Publication Date:
2012-08-03
Description:
This study investigates the choice of quality by producer organisations (POs) in charge of defining product specifications for geographical indications. The model assumes that the PO chooses the quality level that maximises joint producer profits in anticipation of the competitive equilibrium that arises once quality is set. Using a fairly general variant of the vertical differentiation model and a flexible specification of production costs, we show that the PO has an incentive to supply quality in excess of the socially optimal level.
Keywords:
L15 - Information and Product Quality
;
Standardization and Compatibility, L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organization, Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing
;
Cooperatives
;
Agribusiness
Print ISSN:
0165-1587
Electronic ISSN:
1464-3618
Topics:
Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition
,
Economics
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