Abstract
The main objects below are transferable-utility games in which each agent faces an optimization problem, briefly called production planning, constrained by his resource endowment. Coalitions can pool members' resources. Such production games are here extended to accommodate uncertainty about events not known ex ante. Planning then takes the form of two-stage stochastic programming. Core solutions are sought, described, and computed via aggregate dual programs. The analysis is motivated by practical applications. Examples include stochastic production and regional distribution with random demand and supply, illustrated by a numerical example.
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Sandsmark, M. Production Games under Uncertainty. Computational Economics 14, 237–253 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008720525884
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008720525884