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  • 1
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    Norwell, Mass. : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Journal of regulatory economics. 7:2 (1995:Mar.) 161-175 
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  • 2
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract.  In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of regulatory economics 7 (1995), S. 161-175 
    ISSN: 1573-0468
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract An Incremental Incentive Scheme (IIS) encourages some activity by rewarding an agent for overachieving a base level determined by past performance but not penalizing underachievement. We examine an IIS R&D subsidy in a dynamic model due to Grossman and Shapiro (1986). We show that the firm's optimal R&D path either cycles around the no-subsidy path or follows a “ratchet” pattern of small increases in R&D relative to the no-subsidy path. A simple condition determines which type of behavior occurs. Furthermore, we show that an IIS may be an inefficient method of encouraging R&D compared to a flat-rate subsidy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
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    Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
    Publication Date: 2020-01-17
    Description: We examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct monopolist who serves customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing mechanisms that fully extract the surplus from each consumer. Our main insight is that regardless of the dimensionality of the consumers types and the number of goods that the monopoly produces, the surplus that each consumer gets from buying is a scalar. Hence, it is possible to design a two step mechanism where in the first step the monopoly induces the consumers to make efficient purchasing decisions (given their private information), and in the second step the monopoly extracts the surplus from each consumer via a (random) fixed fee.
    Keywords: D42 ; D82 ; ddc:330 ; nonlinear prices ; multidimensional types ; correlated types ; incremental cost ; Clarke-Groves mechanisms
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. We show that it is neither connected nor closed in allocation space. Furthermore, if the public goods are local, the image of the Pareto set in utility space need not be closed or connected. We provide two independent sufficient conditions for the closedness of the Pareto set. The results are directly applicable to private goods economies with joint production. Our results should be of interest for general equilibrium and mechanism design theory; where for example, the properties of the efficient set are important for proving the existence of an equilibrium and for the study of the properties of monotone-path social choice correspondences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. We show that it is neither connected nor closed in allocation space. Furthermore, if the public goods are local, the image of the Pareto set in utility space need not be closed or connected. We provide two independent sufficient conditions for the closedness of the Pareto set. The results are directly applicable to private goods economies with joint production. Our results should be of interest for general equilibrium and mechanism design theory; where for example, the properties of the efficient set are important for proving the existence of an equilibrium and for the study of the properties of monotone-path social choice correspondences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long-term investment in infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the magnitude of investment signals high future demand may include a low degree of managerial myopia, large variability of future demand, a lenient regulatory climate, and low sunk cost. Our model suggests that in estimating valuation models of regulated firms it is important to separate firms into two groups: firms for which a separating equilibrium is likely to obtain and firms for which the equilibrium is likely to be pooling. The market value of a firm in the first group is positively correlated with its level of investment, but uncorrelated with the level of actual demand, whereas for the second group the opposite holds.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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