ISSN:
1573-6938
Keywords:
mechanism design
;
auctions
;
scheduling
;
C92
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract This is an investigation into the design of a market-based process to replace NASA's current committee process for allocating Shuttle secondary payload resources (lockers, Watts and crew). The market-based process allocates budgets of tokens to NASA internal organizations that in turn use the budget to bid for priority for their middeck payloads. The scheduling algorithm selects payloads by priority class and maximizes the number of tokens bid to determine a manifest. The results of a number of controlled experiments show that such a system tends to allocate resources more efficiently by guiding participants to make resource and payload tradeoffs. Most participants were able to improve their position over NASA's current ranking system. Furthermore, those that are better off make large improvements while the few that do worse have relatively small losses.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01669195
Permalink
