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  • 68M20  (1)
  • Marginal Contribution  (1)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Computing 56 (1996), S. 95-104 
    ISSN: 1436-5057
    Keywords: 68M20 ; Probabilistic algorithm ; online scheduling ; interval ; busy time
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science
    Description / Table of Contents: Zusammenfassung Wir betrachten das Problem der Zuteilung von Aufgaben bestimmter Rechenzeit auf einem Rechner, um so seine Auslastung zu maximieren. Die Aufgabe besteht darin, einen probabilistischen Online-Algorithmus mit vernünftigem worst-case Performance-Verhältnis zu finden. Wir geben die Antwort auf ein offenes Problem von Lipton und Tompkins, das das bestmögliche Verhältnis betrifft. Weiter verallgemeinern wir ihre Ergebnisse auf einm-Maschinen-Analogon. Schließlich wird eine Variante des Problems analysiert, in dem der Rechner mit einem Zwischenspeicher für einen Job versehen ist.
    Notes: Abstract We consider the problem of scheduling tasks requiring certain processing times on one machine so that the busy time of the machine is maximized. The problem is to find a probabilistic online algorithm with reasonable worst case performance ratio. We answer an open problem of Lipton and Tompkins concerning the best possible ratio that can be achieved. Furthermore, we extend their results to anm-machine analogue. Finally, a variant of the problem is analyzed, in which the machine is provided with a buffer to store one job.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 21 (1992), S. 249-266 
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Cooperative Game ; Shapley Value ; Precedence Constraint ; Marginal Contribution
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Cooperative games are considered where only those coalitions of players are feasible that respect a given precedence structure on the set of players. Strengthening the classical symmetry axiom, we obtain three axioms that give rise to a unique Shapley value in this model. The Shapley value is seen to reflect the expected marginal contribution of a player to a feasible random coalition, which allows us to evaluate the Shapley value nondeterministically. We show that every exact algorithm for the Shapley value requires an exponential number of operations already in the classical case and that even restriction to simple games is #P-hard in general. Furthermore, we outline how the multi-choice cooperative games of Hsiao and Raghavan can be treated in our context, which leads to a Shapley value that does not depend on pre-assigned weights. Finally, the relationship between the Shapley value and the permission value of Gilles, Owen and van den Brink is discussed. Both refer to formally similar models of cooperative games but reflect complementary interpretations of the precedence constraints and thus give rise to fundamentally different solution concepts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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