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  • Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department  (4)
  • 1
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: While economists have tended to focus on specific public policies when developing recommendations, the achievement of welfare objectives might depend more on the quality of policies than their content. This paper develops several measures of the qualities of policies across countries, arguing that the quality of public policies depends on each polity's ability to strike intertemporal transactions necessary to develop and sustain effective policies. The analytical framework developed here indicates that this ability depends on several characteristics of political institutions, such as congressional capabilities, judicial independence, and bureaucratic independence and professionalism. The empirical evidence presented supports this idea. The measures of policy quality developed here could be utilized for other purposes, including the determination of conditions under which more public spending in a given area is likely to generate the desired outcomes.
    Keywords: D72 ; D78 ; H10 ; H50 ; O10 ; ddc:330 ; Political institutions ; Public policies ; Government capabilities ; Intertemporal cooperation ; Development ; Policy index ; Credibility ; Judicial independence ; Party institutionalization ; Congress capabilities ; Cabinet stability
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
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  • 3
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim of veto player theory by arguing that policy stability does not necessarily mean lower policy adaptability. If policymaking takes place over time with actors interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once, and a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal cooperation. The paper presents a simple formalization of the argument and some supportive cross-national empirical evidence.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
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  • 4
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: This paper introduces preliminary evidence from a cross-country database of policy characteristics and potential uses of that database. While most databases have emphasized either the content of policies (e.g., size of government deficits) or countries' formal institutions (e.g., political regime, electoral system), the variables in this database reflect the policymaking capabilities of different polities. The paper attempts to explain these policy characteristics as depending on the workings of political institutions, using a logic emphasizing intertemporal political compromise. The paper also contrasts this logic with alternatives such as the veto players approach. The paper concludes by suggesting the use of these policy characteristics or state capabilities as explanatory variables for the effectiveness of public spending in various social areas.
    Keywords: D72 ; D78 ; H10 ; H50 ; O10 ; ddc:330 ; Political institutions ; Public policies ; Government capabilities ; Veto players ; Intertemporal cooperation ; Development ; Human Development Index ; Public expenditures ; Policy index ; Adaptability ; Stability ; Judicial independence ; Party institutionalization ; Congress capabilities ; Cabinet stability ; Database
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
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