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  • 1995-1999  (3)
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Year
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Characterizing solutions of supermodular games; intuitive comparative statics, and unique equilibria (1995)
    Springer
    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 181-188 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We present a technique for locating both an upper and a lower bound on equilibrium points of supermodular games by looking only at the first derivatives of the payoff functions at points of disequilibrium. This technique is useful for characterizing equilibria of games when the closed form solution is difficult to calculate, for performing comparative statics analysis, and for determining the uniqueness of equilibria.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213650
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper considers the incentives of a firm with power in a market for one good to tie in the sale of a complementary good even though the complementary good is produced in a zero profit market. If the zero-profit price of the tied good is greater than the marginal cost (which occurs for example when the technology is characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost), a firm will fie in order to increase the sales of the complementary good, which at the margin is profitable. We show that such tying will lower the effective prices paid by customers and increase welfare. This incentive exists if the firm with market power is a monopolist or one of several competing oligopolists.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00433.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination Implies Uniformity (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: DeGraba and Postlewaite (1992) show that the seller of a durable input can solve the time inconsistency problem by offering most-favored-customer (MFC) protection to buyers. McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that if a supplier sells inputs to competing firms using two-part tariffs, MFC protection that allows a firm to replace its contract with a contract executed by any other firm will not solve the commitment problem, and argue this implies managers cannot use MFCs as a strategic commitment device in complex contracting situations. This paper shows that if the profits of the seller and the buyers are monotonic in each term of the contract, then applying MFC protection to each term of a contract allows a manager to solve his commitment problem in complex contacting situations. We show that “standard” contract arrangements (two-part tariffs, declining block tariffs, and royalties as a percentage of sales) meet this condition.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00565.x
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