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  • 1
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups' objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.
    Keywords: D70 ; D72 ; D74 ; D78 ; ddc:330 ; policy formation ; political parties ; ideological predispositions ; electoral power ; post-elections lobbying ; enforced party discipline
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Some immigrants try to keep their ethnicity hidden while others become ever deeply more mired in their home culture. We argue that among immigrants this struggle manifests itself in the ethnic goods they choose to consume. Different types of ethnic goods have vastly different effects on immigrant assimilation. We develop a simple theoretical model useful for capturing the consequences of this struggle, illustrating it with examples of Central Asian assimilation into the Muscovite economy.
    Keywords: J15 ; ddc:330 ; assimilation ; migrants ; culture ; ethnic goods
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 3
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: During the last few decades cultural changes have been taking place in many countries due to migration. The degree to which the foreign culture influences the local culture, differs across countries. This paper shows how the willingness of locals and immigrants to intermarry influences the culture and the national identity of the host country. We use a search-theoretic approach to show that, even in situations where migrants and natives prefer to marry within their own community, the search process may lead to intermarriage. The exogamy can take on two forms: either migrants and natives each hold on to their own culture or the immigrants take on the natives' culture. In the first case we will see new cultures developing and the local culture will not survive over time. In the second case the local culture will survive. We show the conditions for assimilation versus no assimilation between the groups.
    Keywords: F22 ; R23 ; ddc:330 ; Assimilation ; Migration ; Marriage ; Culture ; Migranten ; Kulturelle Identität ; Ehe ; Soziale Integration ; USA ; Europa
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 4
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: A model is set up where migrants must choose a level of social traits and consumption of ethnic goods. As the consumption level of ethnic goods increases, the migrants become ever more different to the local population and are less assimilated. Less assimilation affects the reaction of the local population to the migrants and their willingness to accept the newcomers. This social phenomenon and affects wages and unemployment. We show that the growth in the unemployment and social benefits of legal migrants increases the consumption of ethnic goods, thus creating a trap wherein the willingness of the local population to accept the migrants into the economy decreases. This process also increases the probability of the migrants' dependence on the welfare state. On the other hand, illegal migrants could play an important role in the assimilation of the legal migrants.
    Keywords: F22 ; O15 ; D6 ; ddc:330 ; Welfare state ; Social benefits ; Ethnic goods ; Social trait ; Assimilation ; Unemployment ; Migranten ; Soziale Integration ; Kulturelle Identität ; Konsumentenverhalten ; Beschäftigungseffekt ; Wohlfahrtstheorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; rent dissipation ; central planner ; contest ; all-pay auction ; generalized logit contest success function
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 6
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    Regensburg: Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)
    Publication Date: 2018-06-22
    Description: Some immigrants try to keep their ethnicity hidden while others become ever deeply more mired in their home culture. We argue that among immigrants this struggle manifests itself in the ethnic goods they choose to consume. Different types of ethnic goods have vastly different effects on immigrant assimilation. We develop a simple theoretical model useful for capturing the consequences of this struggle, illustrating it with examples of Central Asian assimilation into the Muscovite economy.
    Keywords: J15 ; ddc:330 ; assimilation ; migrants ; culture ; ethnic goods
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 7
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Studies in the US have shown that black immigrants have remained at the bottom of the wage ladder and that other groups of immigrants have overtaken them over time. The goal of this research is to determine whether a specific group of immigrants can displace a group at the bottom of the ladder. We use Israeli data to compare two ethnic groups: Israeli Arabs and Ethiopian immigrants. Israeli Arabs were considered to be the least successful ethnic group in the Israeli labor market until they were displaced by the Ethiopian immigrants. The results of our analysis show that an ethnic group at the bottom of the wage ladder can be replaced by another.
    Keywords: J15 ; J24 ; J31 ; ddc:330 ; wage differences ; immigrants ; Araber ; Israelisch ; Migranten ; Äthiopien ; Lohnstruktur ; Soziale Mobilität ; Ethnische Gruppe ; Israel
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 8
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all-pay-auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the optimal lottery cannot be dominated by an all-pay-auction.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; contest design ; efforts (revenue) maximization ; discrimination ; endogenous lottery ; all-pay auction
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 9
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    Regensburg: Osteuropa-Institut Regensburg
    Publication Date: 2017-05-08
    Description: We examine agricultural child labor in the context of emigration, transfers, and the ability to hire outside labor. We start by developing a theoretical background based on Basu and Van, (1998), Basu, (1999) and Epstein and Kahana (2008) and show how hiring labor from outside the household and transfers to the household might induce a reduction in children's working hours. Analysis using Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data on the Kagera region in Tanzania lend support to the hypothesis that both emigration and remittances reduce child labor.
    Keywords: D62 ; F22 ; I30 ; J13 ; J20 ; J24 ; O15 ; ddc:330 ; child labor ; emigration ; transfers ; Tanzania ; Kinderarbeit ; Landwirtschaft ; Rücküberweisung (Migranten) ; Internationale Arbeitsmobilität ; Schätzung ; Tansania
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2015-05-22
    Description: Recently, Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2009) established a new method to measure ethnic identity which they called the "ethnosizer". Using information on an individual's language, culture, social interactions, history of migration, and ethnic self-identification, the method classifies that individual into one of four states: assimilation, integration, separation or marginalization. A large body of literature has emerged examining the effects of immigrants' characteristics (age, gender, education, religion, etc.) on their ethnic identity using the ethnosizer. This note presents a basic theoretical framework to shed light on the vast collection of empirical results obtained on this topic.
    Keywords: F22 ; J15 ; Z10 ; ddc:330 ; ethnosizer ; immigrants ; assimilation ; integration ; separation ; marginalization
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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