ALBERT

Notes: Summary Using a chromogenic substrate it has been shown that the endotoxin sensitive procoagulase ofLimulus lysate is not activated by dithiols. Increased turbidimetric readings in the presence of dithiols would therefore appear to be nonspecific.

Notes: Abstract We develop a kinetic theory that describes the behavior of a monatomic four-level laser when the atom is fixed inside a high-Q optical cavity. Such a statement of the problem is similar to that used in the experiment of G. M. Meyer, H.-J. Briegel, and H. Walther [Europhys. Lett. 37, 317 (1997)]. The condition that the number of photons is large and the photon fluctuations are small is employed. We show that by selecting the parameters of the periodic electromagnetic pulses exciting the atom one can achieve regular pumping of the upper laser level and generate sub-Poissonian laser light. We also discuss the reasons why the statistical pattern of the radiation differs from the micromaser pattern with regular injection of atoms.

Notes: Abstract The phenomenon of selective oxidation is briefly reviewed with particular reference to the Fe-Cr system. The results of experiments with a binary Fe-13%Cr alloy and a commercial steel, carried out over the temperature range 400–800°C in various hydrogen-water vapor mixtures are reported. Modes of growth are postulated and the protective qualities of the films shown to be dependent more upon morphology and structure than upon composition. Although protective, α-Cr2O3 films can be grown on the binary alloy, the presence of 0.7%Mn in the commercial steel results in the preferential formation of a nonprotective Mn-Cr spinel. In addition to α-Cr2O3 and the Mn-Cr spinels other oxide phases are identified and their effects considered.

Notes: Abstract The oxidation behavior of Cu-2Be, Cu-5Al, Cu-8Al, Cu-3Si, Cu-2Al-2Si, Cu-2.5Al-2.5Si, Cu-4.5Al-2Si, Cu-7.5 Al-2Si, Cu-6.5Al-4Si, and Cu-4.5Al-5Si, in the temperature range 100–800°C, in air, has been investigated by gravimetric measurements and by electron microscopical examination of stripped oxide films. Most of the alloys showed considerable resistance to oxidation. This was given mainly by a thermally grown film of γ-alumina on the Cu-Al and Cu-Al-Si alloys and by a beryllia film on the Cu-Be alloy. Other oxide phases, principally copper oxides, were also found to grow on the alloys and these are described. Silicon additions to Cu-Al alloys are found to improve their oxidation resistance, although no crystalline oxides containing silicon were observed in the oxide films stripped from the Cu-Al-Si alloys.

Notes: Summary and conclusions A measure of waste from the competitive rent-seeking activity of special interest groups in federal, state and local budgets was calculated over the period 1900–88. This period in U.S. fiscal history is characterized by constitutional changes that have made for more transparency in governmental fiscal activities and for greater diffusion of taxes. The XVI Amendment to the Constitution created the progressive individual income tax (the corporate income tax was judged to be an excise tax in 1909 and passed the test of constitutionality). High marginal tax rates are a justification for a high average level of taxation. The Full Employment Act of 1946 insitutionalized government deficits as a means of meeting a political objective. As a result, opportunities for rent-seeking through budgetary reallocations rose in the United States. In the first two decades of the 20th century, waste at all levels of government represented about 10 percent of incremental national output. Today, waste is three times that amount. The transparency and diffusion of taxes are highest at the federal level and least at the local level. Rent-seeking through budgetary reallocation has followed the public purse. One explanation for the observed centralization of government in the 20th century may be that opportunities to concentrate benefits and diffuse taxes are highest at the federal level. Finally, the withdrawal of resources from the productive economy to pursue rent-seeking in government budgets lowers the rate of real economic growth. I find that rent-seeking through budget reallocations has had a significant and large negative effect on the growth rate.

Notes: Abstract Congressional tenure is longer now than in earlier times, but it is largely a myth that the era of the professional politician is a modern phenomenon. Here, tenure is compared between the 57th and 86th Congresses. Tenure is linked to a simple median voter model. Increased tenure is associated with an increased ability to transfer government expenditures to the political unit. The increased size of government at the time of the 86th Congress compared to the 57th Congress, largely explains the greater length of time in office. The higher tenure of southern legislators is linked to lower per capita incomes.

Notes: Conclusions and caveats With political ideology with respect to the income distribution measured by proxy as the fraction of conservative coalition victories, it is found that over the period 1961–1984 the degree of conservative coalition strength is positively associated with changes in inequality, holding the effects of unemployment and inflation constant. A natural question is why don't the low income types vote in candidates who will consistently redistribute income in their favor? The result of such a political process would be a downward trend in income inequality. In point of fact, there is no evidence whatsoever of any trend in income equality over the period. The answer to both questions may be that Tullock (1983, 1986) is on to something. If the middle class voters transfer gains back and forth, the poor can't gain and they don't, then the distribution should be stable and is. Income redistribution is not a free good. It has been widely recognized that there are efficiency losses to the economy for movements toward greater income inequality (see Okun, 1975). Blinder (1982) has suggested an analytical framework for modeling the linkage between equity and efficiency. Structural modeling of policy variables on equality measures and Farrell-type efficiency measures reveals the order of magnitude of the trade-off for some policy instruments (see Hayes, Scully and Slottje, 1987a). It is highly likely that policy permutations that affect equity in one direction affect efficiency in the opposite direction. Political coalitions that succeed in moving the economy to a greater degree of equity create efficiency losses. The efficiency losses produce political coalitions that move the economy to a higher degree of efficiency (lower equity). By implication, policy and the income distribution are stochastic, and, the statistical association between the income distribution measures and the conservative coalition variable is spurious. Nelson and Plosser (1982) have found that a vast number of U.S. macroeconomic time series behave as a random walk. It has also been found that the various equity measures reported in this paper, when examined over the period 1947 to 1984, behave as a random walk (see Hayes, Porter-Hudak, Scully and Slottje, 1987b). One explanation is that in light of the strong empirical evidence on the stochastic evolution of the economy, of economic policy and of equity, and the finding of an empirical linkage between the equity measures and the political variable employed here, a case can be made that the strength of these political coalitions behaves stochastically. The conclusion is not that politics does not affect economic variables. Rather, the position of Congress on the liberal-conservative continuum is stochastic. These results are consistent with the Tullock hypothesis that redistribution is basically a middle income, pressure group activity with little gain for those as the bottom. Tullock might argue that it doesn't matter which group on the spectrum controls Congress, the transfers will be constrained to the middle. The empirical evidence doesn't invalidate his contentions. We do not have enough degrees of freedom to test whether the measure of the liberal-conservative spectrum is a deterministic function or is an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process.

Notes: Summary and conclusions The motives of the state in projecting a more than minimal presence in the economy may be conceived of as benevolent or malevolent. Whatever the characterization of the motivation, increases in the size of the government share of the economy adversely affect economic growth and the allocation of resources. Nations with relatively large government shares in 1960 on the whole grew more slowly than nations with relatively small state sectors. Interperiod increases in the size of government were associated with lower growth rates over the period. The size of the government share coefficients in the regressions were of sufficiently large magnitude to conclude that the rise in the size of the government has had a substantial depressing effect on economic growth. These results are consistent with those reported by Landau (1983) and Marlow (1986). Landau did not adjust economic growth for the growth in factor endowment. Consequently, his results overstate the adverse effect of government size. Government allocation of resources is thought to be less efficient than private allocation. For the first time in the literature, this hypothesis was tested directly by comparing efficiency measures with the measures of the size of the government sector. It was found that the size of the government share in the economy was negatively correlated with economic efficiency and with the inter-period change in economic efficiency. Nations with relatively large state sectors produced less output per head with the same input ratio than nations with relatively small government sectors.

Notes: Summary and conclusions The Adelman-Morris premise that economic development and equity are incompatible is not supported by the evidence of a strong relationship between equality of rights and the income distribution. The premise that equity requires the denial of individual rights and the affirmation of state control is an oxymoron. What has been overlooked in the literature on growth and equity is the effect of the rights structure on both economic efficiency and on the income distribution. The evidence is that free societies have much larger shares of income going to the middle 60 percent of the distribution than is observed in societies where men are not free to choose. In politically open societies compared to politically closed regimes the share of income to the middle three quintiles is: Q2 (10.7 vs. 8.0), Q3 (16.0 vs. 11.5), and Q4 (22.9 vs. 17.9). In the aggregate the shares to the middle quintiles are 49.6 vs. 37.4. In nations that obey the rule of law compared to regimes in which the rights of the state relative to the individual are paramount the comparisons are: Q2 (11.2 vs. 7.4), Q3 (16.3 vs. 10.6), Q4 (23.0 vs. 17.3). Summing the three quintiles yields a comparison of 50.5 vs. 35.3. In countries that have private property, market allocation of resources, and minimum intervention by the state compared to command economies the shares of income to the middle quintiles are: Q2 (10.8 vs. 8.0), Q3 (16.0 vs. 11.1), and Q4 (22.8 vs. 17.7). Aggregated the shares of the middle class in regimes with high levels of economic liberty are 49.6 vs. 36.8 for regimes with restricted private economic rights. Equally revealing as a matter of equity is the status of the poor and the rich in free and statist nations. The income share of the highest income group is much larger in nations that repress individual rights than in those where rights are protected. Averaging across the rights measures the share of income going to the highest income quintile is 58.3 percent among the least free nations and is 44.4 percent among the most free, a staggering difference of nearly 14.0 percentage points. Among the poorest members of society choice of the rights regime does not have much of an impact on their share of income. While the share averaged across rights measures is larger in the most free nations (5.7 vs. 5.3), the difference is not statistically significant.3 Economic progress and equity are not incompatible. Nations can move to a less restrictive rights regime and increase economic efficiency, economic growth, and equity. Collectivism is a lubricious path to economic progress and equity. Using Ward's composite inequality index, they correlated the Ward measure with GNP per capita, Gastil's rights measures, and a number of other policy and quality of life variables. They found evidence that choice of economic system (capitalism vs. socialism) had no effect on the inequality measure, but that inequality diminishes with increases in civil and political rights.

Notes: Conclusions We have constructed a number of summary indexes of economic liberty based on principal component and hedonic weighting techniques. While overall these indexes are related to each other in a statistical sense, there are sufficient differences among them to impact the rankings of the individual countries. Because the liberty indicators currently available for use are fairly coarse, the differences that these weighting techniques yield in the summary liberty indexes are understated. As research on liberty yields finer measures of the liberty indicators, the choice of the weighting technique will become more crucial in defining an overall measure of economic liberty. As Table 3 indicates, the simple overall ranking index we created summarizes the information content of all the other indexes (based on hedonic, data variance, etc. rationale) and appears to be very robust with respect to all of them. In addition, all the rankings indicate that economic growth and RGDP are positively correlated with the level of economic liberty within a nation.