ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games (2000)
    Springer
    Economic theory 16 (2000), S. 661-687 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Market entry games, Coordination success, Large groups, Adaptive learning, Nash equilibrium solution. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D83.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering, which of the two markets to enter. Across symmetric and asymmetric markets, we find remarkable coordination on the aggregate level, which is accounted for by the Nash equilibrium, together with considerable individual differences in frequency of entry and decision rules. With experience, the decisions of most players converge to decision rules with cutoff values on the combined market capacity that determine whether or not to enter but not which of the two markets to enter. This latter decision is determined probabilistically by the differential market capacities. The aggregate and individual results are accounted for quite well by a reinforcement-based learning model that combines deterministic and probabilistic elements.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050009
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation (1994)
    Springer
    Economic theory 4 (1994), S. 255-273 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01221203
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Nakamura Theorem for coalition structures of quota games (1996)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 25 (1996), S. 189-198 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper considers a model of society $$S$$ with a finite number of individuals,n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω effective coalitions that must contain ana priori given numberq of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of sizeq which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given e andq, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, $$S$$ -equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines bothfree entry andfree mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01247101
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining (1996)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 40 (1996), S. 131-147 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bargaining ; core ; mechanism robustness
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper discusses the relationship between coalitional stability and the robustness of bargaining outcomes to the bargaining procedure. We consider a class of bargaining procedures described by extensive form games, where payoff opportunities are given by a characteristic function (cooperative) game. The extensive form games differ on the probability distribution assigned to chance moves which determine the order in which players take actions. One way to define mechanism robustness is in terms of the property of ‘no first mover advantage’. An equilibrium is mechanism robust if for each member the expected payoff before and after being called to propose is the same. Alternatively one can define mechanism robustness as a property of equilibrium outcomes. An outcome is said to be mechanism robust if it is supported by some equilibrium in all the extensive form games (mechanisms) within our class. We show that both definitions of mechanism robustness provide an interesting characterization of the core of the underlying cooperative game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00133170
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games (1994)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 11 (1994), S. 165-175 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have either finite sets of players or continuum sets of players and finite coalitions. Our research is based on Peleg's axiomatization for finite games and on the notions of measurement-consistent partitions and the f-core introduced by Kaneko and Wooders. Since coalitions are finite in both finite games and in continuum games, we can use the reduced game property and the converse reduced game property for our axiomatization. Both properties are particularly appealing in large economies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00179212
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Biased-Belief Equilibrium (2020)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 2020-05-01
    Description: We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player’s beliefs about the opponent’s strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that (i) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent’s strategy, and (ii) the distortion functions form best responses to one another. We obtain sharp predictions and novel insights into the set of stable outcomes and their supporting stable biases in various classes of games. (JEL C73, D83)
    Print ISSN: 1945-7669
    Electronic ISSN: 1945-7685
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
  • 7
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions (2010)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2010-03-24
    Description: We consider homogeneous two-sided markets, in which connected buyer-seller pairs bargain and trade repeatedly. In this infinite market game with exogenous matching probabilities and a common discount factor, we prove the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies. The equilibrium payoffs are given implicitly as a solution to a system of linear equations. Then, we endogenize the matching mechanism in a link formation stage that precedes the market game. When agents are sufficiently patient and link costs are low, we provide an algorithm to construct minimally connected networks that are pairwise stable with respect to the expected payoffs in the trading stage. The constructed networks are essentially efficient and consist of components with a constant buyer-seller ratio. The latter ratio increases (decreases) for a buyer (seller) that deletes one of her links in a pairwise stable component.
    Print ISSN: 2194-6124
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1704
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
  • 8
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    In Wrong Anticipation - Miscalibrated Beliefs between Germans, Israelis, and Palestinians (2016)
    Public Library of Science
    Details
    Publication Date: 2016-06-16
    Electronic ISSN: 1932-6203
    Topics: Medicine , Natural Sciences in General
    Published by Public Library of Science
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
  • 9
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities (2012)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 2012-05-01
    Description: We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents' benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts, we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities' asymmetry. (JEL D62, D82, D86)
    Print ISSN: 1945-7669
    Electronic ISSN: 1945-7685
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
  • 10
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Incentives and Discrimination (2004)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 2004-05-01
    Print ISSN: 0002-8282
    Electronic ISSN: 1944-7981
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...