ISSN:
1573-2878
Schlagwort(e):
N-person games
;
Nash equilibrium
;
reflexive Banach spaces
;
linear-quadratic differential games
Quelle:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Thema:
Mathematik
Notizen:
Abstract Sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of Nash equilibrium points inN-person games when the strategy sets are closed, convex subsets of reflexive Banach spaces. These conditions require that each player's cost functional is convex in that player's strategy, weakly continuous in the strategies of the other players, weakly lower semicontinuous in all strategies, and furthermore satisfies a coercivity condition if any of the strategy sets is unbounded. The result is applied to a class of linear-quadratic differential games with no information, to prove that equilibrium points exist when the duration of these games is sufficiently small.
Materialart:
Digitale Medien
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00935494
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