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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and International Mergers (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The formation of international mergers is examined in the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information, one when a local firm has private information on market size and the other when a foreign firm has private information on its technology. In each situation, parametric configurations are identified under which a merger offer may or may not be made. It also examines the kind of offer and the probability of its acceptance. The likelihood of a merger beingformed is also related to the basic market size, demand uncertainty, and cost uncertainty. Welfare effects of tax/subsidy policies by the host country are also analyzed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00565.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Joint Ventures versus Fully Owned Subsidiaries: Multinational Strategies in Liberalizing Economies (2001)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
    Review of international economics 9 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9396
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: As ceilings on foreign shareholdings are withdrawn during liberalization, multinationals enter through fully owned subsidiaries that compete with their own joint ventures, unless local partners permit them to raise their stakes. In a framework of quantity competition, this paper demonstrates that an entry threat is more credible when joint venture investment is reversible, the units are independently managed and the local stake is high. Further, profitability of horizontal merger between the units encourages a share reallocation, while its absence favours a new subsidiary. Under irreversible investment, the threat is less credible and both share reallocations or new subsidiaries are less likely.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00271
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