source: Own research

secular state means withdrawing religion from schools (35.8 % of responses), liquidating the Church fund (35.1 %), removing religious symbols from public places (34.2 %), liberating abortion laws (32.9 %), and breaking the concordat (26 %). Differences depend on individual groups and the analyzed variables.

When we look at the postulates about a secular state from the perspective of the respondents' place of residence, three regularities appear. First of all, all of the described postulates are more often mentioned by people from cities with over 500,000 residents. Second, the inhabitants of the largest cities remain most critical about the presence of religious symbols in public places (48.9 %). Third, in the countryside, the secular state is primarily associated with the reduction of Church financing (30.3 %) and the liberalization of abortion laws (28.2 %).

In the fifth chapter, our presentation already pointed out the moral and economic issues in media coverage. The qualitative grounded theory based on the research material in the sixth chapter did not significantly focus on these two topics. The fact that the respondents refer to this issue must therefore bring us closer to what we have already suggested, meaning combining fragments of knowledge from various sources. Is this, however, only a domain for young people?

Theses expressing the implementation of the postulate of a secular state	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
The withdrawal of religion from schools	33.9	36.3	36.7	35.8
Liquidation of the church fund	39.0	36.0	31.5	35.1
Removal of religious symbols from public places	34.9	37.0	31.0	34.2
Liberalization of abortion laws	31.7	33.5	33.4	32.9
Breaking the concordat	28.3	26.7	23.7	26.0
Hard to say	19.2	23.4	21.3	21.4
Nothing	15.7	18.9	19.2	18.2

Fig. 7.22: Theses expressing the idea of a secular state according to age (%).
Source: Own research

Fig. 7.22 proves that age does not significantly differentiate people's opinions on the implementation of the postulate of a secular state. However, there are minor differences among several groups of respondents. People aged 18–34 most often indicate the liquidation of the Church fund as an expression of the implementation of the secular state (39 %). In contrast, liberalizing abortion laws remains similar in all groups. This shows that the younger the group of respondents, the more they link the secular state with minimizing the Church's possessions.

One more area of the respondents' opinions about the secular state is worth taking into account and concerns the views the respondents most often hear about the secular state. Based on the slogans from the media material (Fig. 7.23), we notice that respondents' opinions resonate the postulate defending the secular state, especially repeated by the SLD (26.3 % of opinions). A different statement (22.8 %) is made by the Palikot Movement's agency. However, the rightist views and fears of secularism remain unjustified and only reach 12.5 %. We can interpret this situation in two ways. The first approach assumes that the radical narratives of the leftists operate in the imaginations of recipients. The second indicates that the left's slogans are constructed on the basis of intuitive, simple, and controversial issues that can easily be recalled without any context.

From the perspective of the place of residence, this subject comes down to one basic regularity. Another polarization takes place, namely that the most radical views and the government's defense of the secular state are present in towns with over 500,000 inhabitants (34 %). At the same time, the most gentle approach functions in the countryside (20.3 %). This division fits well into the previously presented differences between villages and the largest cities.

Most often heard ideas on the topic of Poland's secularity	Place of residence (%)					Total
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	
It is necessary to defend state secularity	20.3	27.1	25.8	31.7	34.0	26.3
The secular state is fictional	19.3	24.5	19.5	24.5	30.5	22.8
Don't know, difficult to say	24.0	19.9	21.6	13.7	13.6	19.7
We are not afraid about keeping the secular state	17.7	12.9	16.5	19.8	12.7	16.3
None	16.1	15.5	13.2	6.9	6.3	12.5
Other	2.6	0.0	3.4	3.4	2.8	2.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.23: Most often heard opinions on the topic of Poland's secularity according to place of residence (%). Source: Own research

Most often heard opinions on the topic of Poland's secularity	Age (%)			Total
	18–34 year olds	35–54 year olds	Over 55 years of age	
It is necessary to defend state secularity	33.0	24.4	23.1	26.3
The secular state is fictional	23.1	24.2	21.2	22.8
Don't know, difficult to say	17.8	15.6	24.7	19.7
We are not afraid about keeping the secular state	14.5	13.9	19.8	16.3
None	11.0	17.3	9.2	12.5
Other	0.5	4.7	2.0	2.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fig. 7.24: Most often heard opinion on the topic of Poland's secularity according to age (%). Source: Own research

The age variable also matters. According to Fig. 7.24, the popular thesis about the need to defend the secular state prevails (33 %), especially among the youngest respondents aged 18–34. On the other hand, in the group of the oldest respondents, the answer “I do not know, it's hard to say” (24.7 %) was more often

stated than in the other groups. This leads us to the conclusion that thinking about a secular state cannot be guided by the media and its reception among recipients. The mechanism seems much more complex and ambiguous.

Earlier, we mentioned that it's difficult to see any mutual tension between secularity and impartiality in media coverage. Our main point was that both terms appear and function in parallel, since they are interrelated. In the leftist discourses, sometimes they are treated interchangeably. They rarely function on the basis of contrast. Meanwhile, legal and political practice proves that they exist far from each other. Poland's impartial involvement has little to do with the previous conception of a secular state. When we look at the respondents' statements, polarization will appear only in opinions about the implementation of this impartiality in state practices. What clearly appears in the further material is the significant religious factor in shaping the opinions of the respondents. This shows us that focusing only on the media variable does not convey the essence of this phenomenon.

7.5 Reconsidering the mediatization effect

What does the mediatization effect mean? We pointed out earlier that there are two conflicting approaches when it comes to conceptualizing the mediatization effect in relation to the media effect. The first approach is dominated by the view that the mediatization effect simultaneously contains and exceeds the media effect. A competitive approach assumes that mediatization does not concern the media effect but the mutual relationship between changes in the media and communication and changes in culture and society (Hepp et al., 2015). Let's return to the first of these approaches.

The reader may have noticed that by analyzing audience reception results, it is translated Schulz's intuition into the perspective of the micro and meso analysis. In the second chapter, it is explained why we omit the macro level (Hepp, 2013a). When it comes to the micro-level analysis, we adopt several directives. The results of the grounded theory serve as a reference point. They show clear patterns in the mediatization of the religious and political actors. When we reviewed the audience reception results, what seemed interesting to us was searching for traces of the media effect in the coverage of religious issues. Subsequently, we are interested in the reflections of the agency of individual and institutional religious and political actors, which proves they accommodate to media logic. Next, our intention is to identify and analyze the mechanism of "crossing" the media effect postulated by Schulz as a result of the mediatization process at the meso level. Here we are referring to the discovery of patterns of interaction that appear in

the mutual relationships between changes in the media and changes in society. However, a problem arises at the moment of searching for the media effect.

The following sections of this chapter indicate that our analysis of audience reception applies four important and qualitatively different themes from the media content. It is about sources of knowledge on the subject of the secular state, the agency of religious and political actors, changes in religious symbols, ways of reading the idea of a secular state, and an impartial state in relation to the religion and worldview of its citizens. The results of this part of the study clearly do not confirm Schulz's approach to mediatization.

A few key findings from individual sections serve as arguments for this thesis. First of all, without a doubt, the media play the role of the primary source of information about the secular state. Respondents indicate that television is the first place they look for information (63.2 %), then the internet (54.8 %), and finally the press (44.1 %). Only in the fourth place do they mention knowledge acquisition in the course of interpersonal communication (42.3 %). The results of the reception of the contents of these media about the secular state and Church-state relationship, however, contradict the existence of the media effect.

Key results for the Church-state relationship reveal progress in mediatization when we look at the results of the grounded theory. However, this is lacking when we combine dynamic media coverage for shaping the concordat and Church-state relations in the media and its reception among the audience. The respondents refer to the media as a source of their orientation on the subject of the concordat, state interference in the life of the Catholic Church, and the Church interfering in state politics. When it comes to answering basic questions in the area of covering these issues, they are not able to so do. The youngest group of respondents most often recalls the narrative dominating in the media only in the short period after signing the concordat treaty, which leads us to the claim about mechanisms hiding ignorance on the subject of the secular state.

In the case of religious symbols, the matter is even more unanimous. Media and popular culture exploit the themes of the cross, but clearly trivialize it. We see then that the banal representation of the cross means a political representation. However, the primary symbolism of the cross as a tool of salvation in the media's coverage remains hidden. This looks different in the respondents' declarations. Here, the cross denotes a religious and national symbol. The dominant trace of the merger of the nation and religion, therefore, remains unmoved in its original form.

The postulate of the media effect in the case of the symbolic visits of the leaders of world religions in the Polish parliament is even weaker. These events, which are intensively covered by the media, mainly function, in the opinions

of respondents, in connection with the figures of John Paul II and the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile, Bartholomew I, the spiritual leader of the world's Orthodox Christians, does not even exist in the imaginarium of some media recipients. However, the 18–34 age group of respondents refer to the leaders of the Orthodox Church, Bartholomew I and Kirill I, but we can see reasons for this mechanism in their interest in an “exotic” denomination rather than their desire to learn about the Eastern Churches.

When we look for the basis of the respondents' orientation towards the topics discussed here, the answer is not necessarily found in the media. The results which we presented in the section focusing on secularity and impartiality show that the religious faith factor plays a significant role in understanding the legal context in which the respondents function. We are not talking about media effect here. Respondents are rather affected by many factors conditioning their life context. In this way, non-believers declare a negative view in meeting world-view impartiality based on their everyday practices. In the same way, the more faithful the respondents, the more they are convinced of state impartiality in religious matters.

In the case of this study, Schulz's postulate fails. It reveals a lack of a clear translation of religious content in the media and mediatization processes shaping this content into the awareness of media recipients. There is no way to talk about the media effect here, and we cannot make an analysis at the meso level related to transgressing the media effect. In this situation, it seems important to refer to the five dimensions of the mediatization effect proposed by Schrott (2009). This puts our previously narrow view of the mediatization effect in a new perspective.

One conclusion appears in the case of Schrott's first characteristic, known as causes and rational criteria. The cases described should become the basis for adapting to media logic. The grounded theory actually points to progress in accommodating religious and political actors to media logic. This process, however, appears in the media material, not in the reception study. We put forward interesting applications when it comes to the second of Schrott's characteristics of the mediatization effect, meaning the context defining the limits of media logic. As the reception study shows, beliefs about the secular state are the result of many unequal factors. Two of them were mentioned in the previous section. First, the religiosity of the respondents affects their attitude towards the practical side of Poland's impartiality. Second, when it comes to media, their impact is not so strong. The results of accommodating religious and political actors, to a small extent, translate into respondent knowledge in the field of the secular state.

In the third dimension, we talk about control, which triggers sanctions related to mediatization. The fear of not being covered turns out to be clearly

exaggerated here. This is not because religious and political actors are covered by the media. The knowledge of media recipients does not correspond to a significant extent with the contents submitted to them by these media. Neither the religious or political actors who are mediatized nor the media outlets are able to directly stay in the respondents' awareness. Therefore, one should forget about the need to control the media coverage. The primary task is, first and foremost, to search for formats that will make it possible for their recipients to remember media contents.

In the fourth dimension, instead of talking about the difference between topics subject to media logic and topics going beyond media logic, we should look at the contents of the media as a potential, but rarely effective source of religious imaginations. In practice, the pieces of these imaginations will remain in the minds of media recipients. The mediating potential of a given topic, therefore, only gives the possibility of its consolidation in the recipients' awareness, but no guarantee.

The last of Schrott's dimensions concerns competing institutions. What this element brings us concerns our view of religious and political institutions. The more such competing and implementing media logic, the easier it is to identify with one of these logics. As the grounded theory results showed, this process takes place clearly more easily for political actors than for religious actors. From the perspective of the reception study, it is still of little importance. Religious issue coverage is not so frequent as to have an effect on the audience.

So how do we disclose the mediatization effect? Looking for the right ways to understand this phenomenon, the first thing that remains for us to do is to confirm our inability to observe the direct media effect. The mediatization effect must be incorporated into the non-mediacentric perspective. It does not simply concern the possibility of media logic working. On the contrary, media logic works in the background of other social logics. However, a detailed description of the dependence of these processes requires a study which this time will treat the media variable as one of many, not the dominant perspective.

Conclusion: Church-state issues seen through the prism of the mediatization theory

“Through history, human beings have used prayer and sacrifice to lay their concerns before their gods. Messages have come from the divine, or been presumed to come by way of oracles and written texts. Once received, those messages were passed down to others. In the West, more than elsewhere, it became religiously obligatory to communicate God’s messages to a wider public. Unlike the religions of antiquity from which they emerged, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam made religious knowledge inseparable from religious observance” (Silk, 1995, pp. 3–4).

“In response, we added a third strand, the ‘secular sacred’ (with its attendant categories and subcategories), in order to reflect changes in the ideological, philosophical, ritual and experiential landscape, and to recognize that there is much that is valued in the lives of non-religious people and in the secular sphere that is powerfully significant and meaningful, deeply-held and non-negotiable, as well as a source of personal and social identity” (Knott et al., 2013b: 176).

This paradoxical juxtaposition of two very different fragments of work on the subject of media and secularity fundamentally reflects the content of this book. We are moving about in the area of massively distributed topics about God and religion when touching upon the public side of religion. We also point to its mediatization. At the same time, we realize that secularity is hidden somewhere in the nooks and crannies of this analysis, as a value with a clear and rich meaning. In this final part of the book, it is time to return to the previous theory in the light of the current results.

Poland’s way of creating an endorsed Church

The Butterfly-man mentioned at the beginning does not have an easy task. His occasional activity takes place with marked tension. From the legal perspective, the Butterfly-man disturbs the social scene and religious worship events. From the position of the believer, the Butterfly-man commits blasphemy. He interrupts and ridicules the public worship of Corpus Christi. In the eyes of the opponents of religion in public space, the Butterfly-man performs an act of heroic disruption of worship, which should take place in a church.

When we ask why the Butterfly-man represents a bad agency, we must return to the first two questions that we set at the beginning of the book: Q1 – Does and to what extent does the case of Poland fit into the category of a secular state?

Q2 – What does the practice of Church-state relations look like? The answer to both questions turns out to be quite complex. Looking at the divisions of countries in the key of Church-state relationships, we like Neuberger's (1999) model of the endorsed Church. However, the Polish case has its own specific features.

Earlier, we pointed to the transition towards separation outlined in the 1989 Act to the impartiality of the state's worldview on religion present in later legislation and the 1997 Constitution. The media's report on the presidential center during the case of Archbishop Wielgus showed the essential element of this commitment. The state wants to be in a relationship with religion for symbolic purposes. In this way, it maintains control over the society's deep belief in the Catholic Church's fusion with the nation.

This symbolic value of the relationship between the state and the nation turns out to be profitable for both the government and the Church. The analysis shows that it was easier for the government, regardless of whether politicians represented the right-wing or left-wing option, to implement their programs when they cooperated with the Church. Of course, it had a price to pay. The left has opened up to working side by side with the Church. At the same time, by upholding anti-clerical slogans, it lost its credibility. The material from the analysis shows that after 2010, the appeal of any party to the radical postulates of secularization caused more losses than gains.

When we return to Casanova's three levels of public religion, several conclusions are drawn. At the state policy level, the accommodation of religion and freedom of religion in Poland is characterized by a large kindness of the state visible in its care for public worship, free days granted for worshippers of particular religions during their holidays and ensuring religious education. There is no doubt, however, that the constitutional provision on the agreement with the Vatican has ensured the symbolic primacy of the Catholic Church in the midst of all religions and denominations. This brings the nation considerable profit. In many cases, when combining ecclesiastical and state celebrations, the state plays the role of a host.

At society's political level, it can be seen that in the case of clearly religious events, the state also shows its agency. This is illustrated by Aleksander Kwaśniewski's mentioned involvement in the organization of the Eucharistic Congress in Wrocław, or the use of the Royal Castle in Warsaw for the visit of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow when signing the contract between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Polish Bishops' Conference. The Polish case proves that the endorsed Church model results from the state's utilitarian attitude towards religion. State institutions as well as individual and collective political actors implement the assumptions of this model hoping to function in the

context of the merger of religion and the nation. Therefore, they are motivated by political goals and not by thinking in religious terms.

This also translates onto the level of civil society. Here, social activities take place that are aimed at strengthening the position of individual religious agents clearly related to politics. Earlier, when discussing the issue of Radio Maryja and its director, Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, we pointed to the ease with which this figure uses the support and connections of right-wing politicians. As can be seen in another work (Guzek, 2016a), this results from the wrong but strong conviction of politicians that there exists a crowd of voters behind Rydzyk's station.

The Polish context experienced numerous religious and political events in the analyzed twenty-five years. These moments offered evidence of the very clear relationship between the realm of religion and the realm of the nation. However, the frequency of portraying the secular state in the media has increased in recent years. They show the incoherence of signs of a secular state model practically implemented in Poland's endorsement of the Church.

The characteristics of the ideal secular state by Małajny (2013) included freedom of worship or the denial of religion. It relies on the fact that the state itself does not show signs of being a religious institution, but it does not prevent institutional religions from acting in the public sphere. Comparing this feature with the discussed case, we can see that the state, despite declaring impartiality, is committed to helping those citizens who want to pursue religious practices, including their presence in the public sphere. The state pays for their religious education in school, provides free days to celebrate holidays, and allows for the implementation of important public events connected with religious worship, for example, by starting state ceremonies with the Mass. Finally, it makes the Sejm's tribunal available to representatives of world religions.

The next paradox means that in the assumptions of Poland's state impartiality, settling worldview disputes also concerns the treatment of all citizens. Equality at the individual level, however, does not translate into institutional equality. Everything that we have shown so far proves that the Catholic Church remains the basic partner in dialogues with the state. When the state undertakes an intervention concerning religion, it deals with problematic issues on par with this Church. Other communities play a secondary role for the state.

What strikes when analyzing the case of Archbishop Wielgus is the clear attitude of the state towards occupying the vacancy of the Archbishop of Warsaw. Asking the question about why exactly the state is involved in this results in a complex answer. Among the foundations – according to Grzymała-Busse (2015) – that foster the fusion of religion and the nation, she pointed to education, comparisons with the past, and national rhetoric in a seemingly religious

context. In the analyzed data, it seems difficult to find such a strategy in relation to catechetical religious lessons and comparisons with the past. State participation in religious events, as a whole, permeates the state's respect for the Catholic tradition. This occurs both in our approach to the cross and in approving the concordat. As a result, this also appears in audience reception.

In this environment, the dissonance of the position of nones appears. We are talking about the context of articulating secular state postulates. Both the numerous messages in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, as well as the statements of the leaders of leftist parties, proved that they are interested in the position of non-believers in a society dominated by the primacy of Catholicism. *Gazeta Wyborcza* has repeatedly used the argument of discrimination against nones. Is the image of *Gazeta Wyborcza* correct, according to which nones remain in a lost position within the endorsed Church? The legal system provides them with freedom of belief and freedom in their lack of religious convictions. They cannot, however, request accommodating to a similar degree as the institutional religions. For example, the state does not recognize humanistic weddings. In the environment of the dominant majority of the population that belongs to the Catholic Church, their attitude towards the Church in the public sphere is rather a silence matter. Therefore, it is impossible to speak here about full freedom for all citizens. The majority religion imposes solutions on minorities.

Shaping the concepts

This book did not run out of tiring work on tracing the mediatization of religion and politics. Looking at how individual theoretical concepts worked in this analysis, we come to a series of conclusions in the area of the theory of mediatization. When we look at the theory being built from the perspective of the mechanisms of institutional mediatization, there will be conclusions about the adaptation of political and religious actors to the logic of the media. Specifically, the first years of the analysis indicated that political actors do not work according to the game plan. Their agency seems to clearly disregard media logic. However, this trend is changing.

The mediatization we introduced in terms of Hjarvard's (2008b) views assumed that society would be dependent on the media and its media logic. The media as social institutions are integrated into the operations of other social institutions. As a result, social institutions "take place via the media" (Hjarvard, 2008b: 113). We must remember that the autonomy of media institutions depends on systemic conditions. The results of this project show that it boils down to shifting the accent from the dominance of media logic in society to dominance among the

analyzed political and religious actors. While the process of learning the rules of media logic by these actors is clearly visible, this is also the reason for the lack of transferring their mediated agency onto media recipients. Therefore, if we want to identify the *modus operandi* of the mediatization process, we must look at the agencies of individual and collective religious actors.

Mediatization, as Krotz (2009) suggested, boiled down to “the changes in how people communicate when constructing their inner and exterior realities by referring to media.” In this study, its intuition also finds partial confirmation. When we talk about changes, it’s all about how the main actors covered by the media work and build their image in relation to the media. Here, we can see the fundamental difference between media mediation and media mediatization. The former focuses on a more or less independent coverage of interesting issues. In the case of mediatization, a clear change takes place in potentially covered actors. Their reflexive movement is nothing other than adjusting to the logic of the media in order to be covered.

When Kent Asp (1990) specifies that this is an adaptation to the various limitations and formats imposed by the media, we ought to specify which of them we are dealing with. Analyzing the mediatization of the secular state, we argue that depending on whether we are dealing with religious or political actors, the instrumentation changes. We will refer to the specifics of the mediation of these two groups of agents more broadly in the following section. At this stage, however, we would like to emphasize that this adaptation has many variants. Within one institution exists the possibility of the dominant majority of its actors functioning according to the key of media logic. This does not mean that there is no margin in which some of these actors do not include media logic in their public agency. We can see it based on the example of the professionalization of the Polish Bishops’ Conference and the simultaneous agency of the controversial Archbishop Józef Michalik from Lublin.

When we stated that the analyzed issue had to be captured for establishing the position of the theory of middle rank, two things became problematic. The first concerned the coexistence of many logics. Indeed, this grounded theory points to the mixing of media logic and political logic in the case of actors covered by the media. In addition, the material from the social reception survey indicates the existence of a religious factor in the approach to state secularity. This seems to significantly reflect the general trend in Poland (CBOS, 1994a; CBOS, 2013; CBOS, 2015a; CBOS, 2015b).

The second problematic issue is concerned with the accuracy of the adopted perspective. The question is whether mediatization seen as the middle range theory suits the empirical analysis. The answer is enthusiastic and positive. As

the study shows, relying on a qualitative analysis of the agency of individual actors and institutions provides the basis for revealing the mechanisms of institutional mediatization. A look at media recipients in this perspective also easily illustrates that the mediatization effect does not translate into a simple media effect. In this case, the change mostly affects religious and political actors rather than the media's audience.

As we mentioned in the first chapter, our view on the logic of the media takes into account its entanglement with the political and economic spheres. This applies to the media characteristic of semi-independent media institutions, which, according to Mark Ørsten (2004), are based on media ideology and media logic. In this summary, our attention is particularly drawn to the media ideology argument. In the analyzed media, it slightly emerged in the distanced and favoring perspective of the Catholic approach of *Rzeczpospolita*. In this book, we have barely mentioned this theme, focusing the reader's attention on the more explicit agency of *Gazeta Wyborcza* regarding the coverage of nones.

What conclusions does the analysis of the coverage of nones in *Gazeta Wyborcza* provide us with? First, the ideology of the newspaper translated into its editorial policy to expose a small part of society, or the nones, showing how the media and political logic get intertwined in social practice. On the one hand, the coverage of this marginalized group fits in well with the newsworthiness principles present in the media logic. On the other hand, the arguments for defending nones are a political manifesto in the area of the secular state. We can clearly see the political agency of this medium.

As we assumed at the beginning, the analyzed institutional mediatization has a clearly non-linear nature. This allows us to supplement the search for the causal mechanism of adaptation to the media logic at mediatized moments. Looking at the results of the grounded theory, it is easy to see the remains of the adaptation process. Does this happen just as easily with mediatization moments? The individual activities of religious and political actors are not able to provide us with specific moments in which the approach to media logic suddenly changes. When we look at the mechanism of adaptation to the logic of the media, it turns out that when referring to Hepp's (2013b) concept, instead of talking about a mediatized moment, it is better to use the term mediatized waves.

Shorter or longer periods of modernization of the approach to media logic appear on the time continuum of the adaptation process to media logic. An excellent example of such a micro-scale process is the agency of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski. In it, we can see the mediatization wave, which relies on a new way of accommodating to the media logic, next sets the trend for further individual and institutional actors.

Religious issues get mediatized

What is most characteristic of this study concerns its basic subject of analysis, meaning the agency of religious and political actors. Mia Lövheim's (2011) suggestion to analyze the role played by religious actors turns out to be extremely useful for capturing the mechanisms of the mediatization of religion. First of all, it provides us with tangible evidence for a change in the field of religion. In fact, this change means the action of religious actors. Is Günter Thomas right, however, with his thesis that religious institutions act under the influence of the media's representations of religion and are not the result of a direct causal mechanism of the media?

The results indicate three issues in the area of this theme. (1) Our study on the secular state in Polish legislation, electoral documents, and media transfers always refer to the agency of specific people or institutions. Without them, it is not worth mentioning the new regulations or strategies of action in relation to religion in the public sphere. The fact that these agents work for the sake of religious visibility in society confirms the earlier assumption that the republicization of religion is essentially its mediatization (Lövheim, 2011). (2) Religious institutions may or may not act under the influence of the media's representations of religion. When they choose the path of media visibility, adapting to media formats results from the professionalization of communicating with the environment. When they do not take this path, they appear in the media only as a result of their controversial agency as in the case of Archbishop Michalik. (3) The typical logic of the media is mixed up in religious institutions with the primacy of their values, possessions, and current political participation.

Hjarvard (2012b) lists the three forms of mediatized religion (*religious media*, *journalism on religion*, *banal religion*) that communicate religion differently in the public sphere. All of these concepts work in a specific way in this analysis. First of all, religious media should be read primarily as religious communication, which over the years has been professionalized. The Catholic Church deals with the media both through its own media but especially through its own spokespersons.

In the case of journalism on religion, mediatization of religion boils down to portrayals of religious issues, which include several characteristic media logic formats. This material is all about (1) personalization interwoven with institutionalization, (2) simplification, (3) delivering exclusivity, (4) contextualization, and (5) controversy. The first of the mentioned formats operates on a paradox. Concentration on frontmen, individual characters, goes together with emphasizing their institutional background. Simplification boils down to a simplified description of religious events and rituals and their theological significance.

Exclusivity means showing religion as the space of the hard-to-find sacred, more than an everyday life element. It perfectly reflects the coverage of Kirill of Moscow's visit to Poland. The contextualization is based on the framing of the coverage of religious issues in order to take into account a number of meanings read by a layman on one level, and on a different level by experts. This illustrates the exchange of icons revered between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Poland connected with Kirill I's visit.

Controversies around the secular state and Church-state relationship definitely belong to a separate group of media logic formats that should be mentioned. This trend is clearly mixed up with the category of banal religion. When Hjarvard mentions the mechanism of the trivialization of religious symbols, he emphasizes their zero or limited relationship with institutional religions. He also claims that the banned forms of religion maintain their religious dimension, but they lose their connection with their original symbolism.

This mentioned atmosphere of controversy is characterized by the first of the cases of the cross-banalization present in this study. Contrary to what Hjarvard claims, here the cross does not lose its original meaning, but begins to function in parallel on two plains: the religious and political. It remains on this first religious meaning of the cross, yet its function changes. This symbol of reconciliation and sacrifice now becomes a symbol of struggle and even war due to the cross (Kozub-Karkut & Głuszek-Szafraniec, 2016). On the political level, it maintains a relationship with the institutional Church. In such a relationship, however, it accepts the character of a symbol of oppression and religious domination.

Representatives of banal religion, in relation to religion classes, boil their arguments down to the depreciation of religious feelings and replacing them with economic arguments. According to this view, the tactic of referring to banal representations of religion weakens the religious dimension of catechesis. When we compare this condition with other studies on the topic of banal religion (Nybro Petersen, 2013), it turns out that this is a concept that is clearly flexible and dependent on the context of the analyzed case.

The question arises about the changes in the perception of of these banal representations of religion. The reception survey we presented earlier contradicts this possibility. In the case of Poland's strongly immersed Catholic context, the expansion of trivial forms of religion does not determine changes in the perception of religious symbols. The example of our cross-analysis unequivocally shows that regardless of the meanings of the media coverage on the cross, its primary religious significance remains stable.

Political issues get mediatized

Politics and mediatization arise from a reflection that goes in a different direction than the one connected with religion. First of all, we followed Jesper Strömbäck and Frank Esser, who claimed that mediatizing politics is a process of reactive and proactive adaptation of political actors to media logic. They want to meet the need for media visibility (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014b). In the light of this analysis, political actors took the main initiative in adapting to media logic. The grounded theory we provided did not point to the receptivity of political actors to media logic. On the contrary, they initiated a change based on a projection of benefits that could bring them media visibility.

An important element of the process which the authors referred to was mixing the process of adapting the logic of the media with political logic and differentiating them from the world of politics. Our analysis did not expose the last of these features. In exchange, the interweaving of the logic of the media and political logic acquired a clear meaning. In the material described, however, the first one took primacy. Political actors, to a great extent, followed the rules of media logic. In rare cases, they referred to the primacy of political criteria. This is illustrated by the already mentioned example of the agency of President Kwaśniewski.

Strömbäck and Esser's (2014b) distinction in the framework of political logic on *polity*, *policy*, and *politics* did not fully function in this study. Policies treated in terms of principles regulating the political process did not reflect the mechanisms of mediatization presented here. The policy based on defining problems, forming them, and introducing them into the institutional framework appeared in the petrifying positions of left-wing parties in favor of a secular state. The mechanism here basically consisted in confronting political parties with the context of the endorsed Church. This tactic boiled down to exposing the Church's omnipotence. In the case of politics, however, it was about clearly focusing on the leaders of political parties and gaining support for the demands they made. This was especially visible at the end of the campaign, when PO leaders used anti-clerical discourse to win leftist votes.

Distinguishing the mediatization of politics from the previously presented mediatization of religion concerns the presence of other elements of media logic. In the case of political issues, media logic is primarily a dictate of the four basic mechanisms for shaping contents and formats: (1) leadership, (2) controversy, (3) confrontation, (4) professionalization.

The repeatedly invoked figure of Aleksander Kwaśniewski reflects the need for a political leader who has a clear image. In the case of the former president,

this was about competence and a dialogical rather than an offensive attitude. The next element boiled down to a series of controversial postulates regarding the concordat. It also illustrates the mechanism of confrontation. As can be seen in the contents of the sixth chapter, SLD's leader Grzegorz Napieralski placed himself in opposition to the fusion of religion and the nation. This gave him a short-lived effect in the form of visibility in the media. In the case of professionalization, we are primarily concerned with the development of the institution of the party's advocate, which accepts the role of a frontman or scapegoat in crisis situations.

Insight into the mediation of the secular state

At the end of this book, let's gather the existing insights in the field of the secular state and Church-state relations in response to the rest of the research questions asked. The book's contents show a balance between the initial results of the mediation analysis of the issues (chapter five) and their subsequent mediatization (chapter six). Thus, when facing question Q3 about the shape of the media representation of the secular state and Church-state relations, we are heading towards the coverage of the political or religious actors and traces of religious visibility in the media. The actors in question are essentially individuals and institutions. As demonstrated by the subsequent qualitative analysis, there is a form of centralized personalization here (Patterson, 1994), confirmed in other studies on the contents of the media in Poland (M. Mazur, 2014). Its basis is the mechanism by which individual political actors give in to party leaders and their spokespersons. The same applies to most religious institutions.

When answering question Q4, we are able to confirm the existence of an institutional form of mediatization in relation to the secular state and the relations between the Church and the state. This process takes place primarily on the level of political and religious actors who in their group's typical way adopt media logic. Three issues need to be emphasized here. The actors themselves design the media's potential behaviors. Their accommodation is therefore an intuitive process. It involves learning and clearly occurs in connection with other types of logic, such as political logic.

Second, as we can see, over time, the media coverage of the secular state narrows the perspective of our view of the problem to the model of pure separation. One can see the clear success of accommodating leftist parties to the formats and principles of the media. Third, this process is not sufficient in the face of significant non-media factors shaping the recipients. We are moving here towards a negative answer to question Q5, about how the reception of the

discussed mediatization takes place in society. It turns out that the mutual coupling between political and religious actors on the one hand and the media on the other remains far from the viewpoints of viewers and readers. Specifically, the respondents' opinions lack reflections on the process of mediatization in a secular state.

At the beginning of the book, we juxtaposed opposing quotes from the media involved in the coverage of religious issues and the media presenting the coverage of the secular sacred to the reader. This double-voice led the reader to reflect on the phenomena of secularization and desecularization. We recalled Casanova's supposition that the process of secularization may have not directly resulted from modernization but from a historical choice. We would like to perceive Poland in such categories. As a country whose modernization does not entail radical secularization, we simply choose political and religious actors to balance the fusion of the nation and religion that are continually divided by society.

Secularization in its various types can, therefore, calmly proceed at the individual level until society itself fails to overcome the consensus on the fusion of religion and the nation. In the distant future, the reversal of the mechanism mentioned by Christopher Marsh (2011) will have to be considered. According to its dynamics, at the moment of the departure of society from the fusion of the nation and religion, there should occur the spontaneous process of secularization, which in the present case would boil down to a marked acceleration of the privatization of religion (Borowik, 2010).

Appendix

Fig. A.1: Coding list of categories for the content analysis

Political actors:

Adam Strzembosz; Aleksander Bentkowski; Aleksander Kwaśniewski; Aleksander Małachowski; Aleksandra Jakubowska; Alicja Grzeškowiak; Andrzej Balicki; Andrzej Olechowski; Andrzej Stelmachowski; Anna Komorowska; Anna Sobecka; Antoni Macierewicz; Armand Ryfiński; Artur Dębski; Beata Mazurek; Bogdan Borusewicz; Bogdan Klich; Bolesław Piecha; Bronisław Geremek; Bronisław Komorowski; Dariusz Rosati; Donald Tusk; Ewa Kopacz; Grzegorz Schetyna; Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz; Hanna Suchocka; Izabela Sierakowska; Jacek Kuroń; Jacek Rostowski; Jacek Sasin; Jadwiga Wiśniewska; Jan Jankiewicz; Jan Krzysztof Bielecki; Jan Olszewski; Janusz Kurtyka; Janusz Palikot; Janusz Piechociński; Jarosław Gowin; Jarosław Kaczyński; Jerzy Buzek; Jerzy Jaskiernia; Jerzy Szmajdziński; Jerzy Wenderlich; Joanna Senyszyn; Jolanta Szczypińska; Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz; Józef Oleksy; Józef Zych; Krzysztof Janik; Krzysztof Skubiszewski; Lech Kaczyński; Lech Wałęsa; Longin Pastusiak; Marek Borowski; Marek Kuchciński; Marek Siwiec; Maria Kaczyńska; Marian Krzaklewski; Mariusz Błaszczak; Michał Boni; Michał Kamiński; Paweł Graś; Paweł Zalewski; Piotr Ikonowicz; Przemysław Gosiewski; Radosław Sikorski; Roman Giertych; Roman Jagieliński; Ryszard Bugaj; Ryszard Czarnecki; Ryszard Kaczorowski; Ryszard Kalisz; Stanisław Żelichowski; Stefan Niesiołowski; Tadeusz Iwiński; Tadeusz Mazowiecki; Tomasz Kalita; Waldemar Pawlak; Władysław Bartoszewski; Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz; Wojciech Olejniczak; Zbigniew Bujak; Zbigniew Siemiątkowski; Zbigniew Wassermann; Zofia Kuratowska.

Religious actors:

Archbishop Konrad Krajewski; Archbishop Wiktor Skworc; Archbishop Celestino Migliore; Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk; Archbishop Józef Michalik; Archbishop Józef Życiński; Archbishop Sawa; Archbishop Sławoj Leszek Głódz; Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki; Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski; Bishop Jan Chrapek; Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek; Cardinal Angelo Sodano; Cardinal Franciszek Macharski; Cardinal Józef Glemp; Cardinal Kazimierz Nycz; Dalai Lama; Father Tadeusz Rydzyk; Patriarch Bartholomew I; Patriarch Kirill; Pope Benedict XVI; Pope Francis; Pope John Paul II; Reverend Remigiusz Sobański; Reverend Józef Kloch.

Other social actors:

Adam Michnik; Ewa Łętowska.

Religious denominations:

Adventists; Catholic Church; Churches (in general, in Poland); Lutheran Church; Orthodox Church.

Groups of believers:

Greek Catholics; Non-believers; Orthodox; Roman Catholics.

(continued on next page)

Fig. A.1: Continued**Religious institutions:**

Apostolic Nunciature; John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; Military Ordinariate of the Polish Army; Polish Bishops' Conference; Pontifical Academy of Theology in Cracow; Radio Maryja; The Cracow Curia; The Holy See/Vatican; The Katowice Curia.

State and political institutions:

Constitutional Tribunal; Government; Joint Committee of the Church and the State; The Sejm and deputies; The Senate and senators.

Public visibility of religion:

Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarność" (AWS) – Solidarity Electoral Action; Bartholomew I in the Sejm; Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform (BBWR) – Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms; Bishops on social issues; Chaplains in the army and hospitals; Dalai Lama visits the president and prime minister; John Paul II in the parliament; Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (KPN) – Confederation of Independent Poland; Lewica i Demokraci (LiD) – Left and Democrats; Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) – League of Polish Families; Lustration of Archbishop Wielgus; NSZZ "Solidarność" – Solidarity Trade Union; Patriarch Kirill at Belweder Palace; Platforma Obywatelska (PO) – Citizen's Platform; Political parties; Polska Jest Najważniejsza (PJN) – Poland is most important; Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS) – Poland's Socialist Party; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) – Poland's Peasants Party; Porozumienie Centrum (PC) – Citizen's Central Agreement; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) – Law and Justice; Priests in the public sphere; Reconciliation between the Polish and Russian Churches; Ruch Palikota – Palikot's Movement; Samoobrona RP – Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland; Smolensk crash; Socjaldemokracja Polska (SDPL) – Social Democracy of Poland; Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SDRP) – Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland; Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) – Democratic Left Alliance; Sexual molestation case for Archbishop Paetz; Teachers of religion and religion in school; Unia Polityki Realnej (UPR) – Real Politics Union; Unia Pracy (UP) – Labour Union; Unia Wolności (UW) – Freedom Union; Church celebrations with the participation of politicians (not in authority); Church celebrations with the participation of the authorities; State celebrations with the participation of representatives of Churches; Joint Church and state celebrations; Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (ZChN) – Christian National Union.

Symbols:

Altar; Polish emblem; The cross; The preamble to the constitution; Wawel Royal Castle in Cracow.

Church-State Relationships:

Church and government consultations; Church criticizes representatives of the government and the ruling party; Church negotiations with the state; Church-state compromise; Concordat; Constitution; Interpretation of common Church-state arrangements; Laws and policies on religion; Meetings with the president; Opposition criticizes the Church; Opposition criticizes the government on matters of religion; Parliamentary interpellation on matters of religion; Provisions issued to the Church; Representatives of the state and the ruling party criticize the Church.

Fig. A.1: Continued

Types of Church-state relations:

Autonomy of Church and state; Church's neutrality towards the state; Secular state; Secularism (generally); Separation of Church and state; State ideological neutrality; State impartiality.

Controversies:

Abortion; Catholic Church finances; Church financed by the state; Equality of religions; In-vitro fertilization; Land transferred to the Church; Support for free Tibet.

Fig. A.2: Coding list of the initial coding in grounded theory

No	Code
1	Attacking the Church
2	Stressing the Catholic traditions of the nation
3	Church involvement in the issue of sexual education lessons
4	The Church's involvement in the administrative reform of the country
5	Engaging the faithful in the work on the constitution
6	Appealing to local governments
7	Articulating the Church's readiness to fight the authorities
8	The Church's articulation of readiness to end the fight against the authorities
9	Authorizing the government to be ready to agree with the Church
10	The Church attacking the state
11	Defending the secularity of the state
12	Celebrating the concordat
13	National mourning celebration at Jasna Góra
14	Celebrating national mourning in the Vatican
15	Withdrawing the concordat
16	Withdrawing religion from schools
17	Striving to remove the Church from public life
18	Decisions of authorities on religion (except for participation in religious rituals)
19	Defining secularization
20	Declarations of political parties against the ratification of the concordat
21	Declarations of political parties on religious invocation
22	Declarations of political parties for the signed concordat
23	Declarations of individual politicians against the ratification of the concordat
24	Declarations by individual politicians regarding the ratification of the concordat
25	The Pope declaring support for integration with the EU
26	The disapproval of the clergy's commitment to politics
27	Demand for the enthronement of Christ as the King of Poland
28	Demand for respect for the autonomy of the Church
29	Discrimination of atheists
30	Discrimination of the Church
31	Discussing the state of work on the concordat
32	Discussing power with non-Catholic exiles
33	Distancing society from the Church in public life
34	Actions of minority Churches
35	Anti-clerical action
36	The activity of apostates
37	The action of Nuncio Kowalczyk regarding the concordat

Fig. A.2: Continued

No	Code
38	Pope's action in the process of signing the concordat
39	The president's action regarding the return of Church property
40	Government action on the ratification of the concordat
41	Government action on the return of Church property
42	Exhibiting the cross
43	Church financing from the budget
44	Trading with the Church
45	The Church intruding in politics and legal matters
46	Radio Maryja intruding into the political sphere
47	Interrogation of authorities regarding Church property
48	Instrumentalizing the cross
49	Intervening in the matter of Radio Maryja
50	The intervention of the authorities in the Wielgus case
51	Commenting on the results of the elections by the Church
52	Confronting the case of Archbishop Wielgus
53	Co-operation costs
54	Criticizing the government for signing the concordat
55	Questioning religious symbols in public places
56	Combining abortion and the concordat
57	Praying
58	Prayer before the Smolensk cross
59	Insisting the Vatican ratify the concordat
60	Stigmatizing the Church
61	Violating the principles of freedom of conscience and religion
62	Imposing religious duties by the state
63	Calling Poland a religious state
64	Non-Catholic Churches negotiating their position
65	The Catholic Church negotiating its position
66	Negating the impartiality of the state's worldview
67	Not provoking the Church
68	Not seeking support for the constitution draft in the Episcopate
69	Fearing Poland's atheization
70	Fearing the domination of one religion and worldview
71	Fearing the growth of the Church's position
72	Postponing the ratification of the concordat
73	Rejecting the idea of a religious state
74	Rejecting the concordat as a way to marginalize Catholics

(continued on next page)

Fig. A.2: Continued

No	Code
75	Determining the position of religion in school
76	Identifying the essence of the concordat
77	Defining the essence of contracts with Churches (excluding the concordat)
78	The term Polish model concordat
79	The ratification of the concordat by the Commissioner for Human Rights
80	Emphasizing the role of John Paul II
81	Emphasizing support of the radical right by individual bishops
82	Emphasizing the state's great sins against the Church
83	Signing the concordat
84	Signing the concordat means social stability
85	Signing laws with other religions
86	Support for cooperation by John Paul II
87	Social support for the concordat
88	Social support for the Church
89	The Catholic Church supporting a party
90	The Sejm supporting the ratification of the concordat
91	Postulating the secular state
92	Postulating taxation of priests
93	The Church postulating the prohibition of abortion
94	Postulating non-Catholic statutes as a concordat by non-Catholic denominations
95	Postulating the separation of Church and state
96	Postulating the separation of state and religion
97	Postulating a secular state
98	Postulating Three Kings as a national holiday
99	Linking the concordat with state interests
100	Presenting Christian assumptions in the constitution
101	Problematizing religious vigils
102	Proceeding with the concordat
103	Proposing autonomy and independence
104	Proposing the liquidation of the Church fund
105	Proposing the liquidation of the concordat
106	Proposing the ideological neutrality of the state
107	Proposing the removal of the cross from the Sejm
108	The proposal of the impartiality of the state in world-view matters
109	Protesting against the cross
110	Social protests against the Church
111	Privatizing religion in private schools

Fig. A.2: Continued

No	Code
112	Papal speeches in the parliament
113	Bartholomew I speaking in the parliament
114	Bartholomew I speaking in the Sejm
115	The Dalai Lama speaking in the parliament
116	Transfer of the Smolensk cross
117	Compliance with the concordat
118	Anticipating the date of signing the concordat
119	The adoption of the concordat means the independence of the Church from the moods of the state
120	Accepting a concordat means limiting state policy
121	Assigning the role of religion
122	Restoring the Church-state bond
123	Granting the Church privileges
124	Ratification of the concordat as an introduction to a religious denomination
125	Ratification of the concordat by John Paul II
126	Ratification of the concordat by the president
127	Renegotiation of the concordat
128	Respecting the independence and autonomy of the state and the Church
129	Resignation from religion classes
130	Understanding cooperation
131	Understanding the secular state
132	Benedict XVI's condolence to the family of Prof. Geremek
133	Conflict on the nature of education in schools
134	Conflicts on the place of ethics in schools
135	Bartholomew I meets the parliament
136	Bartholomew I meets the president
137	Kirill meets the president
138	The meeting between the Dalai Lama and politicians
139	The Dalai Lama's meeting in the parliament
140	The Dalai Lama's meeting with the president
141	The meeting of John Paul II with the parliament
142	The meeting of representatives of the Church and the authorities
143	The meeting of representatives of the opposition and the Church
144	Opposing the concordat
145	Church opposition to the provisions of the Constitution on the secularity of the state
146	Church opposition to same-sex unions

(continued on next page)

Fig. A.2: Continued

No	Code
147	Opposition of politicians to same-sex unions
148	Opposition to the separation of Church and state
149	Opposing the secularity of schools
150	Opposing reliefs for Churches
151	Tensions between the Church and state
152	Battling against Catholicism
153	Treating the (Polish) Church as a national symbol
154	Treating Catholics as second-class citizens
155	Treating the concordat as a bargaining chip with the Church
156	Treating the cross as a political problem, not a religious one
157	Treating representatives of the Church as politicians
158	Churches appealing for the return of their property
159	Participation of ministers in secular events
160	A politician participating in a religious event
161	The president participating in the mass
162	Government representative going to the Vatican
163	The Pope gives an audience to a representative of Poland's authorities
164	The Pope gives an audience to a representative of the Polish government
165	Disclosure of data
166	Stabilizing the Church's position with a concordat
167	Determining the level of the Church-state relationship
168	The president's position on the Dalai Lama's visit
169	Removing crosses
170	Maintaining good relations with the Catholic Church
171	Establishing a committee for editing the concordat
172	The authentication of changes in Poland according to the concordat
173	The coalition is addicted to criticizing the concordat
174	Reconciliation of constitutional provisions regarding the Churches
175	Recognizing the concordat as a reference point for other religions
176	Using the term "Real Poles"
177	Fighting for the cross
178	Fighting with the cross
179	Entry into force of the concordat
180	Introducing legal protection for atheists
181	Indicating the inequality of religions
182	Indicating the equality of denominations
183	Indicating the social role of the Church

Fig. A.2: Continued

No	Code
184	Pointing to the equality of denominations
185	Pointing to doubts about the concordat
186	Showing that the state is also for non-believers
187	Cooperation between the Church and Solidarity
188	Suspending abortion laws for fear of the Church
189	Explaining the slow pace of work on the concordat
190	Explaining that the left are not atheists
191	Explaining the Church's tax obligations
192	Showing allergies to Catholicism
193	Using solutions from the concordat for other denominations
194	Listing topics from the secular state
195	Speaking against politicians (by bishops or people of the Church)
196	Developing the understanding of secularity
197	Developing the understanding of neutrality
198	Developing an understanding of secularity
199	The Tribunal's statement on Church matters
200	Drawing a common path for the state and the Church
201	Bringing the bishop to court
202	The Vatican's acceptance of the concordat
203	Catholic Church involvement in work on the constitution
204	Catholic Church involvement in work on changes in the constitution
205	Involvement of the Catholic Church in work on social support for the police
206	Involvement of the Catholic Church about in-vitro regulations
207	The Church speaking out on education
208	Asking questions about the place of the Church in a pluralistic society
209	Instigating religious events in the public sphere
210	Announcing the examination of the constitutionality of the concordat
211	Accusing the authorities of conspiracy with a clergyman
212	Boycotting work on the bill for the ratification of the concordat
213	Insulting the cross
214	Drawing attention to the secularity of a building used for religious purposes

Fig. A.3: Survey questionnaire on the social reception studies

Dear Sir/Madam,

The Institute of Political Science and Journalism of the University of Silesia is carrying out a research project led by Dr. Damian Guzek entitled *Media towards the idea of a secular state*, financed by the National Science Center (grant no.: 2014/15/N/HS5/00646). The project addresses the problem of the media representing the idea of a secular state. The following questionnaire is part of this project and aims to identify the level of correspondence between the respondents' knowledge and media coverage on the idea of a secular state.

You have been selected from among the residents of Poland to take part in this survey. I am asking for honest and comprehensive answers to the interviewer's questions, since only such statements are valuable. The survey is anonymous and the answers will be used to compile collective statistical data.

Thank you for your participation in the research.

1. Does political power in Poland conduct a dialogue with religious denominations other than the Catholic Church?
 - Yes
 - No
 - I don't know
 2. Can Churches and religious associations apply to the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland?
 - Yes
 - No
 - I don't know
 3. Please indicate (any number of answers) which of the following religious leaders visited the Polish parliament:
 - Pope John Paul II
 - Bartholomew I (Patriarch of Constantinople and spiritual head of world Orthodoxy)
 - Kirill (Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia)
 - The Dalai Lama
 - None
 - I do not know
 4. Do you think Poland is a country in which religious freedom is respected, meaning the right of a citizen to profess a chosen religion?
 - Definitely yes
 - Rather yes
 - Probably not
 - Definitely not
 - Hard to say
 5. Do you think Poland is a country in which the constitutional principle of state impartiality in matters of religious beliefs is implemented?
 - Definitely yes
 - Rather yes
-

Fig. A.3: Continued

-
- Probably not
 - Definitely not
 - Hard to say
6. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 1989 the Catholic Church firmly negotiated its position in the democratic state system?
 - Definitely yes
 - Rather yes
 - Probably not
 - Definitely not
 - Hard to say
 7. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 1989, the Catholic Church repeatedly interfered in politics and law-making issues?
 - Definitely yes
 - Rather yes
 - Probably not
 - Definitely not
 - Hard to say
 8. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 1989, the state repeatedly interfered in the organization and life of the Catholic Church?
 - Definitely yes
 - Rather yes
 - Probably not
 - Definitely not
 - Hard to say
 9. How do you think the cross should be treated in Poland? (any number of answers)
 - As a religious symbol
 - As a symbol that testifies to the Catholic tradition of the nation
 - As a symbol of opposition to the PRL system
 - As a symbol of the Smolensk tragedy
 - Hard to say
 10. How do you think the participation of state representatives in religious events should be treated? (any number of answers)
 - As an expression of cooperation between the state and Churches
 - As an element emphasizing shared values and traditions
 - As proof of breaking the principle of state secularism
 - As proof of the influence of religion on state institutions
 - Hard to say
-

(continued on next page)

Fig. A.3: Continued

-
11. Please indicate which of the following statements you consider to be an expression of implementing the postulate of a secular state? (any number of answers)
- The withdrawal of religion from schools
 - Liberalizing the abortion law
 - Liquidating the Church fund
 - Removal of religious symbols from public places
 - Breaking the concordat
 - None
 - Hard to say
12. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 1989 there were clear frictions between state authorities and the Catholic Church?
- Definitely yes
 - Rather yes
 - Probably not
 - Definitely not
 - Hard to say
13. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 1989, state agreements with the Catholic Church were clearly made?
- Definitely yes
 - Rather yes
 - Probably not
 - Definitely not
 - Hard to say
- This part is dedicated to how you use media.**
14. Please indicate the sources (any number of answers) from which you receive information about the secular state:
- Conversations with other people
 - Press
 - Internet
 - Social media
 - Radio
 - Church – sermons and parish announcements
 - TV
 - Other
 - None of the above → go to number 16.
15. Please indicate the main source from which you receive information about the secular state:
- Conversations with other people
 - Press
-

Fig. A.3: Continued

-
- Internet
 - Social media
 - Radio
 - Church – sermons and parish announcements
 - TV
 - Other (which ones?)
 - Difficult to say
16. Please indicate the main source from which you get information out about the postulate of breaking the concordat:
- Conversations with other people
 - Press
 - Internet
 - Social media
 - Radio
 - Church – sermons and parish announcements
 - TV
 - Other
 - Difficult to say
17. Please indicate which opinion about the concordat you hear most often?
- The concordat restores the Church-state bond
 - The concordat introduces the denominational state
 - The concordat protects the Church against excessive state influence
 - The concordat protects the state from excessive Church influence
 - None of the above → go to number 19
18. Please indicate the main source you based your opinion on:
- Conversations with other people
 - Press
 - Internet
 - Social media
 - Radio
 - Church – sermons and parish announcements
 - TV
 - Other
19. Which thesis about the secularity of the Polish state do you hear most often?
- It is necessary to defend state secularity
 - There is no fear of maintaining state secularism
 - The secular state is fictional
 - None of the above → go to number 21
-

(continued on next page)

Fig. A.3: Continued

20. Please indicate the main source of this thesis:

- Conversations with other people
- Press
- Internet
- Social media
- Radio
- Church – sermons and parish announcements
- TV
- Other

This part is devoted to attitudes towards the presence of religion and the Church in public space

21. In Poland, there is a discussion about the place of religion in public life. Are you against the cross being put in public buildings, for example schools or offices?

- I am against
- I am not against
- Difficult to say

22. Please state if you are against religion lessons in schools or not?

- I am against
- I am not against
- Difficult to say

23. Please state if you are or are not against the Church speaking about moral issues and customs?

- I am against
- I am not against
- Difficult to say

24. Please state whether or not you are against the Church voicing its position on the laws passed by the Sejm?

- I am against
- I am not against
- Difficult to say

25. Please state whether you are or are not against priests telling people how to vote in elections?

- I am against
- I am not against
- Difficult to say

26. Please state if you are for or against priests blessing public places and buildings?

- I am against
 - I am not against
 - Difficult to say
-

Fig. A.3: Continued

-
27. Please state whether you are for or against priests or bishops being present at state ceremonies and celebrations?
 - I am against
 - I am not against
 - Difficult to say
 28. Please state whether you are for or against state representatives being present at religious ceremonies and celebrations?
 - I am against
 - I am not against
 - Difficult to say
 29. Please state whether you are for or against the religious style of taking military oaths?
 - I am against
 - I am not against
 - Difficult to say
 30. Please state if you are for or against priests appearing on TVP?
 - I am against
 - I am not against
 - Difficult to say

This part concerns demographic and social variables and metrics

31. Please specify your gender:
 - Female
 - Male
 32. Please specify your age:
 - 18–24 years old
 - 25–34
 - 35–44
 - 45–54
 - 55–64
 - 65 and over
 33. Please indicate your place of residence:
 - Village
 - City up to 19,999 residents
 - 20,000 – 99,999
 - 100,000 – 499,999
 - 500,000 and over
 34. Please indicate your level of education:
 - Elementary/Jr. high school
 - Basic vocational
-

(continued on next page)

Fig. A.3: Continued

-
- High School
 - Higher
35. Please indicate the social and professional group that best describes you:
- Management staff, a specialist with higher education
 - Average personnel, technicians
 - Administrative and office employees
 - Service employees
 - Skilled workers
 - Unskilled workers
 - Farmers
 - Self-employed
 - Unemployed
 - Retirees
 - Pensioners
 - Students
 - Housewives
 - Another group
36. Please state your place of employment:
- State or public institution
 - State or private company
 - Non-agricultural private sector
 - Private farm
 - Other
37. Please indicate the income per person:
- Up to 649 PLN
 - From 650 to 999 PLN
 - From 1000 to 1399 PLN
 - From 1400 to 1999 PLN
 - Over 2000 PLN
 - No answer
38. Please assess your material status:
- Poor
 - Average
 - Good
 - No answer
39. Please indicate your attitude towards religious faith:
- Complete non-believer
 - Rather non-believer
-

Fig. A.3: Continued

-
- Believer
 - Deeply religious
 - No answer
40. Please indicate your confession (belonging to a Church or religious association):
- Roman Catholic Church (Catholic Church – Latin rite)
 - Orthodox Church
 - Evangelical Church of Augsburg
 - Greek Catholic Church (Catholic Church – Byzantine-Ukrainian rite)
 - Old Catholic Mariavite Church
 - Pentecostal church
 - Jehovah's Witnesses
 - Other
 - I do not belong to any religion
 - No answer
41. Please indicate how often you participate in religious practices:
- A few times a week
 - Once a week
 - 1–2 times a month
 - Several times a year
 - I do not participate in Church at all
 - No answer
42. Please indicate your level of political interest:
- High
 - Average
 - Poor
 - None
43. Please indicate your political views:
- Leftist
 - Central
 - Right-wing
 - Difficult to say
-

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