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Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information

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This paper provides a theory of intertemporal pricing in a small market with differential information about the realizations of a stochastic process which determines demand. We study the sequential equilibria in stationary strategies of the stochastic game between a seller and buyer. The seller has zero cost of producing one unit of a non-durable good in all market periods. The buyer's value for the good is a random variable governed by a simple Markov process. At the beginning of each period the unit's value is determined by nature and is privately revealed to the buyer. The seller posts a single price offer each period, which the buyer either accepts or rejects. Only two types of price paths emerge in equilibrium: either prices are constant, or they have persistent cycles between a low and a high value. In both cases, however, prices are “sticky” in the sense that changes in price are less frequent than changes in the economy's fundamentals.

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We thank John Rust and Asher Wolinsky for helpful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from NSF grant SES 89-09242.

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Rustichini, A., Villamil, A.P. Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information. Econ Theory 8, 211–227 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01211814

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01211814

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