ISSN:
1573-0476
Keywords:
lottery payoffs
;
auctions
;
experimental economics
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract The lottery payoff procedure does not successfully induce risk-neutral bidding behavior in first-price, sealedbid auctions. This conclusion follows from both ordinary-least-squares estimation with natural data and leastabsolute-deviation estimation with transformed data from numerous experimental designs. Lottery payoffs do not succeed in inducing behavior predicted from standard expected utility theory assumptions or from assumed utility from winning and/or income thresholds. In contrast, first-price auction experiments with monetary payoffs yield results that are consistent with general models of bidding in the independent private values information environment.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01132731
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