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  • Informationsversorgung  (2)
  • Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute  (2)
  • Göttingen: Ibero-Amerika-Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung
  • Heidelberg: Springer
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Publisher
  • Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute  (2)
  • Göttingen: Ibero-Amerika-Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung
  • Heidelberg: Springer
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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. We show that the answer to this question depends on the cost of information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may lead to divergence of policy platforms.
    Keywords: D72 ; ddc:330 ; information collection ; spatial voting models ; Politische Partei ; Informationsverhalten ; Informationsversorgung ; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on the incumbent party. When parties are policy motivated, they also have to be motivated to select good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate policy motivated parties than office motivated parties to collect information. However, in contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that conflict with the representative voter’s interest.
    Keywords: D72 ; ddc:330 ; political competition ; information ; polarization. ; Politische Partei ; Informationsversorgung ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
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