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  • 79.40  (1)
  • Assignment Games  (1)
  • 1
    ISSN: 1432-0630
    Keywords: 79.40
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mechanical Engineering, Materials Science, Production Engineering, Mining and Metallurgy, Traffic Engineering, Precision Mechanics , Physics
    Notes: Abstract An electron gun system with post-acceleration is described suitable to operation with a carbon fibre field-emission tip. The system was tested in an electron optical bench with a vacuum pressure of about 10−6 torr. The electron current was most stable if the current to the extraction electrode was minimized. The half width of the energy distribution of the electrons accelerated up to 30 keV was 215 meV for small currents (≈10−9A). The half width of the distribution increases with growing emission current. This increase may be attributed to instabilities in the surface structure due to ion bombardment and to the circumstance that more than one emission centre contributes to the electron current.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2018-11-15
    Description: Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and efficient outcomes. Agents on each side of the market make bids for potential partners and are matched if their bids are mutually profitable. Matched agents occasionally experiment with higher bids if on the buy-side (or lower bids if on the sell-side), while single agents, in the hope of attracting partners, lower their bids if on the buy-side (or raise their bids if on the sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of other agents' strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either.
    Keywords: C71 ; C73 ; C78 ; D83 ; ddc:330 ; Assignment Games ; Cooperative Games ; Core ; Evolutionary Game Theory ; Learning ; Matching Markets
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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