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  • 1
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-27
    Description: The taxation of bequests can have a positive impact on the labor supply of heirs through wealth effects. This leads to an increase in future labor income tax revenue on top of direct bequest tax revenue. We first show in a theoretical model that a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on existing estimates for the reduction in earnings after wealth transfers, fails: the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income is not a sufficient statistic for the calculation of this effect because (i) heirs anticipate the reduction in net bequests and adjust their labor supply already prior to inheriting, and (ii) when bequest receipt is stochastic, even those who ex post end up not inheriting anything respond ex ante to the implied change in their distribution of net bequests. We quantitatively elaborate the size of the overall revenue effect due to labor supply changes of heirs by using a state of the art life-cycle model that we calibrate to the German economy. Besides the joint distribution of income and inheritances, quasi-experimental evidence regarding the size of wealth effects on labor supply is a key target for this calibration. We find that for each Euro of bequest tax revenue the government mechanically generates, it obtains an additional 9 Cents of labor income tax revenue (in net present value) through higher labor supply of (non-)heirs.
    Keywords: C68 ; D91 ; H22 ; H31 ; J22 ; ddc:330 ; bequest ; taxation ; life-cycle ; labor-supply ; dynamic scoring
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This note demonstrates that optimal tax calculations in overlapping generations models should not be based exclusively on long-run welfare changes. As the latter represent a mix of efficiency and intergenerational redistribution effects, they typically favor policies which redistribute towards future cohorts. Taking the recent study of Conesa et al. (2009) as an example, we explicitly consider short- and long-run welfare effects and isolate the aggregate efficiency consequences of a tax reform. Based on this aggregate efficiency measure, we find a much lower capital income tax rate and a significantly less progressive labor income tax schedule than Conesa et al. (2009) to be optimal. As we demonstrate, the optimality of capital income taxation is explained by the low interest elasticity of precautionary savings compared to that of life-cycle savings.
    Keywords: C68 ; H21 ; D91 ; ddc:330 ; stochastic OLG model ; precautionary savings ; intragenerational risk sharing and redistribution
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2016-05-23
    Description: In this paper we conduct a quantitative analysis of a number of stylized educational loan systems. We develop a stochastic general equilibrium model of a closed economy with a competitive firm sector and a government that levies taxes and administers educational loans. Individuals are heterogeneous in their talent for education and ability to learn on the job and face uninsurable idiosyncratic labour productivity risk during their working career. We calibrate the model to the US mortgage loan system and subsequently consider two possible reforms. The first is a Graduate Labour Tax (GLT) system whereby grants to students are financed by means of a tax on the labour income of educated individuals. We find that in the long run the proportion of uneducated workers stays roughly constant but the average educational attainment of students increases. As there exists a considerable amount of transitional dynamics in the model the welfare effects of the reform differ by generation. Cohorts alive at the time of the shock are worse off while ex-ante welfare of future cohorts increases. The gains to the latter are large enough to - at least in principle - compensate the losers from the policy reform and generate an overall welfare gain. The second possible reform we study is a Comprehensive Labour Tax (CLT). It is very similar to the GLT except for the fact that the educational tax is levied on all workers, including those who are uneducated. In contrast to the GLT reform the proportion of uneducated workers drops substantially. Generations that become economically active soon after the policy reform are worse off and the aggregate ex-ante welfare effect is negative.
    Keywords: E10 ; E24 ; D91 ; I22 ; J24 ; ddc:330 ; human capital ; experience effects ; educational loans ; uninsured labour market risk ; incomplete markets ; overlapping generations
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 4
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    Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2016-06-03
    Description: It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one, and there are many couples who disagree on having babies. We then build a bargaining model of fertility choice and match the model to data from a set of European countries with very low fertility rates. The distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers turns out to be a key determinant of fertility. A policy that lowers the child care burden specifically on mothers can be more than twice as effective at increasing the fertility rate compared to a general child subsidy.
    Keywords: J13 ; ddc:330 ; fertility ; bargaining ; child care
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
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    Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2015-05-22
    Description: The economic theory of fertility choice builds predominantly on the unitary model of the household, in which there is a single household utility function and potential intra-household disagreement is abstracted from. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that many (potential) mothers and fathers disagree on whether to have children, on how many children to have, and on when to have them. In this paper, we review existing work that brings models of intrahousehold conflict and bargaining to bear on fertility choice, and we point out promising future directions for this line of research.
    Keywords: D13 ; J12 ; J13 ; ddc:330 ; fertility ; bargaining ; child care ; limited commitment
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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