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  • 1
    ISSN: 1434-193X
    Keywords: Bicyclo[1.1.1]pentane ; Haloarenes, cross-coupling of ; Propellanes ; Palladium ; Catalysis ; Small-ring systems ; Chemistry ; General Chemistry
    Source: Wiley InterScience Backfile Collection 1832-2000
    Topics: Chemistry and Pharmacology
    Notes: -Radical addition reactions of organyl iodides 7a-s onto [1.1.1]propellane (2) followed by halogen-lithium exchange and transmetallation with zinc chloride, as well as additions of Grignard reagents to 2, have furnished a variety of 3-substituted bicyclo[1.1.1]pentyl-1-magnesium (14) and -zinc (19) derivatives. The latter have been coupled with various alkenyl, aryl, and biaryl halides and triflates under NiCl2dppe, Pd(PPh3)4, or PdCl2(dppf) catalysis to give a number of 1,3-disubstituted bicyclo[1.1.1]pentyl derivatives 17, 20, and 23, several of which exhibit liquid crystalline properties, in moderate to very good yields. The coupling products 20ca, 23ab, 23ae, 23ff, and 23fg have been further transformed to yield bicyclo[1.1.1]pentyl derivatives 32, 24ab, 24ae, 27ff, and 27fg, respectively, bearing alkynyl, cyano, and/or alkenyl groups.
    Additional Material: 7 Tab.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2015-05-22
    Description: This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the profit maximizing mechanisms for the seller and characterize the conditions under which the seller can gain by employing an ambiguous mechanism.
    Keywords: C72 ; D44 ; D82 ; ddc:330 ; optimal mechanism design ; ambiguity aversion ; incentive compatibility ; individual rationality
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2015-08-19
    Description: We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer’s valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much information the seller has about the mean. However, when the seller has information about the mean and the variance, or the mean and the upper bound of the support, the seller optimally commits to a randomization over prices and obtains a strictly positive payoff. In such a case additional information about the mean and/or the variance affects his payoff.
    Keywords: C72 ; D44 ; D82 ; ddc:330 ; optimal mechanism design ; robustness ; incentive compatibility ; individual rationality ; ambiguity aversion
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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