Abstract
This article shows that regulatory sanctions that fall into an intermediate range can generate subtle problems not apparent in simple enforcement models. Assuming that firms may ultimately face different noncompliance detection probabilities, we highlight that intermediate sanctions may conflict with aspects of both static and dynamic efficiency.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the very helpful suggestions received from an anonymous reviewer and the handling editor, Tobias Wenzel.
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