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  • C72  (1)
  • Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute  (1)
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction.
    Keywords: C72 ; D44 ; ddc:330 ; Auctions ; inefficiencies ; information disclosure ; competition ; Auktionstheorie ; Informationsökonomik ; Wettbewerb ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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