ISSN:
1573-7187
Keywords:
Majority voting
;
Preference extension rule
;
Lexicographic order
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Sociology
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set Ψ of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of Ψ are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also chosen by a majority among all other orders in Ψ. Tournament-consistency thus allows to predict the outcome of majority voting upon orders from the knowledge of majority preferences on their components.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026425015999
Permalink
