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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 603-628 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Market game Excess volatility ; Rational expectations ; Asymmetric information ; Information acquisition. ; JEL Classification Numbers: G12 ; G14 ; D84.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the advantage of becoming informed, the costly acquisition of information, and the impossibility of having equilibrium prices with higher volatility than the underlying fundamentals.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050272
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