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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 1 (1988), S. 61-99 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: auctions ; bidding theory ; experiments
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract First-price auction theory is extended to the case of heterogeneous bidders characterized byM-parameter log-concave utility functions. This model, and its specific two-parameter constant relative risk averse special case, is generally supported by the results of 47 experiments. The one-parameter special case that comprises most of the theoretical literature is not supported by the experiments. One anomaly for the two-parameter model is that too many of the subjects exhibit positive (or negative) intercepts in their linear estimated bid functions. Accordingly, we develop a specific three-parameter model, which introduces a utility of winning, and a threshold utility of surplus. The new model, tested directly by introducing lump-sum payments or charges for winning, is not falsified by the new experiments.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 11 (1995), S. 65-79 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: lottery payoffs ; auctions ; experimental economics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The lottery payoff procedure does not successfully induce risk-neutral bidding behavior in first-price, sealedbid auctions. This conclusion follows from both ordinary-least-squares estimation with natural data and leastabsolute-deviation estimation with transformed data from numerous experimental designs. Lottery payoffs do not succeed in inducing behavior predicted from standard expected utility theory assumptions or from assumed utility from winning and/or income thresholds. In contrast, first-price auction experiments with monetary payoffs yield results that are consistent with general models of bidding in the independent private values information environment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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