ALBERT

Description: Issues addressed by this program: (1) Complicated roles and responsibilities associated with multi-partner projects (2) Working relationships and communications between all organizations involved in the payload safety process (3) Consistent interpretation and implementation of safety requirements from one project to the rest (4) Consistent implementation of the Tailoring Process (5) Clearly defined NASA decision-making-authority (6) Bring Agency-wide perspective to each ElV payload project. Current process requires a Payload Safety Working Group (PSWG) for eac payload with representatives from all involved organizations.

Description: This presentation details the Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety Program in its development and plan for implementation. It is an overview of the program's policies, process and requirements.

Description: This report summarizes and highlights the activities in support of the Space Transportation using Electrodynamic Propulsion Atmospheric Ionospheric Research Small Expendable Deployer Satellite (STEP-AIRSEDS) Project for the period of May 16, 2000 through September 28, 2001. The Alpha Technology, Inc. was tasked to provide support to the MSFC (Marshall Space Flight Center) in requirements development and in verification activities. Specifically, the Alpha Technology, Inc. task was to: (1) develop and maintain the STEP-AIRSEDS Project System Requirements Database; (2) develop and maintain the STEP-AIRSEDS requirements verification definition and planning support database; (3) perform requirements flow down analysis of STEP-AIRSEDS Project System Requirements to TMTC (The Michigan Technic Corporation) Level IV Requirements; (4) provide system engineering guidance to the Project as needed; (5) provide guidance to TMTC in preparation of Level IV Requirements; and (6) provide support to STEP-AIRSEDS meetings, reviews, and telecons as needed.

Description: This slide presentation reviews the use of OVERFLOW, a flow solver, to analyze the effect of separation for a launch abort vehicle (i.e., Orion capsule) if required. Included in the presentation are views of the geometry, and the Overset grids, listing of the assumptions, the general run strategy, inputs into the Overflow solver, the required computational resources, the results of the convergence study. Charts and graphics are presented to show the results.

Description: Stardust is a comet sample return mission that successfully returned to Earth on January 15, 2006. Stardust's targeted landing area was the Utah Test and Training Range in the Northwest corner of Utah. Requirements for the risks associated with landing were levied on Stardust by the Utah Test and Training Range and NASA. This paper describes the analysis to verify that these requirements were met and and includes calculation of debris survivability, generation of landing site selection plots, and identification of keep-out zones, as well as appropriate selection of the landing site. Operationally the risk requirements were all met for both of the GOMO-GO polls, so entry was authorized.

Description: A population of recently discovered deep space objects is thought to be debris having origins from sources in the geosynchronous orbit (GEO) belt. Observations have been presented indicating that these objects have area-to-mass ratios (AMR's) of anywhere from 1's to 10's of m(exp 2)/kg, and thus would explain the observed migration of eccentricity (0.1-0.6) and inclination that distinguishes their orbital characteristics. The solar radiation perturbations on orbital period, inclination and eccentricity over a 20 year period for AMR's of 0.01, 1, 10 and 20 m(exp 2)/kg, are shown in the figures. There is a heightened interest in the international community due to the large number and small size of these objects, as they pose a hazard to active satellites operating in the vicinity of the GEO belt.

Description: The Space Shuttle Payload Information Source Compact Disk (CD) is a joint NASA and USA project to introduce Space Shuttle capabilities, payload services and accommodations, and the payload integration process. The CD will be given to new payload customers or to organizations outside of NASA considering using the Space Shuttle as a launch vehicle. The information is high-level in a visually attractive format with a voice over. The format is in a presentation style plus 360 degree views, videos, and animation. Hyperlinks are provided to connect to the Internet for updates and more detailed information on how payloads are integrated into the Space Shuttle.

Description: The Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 began an unprecedented level of effort within the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community to support the Space Shuttle Program. During the approximately six month time frame of the primary Columbia Accident Investigation Board activity, many technical disciplines were involved in a concerted effort to reconstruct the last moments of the Columbia and her crew, and understand the critical events that led to that loss. Significant contributions to the CAIB activity were made by the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community(REF CAIB) in understanding the re-entry environments that led to the propagation of an ascent foam induced wing leading edge damage to a subsequent breech of the wing spar of Columbia, and the subsequent breakup of the vehicle. A core of the NASA hypersonic aerothermodynamics team that was involved in the CAIB investigation has been combined with the United Space Alliance and Boeing Orbiter engineering team in order to position the Space Shuttle Program with a process to perform in-flight Thermal Protection System damage assessments. This damage assessment process is now part of the baselined plan for Shuttle support, and is a direct out-growth of the Columbia accident and NASAs response. Multiple re-entry aeroheating tools are involved in this damage assessment process, many of which have been developed during the Return To Flight activity. In addition, because these aeroheating tools are part of an overall damage assessment process that also involves the thermal and stress analyses community, in addition to a much broader mission support team, an integrated process for performing the damage assessment activities has been developed by the Space Shuttle Program and the Orbiter engineering community. Several subsets of activity in the Orbiter aeroheating communities support to the Return To Flight effort have been described in previous publications (CFD?, Cavity Heating? Any BLT? Grid Generation?). This work will provide a description of the integrated process utilized to perform Orbiter tile damage assessment, and in particular will seek to provide a description of the integrated aeroheating tools utilized to perform these assessments. Individual aeroheating tools will be described which provide the nominal re-entry heating environment characterization for the Orbiter, the heating environments for tile damage, heating effects due to exposed Thermal Protection System substrates, the application of Computational Fluid Dynamics for the description of tile cavity heating, and boundary layer transition prediction. This paper is meant to provide an overall view of the integrated aeroheating assessment process for tile damage assessment as one of a sequence of papers on the development of the boundary layer transition prediction capability in support of Space Shuttle Return To Flight efforts.

Description: Space-faring crews must have safe breathing air throughout their missions to ensure adequate performance and good health. Toxicological assessment of air quality depends on the standards that define acceptable air quality, measurements of pollutant levels during the flight, and reports from the crew on their in-flight perceptions of air quality. Air samples returned from ISS on flights 8A, UF2, 9A, and 11A were analyzed for trace pollutants. On average, the air during this period of operations was safe for human respiration. However, about 3 hours into the regeneration of 2 Metox canisters in the U.S. airlock on 20 February 2002 the crew reported an intolerable odor that caused them to stop the regeneration, take refuge in the Russian segment, and scrub air in the U.S. segment for 30 hours. Analytical data from grab samples taken during the incident showed that the pollutants released were characteristic of nominal air pollutants, but were present in much higher concentrations. The odors reported by the crew were due to relatively high concentrations of n-butanol, and possibly other pollutants in the mixture. Later data taken during regeneration of Metox canisters that had not been subject to long-term flows showed minimal effects on air quality. Long-term trending data suggest that a disruption in atmospheric mixing between the Service Module and the U.S. Laboratory has occurred and that formaldehyde concentrations are gradually increasing in the U.S. Laboratory. Trending data also show that the releases of octafluoropropane (OFP) have subsided.