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  • 1995-1999  (2)
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Year
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 91 (1997), S. 199-207 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this comment it is argued that the game-theoretical analysis presented by Rasmusen (1993) is incomplete. First, a short description of his model is given, then a proposition stating all equilibria of the model is presented. The proposition supplements the analysis of Rasmusen by showing that an, in our view plausible, equilibrium is ignored. Thereupon a comprehensive equilibrium analysis leads us to qualify his argument; lobbying does not always fully substitute for independent investigation, truthful lobbying is not successful, and a lobbyist having the ‘right’ information does not always gets his way.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 14 (1997), S. 449-464 
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract.  This comment deals with some imperfections of the analysis presented by Austen-Smith and Wright [1]. It is argued that in [1] being informed is incorrectly identified with being informative, yielding an incomplete equilibrium analysis, and leading to bias in the kind of equilibrium behavior predicted. After correcting for this bias, the results obtained corroborate their main conclusion – legislators are often lobbied by just one of two competing groups, typically the a priori disadvantaged group. The comment also strengthens their case for counteractive lobbying; the a priori favored group typically only lobbies to counteract the influence of an opposing group. Another conclusion, however, is qualified; an increase in the groups’ stakes can make it less, rather than more, likely that the legislator makes the correct decision.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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