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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Keywords: I14 ; I24 ; I32 ; I38 ; J13 ; J16 ; J71 ; G20 ; G21 ; ddc:330
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: Spanish
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    La Paz: Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: In this study, I use the timing and eligibility criteria of a large-scale conditional cash transfer program in Bolivian public schools to identify the efect of the program on adults' labor supply. I find that adult females increase their labor supply due to the program, mostly through self-employment. To understand these results, I sketch a simple theoretical framework of selection into employment that introduces fixed costs to work and imperfections in capital markets, two main features of the process of development. In this environment, households select into employment only if they are able to self-finance the fixed costs. I derive additional predictions that are empirically tested. First, the positive treatment efects should manifest at the extensive and not the intensive margin. Estimating treatment efects along the cumulative density function of work hours/week, I find that the efects on labor supply come exclusively from the extensive margin. Second, the efects of an income shock should be stronger when capital market frictions are more salient. Using baseline data for the supply of financial services at the municipality level as a third diference, I find that the efects on labor supply are higher for women in more credit-constrained areas. I compare these results with compelling alternative explanations such as in creases in local aggregate demand induced by the program and the relaxation of time constraints for mothers due to the condition component of the program. I find no evidence supporting these two alternative mechanisms. Overall, the results suggest that after considering the role of credit and labor market frictions, the first step in limbing the ladder of development is to cover come the barriers households face in simply starting to work.
    Keywords: D13 ; J46 ; J21 ; J22 ; O12 ; O18 ; ddc:330 ; Labor supply ; poverty traps ; gender ; conditional cash transfers
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
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    La Paz: Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: Delegating the allocation of public resources to community members is an increasingly popular form of delivering development programs and are associated with a tradeoff between improved information about potential beneficiaries and favoritism towards local elites. Unlike targeting cash transfers to the poor, the optimal targeting of credit is a more complex problem involving issues of productivity, repayment, and market responses: This paper analyzes this problem using a large-scale lending program, the Thai Million Baht Credit Fund, which decentralizes the allocation of loans to an elected group of community members, and provides three main results. First, exploiting a long and detailed panel, I recover pre-program structural estimates of household total factor productivity and find that resources from the program were not allocated to high-productivity, poor households, which is inconsistent with poverty and productive efficiency as targeting criteria. Second, using socioeconomic networks data, I show that actual targeting is strongly driven by connections to village elites and is related to lower program profitability, which suggests favoritism as a reason for mistargeting. Finally, I exploit quasi-experimental variation in the rollout of the program and uncover evidence that, in general equilibrium, informal credit markets compensate for targeting distortions by redirecting credit towards unconnected households, albeit at higher interest rates than those provided by the program. The results highlight the limitations of community-driven approaches to program delivery and the role of markets in attenuating potential targeting errors.
    Keywords: D14 ; G21 ; O12 ; O16 ; O17 ; L14 ; Z13 ; ddc:330 ; credit ; social networks ; misallocation ; targeting
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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