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  • F22  (23)
  • D71  (8)
  • D70
  • 2010-2014  (16)
  • 2000-2004  (17)
  • 1
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups' objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.
    Keywords: D70 ; D72 ; D74 ; D78 ; ddc:330 ; policy formation ; political parties ; ideological predispositions ; electoral power ; post-elections lobbying ; enforced party discipline
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: During the last few decades cultural changes have been taking place in many countries due to migration. The degree to which the foreign culture influences the local culture, differs across countries. This paper shows how the willingness of locals and immigrants to intermarry influences the culture and the national identity of the host country. We use a search-theoretic approach to show that, even in situations where migrants and natives prefer to marry within their own community, the search process may lead to intermarriage. The exogamy can take on two forms: either migrants and natives each hold on to their own culture or the immigrants take on the natives' culture. In the first case we will see new cultures developing and the local culture will not survive over time. In the second case the local culture will survive. We show the conditions for assimilation versus no assimilation between the groups.
    Keywords: F22 ; R23 ; ddc:330 ; Assimilation ; Migration ; Marriage ; Culture ; Migranten ; Kulturelle Identität ; Ehe ; Soziale Integration ; USA ; Europa
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 3
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    New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-06-25
    Description: Migration networks are usually captured by the number of people from the migrant's country in the host region. Using Mexican migration data, we analyze the effects of the usual network variable and two additional origin-village-specific variables on migrants' location choice.
    Keywords: F22 ; J61 ; ddc:330 ; immigration ; location choice ; networks
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 4
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: A model is set up where migrants must choose a level of social traits and consumption of ethnic goods. As the consumption level of ethnic goods increases, the migrants become ever more different to the local population and are less assimilated. Less assimilation affects the reaction of the local population to the migrants and their willingness to accept the newcomers. This social phenomenon and affects wages and unemployment. We show that the growth in the unemployment and social benefits of legal migrants increases the consumption of ethnic goods, thus creating a trap wherein the willingness of the local population to accept the migrants into the economy decreases. This process also increases the probability of the migrants' dependence on the welfare state. On the other hand, illegal migrants could play an important role in the assimilation of the legal migrants.
    Keywords: F22 ; O15 ; D6 ; ddc:330 ; Welfare state ; Social benefits ; Ethnic goods ; Social trait ; Assimilation ; Unemployment ; Migranten ; Soziale Integration ; Kulturelle Identität ; Konsumentenverhalten ; Beschäftigungseffekt ; Wohlfahrtstheorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; rent dissipation ; central planner ; contest ; all-pay auction ; generalized logit contest success function
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 6
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    New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-06-25
    Description: Empirical studies in the migration literature have shown that migration enclaves (networks) negatively affect the language proficiency of migrants. These studies, however, ignore the choice of location as a function of language skills. Using data on Mexican migration to the US, we show that migrants choose smaller networks as their English language proficiency improves.
    Keywords: F22 ; J15 ; J61 ; ddc:330 ; Enclaves ; Ethnic goods ; Immigrants ; Language skills ; Networks ; Sprache ; Englisch (Sprache) ; Ethnische Gruppe ; Mexikaner ; Netzwerk ; USA ; Migranten
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 7
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    New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-06-25
    Description: Fundamentalist organizations and the terrorists they spawn do not arise of a vacuum. Combating terrorism requires understanding the principles of groups’ formation, development and growth. We use economic theory to explain the creation and development of fundamentalist groups. In this paper we develop a theory of fundamentalism and terrorism under which leaders compete to enhance the level of observance of their followers. Our model explains the existence of competing fundamentalist groups and the increase in their intensity over time. Competition among fundamentalists makes them more extreme and may lead to terrorist activity.
    Keywords: D71 ; D72 ; Z12 ; ddc:330 ; fundamentalism ; religion ; rent seeking ; terrorism ; Radikalismus ; Rent Seeking ; Religion ; Wettbewerb ; Politische Gewalt ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 8
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    New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-06-25
    Description: This paper addresses the question: Why and where do immigrants cluster? We examine the relative importance and interaction of two alternative explanations of immigrant clustering: (1) network externalities and (2) herd behavior. We advance the theory by presenting a framework encompassing both network and herd effects, and by delineating various types of network and herd effects in our empirical work. In order to distinguish between herd and network externalities, we use the Mexican Migration Project data. Our empirical results show that both network externalities and herds have significant effects on the migrant's decision of where to migrate. Moreover, the significance and size of the effects vary according to the legal status of the migrant and whether the migrant is a new or a repeat migrant. The network-externality effect has an inverse U shape, not simply a linear positive effect as often presented in the literature. Neglecting herds and/or networks, or the inverse U shape of network effects leads to faulty conclusions about migrant behavior.
    Keywords: F22 ; J61 ; ddc:330 ; herd effects ; immigration ; location choice ; network externalities ; Mexikaner ; Wohnstandort ; USA ; Migranten
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 9
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    New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-06-25
    Description: Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government’s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of fiscal federalism.
    Keywords: F22 ; ddc:330 ; Economic-Models-of-the-Political-Process ; fiscal federalism ; Intergovernmental-Relations ; rent-seeking ; Finanzföderalismus ; Rent Seeking ; Public Choice ; Finanzausgleich ; USA
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all-pay-auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the optimal lottery cannot be dominated by an all-pay-auction.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; contest design ; efforts (revenue) maximization ; discrimination ; endogenous lottery ; all-pay auction
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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