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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2016-09-22
    Description: This paper discusses the organizational structure and technical, operational and political capabilities required for successful productive development policies (PDPs). It also discusses how countries can match their PDPs to existing capabilities, as well as expand their capabilities in the long run. The specific difficulties associated with PDPs are also discussed.
    Keywords: H10 ; H11 ; L50 ; O25 ; ddc:330 ; Government performance ; Industrial policy
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2018-02-06
    Description: This paper summarizes the findings of the recent Inter-American Development Bank book Two to Tango: Public-Private Collaboration Productive Development Policies, based on case studies of 25 productive development policies (PDPs) in five countries and discusses an additional example from Peru. One finding that emerges from those studies is that governments could not make policy in isolation and needed private sector involvement at every phase of the policy process. It is also found that the private sector generally collaborated in the design and implementation of PDPs without attempting to manipulate or capture them. In contrast to previous views of PDPs as static and best undertaken in isolation by governments, successful PDPs involve a dynamic and interactive process with ample and continuous private sector participation.
    Keywords: L52 ; O25 ; O54 ; ddc:330 ; Productive development policies ; Industrial policy ; Policymaking process
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 3
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    Wellesley, MA: Wellesley College, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-06-27
    Description: This paper studies Latin American exchange rate regimes since 1960. We model government exchange rate regime choice, constrained by politics. The model implies that the larger the tradable sectors exposed to international competition, the less likely is the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime. It also implies that the probability of the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate increases as an election approaches. We evaluate these implications with hazard models to analyze the duration dependence of Latin American exchange rate arrangements from 1960 to 1994. We find substantial empirical evidence to support the model. Results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of other economic and political variables, to different time and country samples, and to different definitions of regime arrangement. Controlling for economic factors, a one percentage point increase in the size of the manufacturing sector is associated with a reduction of six months in the longevity of a country?s currency peg. An impending election increases the conditional likelihood of staying on a peg by about 8 percent, while the aftershock of an election conversely increases the conditional probability of going off a peg by 4 percent.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Wechselkurspolitik ; Fester Wechselkurs ; Lateinamerika
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 4
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: In this paper detailed information on the budget institutions of Latin American countries is collected. These institutions are classified on a hierarchical/collegial scale, as a function of the existence of constraints on the deficit and voting rules.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Öffentliche Schulden ; Öffentlicher Haushalt ; Finanzpolitik ; Finanzverfassung ; Institutionalismus ; Lateinamerika
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 6
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: Countries that are classified as having floating exchange rate systems (or very wide bands) show strikingly different patterns of behavior. They hold very different levels of international reserves and allow very different volatilities in the movements of the exchange rate relative to the volatility that they tolerate either on the level of reserves or in interest rates. We document these differences and present a model that explains them as the optimal response of a Central Bank that attempts to minimize a standard loss function, in an environment in which firms are credit-constrained and incomplete markets limit their ability to avoid currency mismatches. This model suggests that the difference in the way countries float could be related to their differing levels of exchange rate pass-through and differences in their ability to avoid currency mismatches. We test these implications and find a very strong and robust relationship between the pattern of floating and the ability of a country to borrow internationally in its own currency. We find weaker and less robust evidence on the importance of pass-through to account for differences across countries with respect to their exchange rate/monetary management.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Flexibler Wechselkurs ; Wechselkurspolitik ; Währungsreserven ; Exchange Rate Pass-Through ; Welt
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 7
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: While economists have tended to focus on specific public policies when developing recommendations, the achievement of welfare objectives might depend more on the quality of policies than their content. This paper develops several measures of the qualities of policies across countries, arguing that the quality of public policies depends on each polity's ability to strike intertemporal transactions necessary to develop and sustain effective policies. The analytical framework developed here indicates that this ability depends on several characteristics of political institutions, such as congressional capabilities, judicial independence, and bureaucratic independence and professionalism. The empirical evidence presented supports this idea. The measures of policy quality developed here could be utilized for other purposes, including the determination of conditions under which more public spending in a given area is likely to generate the desired outcomes.
    Keywords: D72 ; D78 ; H10 ; H50 ; O10 ; ddc:330 ; Political institutions ; Public policies ; Government capabilities ; Intertemporal cooperation ; Development ; Policy index ; Credibility ; Judicial independence ; Party institutionalization ; Congress capabilities ; Cabinet stability
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 8
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 9
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: This paper considers whether institutional factors, in this instance electoral systems and procedures, affect Latin American countries` fiscal performance as measured by the size of the public sector, fiscal deficits, the size of the public debt, and the degree of procyclality of fiscal policy. The authors find that electoral systems characterized by large district magnitude and high political fragmentation have larger governments, larger deficits, and more procyclical fiscal policies. Transparent and hierarchical budget procedures, on the other hand, lead to lower deficits and levels of debt.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: This paper tests whether Rodrik`s (1999) results that institutions for conflict management are associated with the ability to react to economic shocks are robust to different ways of defining the quality of such institutions. We measure the quality of conflict management institutions with two different indices. The first is an index of political constraints on the ability of the executive to impose its will. These constraints limit the ability of the government to arbitrarily change the rules of the game and therefore may reduce redistributive struggles. The second index measures the degree of political particularism. We define political particularism as the policymakers` ability to further their career by catering to narrow interests rather than broader national platforms. The indices used in this paper solve the endogeneity and subjectivity biases that affect Rodrik`s measure of institutional quality. We find strong support for the idea that high levels of political constraints and intermediate levels of political particularism are associated with a quick recovery from economic shocks.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Wirtschaftswachstum ; Wirtschaftskrise ; Institutionalismus ; Sozialer Konflikt ; Entwicklungsländer ; Schwellenländer
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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