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  • 1
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize. We consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer's preferred discrimination between the contestants. Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; rent seeking ; political culture ; discrimination ; contests ; logit contest success function ; All-Pay-Auction ; Wettbewerb ; Extensives Spiel ; Auktionstheorie ; Mechanism Design ; Politische Kultur ; Rent Seeking ; Diskriminierung ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups' objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.
    Keywords: D70 ; D72 ; D74 ; D78 ; ddc:330 ; policy formation ; political parties ; ideological predispositions ; electoral power ; post-elections lobbying ; enforced party discipline
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: In a contest group - specific public goods we consider the effect that managing an interest group has on the rent dissipation and the total expected payoffs of the contest. While in the first group, there is a central planner determining its members' expenditure in the contest, in the second group there are two different possibilities: either all the members are governed by a central planner or they aren't. We consider both types of contests: an all pay auction and a Logit contest success function. We show that while governing an interest group decreases free-riding, it may as well decrease the rent dissipation; at the same time the expected payoffs from the groups may also decrease.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Rent dissipation ; Central planner ; Contest ; All pay auction ; Logit contest success function ; Rent-Seeking ; Öffentliche Güter ; Interessenpolitik ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 4
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime.
    Keywords: D72 ; C72 ; H41 ; ddc:330 ; contests ; rent seeking ; public good ; easy-riding ; Öffentliche Güter ; Rent-Seeking ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize. We consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer's preferred discrimination between the contestants. Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Rent Seeking ; Political Culture ; Discrimination ; Contests ; Logit contest success function ; All-Pay-Auction ; Wettbewerb ; Extensives Spiel ; Auktionstheorie ; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie ; Politische Kultur ; Rent-Seeking ; Diskriminierung ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player's type is known to both players, the other is private information and known only to the player himself. We compare the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-sided private information contest to the Nash equilibrium with no private information, in which both players know the type of the other player. We show conditions under which uncertainty increases the investment of the uninformed player and the rent dissipation of the contest, while decreasing the expected net payoff of the informed player. In addition, we consider conditions under which the informed player - before knowing his own type - prefers that the uninformed player knows his type. Moreover, we show conditions for the existence/non-existence of equilibrium in a two-stage contest in which the informed player declares his type (or does not declare) in the first stage and in the second stage the two players play according to the information available to them.
    Keywords: D72 ; C72 ; ddc:330 ; asymmetric contests ; rent seeking ; incomplete information ; Rent-Seeking ; Unvollkommene Information ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 7
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost-single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.
    Keywords: D61 ; D62 ; D78 ; ddc:330 ; indivisible project ; single beneficiary ; multiple-cost bearers ; unilateral information ; efficient and fair implementation ; Genehmigung ; Investition ; Projektbewertung ; Asymmetrische Information ; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 8
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are decreasing as reflected in the contest success function. In the first part of the paper we show conditions under which freeriding decreases and consider the different properties of the equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we develop the properties of the optimal formation of the group and its affect on the equilibrium outcome.
    Keywords: D72 ; C72 ; H41 ; ddc:330 ; contests ; rent seeking ; public good ; heterogeneity ; free-riding ; orchestration of interest groups ; Rent-Seeking ; Öffentliche Güter ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Interessenpolitik ; Theorie
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 9
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; rent dissipation ; central planner ; contest ; all-pay auction ; generalized logit contest success function
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-03
    Description: The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all-pay-auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the optimal lottery cannot be dominated by an all-pay-auction.
    Keywords: D70 ; D71 ; D72 ; ddc:330 ; contest design ; efforts (revenue) maximization ; discrimination ; endogenous lottery ; all-pay auction
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
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