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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2018-01-25
    Description: In theory, individual producer responsibility (IPR) creates incentives for "design-for-recycling". Yet in practice, implementing IPR is challenging, particularly if applied to waste electric and electronic equipment. This article discusses different options for implementing IPR schemes and producers' under German WEEE legislation. In addition, practical aspects of a German "return share" brand sampling scheme are examined. Concerning "new" WEEE put on the market after 13 August 2006, producers in Germany can choose between two different methods of calculating take-back obligations. These can be determined on the basis of "return shares" or "market shares". While market shares are regularly monitored by a national clearing house, the "return share" option requires sampling and sorting of WEEE. Herein itis shown that the specifics of the German WEEE take-back scheme require high sample sizes and multi-step test procedures to ensure a statistically sound sampling approach. Since the market share allocation continues to apply for historic waste, producers lack incentives for choosing the costly brand sampling option. However, even return share allocation might not imply a decisive step towards IPR, as it merely represents an alternative calculation of market shares. Yet the fundamental characteristics of the German take-back system remain unchanged: the same anonymous mix of WEEE goes to the same treatment operations. In the future, radio frequency identification-based sorting options could foster IPR and incentives for changes in product design.
    Description: Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich. - This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Individual producer responsibility (IPR) ; extended producer responsibility (EPR) ; waste electric and electronic equipment (WEEE) ; return share ; brand sorting ; collection ; cost allocation ; Umweltmanagement ; Elektroindustrie ; Abfallentsorgung ; Deutschland
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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  • 2
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    Berlin: Springer | ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Kiel, Hamburg
    Publication Date: 2018-01-25
    Description: Adequate extension of electricity transmission networks is required for integrating fluctuating renewable energy sources, such as wind power, into electricity systems. We study the performance of different regulatory approaches for network expansion in the context of realistic demand patterns and fluctuating wind power. In particular, we are interested in the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory price-cap mechanism compared to a cost-based and a non-regulated approach. We include both an hourly time resolution and fluctuating wind power. This substantially increases the real-world applicability of results compared to previous analyses. We show that a combined merchant-regulatory regulation, which draws upon a cap over the two-part tariff of the transmission company, leads to welfare outcomes superior to the other modeled alternatives. This result proves to be robust over a range of different cases, including such with large amounts of fluctuating wind power. We also evaluate the outcomes of our detailed model using the extension plans resulting from a simplified model based on average levels of load and wind power. We show that this distorts the relative performance of the different regulatory approaches.
    Description: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-014-9260-0
    Keywords: L50 ; L94 ; Q40 ; ddc:330 ; Electricity transmission ; Incentive regulation ; Renewable integration ; Europe ; Windenergie ; Elektrizität ; Regulierung
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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