Summary
Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. In this paper, the extent of delay is studied in a dynamic,N-person, coordination game. There is no social gain from delay, so an equilibrium with delay is always inefficient. For fixedN, there is no coordination failure when the period length is short: all equilibrium outcomes converge to the Pareto efficient outcome as the period length converges to zero. On the other hand, holding period length fixed, there exist equilibria in which delay is proportional toN, for arbitrarily large values ofN. In addition, it can be shown that the possibility of delay depends on the “timing” of strategic complementarities. However, under certain conditions, delay is shown to be a robust phenomenon, in the sense that “well-behaved” equilibria exhibit infinite delay forN sufficiently large.
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This paper grew out of discussions with Christophe Chamley. While writing it I benefited from discussions with Ken Binmore, Russell Cooper, Bob Rosenthal and Michael Manove. Joe Farrell, Drew Fudenberg, Martin Hellwig and Sawoong Kang made very useful comments on an earlier version that led to substantial improvements. Helpful comments were also made by seminar participants at the London School of Economics, the SUNY at Stoney Brook, the NBER Summer Institute, Northwestern University, and the University of Chicago. I would like to thank Nick Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their editorial advice. Financial support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES 9196061.
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Gale, D. Dynamic coordination games. Econ Theory 5, 1–18 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213641
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213641