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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2016-06-22
    Description: We analyze various regulatory regimes for electricity transmission investment in the context of a transformation of the power system towards renewable energy. We study distinctive developments of the generation mix with different implications on network congestion, assuming that a shift from conventional power plants towards renewables may go along with exogenous shocks on transmission requirements, which may be either of temporary or permanent nature. We specifically analyze the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory price-cap mechanism, a cost-based rule, and a non-regulated approach in dynamic generation settings. Through application in a stylized two-node network, we find that incentive regulation may perform satisfactorily only when appropriate weights are used. While quasi-ideal weights generally restore the beneficial properties that incentive regulatory mechanisms are well-known for in static settings, pure Laspeyres weights may either lead to overinvestment (stranded investments) or delayed investments as compared to the welfare optimum benchmark. Stranded investments could then be avoided through proper handling of weights. Model results indicate that using average Laspeyres-Paasche weights appears to be an appropriate strategy in the context of permanently or temporarily increasing network congestion. Our analysis motivates further research aimed to characterize optimal regulation for transmission expansion in the context of renewable integration.
    Keywords: Q40 ; Q42 ; L51 ; ddc:330 ; electricity transmission ; incentive regulation ; renewable integration ; Laspeyres/Paasche weights ; ideal weights
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
    Publication Date: 2016-02-08
    Description: Derzeit wird diskutiert, ob der deutsche Strommarkt genügend Anreize für Investitionen in Kraftwerke und deren Verbleiben am Netz bietet, um die Versorgungssicherheit zu gewährleisten. Vorschläge, die Energieversorgung weiter abzusichern, beinhalten zum Teil umfassende Zahlungen an die Kraftwerksbetreiber - parallel zu Energieerlösen und basierend auf deren Erzeugungskapazität (Kapazitätsmärkte). Andere Vorschläge empfehlen die Vorhaltung einzelner Kraftwerke, die nur bei Knappheit und hohen Preisen zum Einsatz kommen (Strategische Reserve). In der vorliegenden Studie werden die verschiedenen Gründe, die zu fehlenden Investitionsanreizen führen könnten, analysiert und Handlungsoptionen diskutiert. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass eine Strategische Reserve zur Absicherung der Energieversorgung ausreicht.
    Description: There is an ongoing discussion about whether the German electricity market offers sufficient incentives for investment in power plants and for keeping them connected to the grid, thus ensuring sufficient security of supply. Recommendations for further securing power supply include payments, some of them comprehensive, to power plant operators - in addition to energy revenues and based on their generating capacity (capacity mechanisms). Other suggestions are to keep individual power plants available that are used only during times of scarcity and high prices (strategic reserve). The present article analyzes the various reasons that could lead to a lack of incentives for investment and the extent to which they legitimize employing capacity mechanisms or require other approaches. It is concluded that a strategic reserve would suffice for securing generation adequacy, and finally, design options are discussed.
    Keywords: D47 ; L51 ; Q48 ; ddc:330 ; capacity mechanism ; missing money ; strategic reserve ; Germany ; renewable energy
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: German
    Type: doc-type:article
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2016-06-22
    Description: We study the performance of different regulatory approaches for the expansion of electricity transmission networks in the light of realistic demand patterns and fluctuating wind power. In particular, we are interested in the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism compared to a cost-based and a merchant-like approach. In contrast to earlier research, we explicitly include both an hourly time resolution and fluctuating wind power, which allows representing demand in a very realistic way. This substantially increases the real-world applicability of results compared to previous analyses, which were based on simplifying assumptions. We show that a combined merchant-regulatory regulation, which draws on a cap over the two-part tariff of the Transco, leads to welfare outcomes far superior to the modeled alternatives. This result proves to be robust over a range of different cases and sensitivity analyses. We also find that the intertemporal rebalancing of the two-part tariff carried out by the Transco so as to expand the network is such that the fixed tariff part turns out to be relatively large compared to extension costs.
    Keywords: Q40 ; L51 ; D42 ; ddc:330 ; electricity ; regulation ; transmission expansion ; wind power
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 4
    Publication Date: 2016-06-22
    Description: In Germany and beyond, various capacity mechanisms are currently being discussed with a view to improving the security of electricity supply. One of these mechanisms is a strategic reserve that retains generation capacity for use in times of critical supply shortage. We argue that strategic reserves have specific advantages compared to other capacity mechanisms in the context of the European energy transition. To date, however, the debate on capacity mechanisms has largely been restricted to national contexts. Against this background, we discuss the feasibility and potential benefits of coordinated cross-border strategic reserves to safeguard electricity supply and aid the energy transition in Germany and neighboring countries at large. Setting aside strategic reserve capacity which is deployed only in the event of extreme supply shortages could improve the security of electricity supply without distorting the EU's internal electricity market. In addition, overall costs may decrease when reserve procurement and activation are coordinated among countries, particularly if combined with flow-based market coupling.
    Keywords: D47 ; L51 ; Q48 ; ddc:330 ; capacity mechanisms ; strategic reserve ; market design ; energy policy ; energy transition
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Cleveland: International Association for Energy Economics | ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Kiel, Hamburg
    Publication Date: 2018-08-13
    Description: We analyze various regulatory regimes for electricity transmission investment in the context of a power system transformation toward renewable energy. Distinctive developments of the generation mix are studied, assuming that a shift toward renewables may have temporary or permanent impacts on network congestion. We specifically analyze the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory price-cap mechanism, a cost-based rule, and a non-regulated approach in dynamic generation settings. We find that incentive regulation may perform better than cost-based regulation but only when appropriate weights are used. While quasi-ideal weights generally restore the beneficial properties that incentive regulatory mechanisms are well-known for, pure Laspeyres weights may either lead to over-investment or delayed investments as compared to the welfare-optimum benchmark. Laspeyres-Paasche weights, in turn, seem appropriate under permanently or temporarily increased network congestion. Thus, our analysis provides motivation for further research in order to characterize optimal regulation for transmission expansion in the context of renewable integration.
    Description: This is the postprint of an article published in Energy Journal 36 (2015), 4, p. 105-128, available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.5547/01956574.36.4.jege
    Keywords: Q40 ; Q42 ; L51 ; ddc:330 ; Electricity transmission ; Incentive regulation ; Renewable integration ; Laspeyres-Paasche weights ; Ideal weights ; Energieökonomik ; Erneuerbare Ressourcen
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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