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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 14 (1997), S. 449-464 
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract.  This comment deals with some imperfections of the analysis presented by Austen-Smith and Wright [1]. It is argued that in [1] being informed is incorrectly identified with being informative, yielding an incomplete equilibrium analysis, and leading to bias in the kind of equilibrium behavior predicted. After correcting for this bias, the results obtained corroborate their main conclusion – legislators are often lobbied by just one of two competing groups, typically the a priori disadvantaged group. The comment also strengthens their case for counteractive lobbying; the a priori favored group typically only lobbies to counteract the influence of an opposing group. Another conclusion, however, is qualified; an increase in the groups’ stakes can make it less, rather than more, likely that the legislator makes the correct decision.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2018-07-17
    Description: We test the hypothesis, based on popular and theoretical perspectives, that entrepreneurs are more action-oriented than other occupational groups. We compare their playing strategies in an optimal stopping game using a randomized online experiment among 100s of entrepreneurs, managers and employees. Our experimental results show that entrepreneurs are indeed more action-oriented than others. We theorize that this is driven by their lower levels of loss aversion and higher levels of curiosity. Our empirical test results show that (i) entrepreneurs score indeed higher, on average, than managers and employees on curiosity and lower on loss aversion; (ii) the difference in action-orientedness between entrepreneurs and others vanishes when controlling for individual curiosity levels and (iii) an alternative treatment that provides subjects with counterfactual information (about what would have happened in case of stopping) increases their willingness to stop. Under some assumptions, the combination of these results leads to the conclusion that the higher action-orientedness of entrepreneurs can be linked to their greater curiosity, but not to their lower level of loss aversion. Hence, we find support for the intuitive idea that (curiosity driven) action-orientedness enhances the identification and/or exploitation of opportunities.
    Keywords: L26 ; C93 ; D03 ; ddc:330 ; entrepreneurs ; managers ; employees ; inaction ; curiosity ; loss aversion ; lab-in-the field experiment
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no substantial effects on organizational outcomes.
    Keywords: D20 ; D40 ; D63 ; D82 ; J30 ; ddc:330 ; delegation ; real authority ; strategic ignorance ; Kooperative Führung ; Autorität ; Asymmetrische Information ; Test
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 4
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-11-24
    Description: Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an environment where both demand reduction and preemptive bidding are supported as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of experiments, we compare its performance to that of the discriminatory auction. Strategic demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry by the newcomer imposes a (large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs worse than the discriminatory auction both in terms of revenue and efficiency, while the two auction formats offer similar chances for newcomers to enter the market.
    Keywords: D44 ; D45 ; C91 ; ddc:330 ; Multi-license auctions ; demand reduction ; external effects ; preemption ; Auktion ; Auktionstheorie ; Konzession ; Nachfrage ; Test
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
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    Unknown
    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-11-24
    Description: We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that subjects will choose the payoff dominated game (representing a bad explicit contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity considerations. We also explicitly test how game choice is affected by the length of the repeated game.
    Keywords: C91 ; M52 ; J41 ; ddc:330 ; relational contracts ; explicit incentives ; crowding out ; experiments ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Vertrauen ; Arbeitsvertrag ; Unvollständiger Vertrag ; Implizite Kontrakte ; Test
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 6
    Publication Date: 2017-01-25
    Description: We test the hypothesis, based on popular and theoretical perspectives, that entrepreneurs are more action-oriented than other occupational groups. We compare their playing strategies in an optimal stopping game using a randomized online experiment among 100s of entrepreneurs, managers and employees. Our experimental results show that entrepreneurs are indeed more action-oriented than others. We theorize that this is driven by their lower levels of loss aversion and higher levels of curiosity. Our empirical test results show that (i) entrepreneurs score indeed higher, on average, than managers and employees on curiosity and lower on loss aversion; (ii) the di fference in action-orientedness between entrepreneurs and others vanishes when controlling for individual curiosity levels and (iii) an alternative treatment that provides subjects with counterfactual information (about what would have happened in case of stopping) increases their willingness to stop. Under some assumptions, the combination of these results leads to the conclusion that the higher action-orientedness of entrepreneurs can be linked to their greater curiosity, but not to their lower level of loss aversion. Hence, we find support for the intuitive idea that (curiosity driven) action-orientedness enhances the identi fication and/or exploitation of opportunities.
    Keywords: L26 ; C93 ; D03 ; ddc:330 ; Entrepreneurs ; Managers ; Employees ; Inaction ; Curiosity ; Loss aversion ; Lab-in-the field experiment
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 104 (2000), S. 81-120 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 91 (1997), S. 199-207 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this comment it is argued that the game-theoretical analysis presented by Rasmusen (1993) is incomplete. First, a short description of his model is given, then a proposition stating all equilibria of the model is presented. The proposition supplements the analysis of Rasmusen by showing that an, in our view plausible, equilibrium is ignored. Thereupon a comprehensive equilibrium analysis leads us to qualify his argument; lobbying does not always fully substitute for independent investigation, truthful lobbying is not successful, and a lobbyist having the ‘right’ information does not always gets his way.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant to changes in the distribution of the noise term. This suggests that enriching the economic model commonly applied within this area by including an expectancy parameter is not needed.
    Keywords: J33 ; C91 ; D81 ; ddc:330 ; Expectancy theory ; agency theory ; performance measurement ; experiments ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Leistungsanreiz ; Leistungsbeurteilung
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2016-04-21
    Description: Theory predicts that default breach remedies are immaterial whenever contracting costs are negligible. Some experimental studies, however, suggest that in practice default rules do matter, as they may affect parties' preferences over contract terms. This paper presents results from an experiment designed to address the importance of default breach remedies for actual contract outcomes. We find that default rules do have an influence. The reason for this is not that contract proposals and/or responses are biased towards the default, but rather that parties often disagree over what the best contract is and therefore end up with the default.
    Keywords: K12 ; C91 ; ddc:330 ; breach remedies ; default remedies ; experiments
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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