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  • ddc:330  (24)
  • D61  (2)
  • Heidelberg: Springer  (14)
  • Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute  (10)
  • Göttingen: Ibero-Amerika-Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung
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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2013-07-18
    Description: A high court has to decide whether a lawis constitutional, unconstitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice functions. Although in our setting the preferences are restricted to be singlepeaked over three alternatives, these problems persist. Runoff mechanisms are not well-behaved either: they do not implement any Condorcet consistent social choice function in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that some Condorcet consistent social choice functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via other simple and natural mechanisms.
    Keywords: C72 ; D71 ; D78 ; ddc:330 ; runoff voting system ; Condorcet consistency ; strategy-proofness ; implementation theory ; Wahlsystem ; Condorcet-Paradoxon ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2013-07-18
    Description: We consider allocation problemswith indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods, that can be viewed as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.
    Keywords: D61 ; D63 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; allocation problem ; indivisibilities ; single-peaked preferences ; priority standard ; temporary satisfaction methods ; Allokationseffizienz ; Präferenztheorie ; Unteilbarkeit
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2019-04-10
    Description: The trade deficit of the USA with its NAFTA partners, Mexico and Canada, increased since 1994 from 21,991 to 119,257 million dollars in 2013 (UNCOMTRADE, 2015. http://comtrade.un.org/db), and most of this increase is explained by the growth in the volume of commerce between Mexico and the USA. Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s Mexico has been experiencing its lowest economic growth rates. By using the World Input Output Database and the Input-Output Analysis, this paper presents an estimate of the intra-NAFTA trade flows in terms of value added and its distribution among both labor and capital; labor by skill level; and content of persons engaged. The findings show that trade between the NAFTA members is quite different concerning value added. In 1995 the USA had a trade deficit of 30,351 million dollars with Canada, of which 6384 million dollars was a surplus in favor of Canada in terms of value added. Similarly, the same year the USA had a deficit of 4276 million dollars with Mexico that became a surplus for the latter of 4561 million dollars in terms of value added. For the following years, until 2011, a similar pattern was observed. The distribution of this value added between capital and labor compensations tends to favor USA and Canadian workers, especially middle-skilled labor, and the sector that tends to have the lowest share is the low-skilled Mexican and Canadian workers. Even more, the average labor compensations per hour grew less for the three types of Mexican workers.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Value added in trade ; Income distribution ; NAFTA
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 4
    Publication Date: 2019-04-18
    Description: By means of a single-bounded, referendum format contingent valuation, this paper estimates willingness to pay (WTP) for improved air quality among residents of Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA). Findings from this paper illustrate heterogeneity in WTP associated with environmental and social attitudes, and family concerns. For instance, WTP is higher than average if respondents state a very high priority to air pollution but smaller than average if respondent's household contains more adults than the sample median. This contingent valuation exercise provides elements to carry out cost-benefit analysis of environmental policies both recently implemented and currently under discussion in the MCMA context. For instance, a cost-benefit analysis using estimates from this paper suggests benefits from improved air quality surpass the costs of investing in hybrid buses. Usefulness of this study is underscored by pointing out recent evidence suggesting that (1) air pollution in MCMA has larger health impacts than in similar cities located in developed countries, and (2) policies tackling air pollution in MCMA have had no impact on pollution levels.
    Keywords: Q51 ; Q53 ; D61 ; ddc:330 ; Air quality ; Willingness to pay ; Mexico City ; Contingent valuation ; Attitudes
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 5
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. We show that the answer to this question depends on the cost of information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may lead to divergence of policy platforms.
    Keywords: D72 ; ddc:330 ; information collection ; spatial voting models ; Politische Partei ; Informationsverhalten ; Informationsversorgung ; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
    Publication Date: 2018-04-19
    Description: We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner’s payment is revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue and efficiency. Our findings may have implications for the design of charity auctions, art auctions, and spectrum auctions.
    Keywords: C92 ; D44 ; D82 ; ddc:330 ; Auctions ; Signaling ; Experiments
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 7
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-08-31
    Description: This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment investigating a manager's decision whether or not to delegate authority to a better informed worker whose interests are often, but not always, congruent. Keeping authority implies a loss of information, as the worker communicates his information strategically. Delegating authority leads to a loss of control. A key aspect of our design is that the manager can restrict the worker's choice set when delegating authority. We find that, in case of delegation, managers (as predicted) put tighter restrictions when interests are less aligned. Workers send more informative messages under communication than predicted by the pure strategy equilibria. This finding neither appears to be driven by lying aversion of workers nor by credulity of managers. Qualitatively, our results are in line with a mixed strategy equilibrium under communication, which strictly outperforms optimal restricted delegation and is relatively close to the optimal stochastic mechanism in our setting.
    Keywords: C90 ; D80 ; M20 ; ddc:330 ; Delegation ; Communication ; Laboratory Experiment ; Organizational Economics
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 8
    Publication Date: 2013-07-18
    Description: While general equilibrium theories of trade stress the role of third-country effects, little work has been done in the empirical foreign direct investment (FDI) literature to test such spatial linkages. This paper aims to provide further insights into long-run determinants of Spanish FDI by considering not only bilateral but also spatially weighted third-country determinants. The few studies carried out so far have focused on FDI flows in a limited number of countries. However, Spanish FDI outflows have risen dramatically since 1995 and today account for a substantial part of global FDI. Therefore, we estimate recently developed spatial panel data models by maximum likelihood (ML) procedures for Spanish outflows (19932004) to top-50 host countries. After controlling for unobservable effects, we find that spatial interdependence matters and provide evidence consistent with new economic geography theories of agglomeration, mainly due to complex (vertical) FDI motivations. Spatial error models estimations also provide illuminating results regarding the transmission mechanism of shocks.
    Keywords: F21 ; F23 ; C31 ; C33 ; ddc:330 ; foreign direct investment ; spatial econometrics ; panel data ; Direktinvestition ; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht ; Maximum-Likelihood-Methode ; Schätzung ; Spanien
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 9
    Publication Date: 2017-05-30
    Description: In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the free-to-air broadcasting industry. We compare the equilibrium levels of advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the connection between programme quality and advertising incentives is drastically different in each scenario. We also consider the welfare implications of our analysis and generate policy implications regarding the optimal level of government intervention in the broadcasting industry.
    Keywords: L11 ; L33 ; L82 ; M37 ; ddc:330 ; Quality ; Mixed duopoly ; Advertising ; Media
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive, and (ii) overconfidenceleading to too much activism is more likely than underconfidenceleading to too much passivity. The predictions of our model are consistentwith findings in the social psychological literature.
    Keywords: D81 ; D82 ; D83 ; ddc:330 ; self-assessments ; learning about ability ; coaching ; overconfidence ; underconfidence
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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