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    Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
    Publication Date: 2012-11-22
    Description: This article characterizes the properties of the compensation scheme of delegated portfolio management that would lead to the selection of high risk-high return portfolios. In particular, it provides conditions under which a non-monotone payment structure emerges as an optimal contract, which rewards extreme results and punishes moderate ones.
    Keywords: D86 ; G11 ; G20 ; G30 ; J33 ; M52 ; ddc:330 ; executive compensation ; delegated portfolio management ; nonmonotone incentive schemes ; non-monotone likelihood ratio property
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: Spanish
    Type: doc-type:article
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