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  • 1
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.
    Keywords: D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; social choice ; impossibility theorems ; metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion ; Unmöglichkeitstheorem ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost-single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.
    Keywords: D61 ; D62 ; D78 ; ddc:330 ; indivisible project ; single beneficiary ; multiple-cost bearers ; unilateral information ; efficient and fair implementation ; Genehmigung ; Investition ; Projektbewertung ; Asymmetrische Information ; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 3
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: In this study we propose an axiomatic theory of decision-making under risk that is based on a new approach to the modeling of framing that focuses on the subjective statistical dependence between prizes of compared lotteries. Unlike existing models that allow objective statistical dependence, as in Regret Theory, in our model the emphasis is on alternative subjective statistical dependence patterns that are induced by alternative descriptions of the lotteries, i.e., by alternative framing. A distinct advantage of the proposed general descriptive model of choice is its ability to adequately explain a wide variety of behaviors and, in particular, several well-known paradoxes of different types.
    Keywords: D81 ; ddc:330 ; framing ; statistical dependence ; non-expected utility ; expected value of lottery interchange ; Entscheidungstheorie ; Framing ; Risiko ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 4
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers.
    Keywords: D81 ; D71 ; ddc:330 ; project selection ; public policy ; collective decision making ; committee ; uncertain dichotomous choice ; specialization ; simple majority rule ; Politische Entscheidung ; Gruppenentscheidung ; Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit ; Abstimmungsregel ; Neue politische Ökonomie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize. We consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer's preferred discrimination between the contestants. Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Rent Seeking ; Political Culture ; Discrimination ; Contests ; Logit contest success function ; All-Pay-Auction ; Wettbewerb ; Extensives Spiel ; Auktionstheorie ; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie ; Politische Kultur ; Rent-Seeking ; Diskriminierung ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 6
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: A competitive rent-seeking club (CRSC) offers its members the chance of winning a prize (status, position, privilege) by being selected, typically, by a civil servant or a politician. The selector replaces in our setting the usual contest success function; instead of determining the winner on the basis of the club-members' efforts, he selects the winner on the basis of quality. This paper focuses on the effect of incomplete search of the selector on the efficiency of democratic self-governing and decentralized RSC's that control admittance to the club and its transparency, assuming that quality of their members is fixed. The incomplete search of the selector is assumed to take the simple form of fixed random sampling of the contestants - the members of the CRSC. Our results imply that, even when active rent-seeking expenditures are disregarded, the decisions of CRSC's regarding their composition and transparency tend to reduce quality and are therefore inefficient.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; competitive rent-seeking clubs ; self governance ; decentralized decisions ; quality competition ; selection by fixed random sampling ; simple majority rule ; endogenous membership determination ; transparency ; inefficiency ; quality decay ; Rent-Seeking ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 7
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed privatepublic good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size. (iii) In each group the members decide how much effort to put without observing the sharing rules of the other groups. We provide simple characterizations of the relationship between group characteristics, performance of the competing groups (winning probability and per capita expected utility) and the type of sharing rules they select. Interestingly, richer and more efficient groups or groups with larger valuation of the prize tend to be more equalitarian. We also clarify under what circumstances such tendency is due to larger membership.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; collective contest ; mixed public-good prize ; endogenous sharing rules ; the group-size paradox ; Arbeitsgruppe ; Extensives Spiel ; Erfolgsbeteiligung ; Öffentliche Güter ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 8
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: The classic fair cake-cutting problem [Steinhaus, 1948] is extended by introducing geometric constraints on the allocated pieces. Specifically, agents may demand to get their share as a square or a rectangle with a bounded length/width ratio. This is a plausible constraint in realistic cake-cutting applications, notably in urban and agricultural economics where the cake is land. Geometric constraints greatly affect the classic results of the fair division theory. The existence of a proportional division, giving each agent 1/n of his total cake value, is no longer guaranteed. We prove that it is impossible to guarantee each agent more than 1/(2n-1) of his total value. Moreover, we provide procedures implementing partially proportional division, giving each agent 1/(An-B) of his total value, where A and B are constants depending on the shape of the cake and its pieces. Fairness and social welfare implications of these procedures are analyzed in various scenarios.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; fair division ; cake cutting ; land division ; geometry ; non-additive utilities ; social welfare
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 9
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: In certain judgmental situations where a correct decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This paper presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters' past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities as probabilities yields some optimal aggregation rule that, in turn, yields a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. Thus, a skill-evaluation equilibrium can be defined as an evaluation of decisional skills that yields itself as a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. We show that such equilibrium exists and offer a procedure for finding one. The obtained equilibrium is locally optimal and is shown empirically to generally be globally optimal in terms of the correctness of the resulting collective decisions. Interestingly, under minimally competent (almost symmetric) skill distributions that allow unskilled decision makers, the optimal rule considerably outperforms the common simple majority rule (SMR). Furthermore, a sufficient record of past decisions ensures that the collective probability of making a correct decision converges to 1, as opposed to accuracy of about 0.7 under SMR. Our proposed optimal voting procedure relaxes the fundamental (and sometimes unrealistic) assumptions in Condorcet celebrated theorem and its extensions, such as sufficiently high decision-making quality, skill homogeneity or existence of a sufficiently large group of decision makers.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Condorcet-Paradoxon ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcet-consistent voting rules satisfy the simple-majority decisiveness property. The problem implied by such decisiveness, namely, the universal disregard of the preferences of the minority, can be ameliorated by applying unbiased scoring rules such as the classical Borda rule, but such amelioration has a price; it implies erosion in the implementation of the widely accepted 'majority principle'. Furthermore, the problems of majority decisiveness and of the erosion in the majority principle are not necessarily severe when one takes into account the likelihood of their occurrence. This paper focuses on the evaluation of the severity of the two problems, comparing simple-majoritarian voting rules that allow the decisiveness of the smallest majority larger than 1/2 and the classical Borda method of counts. Our analysis culminates in the derivation of the conditions that determine, in terms of the number of alternatives k, the number of voters n and the relative (subjective) weight assigned to the severity of the two problems, which of these rules is superior in light of the dual majoritarian approach.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; majority decisiveness ; Condorcet criterion ; erosion of majority principle ; the Borda method of counts ; Abstimmungsregel ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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