ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
    Publication Date: 2012-11-22
    Description: This paper is about a model of Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market with free entry of identical firms and variable returns to scale. If the optimum number of active firms in the market is two or more, and the number of active firms is equal to that optimum number, then Bertrand equilibrium exists for that optimum number, and it does not exist if the number of active firms is less than the optimum. The model, however, does not rule out the existence of Bertrand equilibria with more active firms than the optimum number. Finally, when the optimum number of active firms in the market is one, Bertrand equilibrium does not exist.
    Keywords: D43 ; L13 ; ddc:330 ; Bertrand equilibrium ; variable returns to scale ; free entry ; number of firms
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: Spanish
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Buenos Aires: Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
    Publication Date: 2018-06-28
    Description: Este trabajo es acerca de un modelo de competencia en precios en el mercado de un producto homogéneo con libre entrada de empresas idénticas y rendimientos variables a escala. Si el número óptimo de empresas activas en el mercado es dos o más, el equilibrio de Bertrand existe siempre para dicho número óptimo, y no existe si el número de empresas activas es menor que el óptimo. El modelo, sin embargo, no descarta la existencia de equilibrios con más empresas activas que el óptimo. Finalmente, si el número óptimo de empresas es igual a uno, entonces el equilibrio de Bertrand no existe.
    Description: This paper is about a model of Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market with free entry of identical firms and variable returns to scale. If the optimum number of active firms in the market is two or more, Bertrand equilibrium always exists for that optimum number, and it does not exist if the number of active firms is less than the optimum. The model, however, does not rule out the existence of Bertrand equilibria with more active firms than the optimum number. Finally, when the optimum number of active firms in the market is one, Bertrand equilibrium does not exist.
    Keywords: D43 ; L13 ; ddc:330 ; Equilibrio de Bertrand ; rendimientos variables ; libre entrada
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: Spanish
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Buenos Aires: Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
    Publication Date: 2018-06-28
    Description: In this paper we show that a homogeneous-product market with multiple Bertrand equilibria becomes a market with a single Bertrand equilibrium when we introduce a small degree of product differentiation. When differentiation tends to zero, that Bertrand equilibrium converges to the unique price-taking equilibrium of the homogeneous-product market, which is in turn one of the multiple Bertrand equilibria for that market.
    Keywords: D43 ; L13 ; ddc:330 ; Bertrand equilibrium ; price-taking equilibrium ; product differentiation ; Oligopol ; Produktdifferenzierung ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Buenos Aires: Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
    Publication Date: 2018-06-28
    Description: Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo de equilibrio de un mercado con diferenciación horizontal de productos en el cual las empresas fijan los precios de las variedades que proveen y, en ciertos casos, alguna de ellas actúa como líder de precios. Dados esos elementos, el trabajo explora qué condiciones deben darse para que una fusión o adquisición horizontal que aumenta la concentración del mercado lleve a un equilibrio con menores precios que los que se daban antes de dicha fusión o adquisición. La clave para que esto acontezca es que el cambio de estructura sirva para romper la situación de liderazgo previamente vigente, y que el nuevo grupo que se consolida no incremente sustancialmente su poder de mercado.
    Keywords: L13 ; L41 ; ddc:330 ; Horizontale Konzentration ; Betriebliche Preispolitik
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: Spanish
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...