ISSN:
1573-7101
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Conclusion In this paper I have shown that a purely economic theory of nationalization and privatization is conceivable, on the basis of an analysis of government as a rationally discriminating operator acting as the agent of pressure groups competing for redistribution. Variations in cost of capital differentials between private investors and the state (essentially due to the existence of taxation) explain alternate policies of taking over privately owned corporations and divesting from state enterprises (SOEs). Some initial empirical results are encouraging. Consequently I cannot reject the hypothesis that, through nationalization and privatization episodes, politicians, after all, do behave according to economic rationality.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01053442
Permalink
