ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • ddc:330  (33)
  • Competition
  • Entwicklungsländer
  • Heidelberg: Springer  (14)
  • Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute  (10)
  • Brasília: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)  (9)
  • Göttingen: Ibero-Amerika-Inst. für Wirtschaftsforschung
Collection
Keywords
Language
  • 1
    Publication Date: 2018-12-07
    Description: This paper explores the long-run effects of inflation on the dynamics of private sector bank credit and economic growth in Mexico over the period 1969 - 2011. With an ARDL-type model, the statistical results suggest that the availability of private sector bank credit in the economy exerts a positive impact on real GDP. In addition, inflation rates have contributed negatively to the increase in private credit, liquid liabilities, and financial development. A key outcome is that one percent increase in inflation is associated with a 0.07 % fall in long-run real rate of output through its effect on bank credit to the private sector. Another crucial finding is that policies of financial liberalization have helped stimulate economic growth. Reinforcing the literature on finance and growth, this study reaffirms that inflation rates are detrimental to long-run financial development and economic growth.
    Keywords: E31 ; G21 ; E44 ; O4 ; C22 ; ddc:330 ; Inflation ; Private sector bank credit ; Financial development ; Growth
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Publication Date: 2018-12-07
    Description: Background: Opioid addiction is a worldwide problem. Agonist opioid treatment (AOT) is the most widespread and frequent pharmacotherapeutic approach. Methadone has been the most widely used AOT, but buprenorphine, a partial kappa-opiod agonist and a my-opiod antagonist, is fast gaining acceptance. The objective was to assess the budgetary impact in Spain of the introduction of buprenorphine-naloxone (B/N) combination. Methods: A budgetary impact model was developed to estimate healthcare costs of the addition of B/N combination to the therapeutic arsenal for treating opioid dependent patients, during a 3-year period under the National Health System perspective. Inputs for the model were obtained from the specialized scientific literature. Detailed information concerning resource consumption (drug cost, logistics, dispensing, medical, psychiatry and pharmacy supervision, counselling and laboratory test) was obtained from a local expert panel. Costs are expressed in euros (€, 2010). Results: The number of patients estimated to be prescribed B/N combination was 2,334; 2,993 and 3,589 in the first, second and third year respectively. Total budget is €85,766,129; €79,855,471 and €79,137,502 in the first, second and third year for the scenario without B/N combination. With B/N combination the total budget would be €86,589,210; €80,398,259 and €79,708,964 in the first, second and third year of the analyses. Incremental cost/ patient comparing the addition of the B/N combination to the scenario only with methadone is €10.58; €6.98 and €7.34 in the first, second and third year respectively. Conclusion: Addition of B/N combination would imply a maximum incremental yearly cost of €10.58 per patient compared to scenario only with methadone and would provide additional benefits.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Buprenorphine-naloxone, Methadone, budgetary impact, opioid dependence, Spain
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Publication Date: 2017-01-24
    Description: This paper investigates to what extent international migration can be explained by climatic variations. A gravity model of migration augmented with average temperature and precipitation in the country of origin is estimated using a panel data set of 142 sending countries for the period 1995 to 2006. We find two primary results. First, temperature is positively correlated with migration. Second, stronger changes in precipitation are also associated with aligned, but small changes in migration. Both effects are robust to various model modifications. Furthermore, we present initial explorations into the channels relating climate changes with migration via agriculture and internal conflict.
    Keywords: F22 ; Q54 ; ddc:330 ; International migration ; Climate change ; Gravity model ; Panel data
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to differentiate between employees on the basis of their abilities, and (2) to terminate employment of employees on probation. Generally, organizations benefit from committing to strict rules for various HRM practices.
    Keywords: M5 ; D82 ; D83 ; ddc:330 ; rules ; human resource management policies ; self-image ; motivation ; Personalmanagement ; Asymmetrische Information ; Leistungsmotivation ; Spieltheorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive, and (ii) overconfidenceleading to too much activism is more likely than underconfidenceleading to too much passivity. The predictions of our model are consistentwith findings in the social psychological literature.
    Keywords: D81 ; D82 ; D83 ; ddc:330 ; self-assessments ; learning about ability ; coaching ; overconfidence ; underconfidence
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. We show that the answer to this question depends on the cost of information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may lead to divergence of policy platforms.
    Keywords: D72 ; ddc:330 ; information collection ; spatial voting models ; Politische Partei ; Informationsverhalten ; Informationsversorgung ; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on the incumbent party. When parties are policy motivated, they also have to be motivated to select good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate policy motivated parties than office motivated parties to collect information. However, in contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that conflict with the representative voter’s interest.
    Keywords: D72 ; ddc:330 ; political competition ; information ; polarization. ; Politische Partei ; Informationsversorgung ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers etc. We analyse the nature of (implicit) retention contracts boards use to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials; that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak; and that boards occasionally dismiss competent executives.
    Keywords: G30 ; G34 ; ddc:330 ; board of directors ; turnover ; retention contracts ; selection ; moral hazard ; empire building
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no substantial effects on organizational outcomes.
    Keywords: D20 ; D40 ; D63 ; D82 ; J30 ; ddc:330 ; Delegation ; Real Authority ; Strategic Ignorance ; Kooperative Führung ; Autorität ; Asymmetrische Information ; Test
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-08-31
    Description: This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment investigating a manager's decision whether or not to delegate authority to a better informed worker whose interests are often, but not always, congruent. Keeping authority implies a loss of information, as the worker communicates his information strategically. Delegating authority leads to a loss of control. A key aspect of our design is that the manager can restrict the worker's choice set when delegating authority. We find that, in case of delegation, managers (as predicted) put tighter restrictions when interests are less aligned. Workers send more informative messages under communication than predicted by the pure strategy equilibria. This finding neither appears to be driven by lying aversion of workers nor by credulity of managers. Qualitatively, our results are in line with a mixed strategy equilibrium under communication, which strictly outperforms optimal restricted delegation and is relatively close to the optimal stochastic mechanism in our setting.
    Keywords: C90 ; D80 ; M20 ; ddc:330 ; Delegation ; Communication ; Laboratory Experiment ; Organizational Economics
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...