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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctions (1988)
    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 1 (1988), S. 61-99 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: auctions ; bidding theory ; experiments
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract First-price auction theory is extended to the case of heterogeneous bidders characterized byM-parameter log-concave utility functions. This model, and its specific two-parameter constant relative risk averse special case, is generally supported by the results of 47 experiments. The one-parameter special case that comprises most of the theoretical literature is not supported by the experiments. One anomaly for the two-parameter model is that too many of the subjects exhibit positive (or negative) intercepts in their linear estimated bid functions. Accordingly, we develop a specific three-parameter model, which introduces a utility of winning, and a threshold utility of surplus. The new model, tested directly by introducing lump-sum payments or charges for winning, is not falsified by the new experiments.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00055565
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Good News and Bad News: Search from Unknown Wage Offer Distributions (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 197-225 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: job search ; unknown distributions ; reservation wage property ; controlled experiments
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The largest market in national economies is the labor market. Labor market contracting is characterized by job search, often from unknown wage offer distributions. This paper reports experimental tests of finite horizon models of job search in which the wage offer distribution is unknown. Theoretically-optimal search from an unknown wage offer distribution can have the seemingly paradoxical property that some offers will be accepted that are lower than other offers that will be rejected in the same period of the search horizon. Thus the reservation wage property (or lowest acceptable wage path) may not exist. This can occur because an offer that is a priori relatively high (“good news”) can imply that it is highly probable that search is from a favorable distribution, and such an offer can look unattractive when it is an a posteriori relatively low offer from a favorable distribution (“bad news”). This paper reports results from experimental treatments for search from unknown distributions in which the reservation wage property does exist and treatments in which it does not exist. We find that the consistency of search behavior with search theory reported in earlier papers is robust to the presence or absence of the reservation wage property and to whether the draws come from known or unknown distributions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009910627375
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Good news and bad news: Search from unknown wage offer distributions (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 197-225 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: job search ; unknown distributions ; reservation wage property ; controlled experiments ; C91 ; D83 ; J64
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The largest market in national economies is the labor market. Labor market contracting is characterized by job search, often from unknown wage offer distributions. This paper reports experimental tests of finite horizon models of job search in which the wage offer distribution is unknown. Theoretically-optimal search from an unknown wage offer distribution can have the seemingly paradoxical property that some offers will be accepted that are lower than other offers that will be rejected in the same period of the search horizon. Thus the reservation wage property (or lowest acceptable wage path) may not exist. This can occur because an offer that is a priori relatively high (“good news”) can imply that it is highly probable that search is from a favorable distribution, and such an offer can look unattractive when it is an a posteriori relatively low offer from a favorable distribution (“bad news”). This paper reports results from experimental treatments for search from unknown distributions in which the reservation wage property does exist and treatments in which it does not exist. We find that the consistency of search behavior with search theory reported in earlier papers is robust to the presence or absence of the reservation wage property and to whether the draws come from known or unknown distributions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01669196
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Laboratory experiments with a finite-horizon job-search model (1989)
    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 2 (1989), S. 301-329 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: job-search models ; controlled experiments ; decision theory
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this article we explain the essential role of controlled experiments in testing job-search models. We derive the testable implications of a finite-horizon job-search model and lay out the design of the controlled experiments that we use to test those implications. We present the results of several parametric and nonparametric tests, all conditional on the actual draws of the wage offers. Overall, we find close agreement between the predictions of the search model and observations of search duration and income for several experimental treatments.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00209391
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Inducing risk-neutral preferences: Further analysis of the data (1995)
    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 11 (1995), S. 65-79 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: lottery payoffs ; auctions ; experimental economics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The lottery payoff procedure does not successfully induce risk-neutral bidding behavior in first-price, sealedbid auctions. This conclusion follows from both ordinary-least-squares estimation with natural data and leastabsolute-deviation estimation with transformed data from numerous experimental designs. Lottery payoffs do not succeed in inducing behavior predicted from standard expected utility theory assumptions or from assumed utility from winning and/or income thresholds. In contrast, first-price auction experiments with monetary payoffs yield results that are consistent with general models of bidding in the independent private values information environment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01132731
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