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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 4 (1988), S. 298-308 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 11 (1995), S. 353-358 
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
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    Dordrecht : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Theory and Decision. 7:1/2 (1976:Feb./May) 1 
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  • 4
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    Dordrecht : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Theory and Decision. 2:4 (1972:June) 314 
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 67-99 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract I set out an individualistic and pragmatic choice framework for a normative theory of political economy, and argue that, given pluralism with respect to individual ends, a consensus on any political or economic institution presupposes that it is perceived to serve as a public means to private ends. Concerning the crucial question of the distribution of the benefits that political and economic cooperation can make possible, I argue that the various models typically employed—those pertaining to competitive market interaction, decision making under uncertainty, bargaining theory, and social choice theory—fail to provide for a stable consensus, i.e., one that is resistant to non-compliance and renegotiation. Since, however, such instabilities are mutually disadvantageous, these approaches fail to establish how rational individuals can capture all the gains that cooperation makes possible. Appealing to a modified version of the social-psychological construction that Rawls introduces in chapter 8 ofA Theory of Justice I argue that stability is a function of a perceived sense of mutual concern. I conclude by arguing that Rawls own egalitarian/efficiency principle gives natural expression to such a concern, and thus can serve as the object of a stable consensus.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 4 (1993), S. 173-210 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract It seems clear that individuals stand to mutually benefit, in a wide variety of situations, from structuring their interactions in terms of constitutional practices. But a commitment to treat the rules defining such practices as setting real constraints on choice—a commitment to what could be characterized as an “ethics of rules”—is hard to reconcile with the standard, consequentialist theory of rational choice, which requires, in effect, that individuals regard any rule as providing no more than a “maxim” for choice. Such a theory of rational choice, then, constrains individuals to settle for a second best outcome in which choice is aligned with practice rules by means of strategies of precommitment and threats. The outcome is second best because such methods yield only partial alignment, and involve the expenditure of scarce resources, as well as a sacrifice of flexibility and freedom. To say this, however, is to identify the corresponding theory of rational choice as havingconsequentially unacceptable implications. A modified theory of choice is presented, which is still consequentially oriented, but which assesses consequences in a more holistic manner. It is then argued that this modified theory can provide a rational choice grounding for the needed “ethics of rules.”
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 2 (1972), S. 314-341 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The theory of games recently proposed by John C. Harsanyi in ‘A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations’, (Econometrica, Vol. 34, No. 3) has one anomalous feature, viz., that it generates for a special class of non-cooperative games solutions which are not equilibrium points. It is argued that this feature of the theory turns on an argument concerning the instability of weak equilibrium points, and that this argument, in turn, involves appeal to an unrestricted version of a postulate subsequently included in the theory in restricted form. It is then shown that if this line of reasoning is permitted, then one must, by parity of reasoning, permit another instability argument. But, if both of these instability arguments are permitted in the construction of the theory, the resultant theory must be incomplete, in the sense that there will be simple non-cooperative games for which such a theory cannot yield solutions. This result is then generalized and shown to be endemic to all theories which have made the equilibrium condition central to the treatment of non-cooperative games. Some suggestions are then offered concerning how this incompleteness problem can be resolved, and what one might expect concerning the postulate structure and implications of a theory of games which embodies the revisions necessitated by a resolution of this problem.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 7 (1976), S. 1-28 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 3 (1993), S. 319-333 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Plans ; intentions ; coordination ; resolute-choice
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Michael Bratman's restricted two-tier approach to rationalizing the stability of intentions contrasts with an alternative view of planning, for which all of the following claims are made: (a) it shares with Bratman's restricted two-tier approach the virtue of reducing the magnitude of Smart's problem; (2) it, rather than the unrestricted two-tier approach, is what is argued for in McClennen (1990); (3) there does not appear to be anything in the central analysis that Bratman has provided of plans and intentions (both in his book,Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, and in the article “Planning and the Stability of Intention”) that precludes his adopting this alternative approach; and (4) it is an approach that neither requires nor encourages any distinction between the standards appropriate to artificial and to human intelligence.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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