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A group majority voting model of public good provision

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Abstract

A model of public good provision by majority rule selection incorporating the behavior of rational group voting is formulated. Two probability maximizing candidates are assumed. If voters are risk averse in public sector preferences, then a unique symmetric (both candidates offering identical platforms) equilibrium exists. If certain additional conditions hold on the group cost functions of political support, this equilibrium will lie at the public good levels which maximizes the sum of voter utility. It is further demonstrated that it is unlikely for those conditions to be satisfied and therefore more realistic asymmetric equilibria with positive voter turnout is predicted.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Finance, Nicholls State University, P.O. Box 2015, 70310, Thibodaux, LA, USA

    R. B. Morton

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  1. R. B. Morton
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This paper is based on an essay of a dissertation submitted to Tulane University under the supervision and invaluable assistance of Steven Slutsky, Jonathan Hamilton, and William Oakland. The advice of Gerald Whitney, Michaels Johnson, and an anonymous referee is also gratefully acknowledged. All errors remain the authors.

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Morton, R.B. A group majority voting model of public good provision. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 117–131 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450994

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450994

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