ALBERT

Description: Civil and military applications of space transportation have been pursued for just over 50 years and there has been, and still is, a need for safe, dependable, affordable, and sustainable space transportation systems. Fully expendable and partially reusable space transportation systems have been developed and put in operation that have not adequately achieved this need. Access to space is technically achievable, but presently very expensive and will remain so until there is a breakthrough in the way we do business. Since 1991 the national Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) has reviewed and assessed the lessons learned from the major U.S. space programs of the past decades focusing on what has been learned from the assessment and control of Life Cycle Cost (LCC) from these systems. This paper presents the results of a selected number of studies and analyses that have been conducted by the SPST addressing the need, as well as the solutions, for improvement in LCC. The major emphasis of the SPST processes is on developing the space transportation system requirements first (up front). These requirements must include both the usual system flight performance requirements and also the system functional requirements, including the infrastructure on Earth's surface, in-space and on the Moon and Mars surfaces to determine LCC. This paper describes the development of specific innovative engineering and management approaches and processes. This includes a focus on flight hardware maturity for reliability, ground operations approaches, and business processes between contractor and government organizations. A major change in program/project cost control is being proposed by the SPST to achieve a sustainable space transportation system LCC - controlling cost as a program metric in addition to the existing practice of controlling performance and weight. Without a firm requirement and methodically structured cost control, it is unlikely that an affordable and sustainable space transportation system LCC will ever be achieved. '

Description: No abstract available

Description: It is important that engineering and management accept the need for an availability requirement that is derived with its influencing attributes. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability. Also important to provide bounds of the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution, e.g., these influencing attributes become design requirements also. These variables will drive the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions or technology selection to allow control of the total parts count. The relationship of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given availability requirement or if allowed to increase the parts count will drive the system reliability requirement higher. They also provide the understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (or mean down time) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both the mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and availability. The concerns and importance of achieving a strong availability requirement is driven by the need for affordability, the choice of using the two launch solution for the single space application, or the need to control the spare parts count needed to support the long stay in either orbit or on the surface of the moon. Understanding the requirements before starting the architectural design concept will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.

Description: Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.

Description: Conclusions: The hot gases, having flooded the wing interior, quickly heated the upper and lower wing surfaces allowing the aluminum honeycomb facesheets and the wing tiles to debond. The thin-wall aluminum truss tubes would soon collapse and the aerodynamic and structural integrity of the left wing would be effectively destroyed. The forensic evidence is consistent with the observed External Tank foam impact 81 seconds into launch. This is the most probable cause of the damage to the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon. (RCC) leading edge.

Description: Several days following the Columbia accident a team formed and began planning for the reconstruction of Columbia. A hangar at the Kennedy Space Center was selected for this effort due to it's size, available technical workforce and materials science laboratories and access to the vehicle ground processing infrastructure. The Reconstruction team established processes for receiving, handling, decontamination, tracking, identifying, cleaning and assessment of the debris. Initially, a 2-dimensional reconstruction of the Orbiter outer mold line was developed. As the investigation progressed fixtures which allowed a 3-dimensional reconstruction of the forward portions of the left wing's leading edge was developed. To support the reconstructions and forensic analyses a Materials and Processes (M&P) 'team was formed. This M&P team established processes for recording factual observations, debris cleaning, and engineering analysis. Fracture surfaces and thermal effects of selected airframe debris were assessed, and process flows for both nondestructive and destructive sampling and evaluation of debris were developed. The Team also assessed left hand airframe components that were believed to be associated with a structural breach of Columbia. A major portion of this analysis was evaluation of metallic deposits were prevalent on left wing leading edge components. Extensive evaluation of the visual, metallurgical and chemical nature of the deposits provided conclusions that were consistent with the visual assessments and interpretations of the NASA lead teams and the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Analytical data collected by the M&P Team showed that a significant thermal event occurred at the left wing leading edge in the proximity of LH RCC Panels 8-9, and a correlation was formed between the deposits and overheating in these areas to the wing leading edge components. The analysis of deposits also showed exposure to temperatures in excess of 1649 C (3200 F), which would severely degrade support structure, tiles, and RCC panel materials. The integrated failure analysis of wing leading edge debris and deposits strongly supported the hypothesis that a breach occurred at LH RCC Panel 8.

Description: A case study is presented for using models in eddy current NDE design for crack detection in Shuttle Reaction Control System thruster components. Numerical methods were used to address the complex geometry of the part and perform parametric studies of potential transducer designs. Simulations were found to show agreement with experimental results. Accurate representation of the coherent noise associated with the measurement and part geometry was found to be critical to properly evaluate the best probe designs.